Episodes

Kook compares this policy moment to historical 'tooling phase' precedents where government action set the stage for a later capital cycle before the broad market noticed: Bill Clinton-era housing policy juicing Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac ahead of the housing boom, and China's entry into the WTO unleashing a commodity supercycle that oil and steel markets did not price in until years later (citing oil hitting roughly $148 around the SemGroup collapse in 2007-08).

Kook argues that when the US government 'puts its thumb on the scale' with a directive like this, it tends to create undue flows of liquidity toward the favored sector, similar to how mortgage-rate policy prior to the 2008 financial crisis drove huge capital inflows into housing; he sees the current space policy as an analogous, deliberate distortion meant to accelerate US space/launch capacity.

Kook argues that SpaceX's overt statements (including from Gwynne Shotwell and Elon Musk on earnings calls) about going after MNO customers directly have made it harder for SpaceX to win MNO partnership agreements, since it is now seen as a competitive threat rather than a partner.

Kook, citing Anpanman's public commentary, relayed the view that 'the best thing that ever happened to ASTS was SpaceX entering as a competitor,' because SpaceX's aggressive posture created urgency and consensus among MNOs to back ASTS instead.

Kook states his strong belief that T-Mobile will eventually drop SpaceX/Starlink and move to ASTS as its satellite partner, explicitly saying he has no idea when this will happen or what the stock's reaction would be, though he hopes for a large single-day stock move when it does.

Kook notes the ASTS stock did not move on the Vodafone Portugal announcement, framing this as typical of the current 'tooling phase' where positive commercial news is not yet reflected in the share price because the resulting revenue is not yet visible.

Kook describes the current period as the 'tooling phase' — the wiring and hook-up work that will eventually drive large revenue generation but is not yet visible to generalist investors covering many stocks, comparing his search for this kind of conviction to a similar but ultimately unrealized 'spirit vision' he once had on Joby.

Kook uses a news story about a French tourist who died in Death Valley due to lack of cell service as an example of the 'gray zone'/'not spot' coverage gap opportunity that AST SpaceMobile-enabled spectrum, including the Grain 7x7 MHz spectrum, could help solve nationwide.

Kook describes the Grain spectrum as a nationwide 7x7 MHz slug that he doesn't think ASTS strictly needs but views as a 'nice to have,' capable of providing ubiquitous gray-zone ('not spot') coverage nationwide when paired with ASTS's technology.

Kook credits community researcher 'Justin Bar23' with tracking the Ligado FCC docket, which remains active; Kook calls Ligado 'telecom's Afghanistan' — a historically cursed asset that many well-resourced players have chased and failed to secure — but says he remains optimistic given the current administration's regulatory priorities.

Kook argues the Grain spectrum would be unattractive to SpaceX because its satellites can't handle low-band spectrum, the price is high, and there is a risk of losing the spectrum if it is not 'lit up' by a deadline Kook believes is 2029 (stated with hedging, 'I believe').

Kook lays out game theory around the Grain sale: Grain's bankers could leak false SpaceX interest to induce ASTS to bid against itself; SpaceX could buy it for cash given uncertainty over whether it would deploy the spectrum; ASTS could buy it but likely lacks the $6 billion in cash and would prefer a Ligado-style upfront-payment-plus-revenue-share-plus-equity structure; or Verizon, AT&T, and T-Mobile could lease/acquire it jointly with ASTS, which Kook views as the most likely and most economically sensible outcome given full US-market deployment certainty and public-interest benefits.

Kook states the Grain spectrum situation appears to be aiming for resolution within September 2026.

Kook frames a Grain-to-ASTS outcome as a proof point of what he calls the 'Catsy theorem' — his view that spectrum will ultimately flow to whichever operator can deploy it most efficiently, implying ASTS is the low-cost producer that spectrum will gravitate toward.

Kook offers two readings of the removed clause: it may have inadvertently revealed a non-public ASTS-T-Mobile contract, or it revealed a real prior testing agreement that became moot once the spectrum transaction with Grain closed and T-Mobile was no longer the relevant counterparty; either way, Kook concludes ASTS had been testing on this spectrum with T-Mobile.

Kook notes AT&T COO Jeff McElfresh publicly congratulated ASTS on testing on the Grain-related spectrum, and argues McElfresh's interest only makes sense if that spectrum ultimately relates to the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture, reinforcing his view that the JV is built around ASTS's technology to the exclusion of SpaceX.

Kook says he remains confident in ASTS despite the stock languishing in the 70s, stating that whether the stock is ultimately worth $2,000, $1,000, or $500 doesn't change his conviction that the company is still in the early tooling phase of a platform shift.

Kook compared ASTS to Rocket Lab and Redwire, criticizing an unnamed space investor's top-10 list; he singled out Redwire's roughly 5% gross margins in 2025 as evidence it is an engineered-services business without pricing power or platform economics, unlike ASTS which he sees as a platform winner with real existing revenue.

Kook said he expects a satellite shipment announcement from AST SpaceMobile 'next week' as August ends, and is hoping for progress on Grain spectrum and a Ligado approval in the near term.

Kook said a handshake agreement for Japan's J-LEO sovereign satellite contract has already occurred and that he considers it as good as a signed contract, with the formal announcement expected in roughly a month or two given Japan's slower deal-announcement timelines.

Anpanman calls the post bullish because it implies AT&T is supportive of AST working with Grain Management, and its reference to "industry collaboration" building on the joint venture implies AT&T's satellite joint venture is working closely with AST and Grain to deploy the spectrum for satellite services.

Anpanman argues this adjacency, combined with McElfresh's post, suggests the big carriers are working with AST inside the joint venture, and that prior community speculation that the Grain spectrum would ultimately be used by or folded into the joint venture is now effectively confirmed by McElfresh choosing to make this public statement.

Anpanman's key takeaway is that AT&T and the joint venture are likely to end up with the spectrum in some form and that AST will be the one lighting it up, effectively negating the premise that SpaceX would acquire it.

T-Mobile has some economic upside tied to usage of Grain Management's spectrum; Anpanman assumes T-Mobile is likely leaning on Grain not to sell the spectrum to SpaceX, since a friendly sale to Grain being later used against the carriers by SpaceX would be counterproductive for T-Mobile.

Anpanman says the first round of buyer interest in Grain's spectrum process is supposed to be due the first week of September, approximately two weeks after this recording, and expects news to emerge around that process; he notes that if things stay quiet, that's likely a good sign since AST's side typically does not leak information.

Anpanman acknowledges Space Mob has been frustrated that satellite shipping updates haven't come soon enough, but says he believes shipping is truly imminent and expects an update, possibly over the coming weekend.

AST is the only satellite provider using cellular low-band spectrum (roughly 600-900 MHz); SpaceX's direct-to-cell satellites focus on mid-band (currently around 1.9 GHz, with a next generation Anpanman speculates could span roughly 1.8-2.5 GHz), while Globalstar and Iridium operate in L-band and S-band and cannot use cellular spectrum today.

If Grain does not secure a satellite partner by the deadline, it would be on the hook for a multi-billion-dollar, multi-year terrestrial build-out instead, giving Grain an incentive not to overplay its hand in negotiations.

Anpanman believes Grain's bankers leaked the Bloomberg story to Bloomberg to increase competitive tension between AST and SpaceX during confidential negotiations, since parties typically sign confidentiality agreements but leaks let information circulate while providing plausible deniability.

Anpanman compares this to Jay Monroe of Globalstar previously floating a $10 billion number in early Bloomberg articles to drive up bidding, which he says ultimately helped push Amazon to pay up in the Globalstar acquisition.

SpaceX can outbid anyone for the spectrum given its scale and access to capital, and would face no antitrust issue, but would need to build an entirely new satellite platform with a much larger phased array to use low-band spectrum, distinct from its existing V2 direct-to-cell and V3 fixed-wireless satellites and its orbital data center plans.

Anpanman is uncertain SpaceX could develop and deploy this new satellite architecture and meet the 3-year build-out requirement, given competing priorities across its other satellite programs.

If SpaceX wants the spectrum, it would likely have to pay cash outright rather than lease it, because Grain would carry execution risk if SpaceX fails to build out a satellite in time; Anpanman agreed this is a good point given the roughly 1.5-2 year satellite development timeline SpaceX would need.

SpaceX has reportedly signaled to carriers (citing a Wells Fargo research note referencing Brett Johnson) that it wants an MVNO agreement, while publicly threatening to compete directly if carriers don't cooperate; buying the Grain spectrum outright would foreclose the MVNO path by signaling SpaceX is fully committed to becoming a competing MNO.

Anpanman speculates AST would likely offer Grain a Ligado-style deal: cash upfront to lock in exclusivity, a multi-year long-term lease, and a revenue share he guesses (explicitly as a spitball) could be 20-40% of revenue generated from the spectrum, rather than an outright purchase.

Anpanman notes AST recently hired a UBS vice chair as a strategic advisor and suggests the timing fits with structuring a potential Grain deal.

Anpanman contrasts a $6 billion cash sale to SpaceX, which he calls an 'okay' but not a home-run return for Grain, against building a business with AST that generates steady cash flows over many years, which he speculates (as a rough guess) could be valued at $10-13 billion depending on annual revenue and multiple.

Anpanman speculates the reported AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture's mentioned 'third and fourth player' opening could include Grain itself as a new entity contributing its 800 MHz spectrum, with AST contributing satellites and the carriers paying for capacity.

Asked who the fourth JV player could be, Anpanman speculated it could be Comcast, Charter/Spectrum (cable companies), regional carrier Spire, or Grain itself becoming part of a 'super wholesaler' structure.

If SpaceX bids around $6 billion, AST alone likely couldn't win a pure cash bidding war, but AST could offer a mix of roughly $1 billion cash plus stock, making Grain a large AST shareholder; alternatively, AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile could each fund a joint venture with several billion dollars to bid for the spectrum outright, with AST contributing satellites.

Anpanman calls a four-party JV structure 'messy' and not the most elegant solution given the difficulty of getting four parties to agree quickly.

Anpanman says AT&T cannot buy this spectrum outright because it would run afoul of FCC spectrum-screening rules from already owning too much low-band spectrum; Verizon could possibly bid but faces similar constraints; T-Mobile just divested its 600 MHz spectrum in the original swap.

Asked whether AST should 'play chicken' and tell Grain it is walking away, Anpanman said no, framing the spectrum as a nice-to-have rather than a need-to-have, and drawing a parallel to the Iridium sale process where he believes a bidder (possibly AST) stopped bidding once the price exceeded its threshold.

Asked how a banker leak actually happens with confidentiality agreements in place, Anpanman explained that bankers can selectively disclose bidder names and figures to reporters to pressure other bidders, while maintaining plausible deniability with the parties that signed confidentiality agreements.

Asked what AST's recent convertible note offering was for, Anpanman speculated it was partly intended to boost cash reserves in case AST needs to make a large upfront payment (hundreds of millions to a billion dollars) as part of a Grain spectrum deal.

He argues that if an investor has no trust in a company's management and board execution, they should simply sell the stock rather than stay invested and complain.

He says he has been personally bullish on the company for six years and views the current volatility and drawdown, including a day where his own portfolio was down $2 million, as normal investing rather than a sign of company problems.

He says he's confident T-Mobile talks are progressing well, pointing to FCC filings on Grain Management 800 MHz spectrum testing that reference existing agreements between AST SpaceMobile and T-Mobile.

He notes the original FCC Special Temporary Authority filing had redactions referencing T-Mobile agreement conditions, which were removed in a follow-up filing; he speculates, without confirmation, that AST's attorneys may have had it removed because it wasn't meant to be publicly disclosed yet.

He expects an initial MOU with T-Mobile outlining terms, followed eventually by a definitive agreement, similar to the pattern with AT&T and Verizon, and says AT&T has already 'blessed' or acquiesced to AST working with T-Mobile.

He speculates (explicitly using a made-up example number) that if T-Mobile is announced and, say, its own stock rallied to $100 that day, the AST-T-Mobile relationship would become impossible for Wall Street to ignore.

He addresses a bear-case concern that the AT&T/Verizon/(eventually T-Mobile) joint venture could act as a buying cartel that pressures AST SpaceMobile economically or displaces it in favor of other satellite providers like Amazon.

He rebuts that concern, explaining the joint venture pools spectrum and infrastructure resources to ease deployment across the MNOs, while AST's exclusive agreements with AT&T and Verizon individually remain in place and survive the joint venture.

He says a Goldman Sachs research report published the day before the episode discussed Starlink and Amazon's direct-to-cell ambitions but did not cover AST SpaceMobile, and claims to personally know one of the report's authors.

He argues Goldman gives Starlink and Amazon more coverage because Goldman has commercial banking relationships with SpaceX and Amazon, while AST is not currently banked by Goldman, though he expects that to change in coming quarters.

He predicts a future headline, expected in roughly the next two to three quarters, about AST getting a 10x10 MHz S-band spectrum allocation in Europe via Satellite Connect Europe, which he expects will force wider Street recognition of the AST story.

He notes crypto rallied strongly the same day and argues a crypto risk-on bid is typically a good signal for other growth/momentum sectors including space; he references his own earlier tweet speculating on a possible Bitcoin bottom around October.

He references continued massive US government space spending, including a Golden Dome budget he recalls (with some uncertainty, saying 'I think') as approved at roughly $70-something billion, as a durable tailwind independent of near-term stock price moves.

He speculates that, given China's rapid space advancement, the US government may eventually take passive equity stakes in space companies viewed as critical to national security, similar to precedents with MP Materials and Intel, purely as financial support without board seats.

He names AST SpaceMobile and Rocket Lab as examples of companies that could potentially receive such a stake as an alternative counterweight to SpaceX.

He suggests the company keeps sensitive strategic talks like the T-Mobile relationship deliberately under wraps for competitive reasons, given the existing SpaceX/Starlink T-Satellite exclusivity relationship with T-Mobile.

He acknowledges a real risk that T-Mobile could instead grant Starlink an MVNO (mobile virtual network operator) relationship rather than partnering with AST, which he frames as bad for the wireless industry generally but says would paradoxically deepen AT&T and Verizon's strategic reliance on AST as a counter to Starlink.

He states his belief that this MVNO scenario is not the direction things are heading, and that T-Mobile will ultimately work with AST alongside AT&T and Verizon.

Anpanman says discussions between AST and T-Mobile have reportedly been going well, and having someone at T-Mobile with intimate knowledge of AST's product and roadmap, and warm relations with Avellan and President Scott Wisniewski, should help solidify an eventual relationship.

Spitballing on deployment: the spectrum could be folded into the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile telco joint venture with Grain getting economics while AST lights it up to augment carrier coverage, or Grain could build a dedicated IoT network using AST that carriers could also tap.

Grain must choose a direct-to-device satellite operator by around November 2026 (he says 'November or maybe end of November'); Anpanman expects that to be AST, noting no STAs have surfaced showing Grain testing with anyone else, though Lynk Global is a theoretical low-band-capable alternative.

Spitballing: he thinks there's a good possibility AST and T-Mobile will have some type of agreement in place before year-end 2026, likely coming after the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture is finalized, and expects the stock to react strongly once the market learns AST has all three major US carriers plus a stated '4th player.'

Anpanman believes Ramos's hire signals the company is engaged in significant background activity — potentially the telco joint venture, the Satellite Connect Europe JV, the Japan Rakuten JV negotiation, and possible M&A or vertical integration around spectrum or key technologies — and that having an unbiased principal (rather than a fee-motivated banker) advising could support longer-term strategic thinking.

In response to an audience question, Anpanman said a strategic advisor with Ramos's background could help with launch provider negotiations, acquisitions, tuck-in deals, responding to inbound strategic/M&A interest, and OEM partnerships, freeing up Scott Wisniewski and other executives who are stretched across multiple roles.

He argues that legacy spectrum holders Ligado, EchoStar, Globalstar, and Iridium all originally dismissed direct-to-device technology as unworkable or a small market roughly 5-7 years ago, since they had the most to lose from disruption of their existing businesses.

As AST went from roughly $2/share through the 'valley of death' to securing AT&T, Verizon, and other carriers and re-rating, these legacy companies changed their narrative from dismissing direct-to-device to embracing it as their salvation, and each announced its own direct-to-device plan: EchoStar's Charlie Ergen contracted MDA Space to build a constellation; Globalstar's Paul Jacobs (ex-Qualcomm) pursued a direct-to-device strategy; Iridium's Matt Desch first tried a proprietary Qualcomm 'Stardust' chipset before pivoting to the NTN standard.

He characterizes this as a 'fake it till you sell' gambit that worked: Ligado struck its AST deal in January 2025, EchoStar abandoned its own constellation plans after SpaceX acquired its AWS-3/AWS-4 spectrum, Globalstar was bought by Amazon, and Rocket Lab bought Iridium.

He notes Iridium's investor base is largely income-focused (dividends, buybacks), which he says trapped Iridium's management from pivoting to spend billions building a next-gen constellation without shareholder backlash, forcing it toward the eventual Rocket Lab sale instead.

He describes the pairing as mismatched: Omnispace holds ITU priority rights to S-band spectrum globally (though lacking country-level authorizations), while Lynk has a handful of satellites tuned for low-band cellular spectrum but would need to be re-architected to work with Omnispace's mid-band spectrum.

He is skeptical the combination becomes a credible global player, citing Lynk's long history (roughly as old as AST) of being unable to raise capital, a failed SPAC merger attempt with Alex Rodriguez's SPAC, and his own unimpressed 2023 meeting with Lynk's Charles Miller.

Viasat, partnered with Thuraya in a joint venture called Space42, owns roughly 15x15 MHz of S-band spectrum in Europe that Anpanman believes has a high probability of being lost in reallocation (as he expects EchoStar's allocation to be too), but also holds valuable global L-band spectrum via its acquisition of Inmarsat.

Because AST controls the most valuable US/Canada portion, he argues this acts like a poison pill making it hard for Viasat to make a licensing deal attractive to any other player, and predicts a future partnership between AST and Viasat to jointly monetize the remaining international L-band spectrum, avoiding redundant constellations, though he sees no urgency given Viasat's traction securing S-band allocations in Europe and Brazil separately.

Asked why Fidelity owns fewer shares than Vanguard and BlackRock, he explained Vanguard/BlackRock ownership is largely passive via ETFs/index funds tracking the broader market, while Fidelity's active portfolio managers may have chosen to sell as of Q2 based on their own risk-reward view, though they could be buying now.

Asked whether Grain Management is the '4th carrier' AST has alluded to on earnings calls, he said he doubts it since Grain has no existing subscriber base or carrier business, and speculated the '4th player' could instead be a small carrier like Spire, the telco joint venture itself, or a cable company such as Cox, Comcast, or Charter.

On the path back to the stock's prior all-time high near $130, he recalled that after BlueBird 7's launch failure the stock fell to $63 in early May 2026 but rallied to $133 over the following three weeks, illustrating how quickly the stock can recover on catalysts; he specifically believes a T-Mobile announcement could push the stock beyond its most recent all-time high.

Asked whether Japan's roughly $1 billion J-LEO contribution implies about 90 Japan-flagged BlueBird satellites, Anpanman said it's unknown since the $1 billion also covers launch and ground infrastructure, not just satellites, and the actual satellite count depends on per-satellite build costs and details still to be finalized once the joint venture and Japanese regulatory approvals (MIC and what he calls 'CIJA') are completed.

Asked where BlueBirds 14 through 16 stand, he said they are in final stages of testing and should ship soon for a Falcon 9 launch, guessing — not as confirmed company guidance — that this points to a possible September 2026 launch.

Kook notes the stock has been trading in 'gamma bands' tied to where market makers' hedging kicks in based on outstanding option positions, citing an account called 'Reformed Trader.'

Kook reflects that at $70 sentiment feels like 'cause for group therapy,' even though $70 felt like winning the lottery the first time the stock hit that level earlier in 2025, illustrating shifting investor psychology.

Kook speculates that if a billion-dollar non-dilutive government grant flows into the constellation, it could effectively lower AST SpaceMobile's true net cost per satellite below the company's stated per-satellite cost guidance, though he says he isn't certain how the company will formally account for it.

Kook compares J-LEO to Tesla's early reliance on government grants as non-dilutive financing that helped accrue enormous shareholder value, seeing a similar dynamic playing out for AST SpaceMobile.

Kook says definitive J-LEO documentation is still pending and could take a while, but based on how deals customarily get finalized once publicly announced in Japan, he considers the deal effectively done.

Kook says AST SpaceMobile has 'all but told us' that Deutsche Telekom's T-Mobile is going to sign a contract, based on how the company phrased things on the earnings call without stating it outright.

Kook argues sell-side telecom/media analysts typically cover 40 names each and can't justify deep-diving a still-hard-to-size name like AST SpaceMobile, giving retail research (Space Mob) an edge in reading the company's earnings-call signals.

Kook attributes the backlog partly to capacity payments, where MNOs and government customers like FirstNet pay for 5-10 years of guaranteed access.

Kook argues AST SpaceMobile's core advantage is its in-orbit power generation capacity relative to fairing volume, comparing it to Iceland's cheap geothermal power attracting aluminum smelting and Bitcoin mining; AI compute is simply the next 'highest and best use' after RF communications.

Kook stresses the AI compute opportunity is not about consumer queries like powering a chatbot, but sensitive, high-value military and government compute staying in space, comparing it to Porsche acquiring a niche high-margin brand like Ruff to capture the top of the market without needing high volume.

Kook says Anpanman views this STA condition as strong evidence AST SpaceMobile and T-Mobile already have a direct contractual, technical relationship around the spectrum, ahead of a possible commercial announcement.

Kook interprets Ramos's role as a relationship 'door opener' rather than a finance-focused hire like a CFO, drawing on his own experience recruiting similarly senior advisors who could open doors with regulators and counterparties.

Kook says he has specific guesses about what high-level initiatives Ramos will help execute but declines to share them in a public Spaces.

A tweet by 'PennyCheck' cited by Kook counts 56 emerging sovereign satellite constellation deals in progress globally, with the pace still accelerating.

Kook says the probability all 56 sovereign constellations actually get built is 'precisely zero,' but views the underlying trend of countries seeking to avoid dependency on US satellite infrastructure as real, reinforced by the Vodafone European venture and J-LEO's Japan-flagged-satellite structure.

Space analyst Chris Quilty is quoted describing the AST SpaceMobile-Vodafone venture as 'the one challenger with a credible shot at the EU priority lane' for 2 GHz spectrum allocation.

Kook says he never expected a big standalone FirstNet announcement and believes AST SpaceMobile has effectively already gotten it: FirstNet spectrum access and a channel-partner relationship where FirstNet sells the service to its users, possibly with a future capacity payment.

Kook cites a tweet from 'Dr. Ali' modeling communications as a future $1 trillion-per-year business per Elon Musk's framing around AI, robotics, and connected devices, implying a $1 trillion AST SpaceMobile valuation, or about $2,200 per share, which Kook calls his own 'extreme upside case,' not a base case.

Kook cites an analysis from 'Wave 3 Trades' showing that in 4 of the last 5 earnings calls, AST SpaceMobile's stock dipped before rallying to new all-time highs, which he attributes to post-earnings volatility crush followed by momentum once uncertainty clears.

Anpanman argues that a senior banker of Ramos's caliber choosing to join AST rather than pursue other opportunities is a big vote of confidence and suggests the company is contemplating significant strategic transactions, possibly M&A or JV structuring, given the wave of consolidation in the sector (Amazon/Globalstar, Rocket Lab/Iridium).

Anpanman estimates deploying C-band terrestrially is roughly 3 to 4 times more expensive per area than low-band, so he expects the vast majority of C-band coverage outside urban cores to ultimately be delivered via satellite rather than towers.

AST disclosed the ability to bring 100 MHz of usable spectrum to its US direct-to-cell network, versus the roughly 65 MHz SpaceX uses via AWS-3; Anpanman's own back-of-envelope breakdown is 45 MHz from Ligado, 20 MHz from FirstNet, and about 20 MHz from AT&T/Verizon 850 MHz spectrum (roughly 85 MHz total), with the remainder possibly coming from Grain Management or other low-band spectrum — his own estimate, not something the company itemized on the call.

Anpanman speculates the company's Ligado spectrum may be contributed into the US joint venture and used to sell dedicated broadband access to IoT devices (robotics, cars, etc.) separate from mobile carrier traffic, though he stresses this is speculative.

Anpanman raises a regulatory tension: the FCC has said US-flagged constellations must respect global priority S-band rights (relevant to EchoStar, which SpaceX is acquiring), but if foreign regulators instead choose to allocate their own S-band spectrum to AST rather than EchoStar to preserve sovereignty, it's unclear how US regulators would respond.

Anpanman notes that on a separate Deutsche Telekom call, it was suggested EchoStar is running into regulatory issues in Europe and may not retain its roughly 15x15 MHz European S-band allocation, given that Deutsche Telekom, as a local MNO, has leverage over whether EchoStar's licenses get renewed.

Management said the joint venture structure allows for adding a 3rd and 4th player; Anpanman is confident the 3rd is T-Mobile, while a 4th could be the JV entity itself, cable/MVNO operators like Comcast or Charter, or possibly regional carrier C Spire, which holds valuable low-band spectrum and has publicly discussed wanting direct-to-device coverage.

Anpanman estimates AT&T's exclusivity window is probably around 5 years from launch of service and Verizon's around 3 years, after which he expects a direct commercial agreement with T-Mobile to be layered on top of the separate joint venture.

Anpanman rejects a consultant's claim that the joint venture exists mainly to help AT&T, Verizon and T-Mobile negotiate against SpaceX, arguing instead it's a strategic response positioning AST against the competitive threat from Starlink and, by extension, Amazon.

Anpanman speculates potential customers for orbital compute could include strategic investor Google or Meta, which he says AST is currently in talks with, plus the MNO partners themselves, though he frames this as his own inference from the company's new openness on the topic.

Anpanman highlights that an all-in Bluebird satellite cost of $21-23 million with launch included, at scale, could be a compelling cost basis for 100-120 kilowatts of orbital compute power compared to dedicated space-data-center players like StarCloud.

In audience Q&A, Anpanman clarifies that AST is currently producing microns (a satellite subcomponent) at a rate of about 6 per month, but total fully-built satellites are not yet at 6 per month — he estimates the current satellite completion rate at roughly 3 to 4 per month, expected to reach 6 soon, having been slowed somewhat by the Blue Origin launch mishap.

Anpanman speculates a connection to defense-tech company Anduril, noting Palmer Luckey has previously discussed satellite communications work in a televised interview and reportedly held a personal investment in AST as of 2025.

Anpanman speculates Rakuten will likely receive some share of revenue generated when Japan-funded satellites are used outside Japan, though the exact split depends on how the satellite funding is structured between the two companies.

Anpanman contrasts this with Europe's IRIS constellation, a roughly $15 billion (up from a prior $10 billion figure he cited) MSS-spectrum-based European government satellite program, arguing MSS spectrum is less effective than 700 MHz for penetrating collapsed buildings or dense tree cover during emergencies.

Anpanman argues that access to 700 MHz spectrum for emergency backup networks is only possible through AST's MNO-partnership model, not available to satellite-only competitors like SpaceX, Amazon, or Globalstar, who are limited to MSS spectrum.

Asked to clarify a comment about launching "every month or two," Anpanman said he's fairly certain it means launching once or twice per month, since the math otherwise wouldn't support the disclosed launch and satellite targets.

Asked how AST gets to an average $21-23 million per-satellite cost when a single Falcon 9 launch costs $40-80 million, Anpanman explained that figure is a long-run average achieved once Blue Origin's New Glenn reaches full cadence, moving from 7 satellites on 2 launches to potentially 9 satellites on 4 launches (or up to 12 per launch).

Asked why FPGA-based Microns were originally expected for the first 24 Bluebirds with ASICs following, Anpanman said ASIC production at scale took longer than planned, so ASICs likely won't appear until the mid-band Bluebirds; he also notes community member Catseye's point that FPGAs may remain preferable for low-band satellites used in radar and other reprogrammable government applications versus the more rigid ASICs.

An audience member suggested a Barclays connection between new hire Ozzy Ramos and AST President Scott Wisniewski (also ex-Barclays); Anpanman agreed there is probably overlap and that Scott likely knows him.

Over the weekend there was a surge of Starlink Mobile commentary from Musk supporters; Musk stated he believes Starlink could reach 25% of global internet traffic (about $500 billion of revenue) in the next few years, and over the long term up to 50% of all internet traffic, or $1 trillion in revenue.

Musk supporters mocked T-Mobile's CEO over the weekend and Musk himself joined in rather than discouraging it; Anpanman believes the T-Mobile/Starlink relationship is 'untenable' and says he now checks daily whether T-Mobile's T-Satellite webpage is still up as a signal of how the relationship is deteriorating.

Anpanman says the long-running debate over AST SpaceMobile subscriber uptake (previously estimated at 2-15%) is now moot; with Starlink entering the mobile business and threatening MNOs directly, he expects uptake closer to 80-100% rather than the old 5-10% range.

Anpanman argues satellite coverage is becoming 'table stakes' -- a term he attributes to T-Mobile -- meaning 100% connectivity (hybrid terrestrial plus satellite) will become the baseline customer expectation, making dead zones unacceptable.

Anpanman describes a 'prisoner's dilemma': if AT&T puts AST SpaceMobile satellite coverage in all its plans to defend against Starlink, Verizon has to follow, and then T-Mobile has to as well, since offering 100% coverage becomes a differentiator that can shift subscribers.

Anpanman argues AST SpaceMobile gains subscribers without incurring customer acquisition costs, unlike Starlink, which he says costs about $400 to $500 to acquire a customer (advertising, sales, marketing, and incentives); AST's model instead relies on carriers texting customers in dead zones to prompt them to turn on satellite service, building awareness and eventual paid adoption.

Anpanman recalls that roughly two months before this episode, T-Mobile's CFO gave detailed technical criticism of Starlink's service limitations (orbital lag, limited data capacity, satellite replenishment needs) at an investment conference, which Anpanman interprets as a sign T-Mobile feels pressured by the Starlink relationship despite being partners.

Anpanman says the market has shifted from what he previously saw as a Starlink/AST duopoly (Starlink getting maybe 30-40% of MNOs) to a 'winner-take-most' dynamic, with AST potentially capturing 70-80% of global MNO partnerships and Starlink a generous 10-20%, since AST has the incumbent MNOs (60+ partners, 3+ billion subscribers) on its side.

Anpanman describes Globalstar as having good, global spectrum (roughly 8 MHz of uplink and 15 MHz of downlink), suggesting Amazon (which is building on Globalstar-related spectrum) 'is going to be able to build something good,' though he is unsure how long Amazon will take to bring its own direct-to-device satellites to market, citing Kuiper's long development timeline as a precedent.

Anpanman says Amazon's direct-to-device approach is a separate, proprietary bent-pipe-free network (unlike AST's MNO-integrated architecture), aimed at Amazon's own devices, IoT, robotics, and autonomous delivery, and potentially a future Amazon phone; he argues MNOs would be reluctant to partner with Amazon because its Kuiper home-internet service competes with carriers' fiber and 5G home businesses and because Amazon wants to control the customer relationship.

Anpanman estimates AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile combined currently have about 84 million IoT devices, which he expects could grow 3-5x in the next few years, calling this a massive opportunity as the carriers ramp up IoT connectivity.

Responding to Musk's weekend claim that every future car will be connected by Starlink, Anpanman argues this actually strengthens AST SpaceMobile's position, since automakers like Ford, GM, Hyundai, Toyota, and BMW would view SpaceX/Starlink as effectively tied to a competitor, Tesla, and would eventually push SpaceX/Tesla toward a merger.

Anpanman frames SpaceX/Tesla as a vertically integrated 'stack' (AI via Grok, X for social/communications, chips, cars, robots, rockets, satellites, data centers) and argues AST SpaceMobile is the clear 'open alternative' for companies -- robotics makers, IoT device makers, government/military customers -- that don't want to rely on the SpaceX/Tesla ecosystem.

Based on his own due diligence rather than a company statement, Anpanman says Bluebirds 14, 15, and 16 appear very close to shipping, will launch on a Falcon 9, and are likely to launch in mid-September 2026 or later rather than early September.

Asked what analysts will ask on the earnings call, Anpanman guesses: (1) whether AST is in talks with T-Mobile/Deutsche Telekom, (2) how Starlink Mobile's move into the terrestrial mobile business affects AST's strategic positioning and MNO conversations, and (3) launch-provider status, including new launch agreements, Blue Origin's return to launch, and how many additional Falcon 9 launches AST has purchased (which he expects the company to decline to disclose).

Asked whether AST will become a household name, Anpanman says he doesn't think so, and that this is a good thing -- the company's goal is reliable service delivered under carrier branding (e.g. 'Verizon Always Connected powered by AST SpaceMobile'), contrasting this with what he calls T-Mobile's strategic mistake of promoting the Starlink brand, which gave SpaceX free marketing instead of building T-Mobile's own halo effect.

Asked whether AST retains ownership of J-LEO satellites subsidized by Japan, Anpanman says he believes AST will be a minority joint-venture partner, will build the satellites and get paid, and will share in revenue from their use outside Japan, noting Rakuten CEO Mickey Tani (Anpanman's rendering) alluded to Rakuten wanting an economic cut from satellites used globally.

Asked whether the network can handle connectivity for many MNOs without throttling, Anpanman says yes, capacity scales by densifying the constellation; he notes the low-band constellation's initial use cases are lower-usage areas, while the planned mid-band constellation (using Ligado spectrum) will need to scale quickly since it will be deployed even in dense, high-usage areas nationwide.

Answering an analyst question on what won AST the deal, said AST had the only platform demonstrating and delivering broadband capability today, an architecture that lets nations keep data and infrastructure management on the ground, and a multi-year partnership history with Rakuten.

Responding to a shareholder question on whether other countries will pursue their own FirstNet or J-LEO-style programs, said the J-LEO award is a proof point for how large countries think about controllable in-country communications infrastructure and expects this trend to play out multiple times in coming years, citing the 700 MHz band as a resiliency frequency relevant to the US, Europe, and Latin America.

Said the defense market (comms and non-comms) is attractive to many parties, expects international governments to increasingly turn to larger scaled services like AST's over time, and pointed to the European MSS process prioritizing providers with European operations as a relevant trend, alongside strong partners like Rakuten in Japan and Vodafone in Europe.

Declined to comment on specific opportunities but confirmed there are discussions with other parties, said he does not understand why a G20 country wouldn't want this kind of controllable communications capability given the price, and expects this trend to play out multiple times over time similar to what is seen in the Earth observation arena.

Kook spitballs that the next launch is likely no later than the end of September 2026 (his conservative/outside date), with early September as his more aggressive guess, noting other launches may be consuming range availability.

A tweet from investor Vinod S. described a "working session" between Meta and AST SpaceMobile at Meta's San Francisco offices covering end-to-end product vision, user experience, network architecture, go-to-market strategy, and technical integration; Kook, drawing on his own startup experience (an N of 1), speculates such multi-team workshops typically occur after a strategic deal has already been reached.

Kook says he has "99% confidence" that the J-LEO award has effectively gone to Rakuten and AST SpaceMobile, framing it as potentially worth $1 billion of capital to the company, though he notes the deal still needs time to move through Japanese board processes before being formally finalized.

Kook says SpaceX is exploring building out its own terrestrial mobile network but argues this makes little sense given the capital intensity, the low-growth, low-return nature of the MNO business, and the likelihood SpaceX would be the highest-cost new entrant in a saturated market.

Kook frames the 80% European coverage figure as evidence of a 'winner-take-most' market dynamic, comparing it to Nvidia's early GPU business before the market recognized its AI trajectory, and estimates a similar epiphany for ASTS could play out over a 1-2 year timeframe.

Kook notes AST could plausibly have launched roughly 9 satellites within about 3 months given recent cadence, encouraging investors not to underestimate how quickly the buildout toward the 45-satellite target could progress.

Kook's investment thesis is that ASTS is a revolutionary, scalable, defensible business with a large commercial market; he says investors who bought ahead of de-risking events sometimes get compensated, but sometimes the payoff is only clear in hindsight.

Kook says the most recent major de-risking event was the mid-June Batch 1 launch of the composite satellites, which proved the go-forward Block 2 technology works in space, even though commercial operations haven't started yet.

Kook argues ASTS benefits from several reinforcing barriers to entry rare in an early-stage company: commercial barriers, a large patent/IP portfolio, and regulatory barriers, and that the investment industry historically overlooked space until SpaceX's rise.

Kook says the 'super wholesale' business model -- working with any existing device rather than requiring a dedicated satellite phone -- solves the go-to-market inefficiency that killed prior satellite ventures like Iridium.

Kook believes ASTS could be among the fastest businesses ever to scale to 100 million and potentially a billion users, calling this a 'pretty sexy stat' if it proves true, though he frames it as unproven belief rather than fact.

Kook argues Avellan's ability to win the backing of tower companies, spectrum owners, and handset owners -- without whom the company would not be possible -- signals he was viewed as an unusually capable team-builder and executor.

Kook says his original investment depended on a series of 'if' statements -- does the technology work, will regulators approve it, is financing available, will the constellation get built, will MNO deals happen -- that outside experts overwhelmingly believed would resolve to 'no.'

Kook believes those if-statements have now resolved to 'yes' across technology, regulation, and financing, leaving essentially one big remaining if: whether direct-to-device satellite becomes a large market.

Kook says SpaceX's own stock market valuation and its stated ambition to become an MNO are evidence the broader market believes direct-to-device is a big opportunity, which he reads as favorable context for ASTS.

Kook says the consensus view a year or two ago was that satellite ventures have historically been plagued by financial distress, and that most people stopped their analysis there without considering changes in the business model, launch costs, and consumer demand.

Kook says his near-term watch items are the J-LEO announcement (which he calls a billion-dollar deal), continued launch-cadence pacing that could compress to roughly once a month, and larger contracts like Golden Dome and FirstNet that could shift market perception of the company.

Kook says the ultimate driver of value is how much revenue the company generates over time, and that whether ASTS supports a $100 billion, $250 billion, or trillion-dollar market cap is unknown but no longer an unreasonable question given how scalable infrastructure companies can achieve winner-take-most outcomes.

Kook says SPACs are brutal to invest through because of a weak shareholder base, no institutional ownership, and extreme volatility, and that the transition from R&D experiment to operating company took a long time and was very hard.

Kook describes personally living through a near death spiral, where launch/technology delays caused investors to worry about liquidity runway, which repriced the cost of capital and made the runway problem worse -- despite this being the exact risk he had warned the company about in advance.

Kook identifies technology risk, execution risk, regulatory risk, and financing risk as the compound risks he took on, calling financing risk the real killer because it drives enterprise-value leakage once investors worry about the liquidity runway.

Kook says the cap table now includes strategics and long-only institutional holders at the top of the table, a shift from earlier years when the stock was viewed as 'toxic waste' by de-SPAC-wary institutions and traded on thin retail volume.

Kook notes founder Abel Avellan still holds a large economic and voting ownership stake despite the company's capital intensity, which he interprets as a sign the company financed itself well rather than diluting the founder excessively.

Kook estimates roughly $1 trillion of capital in the telecom coverage universe could flow into ASTS as it gains traction and results, a figure he says is now closer to $3 trillion once SpaceX is included, not counting other space companies like Rocket Lab.

Kook says he invested dramatically early and watched the stock grind lower for three to four years before a revaluation moment, illustrating that some stocks require waiting a large fraction of a decade for the market to recognize their value.

Kook recalls being paranoid ahead of the BlueWalker 3 launch, worried launch itself was pure risk, until Anpanman pointed out the market actually likes launches because they represent operational de-risking; analysis of comparable stocks confirmed this pattern held.

Kook says the stock has consistently rallied into and around successful launches (Block 2, the current Batch 2), and that even after the BlueBird 7 New Glenn failure, the stock recovered within days, a pattern he expects to repeat faster after any future mishap.

Kook lays out four valuation regimes the stock has moved through: a distressed-option regime pricing only spectrum/balance-sheet/technology NAV, a 'limited success' regime, a cautiously optimistic $100-150 regime reflecting comfort with execution, and an unrealized winner-take-most regime above $150 tied to government deals and full execution.

Kook says he tracks sell-side estimates (citing Deutsche Bank) mainly as a sanity check on operational metrics and market-share-to-revenue translation rather than as precise forecasts, and notes estimates fell as the market absorbed prior delays before typically rising again as forecasts look further out.

Kook says ASTS has a controlling shareholder in Abel Avellan, which he frames as either terrible or great governance depending on whether you trust the founder to make difficult long-term decisions insulated from short-term Wall Street pressure, citing Google's YouTube purchase and Meta's WhatsApp purchase as historical parallels.

Kook views ASTS's board favorably, saying its members can open doors, inspire regulator and customer confidence, and attract talent rather than being merely 'shiny names.'

Kook says Abel Avellan is an owner-operator aligned with shareholders since AST SpaceMobile is effectively his own investment vehicle and he is the largest common shareholder.

Kook says ASTS monetizes through MNO partners who bear customer-acquisition costs (e.g., AT&T advertising the service), which ASTS captures indirectly through revenue share rather than paying CAC directly.

Kook says his own pricing model uses conservative per-gigabit assumptions, but he believes actual pricing will likely exceed his model because the service is scarce, premium, and can be segmented across billions of consumers globally for value-based pricing.

Kook says he originally modeled spectral efficiency at 2 bits per hertz, but believes the company has 'recently been blasting past that,' citing roughly 10 bits per hertz at peak data rates, which he says makes him uncertain how much further the technology has advanced beyond his own model.

Kook models subscriber counts using only AT&T and Verizon (deliberately excluding T-Mobile, which he believes ASTS will eventually win), applying assumed attach rates and a roughly $10 ARPU to bridge to a range of $10 billion to $40 billion of potential revenue.

Kook says if ASTS were already priced at a $1 trillion market cap he would not own the stock, but believes the company can plausibly do at least $10 billion of revenue, making ownership at roughly 1-3x that revenue an attractive risk-return in his view.

Kook says he personally can see a path to a $250-$500 stock price 'pretty soon,' but frames this explicitly as his own thinking rather than a buy recommendation.

Kook says whether the company can finance itself was long one of the most important questions for the market, and that he took the view, largely out of desperation at the bottom, that 'good projects find money' -- a view that proved correct on outcome but not on his pricing/timing expectations.

Kook says he expected more non-dilutive prepayments from partners than the company has actually received, and is unsure whether partners offered less than expected or whether the company deliberately chose to fund itself and retain better long-term revenue shares instead.

Kook argues that a company stating it is 'fully financed' for one target (e.g., 65 satellites) is not inconsistent with later raising more money to fund a larger ambition (e.g., 100, then 243, then 500 satellites), and cautions against being overly fixated on dilution as a result.

Kook says countries increasingly want sovereignty over satellite constellations rather than relying on the U.S. or on Elon Musk, but that it is logistically and economically infeasible for each country to build its own constellation, creating demand for AST SpaceMobile's flexible JV structures with local kill-switch control.

Kook cites the Saudi Telecom (stc) deal as ASTS's first legitimate revenue backlog, with $1 billion of minimum contracted revenue and a $175 million upfront prepayment, calling it a meaningful data point given Saudi Arabia is not a particularly large country.

Kook says he is 'anxiously awaiting' a possible definitive agreement with T-Mobile, which he describes as 'looking increasingly certain.'

Kook describes the J-LEO structure as potentially allowing ASTS to sell satellites to the Japan JV for roughly $1 billion onto its own balance sheet while retaining economic use of those satellites across the rest of the world outside Japan, though he says he isn't sure exactly how it will be structured.

Kook says an ASTS satellite carries roughly 2,400 square feet of phased array (about 40,000 elements) versus a next-generation, not-yet-launched Starlink satellite's 10,000-12,000 elements operating at higher, non-low-band frequencies.

Kook says ASTS delivers precise, high-power beamforming ('a high-powered rifle') compared to Starlink's broader, less targeted pattern ('shooting shotguns'), based on FCC filing data he attributes to community analyst Katzi's early work.

Kook argues ASTS can do full broadband voice, video, and data natively integrated with an MNO's network using roughly 50 satellites for initial continuous coverage and 250-500 for a full constellation, versus a Starlink constellation he says is measured in the thousands and currently limited mainly to text/data.

Kook says ASTS's ground-based ('bent pipe') processing preserves data sovereignty and integrates seamlessly with a phone as a native network extension, whereas Starlink's space-based processing routes data through Starlink's own network and appears to the phone as a roaming network, which he says can affect battery drain and user/MNO satisfaction.

Kook says FCC filings show SpaceX's system lacks strong beamforming, requiring 100-kilometer interference buffer zones around country borders that make it difficult or impossible to serve smaller, border-dense regions like Hungary without spamming neighboring countries' spectrum -- a limitation he says does not apply to ASTS.

Kook argues ASTS holds several durable technical moats over Starlink: superior beamforming, an unfurling mechanism that fits a large array into existing rockets (versus Starlink's dependence on Starship working), an early-completed AST5000 ASIC chip, and deep integration with MNO network cores.

Kook says ASTS aggregates spectrum three ways: from MNO partners in return for revenue share, through creative corporate deals like the Ligado acquisition, and via government grants that vary by country.

Kook says SpaceX paid over $20 billion for its spectrum, while he believes ASTS struck a comparatively favorable Ligado deal because ASTS's unique beamforming technology is the only system that can turn the otherwise low-value Ligado spectrum into high commercial value.

Kook shares his own back-of-envelope estimate that the Ligado spectrum could be worth roughly $30 billion, sanity-checked against implied per-megahertz valuations embedded in AT&T's and Verizon's market caps.

Kook says the government opportunity, including Golden Dome, is no longer hypothetical -- ASTS now has demonstrated government traction -- though the ultimate size of future contracts remains unknown; he says a large military contract worth hundreds of millions of dollars would be strongly validating for the stock's valuation multiple.

Kook says community analyst Katzi has observed ASTS's ITU-filed sun-synchronous orbital 'shells,' which hint at government/military use cases not always explicitly announced by the company.

Kook says position-navigation-and-timing (PNT) government applications alone could be worth billions of dollars, and that government opportunities are additive/stacking rather than mutually exclusive with the commercial business.

Kook lists additional potential non-dilutive government funding sources including the 5G Fund for Rural America, military grants, and FirstNet, though he says these are increasingly less important to the stock given the company's current balance sheet.

Kook says he is evaluating whether ASTS could become the platform ('the AWS') for AI data centers in space, viewing it as a potential source of significant additional upside beyond his original telecom-only thesis, but stresses this is speculative and not yet explicitly valued in his model.

Kook argues the company's proven ability to build and launch large satellites at increasing scale demonstrates it 'can build' toward an AI-data-center use case, even though the actual market for space-based AI compute remains rapidly evolving and uncertain.

Kook says the market's concern shifted from satellite production capability to launch cadence and capacity after Blue Origin's quality-control issues in the spring, though he notes ASTS is launch-agnostic with agreements across SpaceX, Blue Origin, ISRO, and other providers including newer entrants like Relativity and Stoke.

Kook says he believes ASTS has roughly five Falcon 9 launches booked but is not fully certain there aren't more, and that Blue Origin is expected to return to the pad, giving him confidence in long-term launch visibility even amid near-term bridge-period uncertainty.

Kook says regulatory risk has effectively fallen to zero now that ASTS has received FCC approval, after years of contested proceedings where he says short sellers and skeptics repeatedly claimed approval would not happen.

Kook contrasts satellite-spectrum-based competitors (global but high-frequency, limiting indoor use and throughput) against ASTS's hybrid approach of pairing satellite spectrum with terrestrial MNO spectrum, which he calls the only approach of its kind.

Kook argues Starlink is fundamentally a competitor to full-service MNOs like AT&T rather than to ASTS directly, because MNOs view SpaceX as 'carrier-adversarial' rather than carrier-neutral, positioning ASTS instead as an 'arms dealer' to the world's MNOs.

Kook notes ASTS and SpaceX share vertical integration as a key commonality that other failed satellite ventures lacked, even though building an aerospace production line while simultaneously developing the technology ('production hell') causes many investors to give up too early.

This does not mean AST has a commercial agreement with Deutsche Telekom yet; it is an initial testing step, and Anpanman expects a commercial agreement to eventually follow.

Media and hedge fund commentary warned that today's SpaceX lockup expiry would bring roughly 90 billion shares to market, but SpaceX stock has already traded 98 billion shares, and Anpanman argues the expiry is largely priced in.

Anpanman personally does not expect SpaceX stock to fall much further due to the lockup expiry itself, though he says he could be wrong.

The SpaceX decline has dragged down the broader space sector including AST and Rocket Lab, as some traders treat the whole sector as a proxy trade on SpaceX (long SpaceX/short other names).

As of yesterday, SpaceX's real-time short interest was approximately 298-300 million shares, which he estimates is approaching 50% of the float.

Institutions that participated in SpaceX's IPO (Fidelity, T. Rowe, Invesco, Vanguard, Massachusetts Financial, Jennison, ARK, etc.) only received small toehold positions since just 5% of the company was sold, and are expected to add to positions once lockup liquidity becomes available.

Anpanman believes insider selling from the lockup expiry will be fairly orderly rather than causing a 20% leg down, once shares are digested over the coming days.

There is a lockup milestone requiring the stock to sustain a certain premium to the IPO price for the next tranche to unlock; since the stock is trading below that level, Anpanman says that milestone has not been met.

Anpanman says it was already a foregone conclusion that T-Mobile would eventually join AST, and understands the company is also in talks with T-Mobile directly.

Deutsche Telekom owns 54% economic ownership of T-Mobile but, in his view, fully controls it, so Deutsche Telekom working with Satellite Connect Europe implies T-Mobile eventually will as well.

An analyst noted Starlink has complained it cannot provide adequate service over only a 10 MHz by 10 MHz S-band allocation; Anpanman contrasts this with AST, which he says is built to deliver full mid-band service efficiently over that same amount of spectrum, and notes a similar spectrum dispute is playing out in Brazil.

Pre-market algorithmic trading pushed AST SpaceMobile stock down to around $65 despite the Deutsche Telekom news; Anpanman noted Citadel was a top pre-market trader in the stock and said he was buying aggressively because he viewed the news as major and under-appreciated by the market.

Using an AI query, Anpanman estimates that adding Deutsche Telekom to AST's existing European partners would give AST coverage over roughly 70-80% of EU mobile connections overall, and 80-90% of subscribers in certain major EU countries — his own AI-assisted extrapolation, not company guidance.

Anpanman frames AST as potentially having effectively 100% coverage of the US market and 70-80% of the EU market, and speculates that even conservative subscriber uptake (3-10%) at roughly $5/month would be financially massive.

Anpanman speculates AST could become the largest wireless carrier in the world by subscriber count served (as a wholesaler working through MNO partners), envisioning a scenario years out with roughly 2 billion paying subscribers at $3-5/month ARPU and 85-90% gross margins — explicitly a long-term, speculative scenario.

Anpanman notes AST may generate $150-200 million of revenue in 2026 without any commercial service yet deployed, and argues bears mistakenly value the company on near-term revenue rather than the eventual multi-billion-dollar, high-margin endgame.

Anpanman references other AST skeptics, including Tim Farrar and a commentator he refers to as Stuart Taylor, questioning how they will explain the Deutsche Telekom development given their prior bearish framing.

Anpanman frames this as a European equivalent of the FirstNet public-safety use case, citing recent floods and fires in Spain and France as examples where resilient satellite connectivity for firefighters and first responders is critical when towers are down or destroyed.

Anpanman says Starlink offered its service to some fire-stricken areas, but argues AST's model of enabling first responders to communicate during disasters strengthens AST's case to regulators when seeking 2 GHz S-band spectrum (e.g. 10x10 or 15x15 MHz) up for renewal in May.

Anpanman speculates Satellite Connect Europe could eventually feature a defense 'kill switch' capability or a separate federated constellation of 'Eurobirds' for defense purposes, similar to arrangements in Japan, with potential manufacturing/final testing in Spain and possible Ariane 6 launch support (which he says can carry 6 satellites in its heaviest configuration) and Ex-Im-style funding.

A Bloomberg article from roughly two weeks prior reported Satellite Connect Europe is well positioned to receive a 2 GHz spectrum allocation, but noted current rules may require AST to modify the JV's ownership structure to qualify; Anpanman guesses this could mean Vodafone at 51% and AST at 49%.

Anpanman says MNOs are lobbying European regulators to change rules so Satellite Connect Europe could qualify for both the European-operator and US-operator spectrum allocation buckets, alongside a separate allocation reserved for the EU's own IRIS-2 constellation, which he says has had a slow start and drawn MNO skepticism.

Anpanman argues having Europe's largest MNOs (Vodafone, Orange, Telefonica, Deutsche Telekom) advocating with regulators is a powerful advantage for AST versus SpaceX.

Anpanman recalls Deutsche Telekom's CEO (whose surname he struggles to pronounce, referring to Tim Höttges) previously stating around April that SpaceX is heavily dependent on Deutsche Telekom to help it on regulatory matters in Europe.

Anpanman argues that if Deutsche Telekom shifts its advocacy toward AST, European MNOs who no longer trust SpaceX after its move to compete directly with them will work against, rather than for, SpaceX's EU regulatory interests, tying into broader European desire to protect national telecom champions.

Anpanman contrasts AST's 'bent pipe' architecture, where European-generated traffic stays within the country and returns to the ground locally, with Starlink's global network architecture where traffic can traverse Starlink's network globally, framing AST as more aligned with data sovereignty concerns.

Anpanman notes today's Globalstar architecture is a bent-pipe design similar in approach to AST's, but that in Amazon's newly filed roughly 5,000-satellite constellation, Amazon is adopting a Starlink-like separate roaming network architecture instead.

Anpanman argues this Starlink-like approach benefits Amazon by letting it bundle global connectivity into Amazon devices/Prime, but creates the same fundamental conflict with MNOs (loss of customer/data control) that limits Starlink's MNO partnership traction, which he expects will also limit Amazon.

Asked whether MNOs currently working with Starlink will drop it for AST now that SpaceX has confirmed it will compete for their customers, Anpanman says this is likely over the long run but not the short run, since carriers like T-Mobile and Japan's KDDI/NTT Docomo have heavily marketed Starlink and would find an abrupt reversal embarrassing.

Anpanman suggests T-Mobile could execute a gradual 'uncarrier' marketing pivot by offering AST's service (speculatively branded something like 'T-Space Mobile') as an additional broadband choice alongside its existing Starlink-powered T-Satellite texting service, which he thinks would also play well with regulators.

Japanese carriers other than Rakuten currently lack an AST alternative because Rakuten holds exclusivity in Japan, unless Rakuten chooses to open the relationship to other carriers.

Rogers in Canada rolled out Starlink without a wholehearted marketing push and could pivot to AST relatively easily; AST already works with Bell Canada and added TELUS earlier this year, and Canada has no carrier exclusivity.

Anpanman estimates Starlink is working with roughly 20-22 MNOs globally, some of which, such as Globe Telecom in the Philippines, also have longstanding non-exclusive relationships with AST and will decide which to emphasize once AST's service is live.

Anpanman acknowledges a past investor concern that MNOs might offer both AST and Starlink long-term as Starlink's service improves, but argues SpaceX's decision to publicly announce direct competition with MNOs now makes it easier for MNOs to choose not to push Starlink.

Asked when T-Mobile news might drop, Anpanman says he does not expect it soon, likely only once the Satellite Connect Europe/AST-Vodafone joint venture structure goes definitive, possibly announced alongside that.

Anpanman says today's Deutsche Telekom news is massive but not the biggest catalyst yet; he considers a definitive commercial agreement or MOU with Deutsche Telekom, and eventually T-Mobile, to be the bigger milestone, which he estimates is probably months away.

Anpanman reiterates his standing advice to avoid margin and options given macro uncertainty (citing potential Fed rate moves and the ongoing Iran conflict as examples), advocating for a position sized to be held through volatility without needing to sell.

Satellites 14, 15, and 16 are pretty close to shipping; Anpanman notes SpaceX's turnaround between launches from SLC-40 is roughly 30 days, and speculates there could be enough of a gap to fit in a September 2026 launch.

He does not expect any pre-earnings press releases or T-Mobile news before Monday's call, saying big strategic developments like a T-Mobile relationship will take time and should not be bet on in the near term.

The company confirmed it established communications with the three satellites and achieved nominal control after detumbling; Anpanman expects antenna unfolding in roughly 30 days, noting Bluebird 6 took about 49 days to unfold versus 28, 33, and 34 days for Bluebirds 8, 9, and 10, so he guesses these three might unfold in something like 26-28 days as the company's process improves.

Anpanman plans to listen to Deutsche Telekom's earnings call the next morning, expecting analysts to ask about the strategic implications of Starlink potentially competing with its T-Mobile subsidiary and its European business.

T-Mobile told The Verge it has some exclusivity remaining with Starlink, but per SpaceX's prospectus, MNO relationships (roughly 3 to 5 years) can reportedly be terminated by the MNO without penalty; Anpanman believes T-Mobile will likely exit the relationship sooner rather than later once it makes business sense.

He argues that continuing to actively market T-Satellite each day only provides free marketing and awareness for a company (SpaceX) that is becoming T-Mobile's direct competitor.

Timing for any T-Mobile-AST partnership (MOU then definitive agreement) will take time, partly because the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture structure means AT&T effectively has final say on whether AST can work with T-Mobile, though this would be enabled under the joint venture.

Anpanman initially thought it was unfortunate AST wasn't mentioned in coverage of SpaceX's carrier ambitions, but concluded it's actually beneficial: MNO executives don't want to feel pressured or told what to do, so it's better that the media and SpaceX frame the competitive threat while AST is not positioned as an obvious 'saving grace,' letting MNOs reach that conclusion themselves.

Anpanman says a Michael Pollack presentation (later taken down) indicated that after Verizon's investment, the Department of Defense, SDA, and DIU all began reaching out to AST, reasoning that if both AT&T and Verizon were on board, the technology must be real and viable.

Anpanman argues SpaceX's public comments mean it has 'crossed the Rubicon' — by openly stating it will build its own terrestrial network of small cells and a new Starlink terminal to get customers to act as cell repeaters and compete with carriers, SpaceX has foreclosed future MNO partnerships, making it easier for AST to have MNO conversations since operators globally now see a clear need for a strategic counter-partner.

He contrasts AST's pitch (partnering with local MNOs, offering a 'kill switch' for sovereign control, and keeping data in-country) against what he characterizes as SpaceX's approach of building a colossal global network that extracts value and market share from local incumbents, which he says regulators will resist.

Brazil's Anatel gave AST a 10x10 MHz spectrum allocation; Anpanman believes Europe will make a similar 10x10 MHz allocation, and says AST just received approval to work with Kenya's Safaricom on over 20x20 MHz of 700 MHz spectrum.

The EchoStar-SpaceX transaction has not yet closed and still requires international regulatory approval; Anpanman says SpaceX's aggressive Q&A comments about competing with MNOs could jeopardize that approval, joking that Charlie Ergen 'might be sweating bullets' if the deal gets held up.

In Europe, EchoStar and Viasat together hold a majority of S-band licenses, which face a 'jump ball' reallocation in early 2027; Anpanman speculates AST and Europe's IRIS will get a slug of that spectrum, while it's unclear whether EchoStar and Viasat will be reallocated any, especially given SpaceX's stated intent to compete with European MNOs.

Anpanman argues that to truly compete with MNOs, Starlink would need low-band spectrum, tower infrastructure, and new terminals capable of acting as small cells, plus customer incentives to buy and use that equipment — describing Bernstein's view of AWS-3 deployment as more of a 'low-end quality of service' offering rather than full MNO competition.

Responding to a point attributed to 'Mach33' that most data traffic occurs on Wi-Fi, Anpanman agrees but argues consumers pay a premium for mobile connectivity specifically for areas with no alternative coverage (dead spots, one-bar areas), which is where Starlink could have an initial edge over MNOs in coverage but would still need to build out expensive terrestrial infrastructure to compete in dense areas.

Anpanman frames the key open question as: if Verizon's 2024 decision was the unlock that took AST to the next level, what would a T-Mobile relationship do, given it would mean AST is important to all three of the largest and most profitable US carriers rather than just one.

He notes most TMT investors either don't know what AST SpaceMobile is or dismiss it as unable to compete with Starlink, forgetting that MNOs are the industry's gatekeepers.

Anpanman cautions that the AST-Rakuten J-LEO joint venture is happening but will take time to finalize, and asks listeners to be patient while more details emerge through regulators and eventual Rakuten statements.

He predicts a future Harvard Business School case study on what he calls one of the biggest strategic blunders of all time: former T-Mobile CEO Mike Sievert's decision to partner with SpaceX/Starlink, noting most executives who made that decision are no longer at T-Mobile or Deutsche Telekom.

Asked whether the company would release PRs before earnings, Anpanman said he doubts it since earnings are Monday and the company will likely hold news; he also does not expect T-Mobile news to come soon.

Asked how many Falcon 9 launches are scheduled, Anpanman said AST has a handful scheduled and has bought more, and can potentially take other constellations' launch slots if those other operators are not ready on time, meaning some AST launches could come on short notice in the coming months.

Asked whether Scott (Wisniewski) would provide color on reported Meta talks during the earnings call, Anpanman said he doesn't believe so, but encouraged shareholders to submit their own questions to the company about the status and impact of any Meta discussions.

Anpanman says he personally bought more ASTS shares that morning and the prior day, is not on margin, and urges other shareholders to avoid margin and derivatives so a forced decision doesn't occur right before major catalysts.

He compares the current moment to a shareholder selling Apple stock right before an iPhone announcement due to unrelated volatility, urging investors to just hold shares and trust the process through the earnings call and beyond.

Anpanman noted MNOs' dense terrestrial towers still deliver superior service in dense urban areas, but said Starlink believes its roughly 65 MHz of EchoStar mid-band spectrum, combined with a denser next-generation 'V2' satellite constellation launching next year, could let it match MNO-level service in suburban and rural areas.

Anpanman argued SpaceX going after MNO customers directly is 'the best news possible' for AST SpaceMobile, because AST fills the coverage gaps (dead zones and low-signal areas) that MNOs need to compete against Starlink, without being adversarial to the carriers.

He said SpaceX's public move is effectively forcing MNOs to work with AST, since AST already has superior direct-to-device technology and operates on a 50/50 revenue-share partnership basis rather than competing with carriers.

He explained AST's model lets it piggyback on an MNO's existing customer base and sales/support infrastructure, splitting revenue 50/50, versus SpaceX which must build its own costly customer acquisition and support model (estimated at $600-800 per acquired mobile customer).

He noted Chris Sambar, the former AT&T executive who orchestrated AT&T's AST partnership, is joining T-Mobile shortly, which he reads as a positive signal for a future AST-T-Mobile relationship.

Anpanman reasoned that SpaceX's aggressive, competitive public stance toward T-Mobile, AT&T, and Verizon on the earnings call implies its discussions with T-Mobile about extending their relationship, or with AT&T/Verizon about future partnership, are not going well.

Anpanman said SpaceX/Starlink discussed acquiring MNO customers over buying an MNO outright, since as a growth company it prefers a cost-efficient, share-taking strategy that the market will reward with a premium valuation, versus an outright purchase like Verizon (estimated ~$384 billion enterprise value, implying a roughly $500 billion deal) that the FCC and DOJ would likely block anyway and that would turn SpaceX into a slow-growth carrier overnight.

Anpanman argued SpaceX's public statement that it intends to build a competing 'fourth carrier' actually helps its own regulatory standing with the FCC (citing Chairman Brendan Carr) for spectrum and network investment, but simultaneously undercuts any future attempt by SpaceX to acquire an MNO like T-Mobile, since regulators could point to the public commitment to building a competitor.

Anpanman said SpaceX's public proclamation about competing for wireless customers now gives regulatory cover to the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture: since Starlink is a stated direct competitor, the FCC/DOJ should have no issue with the JV declining to buy satellite service from Starlink, and there should be increased urgency to move the JV to a definitive agreement and deepen work with AST SpaceMobile.

Anpanman said SoftBank and NTT Docomo in Japan are reportedly working with Starlink largely because Rakuten holds exclusivity with AST SpaceMobile in Japan, and that he does not believe Rakuten currently wants to give up that exclusivity given its still-small market share, though it could reconsider in the future.

He argued that European carriers like Deutsche Telekom, weighing AST versus Starlink, now have 'the nail in the coffin' against working with Starlink given its stated plan to build a terrestrial network and take carrier customers directly, comparing it to a Trojan horse.

Anpanman revisited T-Mobile's earlier decision (under then-CEO Mike Sievert) to grant SpaceX 5x5 MHz of PCS-G block spectrum and prominently market the Starlink-powered T-Satellite product to T-Mobile's own customers, calling it what he expects to become a Harvard Business School case study on a major strategic blunder, since it let SpaceX develop, test, and stand up a competing service using T-Mobile's own spectrum and customer base.

He noted T-Mobile's CFO and CEO have recently shifted tone from touting the Starlink partnership to being more defensive about the service and its adoption, which he reads as a strategic pivot.

Anpanman said that after the stock and space sector rallied, sentiment improved markedly, and that signs of a bottom were visible last week, including a long-time AST holder (since the 2021 NPA/de-SPAC days) who expressed deep regret about not selling near $130 and ultimately capitulated and sold as the stock fell toward $55.

Anpanman described a second holder who used margin and options and sold his position after the stock hit $51, having previously been warned repeatedly against holding a high-beta name like AST on margin; after selling, this person predicted a further drop into the 40s, then said 'now that I've sold, it's probably the bottom' — which Anpanman says proved true.

Anpanman said he deliberately does not block most bears or skeptics (with exceptions like Pivotal Capital and Hiro Nanda, whom he follows as reliable bottom signals), and that last week's wave of trolls predicting AST would fall to $30-40, plus negative posts from Lucky Stewie and 'Tim Ferrer' (Tim Ferriss referenced as a critic), reinforced his view that sentiment had washed out near a bottom.

Anpanman said that once it became known that hedge fund Situational Awareness ('Leo's' fund) had to sell its book to Citadel, the market could pinpoint a large institutional driver of the broader unwind (beyond retail liquidation, other hedge fund liquidation, and Korea-related selling), and the market began to bottom from there.

Anpanman said Citadel was the number one advertised trader in Situational Awareness's names (including AST, Rocket Lab, SpaceX, IonQ, Oclo, SMR, Rigetti, Circle, and Robinhood/'Hood') on Thursday and Friday but had largely disappeared from those names by the time of this recording, suggesting Citadel had finished unwinding shorts and selling longs from that book; he noted JPMorgan and Merrill were the top advertised AST traders the day of recording, with retail third.

Anpanman flagged ongoing macro risks including shifting Iran-US headlines (alternating between prospects of peace and conflict) and concerns that unwinding the Japanese yen carry trade could force Japan to sell US Treasuries, pushing yields up and forcing broader risk-asset selling.

Anpanman explained that some shorts are directional bets on the lockup expiry overwhelming demand, while others are 'boxed' positions from holders of pre-IPO shares via SPVs who are not bound by lockup restrictions and are shorting to lock in gains until they can collapse the box once shares are formally distributed.

Anpanman argued the lockup expiry narrative is overblown because major institutions — Fidelity (1.7% position), Baron Capital (0.8%), Vanguard (0.72%), Invesco (0.71%), and Valor Management (6.7%) — are underweight relative to their typical conviction sizing and are likely waiting to buy into the lockup expiry rather than sell, potentially producing a squeeze instead of a selloff.

Anpanman said SpaceX's first public quarterly earnings call was scheduled for the next day after market close, and predicted a 'beat and raise' given how IPO financial models are typically set conservatively by underwriting banks in the first several quarters, plus SpaceX's Google and Anthropic data-center leasing deals as tailwinds.

Anpanman said that with SpaceX trading at $115 (well below its IPO price), he would personally be a buyer of SpaceX at current levels if forced to choose, though he clarified he does not currently own or plan to buy it.

Anpanman argued that because some funds hold AST short as a hedge against long SpaceX positions, a strong SpaceX earnings print and stock rally would likely force those funds to cover their AST shorts, benefiting the broader space sector including AST.

Anpanman estimated AST's current production cadence at roughly 3 to 4 satellites per month, behind the company's stated 6-satellites-per-month goal, attributing the gap partly to the company deliberately slowing production following the Blue Origin New Glenn mishap since there was no need to rush shipping satellites without launch capacity.

Anpanman said Bluebirds 14, 15, and 16 were expected to ship 'fairly soon,' and that the shipment-to-launch timeline appeared to be compressing: Bluebirds 8 through 10 took approximately 27 days from shipment announcement to launch, while Bluebirds 11 through 13 would represent roughly 22 days if the Wednesday launch occurred as planned.

Anpanman said he had tweeted about upcoming Grain Management milestone dates, clarifying those are FCC-imposed deadline bookends and that actual developments could happen sooner; he expects an advisor selection and a decision, and guessed the companies (already testing together) could reach a decision well before the FCC's November deadline, potentially combining Grain's 800 MHz spectrum with AT&T's and Verizon's 850 MHz spectrum for added capacity.

Anpanman said Viasat's stock began re-rating after AST SpaceMobile's January 2025 announcement of an agreement for 80-year rights to Ligado's L-band spectrum, and re-rated further after AST's roughly $450-500 million payment to Ligado around July, causing Viasat's stock to rise from about $10 to $15 and eventually to $30.

Anpanman argued AST SpaceMobile single-handedly revalued the legacy satellite sector's spectrum holdings — Viasat, Globalstar, Iridium, and EchoStar (whose Charlie Ergen he said was 'on his deathbed' financially before AST's activity) — and said in hindsight he should have bought a basket of these legacy names.

Anpanman said Lucky Stewie's Twitter/X account, opened in 2022, never discussed AST SpaceMobile — focusing instead on poker and legacy satellite topics — until August 2025, when Viasat became litigious trying to get out of its spectrum deal with AST; Anpanman said he directly asked Taylor about this timing and received what he called a 'lame excuse' about prior familiarity with direct-to-device via a past EchoStar-related project that never materialized.

Anpanman characterized Lucky Stewie as consumed by tracking AST investors, noting he tweets about small trading gains (around $2,000 on one recent trade) as if 'rubbing it in' the community's face, and joked that the two most prominent AST critics happen to both be British.

Anpanman said he believes a future T-Mobile commercial deal with AST SpaceMobile is 'fait accompli' — inevitable, with the only question being timing — stating the companies are definitely talking, and predicted the stock reaction to a T-Mobile deal would exceed the rally seen after AST's Verizon agreement.

Anpanman closed by reiterating that anyone who liked AST at $100 should be happy buying or holding at $55-63 given improving fundamentals, and said he felt bullish heading into the Bluebird 11-13 launch and SpaceX's earnings call, framing the launch as 'execution' toward commercial service with Bluebirds 14, 15, and 16 following shortly after.

Kook says this reflects a basic factor-risk-management failure: the book was long the momentum and AI factors on both sides, so it behaved as if far more levered than intended.

Kook praises Ken Griffin as one of the best risk managers in the business, contrasting his platform's discipline with Aschenbrenner's apparent lack of a strong risk manager.

Kook explains the mechanics of a deleveraging 'vortex': as market volatility rises, VaR-based funds are forced to sell regardless of conviction, which cascaded through momentum names including the space sector; SpaceX's stock got hit partly on lockup-expiry selling, which dragged ASTS down too.

Kook warns against ever holding leveraged ETFs long-term due to time decay, calling them 'absolutely horrible instruments' outside of very short-term trades.

Kook admits he ran significant unintentional leverage during COVID via SPAC arbitrage trades (buying SPACs redeemable near a $10 floor funded at near-0% rates), but got 'sloppy' and held positions after the NAV floor protection went away, coming close to a lack of sufficient account collateral.

Kook says he later took deliberate, non-recourse leverage via LEAPS options on ASTS when the stock was $12, driven by high conviction after AST promoted Scott Wisniewski to President and Shanti Gupta to COO, which he read as confirmation Block 1 would not be a failure.

Kook contrasts himself with Aschenbrenner, who kept constant leverage even as his book's returns grew, arguing that if you're not a trained risk professional you should generally just own shares outright, and that leverage (if ever used) belongs when a stock is down significantly, not near highs.

Kook compares AST's manufacturing ramp to Tesla's Model 3 'production hell,' arguing AST has now beaten that phase and is delivering satellites at scale rather than just being a 'concept stock.'

Kook expects AST's upcoming earnings call (referenced as 'next Monday') to provide more clarity on 2026 launch cadence, speculating the company could announce it has booked additional Falcon 9 launches using proceeds from its recent convertible note.

Kook relays that an analyst referred to as Kevin Chen pointed out Vodafone CEO Margarita de la Valle stating Vodafone expects to have 45 satellites at the beginning of 2027, which Kook takes as a sign Vodafone has visibility into AST's launch plans; this is Vodafone's statement, not AST's own guidance.

Kook cites network consultant Joe Madden's analysis that ASTS's total addressable market is much larger than Starlink's because ASTS's superior link budget lets it work indoors, which Starlink cannot.

Kook summarizes: ASTS can close the link budget in a car, indoors, and outdoors ('3 for 3'), while Starlink can only close it outdoors ('1 for 3').

Kook explains that ASTS's network is architecturally integrated with MNO spectrum, so an underconnected phone seamlessly pulls from satellite slices without roaming, whereas Starlink's direct-to-cell service works as on/off roaming that a phone tries to avoid.

Kook argues AST's 248-satellite constellation can match what competitors need thousands (Starlink) or even a filed 1 million (SpaceX/AI data center constellation) satellites to do, making AST's fleet fundamentally more manageable for fleet operations.

Citing calculations by Anpanman comparing total array area: Globalstar's 25-satellite constellation (400 sq ft of array) equals about 0.17 of an AST satellite; Iridium's constellation (3,450 sq ft, built for over $3 billion nearly 30 years ago) equals about 1.4 AST satellites; and Starlink's 650-satellite Direct-to-Cell fleet (43,450 sq ft) equals about 18 AST satellites.

Kook recounts that AST engineers told him the small-array 'swarm' coordination approach AST originally considered 'just doesn't work,' which is why AST abandoned it in favor of large single arrays — implying rivals attempting a swarm approach may hit the same wall.

Kook explains what the community previously called the 'Scotiabank thesis' (now renamed after cutting ties with Scotiabank over perceived short-bias conflicts): that AST's real value to MNOs is capital efficiency, letting them deploy licensed spectrum without building towers, freeing up CapEx for uses like stock buybacks.

Kook argues spectrum holders such as Sirius, Grain Management, Ligado, and NexNav are all filing with the FCC to enable their spectrum for supplemental coverage from space, implying AST is the only current solution that can accommodate low-band spectrum for this use.

Kook notes community member Katzi found FCC documents suggesting testing has commenced in Japan, and cites recent APAC business-development and Japan-focused technical-lead hires as further circumstantial signals, while acknowledging he isn't certain what these hires mean.

Kook argues AST's system is designed 'sovereign first,' citing research (credited to Rocket Tank 123 and a researcher called Smith) on Canadian and Bahamian government documents emphasizing sovereignty and control, a pattern he says is echoed across Satellite Connect Europe, J-LEO, and US deals.

Kook says he only partially read Amazon's newly filed constellation documents but notes Amazon is seeking FCC approval only in L-band and S-band, not threatening AST's low-band position, and it remains unclear how Amazon reaches market with its service.

Kook speculates ('hopium') that these 18 launches could hint AST is finally close to a Golden Dome deal, noting AST has filed for 2 Sun-Synchronous-Orbit (SSO) shells with 28 satellites planned, requiring roughly 9 Falcon launches — about half of the just-awarded task order's launch count.

Kook says SpaceX appears to be stoking rumors about acquiring Verizon, which he and Anpanman believe is really pressure/noise aimed at securing an MVNO deal to resell wireless service as a 'SpaceX phone' using a major carrier's network plus Starlink satellites.

Kook expects SpaceX to ultimately pivot its TAM narrative toward AI data centers in space rather than the wireless business, which trades at a much lower revenue multiple than SpaceX itself.

Reflecting on Aschenbrenner's collapse, Kook says he constantly questions whether he could become 'the next Leo,' and discloses his own net worth is down about 50% over the past two months, which he attributes to a market correction rather than a new negative signal.

Kook argues July was an extreme tail-risk 'clearing event' (the hedge fund blowup, war, oil-price spikes) and that historically, forward market performance tends to be strong after such events, making him cautiously optimistic for August, while explicitly disclaiming any ability to forecast prices.

Redrum closes the episode asking listeners in the comments whether the 18 newly awarded SpaceX Falcon 9 launches could secretly be tied to an unannounced AST Golden Dome deal.

Kook speculates Citadel likely bought Situational Awareness's book at a discount, guessing it could have been in the 15-30% range, in a competitive process that also involved Millennium, Jane Street, and possibly banks bidding on the portfolio.

Kook noted Citadel was NOT a top trader in Sharon AI, a name where Situational Awareness had recently done a private placement, speculating any remaining Situational stake there may now be restricted or subject to a holding period from that private deal.

Kook theorizes that after absorbing several billion dollars of high-beta, high-momentum long positions from Situational Awareness, Citadel would not want to carry unhedged market-beta exposure, so it likely hedged using listed put options, custom swaps arranged through banks like Goldman, or over-the-counter puts on correlated names.

Kook offers an alternative explanation: that during Wednesday's rally, Citadel may have directly entered short positions in some of these correlated names, potentially including ASTS, specifically to hedge the beta of the book it was absorbing.

Kook draws on his own experience from the 2008 financial crisis, explaining that when a hedge fund is known to be in trouble, other funds first sell any cross-held long positions to get ahead of the distressed fund's forced selling.

Kook explains that disciplined funds may then go further and short the distressed fund's other positions, anticipating forced liquidation will drive the price down; this collective shorting creates a self-reinforcing overswing to the downside as the distressed fund is forced to accept whatever price it can get.

Kook notes that during deleveraging events, correlation between otherwise-unrelated stocks effectively goes to 1, because funds and retail accounts holding correlated momentum names sell down whichever ones they believe in least to meet margin calls.

Kook says AST SpaceMobile fell to around $50-51 on Wednesday during the forced-selling event, even though ASTS was not a confirmed Situational Awareness holding, attributing the drop to correlated margin-driven selling of momentum names rather than any AST-specific news.

Kook explains that after-hours on Wednesday, positions moved a further 3-5% lower even after markets had already closed at their lows, which he read as a sign someone was being forcibly liquidated overnight.

Kook estimates the deleveraging event was roughly an 8-to-10-sigma event, well beyond a typical 2-to-3-sigma move, though he caveats he would need to double check the exact figure.

Kook says Situational Awareness's gross book had grown to roughly $40-45 billion before the forced unwind; founder Leo reportedly came out the other side with about $10 billion of AUM remaining, which includes private holdings such as a stake in Anthropic.

Kook argues that now that unhealthy leverage has been flushed out of the system, risk-reward has become more attractive across high-beta names, including AST SpaceMobile, since fundamentals for many of these companies remain positive even as concerns about an AI bubble persist.

Kook advises investors not to fixate on making back paper losses from prior peaks, to avoid trading on margin, and to focus on riding out volatility while holding high-conviction positions, framing this as important for mental health during drawdowns.

Kook observes that cycles of market euphoria followed by deleveraging seem to be happening more frequently, citing the April tariff tantrum and an October crypto selloff as recent prior examples of similar dynamics.

Kook closes by estimating that roughly $45 billion of deployed capital came out of the market from Situational Awareness alone, a figure he says is further multiplied by other hedge funds and retail Korean margin investors also forced to liquidate correlated positions; he expects a healthier market going forward with AST's August catalysts still ahead.

He framed the AI CapEx spending debate as an 'arms race,' borrowing a framing from Reformed Trader comparing it to the US-Soviet Star Wars arms race, and said AI demand is 'inexorable' even if there are boom-bust cycles ahead.

He believes markets are closer to a bottom because a large amount of leverage has been taken out of the system — he cited tweets estimating hedge funds had unwound roughly 50-60% of the leverage deployed since the big run began in April — though he cautioned there could still be more shoes to drop.

He argued that if investors loved AST SpaceMobile at $130, they should love it more at $56-58, because he believes the company's fundamentals have improved, not deteriorated, since the stock's high.

He acknowledged the negative of losing Blue Origin as a launch partner (referring to the BlueBird 7 New Glenn anomaly) but noted AST has since raised money and bought additional Falcon 9 launches, plus has a launch coming up next week, as positives offsetting that setback.

He noted the Semafor article referenced SpaceX pursuing C-band spectrum (3.5-4 GHz), which he said is the wrong band for direct-to-device coverage (600-900 MHz is needed), suggesting the reporters don't fully understand what they're describing.

He believes SpaceX is the source of these leaks, aiming to pressure one of AT&T, Verizon, or T-Mobile into an MVNO agreement with Starlink and sow a 'prisoner's dilemma' among the three carriers ahead of their joint venture with AST SpaceMobile becoming a definitive agreement.

He recalled a similar prior leak: shortly after the AT&T-Verizon-T-Mobile joint venture was announced and Gwynne Shotwell said SpaceX would compete against it, a Bloomberg article surfaced claiming Starlink was in talks with Charter Communications about a working relationship, which he characterized as a similar psyop.

He estimated Verizon's enterprise value at about $384 billion versus SpaceX's roughly $1.5 trillion enterprise value; since Verizon shareholders would likely demand an all-cash deal rather than SpaceX stock, SpaceX would need to raise roughly $500 billion or more in cash to acquire it.

He projected SpaceX 2027 revenue at $72.6 billion (up from an estimated $38.9 billion in 2026), versus Verizon's projected $143 billion of 2027 revenue (versus $141 billion in 2026); buying Verizon would make SpaceX predominantly a wireless-service company and likely cause its valuation multiple to derate from about 39x 2026 revenue toward something closer to Verizon's own multiple (roughly 2.5x revenue).

For these reasons he considers it highly unlikely, though not impossible, that SpaceX buys T-Mobile, Verizon, or AT&T; he also noted regulators focused on sovereignty would resist a US entity like SpaceX controlling foreign MNOs if it set that precedent domestically.

Grain Management, which owns former T-Mobile 800 MHz spectrum, is awaiting FCC approval to test with AST SpaceMobile and is running a solicitation process, hiring advisors to determine how the spectrum will be deployed with a direct-to-device operator; the FCC requires deployment of most of the spectrum within a year, and he believes AST is the only qualified low-band direct-to-device satellite operator, likely for use in the AT&T-Verizon-T-Mobile joint venture or IoT applications.

He expects some military contract awards 'soon,' based on hints from due diligence that something is 'cooking and brewing.'

AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile executives said this past week that the satellite joint venture with AST SpaceMobile is 'coming along nicely' and being negotiated well, with a definitive agreement expected to be announced soon; he views the recent SpaceX spectrum/carrier noise as evidence the JV announcement is getting close and someone is trying to disrupt it.

Asked about short-squeeze potential, he said true squeezes require a structurally crowded trade or spiking borrow rates; he noted some hedge funds are long SpaceX and short AST as a hedge, and unwinding that pairs trade could contribute to a squeeze-like move, but he thinks a bigger driver would be markets simply refocusing on AST's fundamentals, which could take the stock back toward the $90s relatively quickly.

Asked whether the US beta service and Vodafone's stated need for 45 satellites in service imply an updated launch chart on the upcoming earnings call, he said the US beta service will likely launch with fewer satellites (aided by FirstNet-specific use cases) while Vodafone wants a more fulsome service and will wait for more satellites, but he is not sure AST will share an updated launch chart on this particular earnings call.

On how SpaceX's upcoming earnings release and insider lockup expiry might affect ASTS, he said this will be SpaceX's first public quarterly discussion of its business and competitive landscape; a strong quarter could be a relief for the space sector broadly, but the lockup unlock (with SpaceX shares heavily shorted at over 230 million shares) makes the net stock impact hard to call, especially since SpaceX stock is already trading below its IPO price.

Asked whether he expects AST to raise full-year revenue guidance, he said no, because launch timing has been delayed by the loss of Blue Origin as a launch partner, and guessed the company might instead sharpen guidance toward the lower end of its range, though he allowed there could also be additional contract wins.

Asked whether bigger market players deliberately target hot names once they get 'too close to the sun' (referencing Situational's blowup), he said he doesn't believe this was coordinated — it was a broad deleveraging event caused by multiple factors, though he allowed some detractors may have wanted to see Situational fail.

Anpanman calls this a regulatory placeholder — a common industry practice where companies file a large constellation to preserve spectrum rights and start the regulatory process, comparing it to failed launch company Astra's 2021 FCC filing for a 10,000-satellite fixed wireless broadband constellation that never came to fruition.

The filed architecture will reportedly be similar to Starlink's rather than AST's, and will also focus on mid-band spectrum in addition to the existing Globalstar bands; many details in the filing are confidential or redacted.

Anpanman expects other satellite operators such as Rocket Lab and Iridium to file similar large placeholder constellations (he guesses on the order of 4,000-5,000 satellites) with the FCC over the next few months to preserve their own spectrum rights and demonstrate expansion plans to regulators.

Mega Constellations (an outside account) speculated Amazon's filing could be a first move toward a deal for Viasat's ex-US L-band spectrum, but Anpanman notes the US rights to that spectrum are actually owned by Ligado, and AST already holds the 80-year rights to it via its Ligado transaction.

Anpanman calls this a "poison pill": anyone wanting to work with Viasat internationally would have to do so without the US market, which he describes as the most profitable market for mobile broadband, giving AST leverage over how that global spectrum gets used.

He separately notes AST also acquired a small company with global spectrum priority rights, putting AST at roughly number 3 or 4 in the international regulatory priority queue, which he says already produced results such as AST's 10x10 MHz S-band allocation in Brazil via Anatel.

Anpanman speculates AST could partner with or lease spectrum from Viasat for international deployment, or alternatively go country-by-country with regulators to secure allocations directly, since Viasat is not fully utilizing its L-band spectrum globally; he frames this as a longer but more economically attractive path.

He estimates nationwide deployment costs of $12-20 billion for low-band spectrum, $20-35 billion for mid-band, and $35-60 billion for C-band, with the step-up driven mainly by needing more towers; he expects the vast majority of mid-band and C-band deployment outside dense urban areas to happen via satellite instead of new towers.

He projects that layering AST's Block 3 (mid-band) and Block 4 (C-band) satellites as an overlay on top of low-band coverage could push per-cell throughput from roughly 200 megabits to well north of a gigabit, enabling genuine terrestrial network performance rather than just a coverage layer.