Episodes

Kook said he backtested technical analysis (TA) approaches and concluded TA generally has little statistical edge, but that some TA-focused traders have genuine skill/instinct that gives them edge even if the raw technique itself doesn't have a proven statistical edge.

Kook explained idiosyncratic volatility: a REIT has low idiosyncratic vol (roughly 15-20%, in his framing) because its price is driven mainly by interest rates, whereas ASTS has extremely high idiosyncratic volatility, meaning company-specific developments — not macro factors — drive most of its price movement, which he says makes research-driven trading unusually profitable on this stock.

Kook said the SpaceX IPO had a bigger market impact on ASTS trading dynamics than he expected, and that his personal stock-loan desk showed shorts covered massive amounts of ASTS stock recently — surprising him since the stock didn't rally on the covering, and volumes have been very weak.

Kook interpreted the short covering combined with weak volume as forming a technical 'bull flag' pattern and a possible early signal that 'not all is lost,' reasoning that if bears truly believed the stock should fall further, shorts would be adding to positions rather than covering.

Citing a chart updated by community member Peter Lindmark, Kook said the count of shipped satellites is rising while the count of satellites still in assembly (work-in-progress, or WIP) has stayed roughly constant, which he interprets as a growing backlog of near-complete satellites that will translate into a surge of shipments over roughly the next two months.

Citing community member @TechInvestor's tracking of a Reddit post, Kook noted AST SpaceMobile leased a large warehouse in Titusville, Florida, and speculated it could be used for ground equipment storage or staging satellites closer to the launch site ahead of an extended launch campaign, rather than relying solely on payload processing facilities.

Kook said community researcher Tanner found that the formal grant decision for Japan's J.LEO sovereign satellite program appears to begin in mid-July, and that as of this recording (mid-July) it looks 'increasingly likely' the next hurdle/press release could come as soon as this week, though he stressed he didn't know for certain if or when it would happen.

Kook cited a slide Tanner found showing J.LEO funding of $900 million with matching investments, for a total of $2 billion, calling this 'gasoline on the financial model' for ASTS and a potential template for sovereign satellite deals to be replicated in other countries, which he framed as directly displacing SpaceX.

Kook said his financial model had been using a normalized spectral efficiency of about 2.5 to 3 bits per hertz with an upside case of 4, and that this result implies peak spectral efficiency of about 10 bits per hertz — a 'complete shock' to his model if AST's monetization scales with the quantity of data it can transmit (which he said is not strictly one-to-one with revenue, but 'sure as hell is not zero').

Kook cautioned he wouldn't necessarily expect the stock to immediately rally on this news, describing it as the type of event that may not trigger urgent buying since 'no one else seems to be driving the stock up higher' yet, but called it a major positive signal for the pace of technology improvement and the value of AST's vertical integration (ability to test/experiment/upgrade its own satellites in orbit).

Kook said he didn't know whether the stock would re-rate on the prospect of another leased spectrum band, noting this is 'embedded value' that may only be realized later once the system is operationalized, but called the sequence of events (FCC approval, AST's STA filing, and Chris Sambar's move to T-Mobile) 'a lot of coincidences.'

Kook speculated that once the Ligado/DoD lawsuit is resolved, Ligado could become more willing to trade back its royalty override and AST lease payments in exchange for ASTS stock, potentially leading to a consolidation of the two entities at a ratio to be determined — a scenario he said he would like to see as a long-term shareholder, but on a timescale of years, with nothing imminent.

Kook said the one-year anniversary of T-Mobile's SpaceX/Starlink Direct-to-Cell contract falls in August, and that per fellow host Anpanman's observation, T-Mobile's public tone toward SpaceX has shifted from favorable to 'flat out acrimonious' recently.

Kook noted Chris Sambar — the former AT&T executive he credits as singularly responsible for AT&T's engagement with AST SpaceMobile — has joined T-Mobile as Chief Enterprise Officer, exactly two years after leaving AT&T, which he framed as suspiciously well-timed relative to expectations of a possible T-Mobile/AST deal and coinciding with T-Mobile's existing direct-to-device joint venture with Verizon and AT&T.

Kook said he finds it unlikely the stock would fall 10% if T-Mobile signs a deal with AST SpaceMobile, calling it an event he's looking forward to, though timing remains uncertain.

Kook said SpaceX has effectively guided to only 1% penetration of the US direct-to-consumer (D2C) satellite market by 2030, which he interprets as SpaceX conceding it will lose T-Mobile, since T-Mobile's participation in a D2C joint venture with Verizon and AT&T implies (in his view) a roughly 99% probability T-Mobile secures a different D2C solution.

Kook described AST's stock chart (per an analysis he titled 'A Vesuvius of Milestones') as trading in roughly a $70-to-$120 consolidation band over about nine months despite a steady accumulation of positive milestones, and said he expects the stock to eventually resolve upward as the constellation is built out, but cautioned he doesn't expect it to 're-rate' to reflect future events overnight.

Kook cited a comparison (credited to 'Reform') noting Starlink added an estimated $500 billion in market cap following its IPO — equivalent to roughly 20 times AST SpaceMobile's own market cap — even though analysts view the mobile/D2C market as a key growth driver for Starlink, calling the valuation gap between the two companies 'huge.'

Kook argued AST SpaceMobile's greatest long-term leverage may come from becoming an open technology platform accessible via APIs, allowing third-party developers close to niche problems (e.g., pet-tracking collars, cattle/sheep herding, maritime beacons, shark-attack alerts for surfers) to build hardware/software solutions AST or its carrier partners wouldn't develop themselves.

Kook cited pet-tech startup Fi's new dog collar with Starlink satellite connectivity as an example of this dynamic already playing out with a competitor, arguing it's an obvious model for AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile to replicate by opening their networks via AST SpaceMobile, since it drives more cellular plan sales through their existing partnerships.

Kook said whether Blue Origin launches again before year-end doesn't materially matter to him, since a launch in January, February, or March would functionally be 'all the same' by that point.

Speculates a decent portion of the short interest in the space-stock basket (including ASTS) came from pre-IPO SpaceX shareholders hedging into SpaceX's August share-lockup unlock.

Theorizes those Millennium desks were short the space-stock sector while long SpaceX as a paired trade, and that as they've unwound (closing shorts, selling SpaceX), it explains SpaceX settling back down near its IPO price and space-stock short interest evaporating.

Said real-time ASTS short interest was in the 'low 70s' as of that morning, down from an '80s' peak.

Noted that short-seller/hedge-fund commentator Kiryu Onoda posted about AST being down again today, which Anpanman treats as a reliable contrarian signal that the stock is near a bottom.

Theorizes Onoda is likely a junior analyst at a 'pod shop' hedge fund whose long book gets hurt on days ASTS and similar names are down, prompting his negative posts.

Called Chris Sambar's hiring at T-Mobile as Chief Enterprise Officer (with an innovation mandate) 'huge news,' emphasizing the timing relative to Starlink's T-Mobile exclusivity ending this month — roughly '10 to 12 days' out from this recording.

Noted Sambar's hiring came shortly after AT&T and Verizon announced their joint venture and invited T-Mobile to join, implying T-Mobile needed someone who understands AST's technology and the players involved before entering that JV.

Said he personally reached out to AST SpaceMobile for comment on the Sambar hire and got no response, which he interpreted as a positive sign of sensitivity around communications and a hint that 'more stuff' is coming.

Cited past interviews where Sambar said AST 'has no competition' relative to Starlink, describing Starlink's approach as 'grafting' acquired Swarm technology onto existing satellites in a suboptimal way, and noting Sambar was aware of interference issues with that approach.

Framed Sambar's hire as the latest step in a pattern he's tracked since 2023: T-Mobile's original pro-Starlink executives (including Mike Katz, who architected the Starlink/T-Satellite partnership, and former CEO Mike Sievert) have been leaving, replaced by an AST-aligned executive, which he reads as building toward T-Mobile eventually partnering with AST.

Argued sell-side analysts mostly reflect investor/trader flow and conversations rather than original insight, and that the Starlink/SpaceX narrative is simply too dominant and fee-generating (large IPO, $20 billion debt refinancing) for analysts to bother researching AST as a competitor.

Suggested UBS's Europe-centric research focus is one reason it overlooks AST and Satellite Connect Europe, since AST is headquartered outside Europe.

Predicted this blind spot will become 'very hard to ignore' once the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture goes definitive and detailed plans are disclosed.

Said Japan's J-LEO program should get a formal grant and start being funded 'as early as mid-July' — about two days out from this recording, possibly a bit longer — representing $900 million to $1 billion of non-dilutive government funding.

Explained that once the JV has guaranteed Japanese government cash flow, it can borrow an equivalent amount from a bank such as Sumitomo at a very low interest rate, effectively doubling available capital, to be used for launch purchases (from Mitsubishi, SpaceX, etc.) and satellite construction.

Said Grain has buildout requirements at the 1-year and 2-year marks, and argued AST SpaceMobile is the only provider that can help Grain meet them since Starlink currently has no satellites capable of using low-band spectrum.

Expects the solicitation/decision on who gets to utilize the Grain spectrum to conclude before the end of November, guessing it will be some type of partnership with AST, with that spectrum ultimately folded into the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture.

Confirmed the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture has not yet gone definitive, but said 'it will.'

Said BlueBird 12 and 13 will ship imminently, with BlueBird 11 already on its way to Cape Canaveral, and that the next SpaceX launch is expected the first week of August.

Said he'd be 'shocked' if AST doesn't sign a multi-launch agreement with Mitsubishi for the H3 rocket (tied to J-LEO), and guessed a multi-launch agreement with ULA would follow soon.

Estimated the company's micron-production capacity is around 10 satellites' worth per month, but full assembly (composite ring plus control unit) currently caps actual output closer to 4-5 satellites per month.

Said hitting the 6-per-month manufacturing target doesn't matter right now because production isn't the constraining factor — launch capacity is — though it will matter once launch supply is abundant (noting Blue Origin may come back online in December).

Recalled that when Verizon joined AST SpaceMobile, it was a shock to the market and re-rated the stock from $5 to $39, and argued a similar (though not necessarily equally sized) re-rating is likely if/when T-Mobile signs.

Despite the broader risk-off environment, Anpanman said there were two pieces of genuinely positive AST SpaceMobile news that day that he believed the market hadn't yet processed.

Anpanman predicted that once research analysts fully digest what the spectral efficiency figure means for broadband speeds across the constellation, the market's view of AST's competitive differentiation will shift dramatically.

Anpanman speculated Sambar's career at AT&T had a ceiling because John Stankey was recently appointed CEO and is likely to hold that seat for a long time, making it a natural point for Sambar to move on.

Between AT&T and T-Mobile, Sambar spent close to two years (full two years as of this coming October) as Chief Operating Officer of Public Storage; Anpanman guessed this period served out a non-compete of roughly 1.5 to 2 years from AT&T while still drawing a paycheck.

Anpanman argued that hiring Sambar transforms T-Mobile's position in the carrier JV from a distrusted, 'hat in hand' latecomer (having previously partnered with Starlink) to a credible party, since Sambar has direct personal trust with Abel Avellan and deep knowledge of AST's technology.

Anpanman speculated that Grain's 800 MHz spectrum will eventually be combined with the AT&T and Verizon spectrum already leased to AST inside the carrier JV, possibly with the T-Mobile/Grain cash deal renegotiated so T-Mobile redirects that capital into the JV instead.

Anpanman speculated the JV would feature shared gateway infrastructure across the US, Alaska, Canada and US territories to avoid redundant spending, likely interfaced through AT&T's network (analogous to multiple carriers sharing equipment on a single tower site), with each carrier still marketing the service independently.

Responding to a listener question about whether a 60-satellite constellation would provide enough bandwidth for all three carriers, Anpanman said it should be sufficient initially but that the constellation will need to densify over time with more low-band BlueBirds, then mid-band, then eventually a C-band constellation.

Anpanman said Katz was largely responsible for the commercial/product execution of T-Mobile's Starlink and T-Satellite relationship, though he was unsure how much decision-making authority Katz had in originally bringing Starlink on.

Anpanman framed Katz and former CEO Mike Sievert (who departed roughly a year earlier) as the 'old guard' who championed the Starlink deal, which Anpanman said is now viewed, in retrospect, as a strategic mistake for the industry.

Anpanman argued the timing — Katz's exit and Sambar's hire coinciding with the end of T-Mobile's Starlink exclusivity — is not coincidental and signals T-Mobile shifting away from the leadership responsible for the Starlink deal.

Anpanman argued markets are not always efficient, and that the gap between what informed investors understand now (about the Sambar hire and spectral efficiency news) and what the broader market will eventually price in is where investors make real returns.

Anpanman advised listeners to stay disciplined given the risk-off environment: avoid margin, don't overload positions, don't convert entirely into options, and instead hold and stay informed until conditions settle.

Anpanman said he plans to research Mike Katz's departure further, potentially reaching out to industry analyst Will Townsend of the 6G Podcast for his read on whether Katz's exit is tied to the broader AST/Starlink dynamic.

Anpanman closed by saying that when the official news eventually comes that T-Mobile is joining AST SpaceMobile, investors should 'hold on to your butts' because it will be a major stock-moving event.

Anpanman says he has held ASTS for almost 6 years and has seen severe drawdowns to the point of being 'almost mentally broken,' as well as major highs, and argues that patience and conviction — not reacting to positive news not being immediately reflected in the stock price — is what separates investors who build wealth from those who buy euphoric highs and sell at the bottom.

He advises that investors who can't emotionally handle single-stock volatility, or who are on margin/options, are poorly suited to hold high-beta single names, and that low-conviction portfolio positions are typically the first sold in a downturn.

Anpanman says the company hasn't fully confirmed the exact mechanism, but speculates (spitballing) it likely involves dual polarization — transmitting packets on both horizontal and vertical wavelengths over the same 10 MHz downlink channel, effectively achieving about 5 bits/hertz times two.

Based on his own past research, Anpanman estimates terrestrial cellular systems run around 7-8 bits/hertz, so reaching 10 bits/hertz from space is, in his words, 'pretty insane' and a 'game changer' for efficiency.

He clarifies AST won't outperform terrestrial towers' raw capacity in dense urban areas, since terrestrial networks can simply add more towers to densify coverage there; but in suburban or rural areas AST's satellites should effectively rival terrestrial towers, and with multiple satellites overhead plus carrier aggregation and MIMO, could outperform terrestrial networks in those areas.

He references Katzy's separate posts about strong signal results from recent tests in Ireland as further evidence, alongside the spectral-efficiency news, that AST's technology is highly differentiated versus current or future alternatives — part of why he says roughly 60 MNOs, the US Department of War (defense), the Japanese government, and Brazil have chosen to work with AST, with Europe likely to follow.

He guesses (spitballing, no firm date given) that the next Falcon 9 launch of BlueBirds will likely occur in the first week of August.

Anpanman says direct-to-device, once thought a small niche market, is now seen by Wall Street as an existential threat to wireless carriers; T-Mobile was upgraded by Morgan Stanley on the day of this episode, and AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile stocks have broadly derated over the past several months.

Part of the derating concern is fixed wireless/home broadband: aggressive cable-company pricing is pressuring carriers' fiber and wireless-to-home growth businesses, and if SpaceX's Starship and V3 satellites can deliver gigabit-per-second speeds (versus current hundreds of Mbps), that could further threaten carriers' home wireless and fiber businesses.

He argues Starlink operating as an MVNO (using a carrier's network under its own brand via a wholesale deal) is strategically incompatible with the carriers' interests, and that AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile have all effectively said no to enabling this, since letting any one of them break ranks would be bad for all three over the medium-to-long term — which he says is why they formed a joint venture together in May.

Anpanman says two of the key players in that carrier joint venture, AT&T and Verizon (with AT&T described as having 'quarterbacked' it), are already working with AST SpaceMobile; he reads the situation as strongly suggesting T-Mobile will eventually join as well, calling it 'just a matter of when and how that will get announced.'

As an alternative to an MVNO deal, SpaceX could try to acquire a carrier like T-Mobile, AT&T, or Verizon given its market cap, but Anpanman argues this would likely derate SpaceX's valuation toward a traditional wireless-carrier multiple, would signal to every global carrier not to work with SpaceX, and would likely face heavy regulatory resistance from the DOJ/FCC given that approving the prior T-Mobile/Sprint merger already reduced the US to three national facilities-based carriers — he notes the FCC approving SpaceX's purchase of EchoStar spectrum instead reflects hope for a more competitive fourth carrier, not further consolidation.

He states there has been no sell-side research coverage connecting AST SpaceMobile to the wireless carriers' competitive predicament, and no AST research update since June 12 from B. Riley; he expects a formal T-Mobile-AST announcement (MOU or partnership) to trigger a violent re-rating similar to the one seen after the Verizon news in the summer of 2024.

He dismisses a named skeptic, 'Lucky Stewie,' described as a 'washed-up' independent industry consultant who questions whether the technology works, arguing the engineers at all the MNOs and companies working with AST are a more credible source than the skeptic.

He expects the stock to consolidate until the next major catalyst, citing the upcoming BlueBird launch batch, formal J-Leo (Japan) award details — which he guesses (spitballing) could come out in the second half of July — and ongoing developments at Satellite Connect Europe as near-term items to watch, alongside the anticipated T-Mobile/AST announcement as the biggest catalyst.

Kook opens by describing a conversation with an experienced, accomplished portfolio manager friend about how ASTS has 'high idiosyncratic volatility' — meaning ASTS-specific news drives the stock much more than broad market moves, unlike a Walmart or a REIT where the market itself drives the stock.

Kook argues this means the return on research effort into ASTS is unusually high — citing his friend 'DeMunk,' a non-finance-background researcher whose work he says is largely responsible for the community's awareness of the J.Leo contract, as an example of research paying off disproportionately for this stock.

Kook says the exact structure of the $2 billion figure and how it flows through is not yet known, but calls it 'all very positive,' describing a pathway to a Japanese sovereign constellation that also provides leverage for AST SpaceMobile's global constellation buildout.

Kook notes Japan is adding launch capacity through MHI (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) the same week, and connects this to J.Leo's stated requirement for local Japanese content across the value chain (ownership, satellites, and launch), suggesting a formal multi-launch agreement with MHI capacity supporting satellites sold into the Rakuten/AST joint venture ('RAST') is likely coming.

On launch-capacity worries generally, Kook argues: 'don't worry about what you're worried about today, worry about what you should be worried about in 6 months' — if 15 to 25 satellites are already spoken for on MHI alone, plus F9, ULA, and Blue Origin capacity, today's launch-capacity concern will look overblown in six months.

Kook cites an article (found via 'Reformed Trader') about France/Paris complaining about Palantir and overreliance on US tech providers, framing this as part of a broader trend favoring providers — like AST SpaceMobile — that can tailor solutions to individual countries' security needs rather than a one-size-fits-all US-centric model.

Kook says South Korea has separately signaled it wants its own satellite constellation, and notes AST SpaceMobile already has ties there via an investment from the Samsung Next Fund and letters of support to the FCC from Samsung, suggesting South Korea (unable to support its own constellation alone) is likely to pursue some kind of joint-venture structure similar to Japan's.

Kook relays a point from a follower ('another Smith') that a person shown in a Vodafone update photo is the coordinator of the European Union Critical Communication Service (EUCCS), which Kook interprets as a signal of AST SpaceMobile providing FirstNet-type public-safety services across the EU.

Kook estimates the government-services pillar (FirstNet-type business) could be worth at least $1 billion in the US alone, and that multiplying this globally could produce $5 to $10 billion in government service business revenue for AST SpaceMobile before even counting military applications.

An unnamed contributor (believed by Kook to be Japanese) pointed out that Japan has already signaled intent to participate in Golden Dome, and that J.Leo — beyond serving Rakuten/AST emergency services — could indirectly count as Japan's contribution to Golden Dome, similar to how NATO countries buying F-35s counts toward their fighter-capacity contributions.

Kook argues AST SpaceMobile's system was specifically designed to be compliant with Voice over LTE, emergency inter-operator roaming, and 911-service requirements, which he says SpaceX cannot match, calling SpaceX 'a bunch of piece of shit vaporware' for these public-safety/sovereignty use cases.

Kook relays Redrum's framing that a signal-to-noise ratio of 16 is already good, but going to 21 is 'blasting,' improving bandwidth, reliability, and indoor coverage — important for all applications but especially public safety.

Kook argues the total addressable market goes well beyond consumer use cases to include IoT, government, military, and rural tower displacement, illustrating with his own experience in a part of New York with no cell coverage despite residents having money, implying high potential ARPU in such areas.

Kook argues by analogy that if people like his friend pay $55 to $100/month for a Starlink backup system used only ~1% of the time, many consumers would easily pay $5-$10/month for backup cellular connectivity via AST SpaceMobile.

Kook says he continues to believe it's sensible that Meta could pursue some sort of relationship or deal with AST SpaceMobile to make WhatsApp work everywhere and give Meta more control over WhatsApp's functionality, though this is his own speculation and not confirmed.

Kook references the same X account ('Anpanman') doing ARPU-times-users-times-multiple math to arrive at a speculative upside price target around $2,500/share, saying he agrees with this analysis 'just this once' as an upside case rather than a base case — the stock doesn't need to reach that level for a good outcome.

Kook says FCC Chairman Brendan Carr is demanding the spectrum be used for direct-to-cell (D2C) service and explicitly not for 'squatting,' which Kook interprets as directed at Charlie Ergen, and concludes this points toward AST SpaceMobile being able to negotiate a lease or profit-share arrangement with Grain Management for the spectrum, though he notes a competing theory that it could be used for utility applications instead.

Kook argues pressure is building on SpaceX from multiple directions: increasing competition from Kuiper in fixed broadband, the hope that SpaceX loses its T-Mobile direct-to-cell contract to AST SpaceMobile, and a wave of incoming rocket capacity from competitors, predicting a possible 'SpaceX squeeze' over the next couple of months as Starlink's IPO-related lockups approach.

Kook notes India is also increasing rocket power, which he says would seem to allow the LVM3 vehicle (used for AST's prior launch) to carry 3 BlueBirds instead of fewer, and speculates this could foreshadow an Indian joint venture similar to Japan's, plus additional local-content-driven launch capacity in India.

Kook says Rocket Lab's roughly $8 billion acquisition of Iridium — reversing founder Peter Beck's previously stated position against such a deal — looks like a 'desperation move' driven by seeing SpaceX's, Blue Origin's, and AST SpaceMobile's progress, and mocks people in the Rocket Lab community only now discovering Iridium's narrowband satellite-phone service as if it were novel.

Kook says all questions now turn to Viasat, viewed as the 'next one to go,' with an unclear buyer; he speculates AST SpaceMobile could reach a deal with Viasat for its global S-band spectrum (potentially via an activist campaign) to pair with its Ligado spectrum position, but says 'we'll find out.'

Kook says next week he expects a formal J.Leo announcement and news that 'Batch 2' satellites are shipping, calling these the main catalysts that would make for an exciting week.

Because T-Mobile retains an economic upside stake in the 800 MHz spectrum, Anpanman argues T-Mobile has a direct financial interest in seeing it deployed, and ties this to reports that T-Mobile is walking away from Starlink and joining an AT&T/Verizon joint venture with AST SpaceMobile, calling it 'not by chance.'

Ergen's position was effectively rescued when AST's Ligado transaction (January 2025) drove up the value of MSS/S-band spectrum, leading SpaceX to acquire EchoStar's spectrum instead.

AST already holds a lease on AT&T and Verizon's 850 MHz spectrum; Anpanman expects AST will similarly obtain a lease on Grain's 800 MHz spectrum, creating one contiguous cellular band with strong wall-penetration and broadband capability.

Anpanman expects AST to file an application for experimental testing of the Grain spectrum within the next few days, and says he will add that to his catalyst tracker.

Grain committed to reach a negotiated spectrum deal with an interested party within 30 days of FCC approval; Anpanman calls this effectively 'tailor-made' for AST since Starlink has no cellular-band satellite roadmap and Lynk (roughly 10-13 satellites, no funding raised) can't meet the milestones on day one.

Anpanman speculates the Grain spectrum will ultimately be folded into a broader AT&T/T-Mobile/Verizon joint venture with AST rather than remain a standalone bilateral lease, and argues AST won't be squeezed on the assumed 50/50 economic split given its strategic importance as the carriers' counter to Starlink.

Anpanman argues Grain 'needs AST more than AST needs Grain' — AST already has AT&T/Verizon spectrum and partnerships, so the Grain deal is a 'nice to have' that makes the service more robust rather than a necessity.

Anpanman argues Starlink can't realistically assemble enough low-band spectrum to justify building a low-band satellite, since MNOs won't lease or sell their low-band spectrum to a direct competitor; he notes ATEX, a company holding some low-band spectrum, has seen speculative investor interest as a potential monetization play.

Responding to an audience question on revenue potential, Anpanman runs the math on a $5/month ARPU assumption ($60/year per connection) times roughly 1 billion connections, yielding about $60 billion in revenue at an assumed 80-90% EBITDA margin; he argues 1 billion connections is likely a bearish (too low) assumption once multiple devices per person (phones, watches, laptops), IoT, and military/drone applications are counted, comparing to Iridium and Globalstar charging roughly $20-30/month for narrowband IoT devices.

Anpanman argues this is a direct strategic threat to Apple, Google, and Samsung, since owning a proprietary OS and device is the platform from which SpaceX/xAI could expand into other hardware categories (watches, tablets, computers), and connects it to X's broader ambitions such as X Money going live as part of a super-app strategy.

Anpanman argues this raises AST's strategic value, since Apple (which has been testing with AST) and Google (an AST strategic investor) both need a credible counter to a vertically-integrated SpaceX/Starlink threat, and MNOs need AST as their own competitive response to Starlink amid depressed carrier stock prices.

Anpanman expects analysts who downgraded the stock to reverse course with upgrades in the coming weeks and months, likely timed around AST's Q3 update in August 2026, which coincides with the planned BlueBird 11/12/13 launch.

Anpanman doesn't expect these hedge baskets to unwind until SpaceX's first lockup expiry around August 20, 2026, when an initial tranche of roughly 20-30% of shares becomes sellable; he expects this to coincide with all-time-high ASTS short interest starting to unwind, calling the combination of catalysts 'awesome' for the summer.

Asked whether the Rural 5G Fund grant Scott Wisniewski previously mentioned is still a possibility, Anpanman says he's unsure but that it doesn't materially matter given the company's current progress — it would be nice to have, but AST won't wait around for it.

Asked whether SpaceX would have to disclose an internal AI device project to the public, Anpanman says a public company doesn't have to disclose trade secrets, only material partnerships or contracts.

Asked if the Grain deal is a precursor to a T-Mobile agreement, Anpanman clarifies T-Mobile doesn't own the Grain spectrum but holds an economic stake in it, and speculates T-Mobile saw AT&T and Verizon's pooled 850 MHz spectrum plus AST partnership as a superior offering and didn't want to be left behind, which he believes prompted AT&T CEO John Stankey (who first invited Verizon) to also bring in T-Mobile.

Short sellers, skeptics, and industry incumbents have called SpaceMob and space investors generally 'delusional'; Anpanman says he takes that as a compliment because it took real mental fortitude to invest in the space sector for five-plus years before it was popular.

He names early critics who he says actively tried to sabotage the company via opinion pieces and international regulatory petitions — citing 'Tim Ferriss' (likely a mis-transcription of satellite analyst Tim Farrar), Alan Gottlieb, and Ken Miller of Lynk — and credits early strategic investors Cisneros, Rakuten, American Tower, and Bell Canada, plus Rakuten's Mickey Mikitani personally, for backing the company through that period.

He compares AST conviction to holding Nvidia, Amazon, or memory names like Micron/SanDisk early, arguing that in hindsight everyone claims the thesis was obvious, when in reality it took 'delusional' conviction to hold through the uncertainty at the time.

Unlike a typical disruption story where incumbents simply lose share, ViaSat, Iridium, and Globalstar's spectrum holdings became more valuable specifically because AST (and later Starlink) proved out the direct-to-device market, even as their core service businesses were disrupted.

He draws a parallel to EchoStar, calling it 'worth more dead than alive': the stock dipped to around $17 during Charlie Ergen's standoff with the FCC over spectrum use, but after agreeing to sell its AWS-3 spectrum (roughly 50 MHz) to SpaceX, EchoStar now trades around $102 — even though that deal isn't expected to close until the end of summer 2027.

He estimates (with uncertainty, saying he needs to double-check) that Globalstar holds full-duplex dedicated spectrum of roughly 15 MHz downlink and about 6-7 MHz uplink.

He argues ViaSat's core businesses (e.g., commercial-airline broadband) are being hammered by Starlink, so the stock is now valued mainly on its spectrum holdings, with the market assuming ViaSat eventually strikes some deal (the failed Rocket Lab-anchored Equitas/Space42 venture, possibly MDA Space, or AST itself).

He argues SpaceX won't buy ViaSat, Iridium, or Globalstar because SpaceX is mid-acquisition of about 50 MHz of AWS-3 spectrum from EchoStar (not expected to close until end of summer 2027), and layering on more spectrum deals during that regulatory review would raise anti-competitive concerns.

Rocket Lab's planned acquisition of Iridium is framed as a fix for Iridium's 'catch-22': Iridium had loaded up on debt and promised a fat dividend, making it hard to redirect cash into innovation, whereas Rocket Lab's shareholders don't expect a dividend and are used to heavy reinvestment (he cites Peter Beck reportedly saying about 95% of Rocket Lab's R&D budget goes to the Neutron rocket).

Amazon/Globalstar's path forward beyond its committed MDA-built replenishment and next-generation satellites is unclear, in Anpanman's view.

Because Rocket Lab chose to acquire Iridium instead, it appears to have 'slow-rolled' and abandoned its prior commitment to anchor the ViaSat/Space42 'Equitas' joint venture, leaving that venture without a partner ('at the altar with no groom').

He argues AST's 80-year rights to use L-band spectrum in North America function as an effective 'poison pill': any rival trying to build a global L-band direct-to-device constellation cannot access the most profitable market in the world (North America) without going through AST.

He compares the stalled ViaSat/Space42 Equitas venture to Charlie Ergen's earlier EchoStar playbook of threatening to build a competing D2D service (with MDA Space) to force a buyer to pay up for spectrum — a leverage play that worked when Starlink eventually paid Ergen's price.

His expectation is that ViaSat and AST eventually strike a spectrum-leasing arrangement rather than a merger or acquisition, since AST already anchors the most valuable (North American) piece of the spectrum.

Per his understanding of the process, Rakuten must submit detailed plans (launch, technology, ground infrastructure, budget, timeline) to Japan's CIAJ and MIC for review, possibly with feedback/revisions, before formal approval lets the J-LEO project begin executing; based on 'ChatGPT AI analysis of historic precedent,' he guesses a formal approval declaration lands sometime mid-to-end of July 2026.

He says the next BlueBird mission (BlueBirds 11-13) could launch around the first week of August, meaning satellites likely need to start shipping soon — 'perhaps as soon as this weekend.'

He expects possible press rumblings about a T-Mobile definitive commercial agreement, or at least an MOU, in the near term.

He would 'not be surprised' if a multi-launch agreement (MLA) with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is signed alongside the formal J-LEO announcement, speculating that Japanese regulators would want to see a launch agreement in place before approving the project.

He plans to ask on the next earnings call about the amount and timing of Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) or Export-Import financing for the JV, noting the JV doesn't need to be funded with equity/cash and can use matched debt; he also references AST previously pursuing roughly $500 million in US Export-Import Bank financing, which he speculates could be fully realized since Japan would need to purchase BlueBird satellites (qualifying for export financing).

He frames the J-LEO structure — roughly $1 billion of financing over three years plus a likely matching ~$1 billion of JBIC-backed side-by-side debt — as a template other sovereignty-minded countries/regions will likely replicate, citing Europe's SatCo (expected 2 GHz spectrum, 5x5 or 10x10 MHz, with possible European funding), Brazil (Anatel approval plus 10x10 MHz S-band), Mexico (testing with Altán Redes, which holds 45x45 MHz of 700 MHz spectrum, and a possible JV given AST's relationship with Carlos Slim), and Saudi Telecom (which committed roughly $1 billion of economic value in its 10-year commercial deal and could become a Middle East JV partner).

Answering a listener question, he explains that Japanese-owned satellites ('Japan Birds') will be fully owned and operated by the Japan JV but leased to AST for commercial use elsewhere (Europe, US) when they are not positioned over Japan, letting the JV amortize costs while AST gains capacity someone else paid for.

He argues SpaceX's stock being down about 7% on the day (while AST and other space names were up) partly reflects the market starting to treat SpaceX as an AI-compute-leasing company (with Anthropic, Google, and other AI contracts potentially making up 60-70% of future SpaceX revenue) rather than a pure space company, especially after Meta announced entering the AI compute-as-a-service business, pressuring 'NeoCloud' names like IREN, NBIS, and MARA; he speculates hedge funds may need to rebalance SpaceX-linked short baskets away from space names and toward NeoCloud names.

He argues Starlink is disadvantaged in competing for this spectrum because the FCC approval requires quick deployment for direct-to-device, and Starlink's satellites aren't architected for low-band spectrum — guessing (explicitly making up numbers) that Starlink can only work in roughly the 1.7-2.5 GHz PCS/S-band MSS range, and noting the next-generation Starlink V3 satellite (5m x 5m) is too small for an effective low-band phased array.

Asked whether a T-Mobile agreement faces the same 'iron out the details before announcing' dynamic, he clarifies this refers to a joint venture involving AT&T and Verizon; details are still being finalized, and once it goes definitive it will be a major catalyst effectively signaling those carriers are walking away from Starlink, subject to regulatory review and approval.

The JLEO project requires nationwide service availability to ordinary smartphone users by March 31, 2029 — a requirement Anpanman says Starlink's current or future constellation could never meet, since neither is architected to work with ordinary phones without a new chipset.

The service must support video calls across Japan for roughly 70% of each day; Anpanman says Starlink's current service can't support this, and while a future Starlink constellation might, no one besides AST SpaceMobile has demonstrated true cross-carrier video calling to a mobile phone, and that demonstration was specifically in Japan.

Anpanman disputes a widely circulated video of two Starlink engineers making a video call, arguing it was likely one engineer connected to the satellite beaming a signal directly down to the other engineer nearby — not a call routed over an MNO network across real geographic distance the way AST has demonstrated.

AST expects to reach 100% daily video-call coverage (versus the ~70% JLEO requirement) sometime over the course of 2027, per Anpanman's own estimate.

The winning service must use domestic (Japan-based) gateways, satellite control, payload control, and network control facilities so the constellation can be fully operated from Japan — something Anpanman says Starlink is neither architected for nor interested in doing.

Anpanman states winning the JLEO award should 'greenlight' full commercial approval for AST in Japan, which he expects sometime in August or September 2026 — distinct from the earlier MIC approval of the 700 MHz band itself for satellite use.

Anpanman speculates KDDI, NTT Docomo, and SoftBank will drop Starlink and join the government-backed JV instead, for competitive comfort and because of what they're seeing from Starlink's broader ambitions.

Anpanman guesses the Japan JV will likely be structured similarly to Satellite Connect Europe, where Vodafone holds majority/controlling ownership (he floats 60/40 or 51/49 as illustrative splits) but AST receives a larger share of the economics; he expects a roughly 50/50 ownership structure in Japan with economics split differently in AST's favor.

Anpanman says the JLEO award 'pretty much guarantees' a multi-launch agreement with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries will happen, potentially within the next few weeks or months, since the JLEO bid reportedly committed to using Japanese launch vehicles to support Japan's sovereign space program — something SpaceX/Starlink would never agree to.

Anpanman guesses a good portion of the JV's roughly $1 billion in funding (spread over 3 years) will go toward launch costs, and speculates Mitsubishi Heavy might offer some discount if a multi-launch agreement is signed.

Because the Japan JV would receive roughly $1 billion in government funding over 3 years, Anpanman argues the entity becomes 'bankable' and eligible for JBIC (Japan's Exim equivalent) supported debt/guarantees, as well as US Export-Import Bank financing on the US side since AST would be manufacturing and shipping BlueBird satellites to Japan.

Public reporting says Rakuten and AST must contribute up to half of the JV's funding themselves; Anpanman speculates that this half could itself be raised as debt financing supported by the JV's government backing, rather than cash contributed directly.

Under the federated ownership model, Japanese-funded 'BlueBird' satellites would be fully owned and operated by Japan, but — similar to the Planet Labs/J-Sat partnership analogy — could be utilized by AST's broader global constellation when operating outside Japan.

Anpanman says this federated model doesn't need to exist in the US (where the three US carriers are building their own joint venture) but will apply in Europe via Satellite Connect Europe, the AST-Vodafone JV.

He connects this to a 30 MHz-by-30 MHz block of EU 2 GHz MSS spectrum coming up for renewal, which Starlink is also expected to pursue; Anpanman predicts Satellite Connect Europe will win a solid spectrum allocation and business, effectively creating 'the first net of Europe,' paralleling what he expects in Japan ('the first net of Japan').

Rakuten previously received an allocation of the 700 MHz 'Platinum Band' in Japan as the startup 4th carrier, which is the spectrum underlying this JLEO service; Anpanman speculates additional Japanese spectrum could come up for future allocation and that this AST-Rakuten JV (now government-backed) would be the natural recipient.

Anpanman predicts AST SpaceMobile is on a path to 100% market share in Japan, moving from being the 'scrappy 4th player' (via Rakuten) to serving all major carriers, and says he doesn't think the market currently understands the scale of this.

Anpanman references having listened to part of a Kook-hosted X Space the prior night, noting that once people move past SpaceX IPO hype and start examining the competitive landscape, they'll realize AST SpaceMobile is a name they 'have to own.'

Verizon announced combining its international operations with British Telecom for cost savings/synergies; Anpanman speculates that since BT currently works with Starlink only for fixed wireless to the home (no direct-to-device plans), BT will likely start working with AST SpaceMobile as well.

Comcast announced splitting its media business from its internet business, sending Comcast's stock up; Charter's stock also rose, which Anpanman attributes partly to Starlink-related speculation and partly to expectations of broader cable industry consolidation (e.g., potentially combining Comcast internet with Spectrum/Charter internet) to build a nationally competitive cable player.

Anpanman argues that cable companies (Comcast, Charter) should be talking to AST SpaceMobile rather than Starlink, since AST doesn't directly compete with their fiber/cable business the way Starlink does, and cable companies already resell MNO service (e.g., as an MVNO reselling Verizon/T-Mobile) — a natural path to eventually reselling AST SpaceMobile service too.

Kook describes the psychological difficulty of holding through drawdowns (the temptation of the 'red button' to sell) and says he copes by studying the volatility history of other secular-trend winners he missed, which reinforces his long-term conviction ('diamond hands').

Kook interprets Carr's comments as signaling regulatory support beyond AST's current approvals, likely including approval of the Ligado 45 MHz L-band spectrum deal, a possible T-Mobile spectrum/JV approval, and other spectrum holders (e.g. Grain Management, SiriusXM) seeking to upgrade their spectrum economics — framed explicitly as his own forward-looking read, not a company statement.

Kook explains that a large phased array matters for two reasons: it lowers cost per watt of capacity (energy converts to RF signal capacity), and a large array enables powerful, tightly controlled beams needed for spectral efficiency, link budget, and interference control to deliver usable mobile broadband.

Citing Anpanman's analysis, Kook states Starlink's Version 1 direct-to-cell satellites total 650 satellites equating to about 4,000 square meters of array, while AST's planned 243 Block 2 satellites will total roughly 54,000 (almost 55,000) square meters of array — about 13 times the array area using roughly one-third the satellite count.

Kook argues the SpaceX IPO itself doesn't change the underlying competitive dynamic (SpaceX already had capital access), but it will force many more investors to analyze the direct-to-device industry and, in doing so, compare AST SpaceMobile directly against SpaceX/Starlink.

If AST wins the J-LEO contract, Kook expects the market to ask why Starlink didn't win it, raising data-sovereignty questions; if T-Mobile signs with AST, he expects scrutiny of why Starlink's 'foundational customer' didn't renew/switch, and expects the market to note an implied valuation disparity between the two companies on the order of roughly 1-to-50.

Kook, citing Anpanman, notes SpaceX insiders can't sell shares and are restricted from hedging via puts, so he believes many are likely shorting liquid, perceived-correlated space-sector stocks instead, naming AST SpaceMobile, Rocket Lab, and SATS as likely targets, with Goldman Sachs reportedly running a basket for this purpose.

Kook explains the 'basis risk' concept: a basket short strips out idiosyncratic (company-specific) risk to isolate systemic/sector risk, but AST-specific news (e.g., a J-LEO win, or especially a T-Mobile signing) would reintroduce idiosyncratic risk, creating a 'pair trade' where the short position on the AST leg loses money for a completely different reason than intended — potentially very costly for these hedgers.

Kook expects a hedging unwind to become a source of AST buying pressure starting in August, when SpaceX's own lockup restrictions begin lifting and hedgers who shorted AST as a SpaceX proxy can sell actual SpaceX shares and unwind the hedge.

Kook frames MNO participation in these JV structures as economically rational: it lets MNOs monetize their spectrum/ground assets for a cut ('vig') of revenue and keeps SpaceX at bay as a competitor.

Kook highlights three seemingly coincidentally-timed events: the new Rakuten JV, Japan's regulatory approval of the 700 MHz band for AST's use (a band he says only AST's large arrays can practically use, since Starlink's smaller satellites can't handle such wide beams), and the imminent expected award of the J-LEO government contract — he frames connecting these as 'reasonable speculation' on his part, explicitly noting he can't be sure and it wasn't something he'd been tracking closely until about a week earlier.

Kook compares this potential setup to the Golden Dome news from the prior year, which he says drove the stock straight from around current levels to $100 because it also wasn't priced into the stock at the time; he believes a J-LEO win (potentially a billion-dollar deal) likewise doesn't look priced in with the stock in the mid-$70s, though he's careful not to bet on stock direction from any single news event.

Kook spitballs a possible deal structure (explicitly his own guess, not confirmed): assuming satellites currently cost around $50 million each (higher than the eventual cost-curve target), the Japanese government could give the JV a $1 billion subsidy, which the JV uses to place a $1 billion purchase order for about 20 AST satellites; roughly 25 satellites would provide good coverage for a Japan-only shell given limited longitude needs.

In Kook's proposed structure, satellites would be owned by a Japanese sovereign entity while over Japan, then leased back to AST SpaceMobile for use elsewhere when not needed for Japanese coverage — effectively a sale-leaseback that nets out to AST benefiting from a $1 billion subsidy while the JV may collect some lease payments as return on capital.

Kook expects the arrangement will also build in FirstNet-like capabilities and expects other major Japanese MNOs (he names KDDI and Docomo) may eventually join, potentially ditching Starlink.

Kook hopes the J-LEO subsidy announcement lands on June 30th (before quarter-end, ahead of the July 4th weekend), joking about wanting Japan to run 'on time' the way its subway system does.

Separately, Kook notes Japan's Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) is looking to increase launch cadence on its H3 launch vehicle right around the same time as the other Japan developments, which he interprets as evidence Rakuten will buy the satellites while MHI becomes the vertically-integrated, sovereign Japanese launcher.

Kook draws an extended analogy to Tesla around the time of the Model 3 launch roughly a decade ago: rather than de-rating Tesla to car-company multiples, the Model 3's arrival de-risked the market's view of Tesla's ability to scale, and the stock subsequently re-rated in stages tied to proof points like the Shanghai and Germany plant openings.

Kook argues AST is a good analog to Tesla's pattern of long consolidation followed by rapid re-rating, and frames the key 'multiple choice question' for AST right now as simply: can they unlock operational launch cadence? He points to the arrival of Antonov aircraft shipments, growing satellite build counts, and satellites shipping as evidence this is happening.

A meme Kook cites shows AST's time between satellite launches shrinking from about 2 years, to 15 months, to 4 months, to now about 2 months, with Kook expecting the cadence to soon reach roughly one launch per month.

Kook says people who monitor truck traffic near Midland ('camp out in their cars') report trucks and new shipping containers headed to Midland, which he takes as evidence that the next satellite batch ('batch 2') shipment, expected around August with a company update likely in the first half of August, is approaching; he also notes the company appears to be working on BlueBird 37, consistent with a prior update.

Kook says the Antonov shipments include composite rings and other equipment, describing this as evidence of an active, if still just-in-time, supply chain that the company is admittedly still working to catch up on.

Kook notes TLE (two-line element) tracking data on the recently launched satellites (referred to as 'Dodge 1,' a term that is unclear/possibly garbled in the transcript) looks good, and speculates the satellites could unfurl within weeks, potentially by the end of July, given it's already been about two weeks since launch.

Kook references a PDF listing civilian-government and warfighter use cases for the underlying 5G/D2D technology — including supporting soldiers in the field, jamming, situational awareness, and IoT — as evidence of a broad set of future revenue opportunities beyond simply 'connecting the unconnected.'

Kook says he believes AST's eventual product roadmap release covering 'AI data birds' (satellites repurposed for AI compute rather than connectivity) will be a major catalyst; he cites a Qualcomm article about AI agents replacing apps and Qualcomm working on roughly 40 new AI-powered devices (including jewelry, camera-equipped earbuds, wearable pins, and watches) that will need connectivity, which he argues will drive future connectivity demand well beyond current use cases.

Kook draws an analogy to solar and wind reaching 'grid parity' roughly 20 years ago (moving from subsidy-dependent to genuinely cost-competitive with existing power generation, at which point demand becomes effectively unlimited) and says he's trying to find the equivalent 'grid parity' threshold for AI data centers in orbit.

As a rough, explicitly speculative calculation, Kook guesses an 'AI data bird' satellite might cost around $20 million, reasoning that the solar array and satellite frame stay the same while RF processing chips are swapped for AI ASICs and radiators — potentially even a net reduction in cost rather than an addition.

Kook assumes (while flagging he isn't sure this is correct) that such satellites would be placed in sun-synchronous orbit to allow a 24-hour duty cycle, and says he hasn't yet solved for the implied price per kilowatt-hour versus the fully loaded cost of a terrestrial data center (which must also account for cooling, land, infrastructure, and maintenance) — describing this as still an open, unsolved question.

Kook describes a conversation with 'Katzie' that led to the idea of a 'Micron sandwich' satellite design for AI compute: because no beamforming is needed on the Earth-facing side, AI chips can instead be spaced out (rather than clustered) specifically to radiate heat, alongside a large solar array for power — which Kook argues makes the existing satellite chassis design well suited to this repurposing.

Kook speculates that if AI data birds materialize as a business, it could be the catalyst that takes the stock from (his own hypothetical, not current) roughly $1,000 to $2,000, explicitly caveating that the current stock price is nowhere near $1,000 and that he doesn't believe in fixed price targets since markets can move companies further than even founders anticipate.

As a thought experiment, Kook argues that in 6 months (around New Year's), AST will likely have launched 12-15 more satellites, bringing the total fleet to roughly 21 satellites; while still short of the 45-satellite figure, he argues the market will have already 'eaten' any delay and the 45-satellite threshold will have shifted from a year-end litmus test to a more achievable Q1/mid-Q2 target.

Kook speculates that by that point AST could also have new launch agreements with ULA and possibly a large multi-launch agreement with MHI (good for roughly 15-25 satellites), plus additional Falcon 9 launch purchases from SpaceX, meaning more total launch capacity than currently expected even if Blue Origin also comes back online.

Kook speculates that Abel modeling his compensation on Bezos may be notable given Amazon/Blue Origin is also one of AST's most important strategic partners, and floats (explicitly as speculation, not an announced plan) that a future combination of Amazon's Kuiper, Blue Origin, and AST SpaceMobile could be an 'elegant' potential strategic outcome or exit path, given Amazon's distribution power.

Kook notes the company was already tweeting on Sunday about scaling operations, which he suggests could mean a satellite shipment sooner rather than later, and reiterates that expectations for the Japan timeline should be kept appropriately low so as to be positively surprised.

Kook closes by noting the July 4th weekend marks America's 250th anniversary, and cites a roughly 80% historical probability of the stock market being up over that weekend; he also notes AST SpaceMobile has historically performed well in the summer alongside launch events, and suggests the SpaceX-hedging dynamic discussed earlier could further fuel an exciting summer for the stock.

Charter got into its current position by focusing on financial engineering over time — raising a lot of debt and buying back stock on the assumption growth would continue indefinitely; the company now has about $100 billion of debt against an equity value of only about $18 billion, making it, in his words, 'pretty much a distressed company right now.'

Instead, Charter entered a partnership with Verizon: Charter gave Verizon the spectrum it had accumulated, and in exchange Verizon lets Charter operate as an MVNO, using Verizon's towers and spectrum while running a decent amount of network traffic on Charter's own network fabric. Anpanman estimates Charter has 'maybe around 10 million subscribers or so' through this arrangement.

One possibility Anpanman raises: Charter itself leaked it to show equity and bondholders it has options to salvage the business by partnering with Starlink — though he notes this is complicated because Starlink is itself one of the causes of Charter's subscriber losses, and it's unclear what agreements would let Starlink use Charter's infrastructure while it's still contractually tied to Verizon/T-Mobile as its MVNO backbone.

Anpanman's main view is that Starlink is most likely the source of the leak, intending to show 'they've got options' and to pressure T-Mobile not to walk away from its existing agreement, while also signaling to the broader market and other carriers that Starlink has alternatives if carrier relationships don't work out.

Anpanman calls the leak 'quite desperate' and 'another strategic blunder' for Starlink. He contrasts two interpretations: one view is that leaking a Charter partnership threatens carriers into acquiescing; his own view is the opposite — it will galvanize carriers, making them refuse to enable Starlink as an MVNO (viewing it as an existential threat) and prompting them to reevaluate their existing MVNO agreements with cable companies to close off any 'end around.'

On the idea that Starlink could simply buy an existing MVNO to bypass carrier resistance, Anpanman argues it's 'not as simple as' it sounds: MVNO contracts likely contain change-of-control clauses letting the underlying mobile network operator evaluate and potentially terminate the agreement if a new, unwelcome party (e.g., Starlink) steps in. He also reiterates a prior view that Starlink acquiring a mobile network operator outright would cause its own valuation to derate, would likely be blocked by regulators, and would further galvanize all MNOs against it.

Anpanman argues the pieces instead fit a different narrative: the T-Mobile/Starlink exclusivity is ending around June/July (he says 'I think it's July'), the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile JV formed just before that, Starlink has become vocal about going direct-to-consumer with a mobile offering, and now Starlink is reportedly talking to cable companies — all of which he reads as carriers closing ranks against a Starlink mobile threat rather than cooperating with it.

Anpanman predicts there will likely be another article in the coming days specifically reporting Starlink talking to Spectrum (Charter's brand).

Anpanman's closing take: regardless of these short-term maneuvers, AST SpaceMobile's strategic value 'continues to go up by the day' as Starlink Mobile becomes 'more toxic' to potential MNO partners; when the broader market/Street catches up to this, he expects the stock to 'massively re-rate higher' as AST's service becomes a critical strategic asset for every MNO and for tech companies outside the Tesla/SpaceX vertical stack.

Anpanman's key takeaway: AST SpaceMobile's strategic value 'has gone up exponentially' as a result of this disclosure, because it confirms Starlink's long-term intent to compete with, not complement, MNOs.

He expects this FT article to circulate to every board member at every global MNO, forcing them to reassess whether working with Starlink was a strategic error ('enabling' a future competitor).

General market/investor reaction will likely be that this news is broadly negative for AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, Google, Amazon, and Apple — which he says is mostly true — but he argues AST SpaceMobile is the exception because it is the only competitor offering true broadband to an unmodified phone using low-band spectrum, versus Starlink's current narrowband texting service (with broadband coming later, but capacity-limited by mid-band spectrum).

Anpanman states T-Mobile is joining AT&T and Verizon in AST SpaceMobile's joint venture, describing it as T-Mobile recognizing that enabling the 'Trojan horse' (Starlink) inside its own network made no sense; he ties this to T-Mobile's Starlink Direct-to-Cell exclusivity (announced August 2022) ending 'this or next month.' This is presented as Anpanman's own analysis/claim rather than a cited company announcement.

He notes former T-Mobile CEO Mike Sievert is no longer at the company, speculating (without certainty) that he was pushed out, though he says it 'doesn't seem like' Sievert left entirely on his own.

As Starlink pursues the terrestrial mobile business, AST becomes increasingly important not just to MNOs but to any company that competes with the integrated SpaceX/Tesla stack — robotics, autonomous drones, IoT, and AI edge-case connectivity providers — since working with SpaceX risks being 'hollowed out' by them.

Existing strategic investor Google, plus Meta (which he says has visited AST's Midland facility and is testing apps like WhatsApp with AST in Spain), Microsoft, and Amazon (which bought Globalstar for spectrum) are all cited as tech players with growing strategic interest in AST, though he says it's unclear if Amazon can stand up a real competing service via Globalstar.

Referencing a call with Ben Devron about Bridger Aerospace, Anpanman relays that firefighters lose connectivity during wildfires because dense forest canopy blocks Starlink's fixed-wireless service, whereas AST's low-band cellular approach can penetrate trees and foliage — illustrating a real-world use case for AST's spectrum advantage.

AST currently has relationships with roughly 60 global MNO partners (including Vodafone, Orange, Telefonica, Telenor, CK Hutchison, Saudi Telecom, MTN, Rakuten, Globe, an unnamed Korean carrier, and Vodafone Idea in India), and he expects that number to keep growing as Starlink's stated ambitions push more carriers to hedge by working with AST.

He describes a likely near-term model: consumers would buy Starlink mobile service directly (speculating a price point of roughly $30-50/month), set the Starlink eSIM as their phone's primary network, and keep a cheaper backup carrier (an MVNO or AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile) as a fallback for when Starlink's line-of-sight service drops (indoors, in cars, in tunnels).

This handoff would not be seamless — an active call would drop and the phone would need to re-search for the backup network — meaning users would effectively pay for two services ('dual bill') unless a carrier agreed to lease network space to Starlink as an MVNO host, which AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile have all said they are not interested in enabling.

Because Starlink's mid-band spectrum has line-of-sight limitations, its service would work well outdoors with a clear sky view but become 'patchy' indoors or under tree cover; to truly build a terrestrial-competitive network Starlink would need to erect radio towers (or lease space from companies like American Tower) and, critically, acquire scarce low-band spectrum.

He flags Grain Management as a company going through FCC approval to sell roughly 800 MHz of spectrum, and floats the possibility that either AST/its partners or SpaceX could acquire it; if SpaceX buys it, he says that would be an 'unequivocal shot across the bow' against T-Mobile/AT&T/Verizon and a signal to buy more AST stock, since it would definitively end any chance of those carriers cooperating with Starlink.

He argues this history is exactly why the DOJ/FCC would block any SpaceX acquisition of T-Mobile: regulators only recently approved SpaceX's AWS-3 spectrum purchase on the premise that Starlink would become a competitive 4th player, and buying T-Mobile would collapse the market back to 3 large carriers, the opposite of that stated goal.

He references a Wall Street note (he believes from TD Cowen) speculating that SpaceX could acquire T-Mobile, which he calls 'harebrained' and says is 'dead on arrival' from a U.S. regulatory standpoint for the reasons above.

He argues Deutsche Telekom (T-Mobile US's parent) previously considered selling down its T-Mobile stake but reversed course in recent years and has been buying back T-Mobile shares because the U.S. market is more attractive than Europe's tougher regulatory/economic environment for telecom — making a sale unlikely even before considering approval odds.

He argues European regulators would similarly block any attempt by SpaceX to acquire Deutsche Telekom itself, given sovereignty/national-champion protections and Elon Musk's polarizing political profile in Europe.

Using Street projections, he estimates T-Mobile's 2026 revenue at roughly $95 billion with ~63% gross margin, ~$37 billion EBITDA, and ~$10-11 billion annual capex, trading around 7.5x EBITDA, versus SpaceX trading at roughly 160x projected 2026 EBITDA; folding a slow-growing wireless business into SpaceX would badly 'de-rate' SpaceX's valuation multiple.

He describes SpaceX as now roughly 60-70% a 'neo-cloud leasing' company via compute-leasing deals with Google, Anthropic, and a third party he refers to as 'Relative AI' (name possibly garbled), a shift from connectivity being about 69% of revenue previously; SpaceX has also acquired Cursor as it moves toward higher-value tools.

He concludes that buying an incumbent like T-Mobile would be a value-destructive path for SpaceX versus organically taking market share, which the market would reward with an even higher valuation multiple; he doesn't believe Elon Musk wants to destroy SpaceX's valuation this way.

AST's roughly 50/50 revenue split with AT&T and Verizon reflects true partnership economics, versus the roughly 80/20 split (Starlink keeps 80 cents, T-Mobile keeps 20 cents) in T-Mobile's Direct-to-Cell deal, which he attributes to Starlink owning all the infrastructure (satellites, gateways) with no integration into the carrier's core network.

He argues foreign regulators will become far more sensitive to sovereignty and 'national champion' protection now that Starlink has openly declared its intent to compete with (not just partner with) local carriers, making it much harder for Starlink to get approvals to become an MVNO or acquire local carriers abroad.

He contrasts this with past cross-border ownership that regulators did allow — e.g., SoftBank (Japan) owning Sprint, and Deutsche Telekom (Germany) owning T-Mobile US — because those were allied-nation owners, unlike a scenario where a foreign (or politically controversial) entity like SpaceX would seek to acquire a domestic carrier abroad.

Because Starlink must seek country-by-country approval to use the S-band spectrum rights it acquired from EchoStar, and it is now openly saying it intends to compete with each country's domestic wireless carriers and send profits back to the U.S., he expects many regulators to simply deny those S-band approvals, calling the spectrum acquisition's global-harmonization thesis effectively 'toxic' now.

He notes the FCC could threaten reciprocity (blocking foreign carriers from the U.S. market if foreign regulators block Starlink), but argues this leverage is weak since most foreign carriers have no interest in offering service in the U.S. anyway.

AST's partnership/JV model — such as Satellite Connect (Europe, with Vodafone) and the Rakuten-AST J-LEO joint venture in Japan — lets local partners own ground infrastructure, command-and-control, and even a 'kill switch' over satellites while over their territory, which he argues is the key structural reason regulators will favor AST's approach over Starlink's 'take it or leave it' model.

He cites the potential for dual-use military/defense value in these JV structures (e.g., a European or Japanese 'Golden Dome'-style capability) and references a Spain flooding event roughly one to two years earlier where terrestrial infrastructure was wiped out, arguing AST satellites could have restored mobile service and helped first responders locate victims during the outage.

He acknowledges smaller (3rd/4th place) carriers in some countries may still choose to enable Starlink as an MVNO to gain subscriber share even without full economics, but argues this dynamic actually increases the strategic urgency for the larger 2-3 carriers in that market to partner with AST as a counter.

He briefly notes a competing direct-to-device player, referred to as 'NBA Space' with 'Aurora' satellites, saying it's too early to assess since those satellites haven't launched or been tested, and that the company does not appear to be working with local partners the way AST does.

He closes with a Napoleon Bonaparte analogy — 'don't interrupt your enemy while they're making a mistake' — framing Starlink's decision to openly reveal its terrestrial mobile ambitions as a strategic blunder that will make its global rollout much harder to execute than its domestic one.

He recalls AST's stock moving from roughly $5-6 to $39 after the market recognized the significance of the AT&T and Verizon partnerships, framing the recent stock 'malaise' as similar pre-recognition uncertainty that he expects to resolve once the market understands the implications of Starlink's disclosure.

He notes AST's constellation compute capacity/data delivery capability is up over 100% in recent months as more satellites have launched, and frames current stock volatility as 'a feature, not a bug' rather than a sign the news is actually bad.

He says he personally bought more AST stock following this news and remains highly bullish despite the broader space-sector and stock-price pullback.

Short interest in ASTS is around 81 million shares in real time, and as the stock has moved lower, convertible arbitrageurs covering their shares suggests there is still net additional shorting happening.

He attributes some of the shorting/hedging activity to pre-IPO SpaceX holders hedging their positions ahead of an expected liquidity event — the first SpaceX lockup expiration, which he says is coming in August.

The entire space sector — not just AST SpaceMobile — is down and correlations across space stocks are essentially at 1, so materially positive news for companies like Rocket Lab or Planet Labs isn't moving those stocks either; he believes the market is at or close to a bottom.

He views this as reinforcing Satellite Connect Europe's attractiveness to EU regulators ahead of the upcoming 2 GHz spectrum allocation decision.

Rakuten is forming a joint venture with AST SpaceMobile to serve as the vehicle for Japan's J-LEO project; per press reports, the Japanese government is expected to invest $1 billion into the JV, which the JV would use to buy Bluebird satellites, ground station/command-and-control equipment, and stand up staff in Japan.

An internal Japanese government decision on J-LEO was expected at the end of June (2026), and he believes AST is very well positioned to win the program, partly because he does not think Starlink can meet the program's requirements.

Under the JV structure, satellites procured for J-LEO would be fully owned and controlled by the Rakuten/AST joint venture (not AST, the US, or any other entity), including a 'kill switch' to turn off service, addressing his earlier confusion about how Mikitani's comment on 'rolling out global service' would work.

He speculates Mikitani's board departure may have been partly to allow him to sell stock to help capitalize the JV, and/or to enable more arm's-length negotiations, and/or because it was a requirement of the J-LEO tender — he is not certain which.

When the JV's satellites fly over regions outside Japan (e.g., the US, Europe, Africa), AST (or other MNO partners) would pay the JV to lease that capacity — explaining Mikitani's 'global service' remark as monetizing fly-over capacity rather than Rakuten operating a roaming network directly.

As a rough, explicitly speculative estimate, he guesses the $1 billion Japanese investment could pay for 'somewhere around 30-some-odd satellites,' though he frames this as a guess ('I don't know').

In response to a listener question about how satellite-sharing economics might work (e.g., a JV leasing a satellite to Verizon), he sketches a hypothetical: if Verizon charges its customer $10, Verizon might keep $5 and give AST $5; AST would then pay some portion — maybe $1 — to the relevant regional JV for use of that satellite, with the split depending on which party funded more of the satellite's construction/launch.

He suggests the JV likely gets less economics in regions like the US in exchange for keeping more economics within its home market (e.g., Japan), and that a fully-paid-for satellite effectively becomes incremental, high-margin network capacity for AST.

He expects an EU decision in May of next year (2027) on renewing roughly 30 MHz by 30 MHz of 2 GHz spectrum currently used by EchoStar, Viasat and others, with about 15 MHz expected to go to European-owned entities and the remainder to other users.

He believes Europe's own IRIS sovereign satellite constellation project is unlikely to materialize on its stated timeline given the bureaucracy and number of companies involved ('like herding cats').

Published EU criteria for the 2 GHz allocation reportedly require EU ownership of the constellation, European operations/control centers, traffic that originates and lands within Europe (not routed through other regions), and a constellation flagged in an EU country — which AST has pursued via Germany.

Deutsche Telekom has not yet joined Satellite Connect Europe, but he expects it eventually will, given the competitive threat MNOs see from Starlink.

As part of positioning as a 'fully European solution,' Satellite Connect Europe plans to launch its satellites on Ariane rockets where possible.

If granted, he expects Satellite Connect Europe could receive on the order of 10 MHz by 10 MHz of S-band spectrum.

Using a hypothetical Brazil example to illustrate how sovereign JV structures could get around FCC/EchoStar reciprocity disputes over global spectrum rights, he states that a 10 MHz by 10 MHz S-band allocation for local Brazilian MNOs 'is actually what has happened' — though he introduces this as a hypothetical, so the specific claim should be treated as uncertain/unclear.

He argues this creates a sovereignty risk with Starlink around data interception/filtering and around the network being unilaterally turned off if a country's leadership were at odds with SpaceX's owner, whereas AST's regional JV structure gives local partners full control including a kill switch.

He states Starlink has not formed joint-ownership structures with local MNOs anywhere and does not integrate into an MNO's core network, unlike AST's model.

He says he is 'almost 100% certain' AST's J-LEO proposal will commit to launching a meaningful share (he floats 50-80%) of Japan's satellites on Mitsubishi Heavy, framing this as a win-win for regulators supporting both communications and launch sovereignty.

He believes most global MNOs now see SpaceX as a direct competitive threat since its IPO prospectus and presentations targeted terrestrial cellular service, and expects early Starlink-aligned carriers in Japan (KDDI, NTT Docomo, SoftBank) to begin leaving the 'Starlink train' if AST wins J-LEO.

An Antonov large cargo plane from India — where the company's composite 'donut rings' are made — was expected to land in Midland the day of recording; he guesses 7 to 10 rings (possibly more) will be unloaded now that a prior stacking issue has reportedly been solved.

Going forward, the company does not plan to rely on Antonov flights for all ring shipments; as the composite ring design finalizes and production stabilizes, he expects more shipments to move by boat, noting some rings may already have arrived that way.

Because Rakuten was an early seed investor in AST, AST ceded control/exclusivity of the Japanese market to Rakuten, meaning AST could not previously sign direct agreements with KDDI, SoftBank, or NTT Docomo.

He says the J-LEO program's requirement that service be available to every carrier is expected to open the Japanese market to AST, allowing it to earn economics from KDDI, NTT Docomo, and SoftBank users — though probably not from Rakuten itself — a dynamic he thinks the market doesn't fully appreciate.

He notes Deutsche Telekom had previously been reducing its T-Mobile stake but reversed course over the last 3-4 years to increase ownership, viewing T-Mobile as strategically important given weaker profitability in the European market.

If SpaceX did acquire a large carrier like T-Mobile (which he estimates at roughly $95 billion of revenue and $37 billion of EBITDA), he argues SpaceX's valuation would likely get 'derated' toward wireless-carrier multiples (roughly 6-7x EBITDA, maybe a blended ~12x) from its current much higher multiple, since a majority of pro forma revenue and EBITDA would become traditional wireless-carrier economics.

He compares a hypothetical SpaceX/T-Mobile deal to AOL's acquisition of Time Warner during the dot-com bubble — financially accretive in some ways but ultimately associated with significant value destruction.

He argues that if Starlink acquired T-Mobile, it would put every Starlink-partnered MNO globally 'on notice' of SpaceX's competitive intent, potentially accelerating adoption of AST SpaceMobile among remaining incumbent carriers.

He discusses broader macro context — crude oil having round-tripped back to pre-Iran-conflict levels (potentially deflationary) even as the market's Fed outlook has shifted from rate cuts toward possible rate hikes of 25-50 basis points by year end — as part of why high-beta sectors like space have underperformed defensive/cyclical names recently.

In response to a listener question, he says AST will not hit a previously floated target of 45 satellites in orbit by year-end, expecting that milestone more likely in Q1 or Q2 of next year; he attributes the lack of updated public guidance to the company being in active discussions for additional launch capacity and not yet knowing if the eventual count lands around 20, 25, or 30.

Responding to a question about whether the J-LEO award is $1 billion split across multiple companies, he clarifies his understanding that the award goes to one company/joint venture — $1 billion upfront plus ongoing economics — not split among multiple firms.

Asked whether Starlink could preserve data sovereignty simply by using only Japanese gateways, he responds that Starlink owns all of its own gateway infrastructure in every market and has never entered into MNO joint-ownership structures, so architecturally and business-wise it doesn't achieve the same sovereignty as AST's model.

The derating across space stocks kicked off at the end of May, triggered by the Blue Origin New Glenn 4 hot-fire test explosion that destroyed Blue Origin's launch pad at SLC-36; since then, positive company-specific news (from AST, Rocket Lab, Planet, etc., including defense contracts) has not moved the stocks.

Part of the sector weakness reflects liquidity draining out as fast money that had owned space stocks ahead of the SpaceX IPO sold them to buy SpaceX instead; SpaceX has traded as high as about $220 and was recently around $158, and is likely to remain volatile given its public float is only slightly above 5% of the company (after the green shoe was exercised).

To hedge or monetize a locked-up SpaceX position, a holder would typically need to establish a relationship with a bank like Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley to get margin/collateral against the private stock (e.g., roughly 30% margin against a $100 million SpaceX position), then use that collateral to short a basket of other space stocks (not SpaceX itself).

AST has taken the brunt of this hedging versus other space names like Rocket Lab, Redwire, and Planet because AST is one of the few pure-play public proxies for SpaceX's connectivity/Starlink business, which is the largest piece of SpaceX's financials; short interest in Rocket Lab has also risen materially (notably around Friday/Monday), but not as much as in AST.

EchoStar is another popular indirect proxy to short SpaceX given EchoStar's SpaceX stake, but Anpanman cautions the EchoStar sum-of-the-parts arbitrage trade (long EchoStar, short SpaceX to close the valuation gap) is difficult — citing trading discount, liquidity, and tax considerations, plus the historical example of the multi-year Alibaba/Yahoo arbitrage — and says these trades need a clear catalyst or corporate event to unlock value, which is unclear here (also flagging uncertainty about what Charlie Ergen would do with proceeds if SpaceX stock were sold).

The first SpaceX lockup expiration is expected around August 20, unlocking 20% of total shares outstanding, with a further 10% unlocking if the stock price holds at a certain level; people are expected to start unwinding hedges before that date to get ahead of others doing the same.

AST's short interest is at all-time highs versus when the stock was near $130 at the end of May, even though the share price has fallen about 49% since then.

There are 4 outstanding convertible bond issuances; the first two have largely been retired, leaving two large tranches of roughly $1.1 billion each. Assuming convert-arb desks hold about 80% of those issuances, they would have had to cover an estimated 7 million shares of their delta-hedge short position as the stock fell from about $130 to about $70.

Because overall net short interest actually grew despite convert-arb covering, Anpanman estimates outright shorts/hedgers have added about 23-24 million shares short since the $130 top — roughly $2.3 billion of hedge notional at an assumed average price of $100 — a figure he says is consistent with sophisticated SpaceX holders hedging via a basket of comps.

Ideally this hedging is done via a diversified basket to avoid idiosyncratic risk, but in practice AST has taken an outsized share of the hedging; more recently the hedging appears to be broadening to other names too (e.g., Rocket Lab down about 9% on the day discussed).

Anpanman views the short position as temporary — once insiders' SpaceX shares unlock and are sold, the hedges should be covered (unless holders have an independent bearish view on space names), which he sees as a coming positive catalyst.

Anpanman estimates that going forward, over 60% of 'new SpaceX's' revenue could come from leasing compute infrastructure (apparently built originally for xAI) rather than from space/connectivity, meaning SpaceX is becoming more of a terrestrial data-center company than a pure space company, at least for now.

This shift introduces 'basis risk' for anyone shorting a basket of space names purely to hedge SpaceX connectivity exposure: a sophisticated hedger should arguably reallocate roughly 60% of their short basket into compute/data-center names (e.g., IREN, NBIS, MARA, CoreWeave) and only about 40% into space names like AST, Rocket Lab, and Firefly, but Anpanman says the relative price action suggests this reallocation has not really happened yet, or has only occurred gradually.

Combined with the AST-Rakuten joint venture announced the prior day, Anpanman believes today's 700 MHz approval strongly positions the venture (which he expects will be branded something like 'Satco Japan') for Japan's J-LEO contract, a public-private partnership allocating over $1 billion of Japanese government capital to build a satellite backup network functioning as Japan's equivalent of the U.S.'s FirstNet, addressing risks like earthquakes, tsunamis, and potential conflict-driven network outages.

Anpanman argues AST has a decisive architectural edge over Starlink for J-LEO because AST's system works with existing, unmodified phones already in the hands of Japan's (including elderly) population, and because low-band spectrum penetrates rubble/buildings far better than the mid-band spectrum Starlink's satellites use — citing an earthquake/building-collapse scenario as the clearest illustration.

An internal J-LEO decision is expected around the end of June, with the winning bidder likely made public in July or August; Anpanman speculates the result could leak via Japanese reporters (e.g., Nikkei) before an official announcement, and jokingly suggests watching Abel Avellan's demeanor at the upcoming launch as a possible tell.

A formal Rakuten-AST JV announcement (i.e., a full commercial unveiling) is not expected until either AST/Rakuten win the J-LEO project or get closer to commercial service; the regulator is expected to revisit today's 700 MHz approval at a meeting in September, which may be when formal commercial-service approval and a bigger JV announcement follow.

Rakuten and AST have reportedly been testing service using SoftBank's spectrum, which Anpanman reads as a signal that SoftBank is likely to eventually join the joint venture; he expects other Japanese carriers (SoftBank, NTT Docomo, and possibly even KDDI) to defect from their current Starlink partnerships and join the Rakuten/AST venture over time, partly because Japanese users have given Starlink poor reviews and because emergency-network law may require interoperability during a terrestrial network outage.

As part of J-LEO's domestic-industry support angle, AST (per prior comments from Abel Avellan in Q3 of last year) has been in talks with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, whose H3 rocket in its heaviest configuration could carry roughly 3 BlueBirds to LEO; Anpanman suggests J-LEO government funding could subsidize AST launches on a Japanese vehicle, an option not really available to SpaceX/Starlink.

Anpanman expects a similar joint-venture structure to emerge in Brazil, likely centered on 1-2 key MNOs who would then invite other Brazilian carriers to join, contributing additional low-band spectrum to complement AST's existing S-band grant; he notes AST has been hiring employees in Brazil, consistent with this expansion.

Anpanman frames the emerging pattern (Europe's Satellite Connect, an unnamed U.S. venture, and Japan/Brazil) as AST building regional joint ventures market by market.

BlueBirds 11 through 13 are close to complete; the next SpaceX launch is expected in the first week of August, which Anpanman says matches AST's own due diligence despite some investor hope for a July launch.

Anpanman estimates 4 total SpaceX (or equivalent) launches for AST this year, including the upcoming one, implying roughly one launch every 1.25 months for the rest of the year depending on production; he expects the company may announce additional SpaceX launches, plus new launch agreements with ULA, Relativity, and MHI (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries), and possibly Ariane.

The prior '45 satellites by year-end' target is not going to happen this year, in Anpanman's view; he expects the milestone to shift to around March or April of next year, which he characterizes as not a big deal, with Blue Origin's New Glenn expected to resume launches for AST once it completes roughly 2-3 successful commercial missions after fixing its pad (hoped for around December).

The T-Mobile/Starlink deal is believed to be ending this month or next month, though Anpanman doesn't expect T-Mobile to fully abandon Starlink immediately; he thinks an AST-T-Mobile arrangement could be announced a few months out, but notes the AST/MNO joint-venture structure (which would enable T-Mobile to work with AST) has not yet gone definitive.

On the recent AWS-3 spectrum license auction (remaining licenses), Anpanman guesses a single primary bidder purchased most licenses and speculates it was likely AT&T given its relatively lower mid-band exposure; he flags that if SpaceX itself had bought the licenses, that would be a notable signal underscoring MNOs' need to partner with AST to counter SpaceX's move into terrestrial spectrum.

Kook recalls that when ASTS first gapped up (he believes in 2024), he faced a large short-term capital gains tax bill and considered a prepaid forward with his private bankers, but ultimately did not do it — a decision he's glad about since the stock later rose from around $40 to around $70 at time of recording (noting he views the current price as a temporary drawdown from a higher 'real' value).

Kook says exact put and call strike prices for the new transaction are not yet known, but could be reverse-engineered on Bloomberg to find strikes that net out to approximately $0 cost.

Kook states this is 'absolutely not a CEO selling out' — Avellan has not actually sold shares; he would only part with the 2.5 million collared shares if the stock price rises well above the call strike by expiry and he chooses not to roll the position again.

Avellan takes no salary from AST SpaceMobile — paying himself cash would require issuing shares to fund it since the company lacks positive cash flow, and would therefore be dilutive; he also takes only a modest amount of stock compensation. His true 'income' comes from the wealth generated by his stock ownership as founder, monetized periodically via structures like this prepaid forward rather than via company-paid compensation.

Kook believes that when Avellan's prior 2.5 million share prepaid forward was disclosed, it was also executed the same day, because pre-announcing such a structure would let the market front-run the hedging flow; he assumes with '99% probability' the new transaction was also executed on the day it was disclosed, which he believes explains unusual weakness in ASTS that day even though it outperformed other space stocks.

Kook notes the timing is coming up against an approaching quarter-end blackout period (exact blackout dates unknown to him) during which a CEO typically cannot transact, which he believes factored into the timing.

Kook praises Avellan for not executing this transaction at the stock's prior all-time highs (ahead of the recent launch and before the New Glenn pad explosion), calling the chosen timing — after a successful Block 1 BlueBird launch — a 'gentleman's move' and an expression of respect toward retail shareholders.

Kook frames the combination of a panicked/rock-bottom sentiment environment plus this hedging-driven selling as a possible 'market clearing event' for ASTS, and says he was personally adding to his position today using a strategy he calls 'Torques' (selling a put spread to buy an out-of-the-money call), though he held back from full size to think it over further.

Kook draws a parallel to his own experience selling covered calls last September that got deep in-the-money after the stock ran through $100, forcing him to repeatedly roll the calls to avoid assignment; he expects Avellan will have similar 'avenues' to roll his structure, likely expiring in about one year's time.

If the stock price rises too far above the call strike (using a hypothetical example of the stock at $250 against a made-up $95 strike), it becomes very hard to roll the call, and the structure would settle by delivering the 2.5 million shares to the counterparties at the upper strike band — which would then represent an actual sale of Avellan's stock at that time.

Kook describes very negative retail sentiment ('the kook bottom') and notes ASTS often trades inversely to SpaceX-related news/sentiment; he has been checking with brokers on stock-loan flow and observed ASTS trading volumes starting to normalize, which he interprets as selling intensity coming down.

Kook says he personally is 'fully lent out' on his own ASTS shares (owning a portion of the float below the 13G disclosure threshold) and uses that information about short positioning to inform his trading, refusing to sell while he knows shorts haven't covered.

Kook credits an X account 'Reformed Trader' for good work identifying turning points, and says they had been discussing that today or tomorrow would likely mark the bottom even before knowing about Avellan's transaction.

Kook recounts a lesson from a former Pequot Capital portfolio manager (he recalls the name as possibly 'Arthur Pettit,' expressing uncertainty about the exact name) that 'bad news travels in packs,' and applies this framework to argue that a rock-bottom sentiment environment plus Avellan's filing together represent the kind of clearing event he looks for.

Kook says he did not expect the New Glenn pad explosion and feared it would 'suck the energy' out of the market for space stocks, but chose not to trade around that fear since he doesn't trade his core position; he now views the combination of events as a 'complete reset' and is 'setting up for an exciting summer.'

Kook contrasts Avellan's behavior with 'enormous stock sales' by executives at Intuitive Machines ('the Lunar guys') and a roughly $100 million stock sale by Rocket Lab's CFO, saying the latter would scare him if he saw it from AST SpaceMobile management, even though it didn't stop Rocket Lab's stock.

Kook likens Avellan's compensation philosophy — foregoing stock grants because he already owns enough — to Jeff Bezos's approach at early Amazon, calling it a top-class corporate governance model and saying this alignment gave him extra confidence in what was a risky, and is increasingly a de-risked, investment.

Kook says that if he ever saw 'piggy' executive behavior at AST SpaceMobile, it would turn him off and could make him reconsider his position sizing, but that so far governance and executive alignment have been top-tier on the issues he cares about most.

Kook estimates Avellan's stock holdings at roughly '$7 billion... $4, whatever it is, $5 billion' worth (garbled/uncertain figure), and argues that owning that much concentrated, illiquid stock creates real tax and estate-planning complexity, justifying a need for some liquidity via structures like the prepaid forward.

Kook believes (his own guess) that the next batch of BlueBirds could ship the first week of July, and thinks the market isn't focused on delivery cadence because it's still fixated on launch-vehicle availability, when satellites leaving the facility for launch is actually the best test of both launch-vehicle access and operational cadence; he believes ASTS has at least 5 Falcon 9 launches lined up in succession.

Citing a third-party analysis by 'Kevin Chen,' Kook says each BlueBird adds 20-30 minutes of daily coverage in key markets, so 3 satellites add 60-90 minutes; 20-25 satellites would enable initial non-continuous coverage with some consumer beta service, and 45-60 satellites would deliver continuous coverage in key markets — contrasted with Starlink's model needing hundreds of much smaller satellites.

Kook reflects on the tendency to get bored or anxious with a slow-moving growth stock and sell too early, describing his own past mistake of selling covered calls and only capturing 30% gains before a stock re-rated sharply higher; he credits a retail acquaintance ('Littrell Spackwell') with teaching him to keep a 'moonbag' position for asymmetric upside scenarios.

As an example of a moonbag-worthy idea, Kook mentions he owns Horizon Quantum (ticker HQ), a roughly $500 million market cap company (his figure), acquired partly by being lazy about selling after Anpanman and 'Tutte' sold their positions.

Kook explains his long-running personal joke/thesis that ASTS represents 'competition for the internet,' an idea he jokingly conceived with a friend in high school in the 1990s, and which he sees Elon Musk having realized with Starlink at an implied valuation of roughly $2 trillion (his figure); he argues AST SpaceMobile represents his chance to invest in a similarly transformative, low-friction consumer satellite connectivity business.

Kook articulates his belief that the biggest investment returns come from betting on the management team ('the jockey') rather than the specific current technology ('the horse'), arguing AST SpaceMobile's leadership has repeatedly solved engineering problems (like the casing redesign) that go far beyond what he understood to be possible when he first invested.

Kook speculates — explicitly labeling it pure speculation — that AST may be developing dedicated on-orbit power-generation satellites ('data birds'), floating the idea that AST could act as an independent power platform provider hosting other companies' payloads rather than selling connectivity itself for those satellites.

Citing commentary from 'Reform Trader' and 'Chris Knight,' Kook notes the batch-one launch press release specifically highlighted the satellites' 'high power generation in orbit,' which he interprets as an intentional signal (a 'Scott move') hinting that dedicated power/data-bird satellites are coming, since power itself isn't the RF connectivity product AST normally sells.

Kook mentions that 'Decatzee' has decoded new symbolism on the mission patches (an 'ACE' / Non-Terrestrial Network reference, following a prior patch with MILNET in Morse code), consistent with AST's previously disclosed non-communication use cases.

Kook references research shared by Anpanman on a reported joint venture among AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile (announced in May, per Kook, exact date not given), speculating the arrangement is structured to satisfy antitrust/FTC requirements (separate individual contracts, no price-fixing) and may function as a mechanism to box out SpaceX — which Kook argues would indirectly benefit AST SpaceMobile.

Kook says he still doesn't know the specific structure of an eventual FirstNet commercial deal, but his strongest guess is that it could represent roughly $1 billion a year in revenue through usage and subscription agreements.

Kook introduces Japan's 'J-LEO' program from the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a roughly billion-dollar subsidy for operators bringing direct-to-device satellite constellations under Japanese management, and speculates AST could be positioning to win it given its existing Rakuten partnership and the Connect Europe/SatCo sovereign-JV model as a template.

Kook argues AST's new head of APAC business development being based in Tokyo (a former NEC employee, NEC being AST's key Micron manufacturing partner) only makes sense if a bigger Japan opportunity is in play, since he characterizes AST's existing Rakuten commercial contract (from the Series B) as a weak deal that gave away the service component in exchange for capital.

Kook mentions speculation (attributed to community 'cards flipping into place,' including a point from Anpanman) around a possible AST agreement with Mitsubishi Heavy for the H3 launch vehicle, framed as building Japanese local content and value chain to support a Japan-sovereign constellation narrative.

Kook cautions this entire Japan J-LEO thread is speculative, was not previously on his radar, and is unlikely to be priced into the stock; he says if AST does not win it, he doesn't think it matters much, but winning would be a positive surprise.

Kook discusses Europe's competing sovereign satellite effort (the IRIS2-style constellation involving Eutelsat, SES, and Hispasat), describing it as burdened by 'pork complexity' from having to satisfy multiple national governments (e.g., France, Italy), and notes SpaceX has criticized the EU's plan for distributing 2 GHz satellite spectrum.

Kook argues Vodafone/AST have effectively already found a 'fast track' sovereign model in Europe (via legal structuring so the JV is treated as sovereign) and suggests the same approach should be repeatable in Japan.

Kook says ASTS shares are effectively 'max lent out' (every available share borrowed for short-selling), which he attributes largely to investors with large private SpaceX holdings hedging that exposure by shorting ASTS (and similar names like Rocket Lab) rather than to bearishness on AST's own fundamentals.

Kook compares the current SpaceX-hedging dynamic to Goldman Sachs partners setting up funds specifically to short Goldman stock around its IPO as a workaround to trading restrictions, and predicts that as SpaceX-linked liquidity events resolve and people cover lazy/basis-mismatched short positions, ASTS could see a sharp squeeze-like move higher, especially heading into a period of low summer liquidity and pending Russell 2000 inclusion.

Kook describes his own sentiment as currently 'crap' / a possible 'Kook Bottom' capitulation low, similar to a feeling he had a few weeks earlier when the stock was in the 80s just before it ran to the 90s and 100s, and says this dynamic often precedes a rebound ('snapback').

Kook expects the first week of July and summer generally to be historically strong periods for ASTS, and reiterates his guess that the next BlueBird shipment/launch could occur around August, while cautioning he habitually pushes his own launch estimates back a month.

Kook restates that his goal isn't just building community but achieving a 10x to 20x return on his ASTS investment from current levels.

Anpanman's guess is the Falcon 9 is scheduled for either the first or second week of August, since the satellites are close to being completed and tested.

Anpanman expects the next batch of BlueBirds to ship (or get a shipment-readiness PR) around the second week of July.

Anpanman notes memory is inherently cyclical (boom periods lead to overbuilding of fabs, then demand drops), and questions whether AI demand data-center pullthrough for memory has peaked, though he says the current boom cycle could still run longer than expected.

Anpanman argues leveraged Korean retail investors getting margin-called can cascade into selling of unrelated US holdings, including ASTS and IonQ (IONQ), which he says is widely held by Korean retail investors, similarly to what was observed around the last Bluebird launch.

Anpanman believes space stocks broadly have been de-rated as SpaceX-related enthusiasm has drained out of the sector, and thinks ASTS may have reached at least a near-term bottom because sentiment is 'completely bombed out.'

Anpanman explains that convertible-note arbitrageurs delta-hedge against the underlying warrant/bond: as the stock falls (from $104 toward $77), they become less long and have to cover (buy back) shares, meaning some of the raw short-interest change already reflects covering, not just new shorting.

Because convert arbs were likely net covering several million shares as the stock fell, the rise from 64 million to 77 million shares short implies there are a lot more outright shorts (fundamental shorts or hedged 'space basket' shorts, e.g. via Goldman swaps) than the headline number alone suggests.

Anpanman flags an upcoming SpaceX share lockup: a minimum of 20% of SpaceX shares become tradable on August 20, with up to an additional 10% (30% total) unlocking depending on SpaceX's trading performance.

Anpanman theorizes that when SpaceX shares unlock, investors holding a hedged 'space basket' short (including ASTS) against private SpaceX stakes will sell their newly liquid SpaceX shares and cover their ASTS shorts, creating a potential squeeze dynamic given how heavily shorts have piled into AST.

This JV structure mirrors Satellite Connect Europe, which AST formed with Vodafone and later brought in additional partners including Orange, Telefónica, CK Hutchison, and Telenor; Anpanman guesses Deutsche Telekom will also eventually join the European JV.

The JV is intended to be established within 2026, likely within the next few months, and was clearly designed to help win Japan's J-LEO project, with a decision expected within about a week (end of June).

The JV structure allows competitor carriers (KDDI, NTT Docomo, SoftBank) to access Rakuten's exclusive AST network during disaster/emergency roaming scenarios via pooled spectrum protocols, even though Rakuten remains the exclusive commercial user.

Criterion 1 — Japanese ownership/operational control: the winner must be a Japan-incorporated entity that owns, operates and manages the LEO infrastructure itself, with all ground facilities (gateways, operational/payload/network control centers) located in Japan; Anpanman argues AST's bent-pipe architecture and the new Japan-owned JV satisfy this, while Starlink's model (fully owned/operated by Starlink, providing only an eSIM to carriers like T-Mobile) does not, unless Starlink creates a new Japan-controlled entity.

Criterion 2 — direct-to-smartphone service by March 2029: both AST and Starlink can plausibly meet this deadline; Anpanman is skeptical MDA Space and Telesat (speculated as possible bidders) could build a full constellation and launch service in time.

Sub-criterion — video calling for roughly 70% of each day nationwide (about 16.8 hours/day): Anpanman argues this effectively disqualifies Starlink's current 650-satellite V1 direct-to-device constellation, which he says only supports narrowband data (not video calling with multiple users in a cell), while AST believes it can deliver continuous coverage over Japan with 45-60 satellites.

Sub-criterion — service to general (existing) users: AST's service works with unmodified existing phones, whereas Starlink's approach requires a new chipset for V1 and an entirely new one for future V2 satellites (targeted around 2028-2029), which Anpanman argues makes Starlink poorly suited for near-term, backwards-compatible disaster/emergency use.

Low-band spectrum: AST's Block 2 satellites use low-band spectrum, which Anpanman argues is critical for penetrating rubble/debris in disaster scenarios, versus Starlink's current mid-band-only architecture, which he says can't penetrate obstacles as effectively and would require a new, larger phased-array satellite and MNO partnerships to access low-band.

Criterion 3 — disaster roaming across Japanese operators: the winning system must support Japan's planned emergency interoperator roaming, letting any Japanese carrier's subscribers roam onto the JLEO operator's satellite service during a terrestrial outage; Anpanman notes Starlink has not formed an equivalent joint venture with KDDI to serve this role.

Criterion 4 — spectrum licensing path: bidders need a credible path to uplink/downlink spectrum (own, lease, or JV contribution), not necessarily ownership today; Rakuten holds 700 MHz low-band plus some mid-band spectrum, while Anpanman argues this likely disqualifies MDA Space, which lacks an MNO partner.

Deployment plan / launch vehicle criterion: AST and Rakuten could contract Mitsubishi Heavy (whose 6-SRB configuration can launch 3 Block 2 satellites per launch) for part of the constellation, supporting Japan's domestic space program and economy — something Anpanman says Starlink/SpaceX would not do given its own launch capacity.

Criterion 5 — financial stability/post-subsidy operation: bidders must show technical capability, staffing, a fully funded plan, and a viable commercial model; Anpanman says AST/Rakuten meet this given demonstrated video calling in Japan and financial capacity.

Anpanman does not believe the market is currently pricing in a potential J-LEO win for AST, since the stock hasn't reflected it over the last few weeks; he'd be disappointed if Starlink wins but sees AST as clearly better positioned on the stated criteria.

Anpanman frames sovereignty/control as central to why countries like Japan (and comparably India) want their own governed satellite infrastructure rather than relying on Starlink, citing Elon Musk's past unilateral decision to turn off Starlink service related to the Ukraine-Russia conflict as the 'kill switch' scenario nations want to avoid.

Under AST's model, the local JV/MNO effectively owns, operates, and controls the network in-country, so there's no external kill switch; data goes directly from the phone up to the satellite and back down to the local network operator rather than routing through Starlink's own separately-owned global network infrastructure.

Anpanman argues a US-company-provided (AST) solution winning J-LEO would still be a net positive for the US government's interests as a Japan ally, versus concerns about a foreign (e.g., Chinese) constellation, though he acknowledges Elon Musk's political influence in the US government could theoretically factor into any decision.

Anpanman recalls that around February 2026, AST filed with the FCC to test on T-Mobile's spectrum, which was puzzling at the time; he now thinks this makes more sense in light of the announced AT&T/Verizon JV, and speculates T-Mobile could eventually defect from Starlink toward AST.

Asked about SpaceX buyout rumors, Anpanman assigns a very low likelihood, citing US antitrust law (Sherman Act, Clayton Act), the DOJ, and the FCC's preference for supplier diversity; he says this could only change if either SpaceX or AST became financially distressed, which he doesn't foresee.

Responding to a listener who noted the August launch seems late relative to a 45-satellites-by-year-end target, Anpanman says AST will not hit 45 satellites by year-end; he guesses 20-25 satellites by year-end 2026 and 45 by late Q1/early Q2 2027, with the company still procuring additional SpaceX launches and other launch-provider agreements (MLAs), and watching how quickly Blue Origin returns to the pad.

Anpanman disputes a listener's suggestion that the August launch represents 'another delay,' saying he does not recall the company ever guiding to two launches in July; he expects the Q2 earnings call to land in early August, around the same time as the BB11-13 launch, and guesses another batch of ready-to-launch Bluebirds could be announced before that August launch.

Asked why Elon Musk has never commented on AST SpaceMobile, Anpanman theorizes Musk avoids the topic because Starlink's direct-to-cell effort (built by acquiring narrowband IoT provider Swarm, whose team was later let go) followed AST's, and because Musk used wording similar to AST's own marketing when announcing the T-Mobile service in August 2022 — implying he doesn't want to legitimize a competitor that got there first.

He calls this a testament to the company's engineering, noting no other operator has, to his knowledge, built a satellite that deploys a massive phased array without needing a separate launch vehicle adapter (LVA).

The company currently can stack 3 to 4 satellites and is iterating toward stacking a full 8, which would fill a Blue Origin New Glenn fairing; for a New Glenn 9x4 configuration he guesses a 6x6 stacked arrangement.

The deployed phased array is roughly 200 meters squared in size; there is also an unadvertised tail extension carrying additional solar arrays, which he speculates may also have some phased-array functionality (unconfirmed).

AST's large phased array is what lets it communicate with unmodified, low-power phones on low-band spectrum from 26,000-27,000 km/hr orbital speeds, whereas Starlink's phased array (roughly 2.5m x 2.5m) is optimized for mid-band spectrum, requires FCC waivers to operate, and only works with newer phones carrying a specific chipset — not older phones.

He ties AST's backward compatibility with existing/older phones to AST and Rakuten being well-positioned to win Japan's J-LEO contract, and to disaster-recovery/national-security use cases where new-phone requirements are a liability; he notes EchoStar's planned spectrum deployment (sometime 2028-2029) will also require a new phone.

He argues competitors who dismissed the need for large phased arrays are now all moving toward larger arrays themselves, but says AST's existing patent portfolio (an updated patent count was included in the day's press release, number not stated) creates a 'massive moat,' and speculates the company may eventually enforce or monetize those patents once competitors' roadmaps are locked into covered technology, rather than doing so now.

For comparison, he says current Starlink satellites top out around 7 Mbps per cell (narrowband texting/SOS/some pictures), while next-generation Starlink is targeting around 150 Mbps, contingent on Starship achieving commercial-cadence success.

Whether those satellites ship immediately depends on the next Falcon 9 launch date: if it's in July they'll likely ship soon, but if the next launch slips to early August the satellites may be held rather than shipped before the launch site is ready to receive them.

He believes the company is procuring offsite storage/processing space near Cape Canaveral (citing a job posting for a payload integration/receiving manager there) to handle logistics as launch cadence scales toward deploying 248 satellites over the next 2-3 years.

With Blue Origin New Glenn offline for a projected several months, he expects AST to announce additional Falcon 9 launches and formal multi-launch agreements with ULA and Mitsubishi in the near term, with Arianespace as another possible addition and more frontier providers like Relativity Space potentially added later — all framed as his own guesses, not confirmed.

He notes Relativity's Terran R (a heavy-lift rocket he estimates could carry around 6 Bluebirds) is expected to have its maiden flight sometime in Q3 or Q4 (his guess, year unstated but implied 2026).

His expected strategy: anchor launches on Falcon 9, layer on Blue Origin after further successful missions, then add ULA, Ariane, Mitsubishi, Relativity and ISRO to avoid concentrating risk in one or two providers.

He recalls (uncertain/approximate) that BlueBird 6 launched around December 23 (2025) and the company issued a PR confirming successful deployment around February 10 (2026), roughly 49 days later; he guesses the actual unfolding happened closer to 40-45 days post-launch with a short buffer before the PR.

Applying a similar but possibly shorter timeline (accounting for three satellites instead of one), he estimates confirmation of BlueBird 8/9/10's successful deployment in roughly 35-45 days, putting it around mid-to-second-half of July 2026 — a milestone he plans to add to his catalyst tracker.

Real-time short interest data shows ASTS hit an all-time peak the prior day; the previous high was around 69 million shares, set in mid-May 2026 when the stock price was much higher (he estimates near $100). The current all-time-high figure was stated as approximately '72.2 [million]' shares, though the exact number was garbled/unclear in the audio.

He attributes elevated short interest partly to convertible-note arbitrageurs shorting the stock to hedge the bonds' embedded conversion option, and partly to hedge funds hedging long SpaceX exposure around its IPO by shorting a basket of space comparables (AST SpaceMobile, Rocket Lab, Planet Labs) or running a direct long-SpaceX/short-ASTS pair trade.

He argues many of these shorts don't understand the underlying business (e.g., that AST partners with roughly 60 mobile network operators and could eventually reach a subscriber base numbering in the billions), and expects the trade to eventually 'blow up' on them as the story de-risks, similar to prior short squeezes at $2, $20, $30, $40, and $50 per share.

Upcoming catalysts listed: (1) Bluebird 11, 12, 13 being announced ready to ship; (2) Japan's J-LEO project decision, worth over $1 billion potentially, expected at the end of this month (within about 2 weeks of the episode); (3) confirmation of BlueBird 8-10's successful antenna unfolding and operations; (4) an update/confirmation of the 200 Mbps performance milestone, possibly during a quarterly earnings call; (5) a possible FCC Special Temporary Authority grant for 900 MHz military-application testing, whose application was filed about a week prior, with fast turnaround expected 'given the new world at the FCC'; and (6) a T-Mobile definitive commercial agreement, which he guesses is two quarters or more away, though hints may surface sooner.

He also expects additional multi-launch agreement announcements in between these catalysts.

Asked how many satellites are needed for full North America service, he answers approximately 45 for near-continuous service, with beta/intermittent service achievable at around 20-25 satellites.

Responding to a listener (Ben Deverin) about whether SpaceX could buy EchoStar's remaining paired AWS-3 spectrum, he notes EchoStar received about 2.2% of SpaceX's outstanding stock in the existing AWS-3 transaction, and that EchoStar's sum-of-the-parts (spectrum plus Dish Network) trades at what he estimates as a 40-50% discount; he speculates SpaceX buying more EchoStar spectrum wouldn't surprise him, but this is unconfirmed guesswork.

With New Glenn out of commission for what he estimates as about the next 6 months, the entire space sector derated from all-time highs at the end of May (2026); ASTS itself fell from around $133 pre-mishap to about $86.

He believes AST will produce a Block 3 (mid-band constellation) satellite by the end of this year, and a future Block 4 built around C-band (3.5 GHz) spectrum in partnership with AT&T and Verizon and 'soon' T-Mobile, eventually reaching gigabit-level speeds comparable to fiber — framed as his own expectation, not confirmed guidance.

He refers informally to a government-only satellite constellation as 'Blackbirds' (a name he isn't sure the company will officially use), suggesting FM-1 and FM-2 were effectively early Blackbirds, with more of that constellation coming in the following months.

He expects additional defense-contract news soon, related to Golden Dome and other communications, radar, or sensing applications.

Successful satellite separation itself demonstrates the composite structure held up under launch loads, which is notable given this is a new spacecraft design.

Confirmation that satellites are under control and nominal (powered up, flying) typically comes not long after release, but full deployment/unfolding and successful operations confirmation could take weeks to months; Anpanman guessed operational confirmation would arrive in a few weeks.

Anpanman recalled BlueWalker 3's launch (which he described as approximately 4 years earlier, i.e. around September 2022) as a company-defining event — he and Kook were both there in person with their children, and a mission failure at that stage would likely have been fatal to the company's ability to continue.

A rumored 'JLEO' program has recently come up in the community; one possible 'tell' is that AST SpaceMobile recently hired an APAC program manager based in Japan with significant manufacturing experience at a large Japanese company, which Anpanman suggests could be linked to timing around a JLEO-related decision, though he cautions this connection is unconfirmed speculation.

Anpanman's understanding is the company can currently manufacture around 10 satellites' worth of 'microns' (the phased-array/solar-panel payload) per month, but the composite 'donut' structures housing the phased array plus the control bus are produced at 'just under 6' per month (roughly 4-5).

Reaching 6 satellites/month is a company goal, but is less urgent right now given Blue Origin's New Glenn is offline after the Bluebird 7 loss, reducing available launch capacity; Anpanman guesses the 6/month rate is reached sometime in Q3 2026, over the next month or two.

Longer-term, once additional launch providers come online, Anpanman expects the company to scale toward roughly 10-12 satellites per month at full capacity, factoring in a planned dedicated 'government shell' production line in addition to low-band and mid-band Block 2 Bluebirds.

There is a possibility of a PR disclosing that 'batch 2' satellites are finished/ready but awaiting shipment, since satellites can be ready before the next Falcon 9 slot; the company reportedly hired or was looking to hire a processing manager at Cape Canaveral and may rent or build an integration/storage facility there because AST may ship more Bluebirds than can be immediately launched.

Anpanman predicts AST SpaceMobile will reach a deal with T-Mobile — an MOU and/or definitive agreement — before the end of 2026, most likely in Q4; he called this 'pretty much fait accompli.'

AT&T and Verizon invited T-Mobile to join their new joint venture focused on pooling spectrum and sharing infrastructure for direct-to-cell satellite connectivity, with AT&T 'quarterbacking' the effort; the JV will be positioned to regulators as important for US broadband connectivity and national security.

Anpanman does not expect a visible, fanfare 'breakup' between T-Mobile and Starlink; instead he expects Starlink to remain available as a non-exclusive add-on for T-Mobile customers to appease regulators, while AST SpaceMobile becomes T-Mobile's default full-broadband satellite option.

T-Mobile's exclusivity arrangement with Starlink ends in June or July 2026; Anpanman expects a possible T-Mobile MOU with AST as soon as this month or next, but not a definitive agreement immediately, since the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile JV itself must first become definitive and clear regulatory review before a commercial deal with AST for T-Mobile would follow, pushing definitive terms potentially to Q4 or later.

Anpanman guesses the next Bluebird batch launch will occur in late July or early August 2026.

Integration time from satellite shipment to launch is roughly 3 weeks, which Anpanman describes as fast because the satellites ('tuna cans') are self-contained and stack directly on each other atop the Falcon 9, without needing a custom launch-vehicle adapter structure.

Bluebirds 11, 12, and 13 are expected to be ready for shipment fairly soon, with shipment timed roughly 3 weeks ahead of the next Falcon 9 launch slot, likely putting shipment/launch around late July or early August 2026.

The next launch is expected to be a company-sponsored/hosted event; Anpanman expects launch parties to become less frequent (every 2-3 batches rather than every batch) as launch cadence increases.

Anpanman noted that some hedge funds, via expert-network calls, had taken these skeptics' claims seriously enough to ask whether the satellites would even fit in a Falcon 9.

Anpanman says he participated in the SpaceX IPO and flipped his shares at $165, then reconsidered as the price kept rising overnight, and now thinks SpaceX could be 'the greatest meme stock of all time' because it touches multiple sectors people care about (space, AI, data centers) and has universal brand recognition.

He notes that for a company valued around $3 trillion (as of recording), the tradable float is only about 638 million shares, meaning the stock can be pushed around significantly by trading flows until the first lockup expires, which he guesses is sometime in August or September.

He describes SpaceX's broader business mix as an investment vehicle: dominant positions in launch and communications, a 'call option' on AI data centers, and xAI, which he says has pivoted to leasing its large compute buildout to Anthropic and Google to show revenue growth (margins unclear to him), and which acquired Cursor (programming tools) for $60 billion to build out AI coding functionality.

He compares X (Twitter) within the SpaceX/xAI ecosystem to Reddit, as a platform generating user content that can be used to train AI models.

Anpanman says liquidity has been draining out of the space sector (though not out of neocloud names like IREN and NBIS that SpaceX also competes with) as SpaceX absorbs attention and capital ahead of and after its IPO.

He agrees with a recent comment from Rocket Lab CEO Peter Beck that the space sector will bifurcate into higher-quality names (which he identifies as Rocket Lab in launch/space systems, AST SpaceMobile in communications, and Planet Labs in Earth observation, plus other names like Voyager) versus lower-quality/speculative trading vehicles such as Virgin Galactic and Sidus Space.

He says AST's real-time short interest has jumped over the last few days, nearing its all-time high of roughly 68.4 million shares (versus an all-time high of about 69 million shares reached a few weeks earlier), which he attributes partly to hedge funds running a long-SpaceX/short-space-basket momentum trade that he expects to unwind once SpaceX pulls back or new space investors look for other pure-play names.

He relays a point Kook made over the weekend comparing the space trade to the AI trade: just as Nvidia was the obvious pure-play AI name before capital rotated into AMD, energy/gas-turbine component makers, and optical names, he expects capital to rotate from SpaceX into pure-play space names like AST SpaceMobile, Rocket Lab, and Planet over the summer.

He suggests that if Blue Origin gets its launch pad rebuilt and completes a few commercial launches, Jeff Bezos should take Blue Origin public given SpaceX's valuation, which he says would be a watershed moment creating a genuinely investable public space sector.

He expects a shipment announcement for the next batch (BlueBird 11, 12, 13) soon, noting the company has recently achieved about a 3-week turnaround between shipping satellites and having them integrated into a launch fairing; he guesses that next launch happens in late July or early August.

Anpanman states that after this launch, the constellation count changes ('by getting these 3 satellites up, we have 6... increase it by 50%... got another 3, so we're basically double the constellation in the next 2 months') — the specific figures are somewhat garbled/inconsistent as stated and should be treated as uncertain.

He expects a handful of multi-launch agreements (MLAs) to be announced in the next few months, adding specificity that talks with Ariane and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) are progressing and that Relativity is likely also in the running.

He speculates that if AST wins the roughly $1 billion Japanese LEO (JLEO) project, he 'wouldn't be surprised' if AST buys launches from Mitsubishi Heavy as part of that package deal.