Episodes

Kook spitballs that the next launch is likely no later than the end of September 2026 (his conservative/outside date), with early September as his more aggressive guess, noting other launches may be consuming range availability.

A tweet from investor Vinod S. described a "working session" between Meta and AST SpaceMobile at Meta's San Francisco offices covering end-to-end product vision, user experience, network architecture, go-to-market strategy, and technical integration; Kook, drawing on his own startup experience (an N of 1), speculates such multi-team workshops typically occur after a strategic deal has already been reached.

Kook says he has "99% confidence" that the J-LEO award has effectively gone to Rakuten and AST SpaceMobile, framing it as potentially worth $1 billion of capital to the company, though he notes the deal still needs time to move through Japanese board processes before being formally finalized.

Kook says SpaceX is exploring building out its own terrestrial mobile network but argues this makes little sense given the capital intensity, the low-growth, low-return nature of the MNO business, and the likelihood SpaceX would be the highest-cost new entrant in a saturated market.

Kook frames the 80% European coverage figure as evidence of a 'winner-take-most' market dynamic, comparing it to Nvidia's early GPU business before the market recognized its AI trajectory, and estimates a similar epiphany for ASTS could play out over a 1-2 year timeframe.

Kook notes AST could plausibly have launched roughly 9 satellites within about 3 months given recent cadence, encouraging investors not to underestimate how quickly the buildout toward the 45-satellite target could progress.

Kook's investment thesis is that ASTS is a revolutionary, scalable, defensible business with a large commercial market; he says investors who bought ahead of de-risking events sometimes get compensated, but sometimes the payoff is only clear in hindsight.

Kook says the most recent major de-risking event was the mid-June Batch 1 launch of the composite satellites, which proved the go-forward Block 2 technology works in space, even though commercial operations haven't started yet.

Kook argues ASTS benefits from several reinforcing barriers to entry rare in an early-stage company: commercial barriers, a large patent/IP portfolio, and regulatory barriers, and that the investment industry historically overlooked space until SpaceX's rise.

Kook says the 'super wholesale' business model -- working with any existing device rather than requiring a dedicated satellite phone -- solves the go-to-market inefficiency that killed prior satellite ventures like Iridium.

Kook believes ASTS could be among the fastest businesses ever to scale to 100 million and potentially a billion users, calling this a 'pretty sexy stat' if it proves true, though he frames it as unproven belief rather than fact.

Kook argues Avellan's ability to win the backing of tower companies, spectrum owners, and handset owners -- without whom the company would not be possible -- signals he was viewed as an unusually capable team-builder and executor.

Kook says his original investment depended on a series of 'if' statements -- does the technology work, will regulators approve it, is financing available, will the constellation get built, will MNO deals happen -- that outside experts overwhelmingly believed would resolve to 'no.'

Kook believes those if-statements have now resolved to 'yes' across technology, regulation, and financing, leaving essentially one big remaining if: whether direct-to-device satellite becomes a large market.

Kook says SpaceX's own stock market valuation and its stated ambition to become an MNO are evidence the broader market believes direct-to-device is a big opportunity, which he reads as favorable context for ASTS.

Kook says the consensus view a year or two ago was that satellite ventures have historically been plagued by financial distress, and that most people stopped their analysis there without considering changes in the business model, launch costs, and consumer demand.

Kook says his near-term watch items are the J-LEO announcement (which he calls a billion-dollar deal), continued launch-cadence pacing that could compress to roughly once a month, and larger contracts like Golden Dome and FirstNet that could shift market perception of the company.

Kook says the ultimate driver of value is how much revenue the company generates over time, and that whether ASTS supports a $100 billion, $250 billion, or trillion-dollar market cap is unknown but no longer an unreasonable question given how scalable infrastructure companies can achieve winner-take-most outcomes.

Kook says SPACs are brutal to invest through because of a weak shareholder base, no institutional ownership, and extreme volatility, and that the transition from R&D experiment to operating company took a long time and was very hard.

Kook describes personally living through a near death spiral, where launch/technology delays caused investors to worry about liquidity runway, which repriced the cost of capital and made the runway problem worse -- despite this being the exact risk he had warned the company about in advance.

Kook identifies technology risk, execution risk, regulatory risk, and financing risk as the compound risks he took on, calling financing risk the real killer because it drives enterprise-value leakage once investors worry about the liquidity runway.

Kook says the cap table now includes strategics and long-only institutional holders at the top of the table, a shift from earlier years when the stock was viewed as 'toxic waste' by de-SPAC-wary institutions and traded on thin retail volume.

Kook notes founder Abel Avellan still holds a large economic and voting ownership stake despite the company's capital intensity, which he interprets as a sign the company financed itself well rather than diluting the founder excessively.

Kook estimates roughly $1 trillion of capital in the telecom coverage universe could flow into ASTS as it gains traction and results, a figure he says is now closer to $3 trillion once SpaceX is included, not counting other space companies like Rocket Lab.

Kook says he invested dramatically early and watched the stock grind lower for three to four years before a revaluation moment, illustrating that some stocks require waiting a large fraction of a decade for the market to recognize their value.

Kook recalls being paranoid ahead of the BlueWalker 3 launch, worried launch itself was pure risk, until Anpanman pointed out the market actually likes launches because they represent operational de-risking; analysis of comparable stocks confirmed this pattern held.

Kook says the stock has consistently rallied into and around successful launches (Block 2, the current Batch 2), and that even after the BlueBird 7 New Glenn failure, the stock recovered within days, a pattern he expects to repeat faster after any future mishap.

Kook lays out four valuation regimes the stock has moved through: a distressed-option regime pricing only spectrum/balance-sheet/technology NAV, a 'limited success' regime, a cautiously optimistic $100-150 regime reflecting comfort with execution, and an unrealized winner-take-most regime above $150 tied to government deals and full execution.

Kook says he tracks sell-side estimates (citing Deutsche Bank) mainly as a sanity check on operational metrics and market-share-to-revenue translation rather than as precise forecasts, and notes estimates fell as the market absorbed prior delays before typically rising again as forecasts look further out.

Kook says ASTS has a controlling shareholder in Abel Avellan, which he frames as either terrible or great governance depending on whether you trust the founder to make difficult long-term decisions insulated from short-term Wall Street pressure, citing Google's YouTube purchase and Meta's WhatsApp purchase as historical parallels.

Kook views ASTS's board favorably, saying its members can open doors, inspire regulator and customer confidence, and attract talent rather than being merely 'shiny names.'

Kook says Abel Avellan is an owner-operator aligned with shareholders since AST SpaceMobile is effectively his own investment vehicle and he is the largest common shareholder.

Kook says ASTS monetizes through MNO partners who bear customer-acquisition costs (e.g., AT&T advertising the service), which ASTS captures indirectly through revenue share rather than paying CAC directly.

Kook says his own pricing model uses conservative per-gigabit assumptions, but he believes actual pricing will likely exceed his model because the service is scarce, premium, and can be segmented across billions of consumers globally for value-based pricing.

Kook says he originally modeled spectral efficiency at 2 bits per hertz, but believes the company has 'recently been blasting past that,' citing roughly 10 bits per hertz at peak data rates, which he says makes him uncertain how much further the technology has advanced beyond his own model.

Kook models subscriber counts using only AT&T and Verizon (deliberately excluding T-Mobile, which he believes ASTS will eventually win), applying assumed attach rates and a roughly $10 ARPU to bridge to a range of $10 billion to $40 billion of potential revenue.

Kook says if ASTS were already priced at a $1 trillion market cap he would not own the stock, but believes the company can plausibly do at least $10 billion of revenue, making ownership at roughly 1-3x that revenue an attractive risk-return in his view.

Kook says he personally can see a path to a $250-$500 stock price 'pretty soon,' but frames this explicitly as his own thinking rather than a buy recommendation.

Kook says whether the company can finance itself was long one of the most important questions for the market, and that he took the view, largely out of desperation at the bottom, that 'good projects find money' -- a view that proved correct on outcome but not on his pricing/timing expectations.

Kook says he expected more non-dilutive prepayments from partners than the company has actually received, and is unsure whether partners offered less than expected or whether the company deliberately chose to fund itself and retain better long-term revenue shares instead.

Kook argues that a company stating it is 'fully financed' for one target (e.g., 65 satellites) is not inconsistent with later raising more money to fund a larger ambition (e.g., 100, then 243, then 500 satellites), and cautions against being overly fixated on dilution as a result.

Kook says countries increasingly want sovereignty over satellite constellations rather than relying on the U.S. or on Elon Musk, but that it is logistically and economically infeasible for each country to build its own constellation, creating demand for AST SpaceMobile's flexible JV structures with local kill-switch control.

Kook cites the Saudi Telecom (stc) deal as ASTS's first legitimate revenue backlog, with $1 billion of minimum contracted revenue and a $175 million upfront prepayment, calling it a meaningful data point given Saudi Arabia is not a particularly large country.

Kook says he is 'anxiously awaiting' a possible definitive agreement with T-Mobile, which he describes as 'looking increasingly certain.'

Kook describes the J-LEO structure as potentially allowing ASTS to sell satellites to the Japan JV for roughly $1 billion onto its own balance sheet while retaining economic use of those satellites across the rest of the world outside Japan, though he says he isn't sure exactly how it will be structured.

Kook says an ASTS satellite carries roughly 2,400 square feet of phased array (about 40,000 elements) versus a next-generation, not-yet-launched Starlink satellite's 10,000-12,000 elements operating at higher, non-low-band frequencies.

Kook says ASTS delivers precise, high-power beamforming ('a high-powered rifle') compared to Starlink's broader, less targeted pattern ('shooting shotguns'), based on FCC filing data he attributes to community analyst Katzi's early work.

Kook argues ASTS can do full broadband voice, video, and data natively integrated with an MNO's network using roughly 50 satellites for initial continuous coverage and 250-500 for a full constellation, versus a Starlink constellation he says is measured in the thousands and currently limited mainly to text/data.

Kook says ASTS's ground-based ('bent pipe') processing preserves data sovereignty and integrates seamlessly with a phone as a native network extension, whereas Starlink's space-based processing routes data through Starlink's own network and appears to the phone as a roaming network, which he says can affect battery drain and user/MNO satisfaction.

Kook says FCC filings show SpaceX's system lacks strong beamforming, requiring 100-kilometer interference buffer zones around country borders that make it difficult or impossible to serve smaller, border-dense regions like Hungary without spamming neighboring countries' spectrum -- a limitation he says does not apply to ASTS.

Kook argues ASTS holds several durable technical moats over Starlink: superior beamforming, an unfurling mechanism that fits a large array into existing rockets (versus Starlink's dependence on Starship working), an early-completed AST5000 ASIC chip, and deep integration with MNO network cores.

Kook says ASTS aggregates spectrum three ways: from MNO partners in return for revenue share, through creative corporate deals like the Ligado acquisition, and via government grants that vary by country.

Kook says SpaceX paid over $20 billion for its spectrum, while he believes ASTS struck a comparatively favorable Ligado deal because ASTS's unique beamforming technology is the only system that can turn the otherwise low-value Ligado spectrum into high commercial value.

Kook shares his own back-of-envelope estimate that the Ligado spectrum could be worth roughly $30 billion, sanity-checked against implied per-megahertz valuations embedded in AT&T's and Verizon's market caps.

Kook says the government opportunity, including Golden Dome, is no longer hypothetical -- ASTS now has demonstrated government traction -- though the ultimate size of future contracts remains unknown; he says a large military contract worth hundreds of millions of dollars would be strongly validating for the stock's valuation multiple.

Kook says community analyst Katzi has observed ASTS's ITU-filed sun-synchronous orbital 'shells,' which hint at government/military use cases not always explicitly announced by the company.

Kook says position-navigation-and-timing (PNT) government applications alone could be worth billions of dollars, and that government opportunities are additive/stacking rather than mutually exclusive with the commercial business.

Kook lists additional potential non-dilutive government funding sources including the 5G Fund for Rural America, military grants, and FirstNet, though he says these are increasingly less important to the stock given the company's current balance sheet.

Kook says he is evaluating whether ASTS could become the platform ('the AWS') for AI data centers in space, viewing it as a potential source of significant additional upside beyond his original telecom-only thesis, but stresses this is speculative and not yet explicitly valued in his model.

Kook argues the company's proven ability to build and launch large satellites at increasing scale demonstrates it 'can build' toward an AI-data-center use case, even though the actual market for space-based AI compute remains rapidly evolving and uncertain.

Kook says the market's concern shifted from satellite production capability to launch cadence and capacity after Blue Origin's quality-control issues in the spring, though he notes ASTS is launch-agnostic with agreements across SpaceX, Blue Origin, ISRO, and other providers including newer entrants like Relativity and Stoke.

Kook says he believes ASTS has roughly five Falcon 9 launches booked but is not fully certain there aren't more, and that Blue Origin is expected to return to the pad, giving him confidence in long-term launch visibility even amid near-term bridge-period uncertainty.

Kook says regulatory risk has effectively fallen to zero now that ASTS has received FCC approval, after years of contested proceedings where he says short sellers and skeptics repeatedly claimed approval would not happen.

Kook contrasts satellite-spectrum-based competitors (global but high-frequency, limiting indoor use and throughput) against ASTS's hybrid approach of pairing satellite spectrum with terrestrial MNO spectrum, which he calls the only approach of its kind.

Kook argues Starlink is fundamentally a competitor to full-service MNOs like AT&T rather than to ASTS directly, because MNOs view SpaceX as 'carrier-adversarial' rather than carrier-neutral, positioning ASTS instead as an 'arms dealer' to the world's MNOs.

Kook notes ASTS and SpaceX share vertical integration as a key commonality that other failed satellite ventures lacked, even though building an aerospace production line while simultaneously developing the technology ('production hell') causes many investors to give up too early.

This does not mean AST has a commercial agreement with Deutsche Telekom yet; it is an initial testing step, and Anpanman expects a commercial agreement to eventually follow.

Media and hedge fund commentary warned that today's SpaceX lockup expiry would bring roughly 90 billion shares to market, but SpaceX stock has already traded 98 billion shares, and Anpanman argues the expiry is largely priced in.

Anpanman personally does not expect SpaceX stock to fall much further due to the lockup expiry itself, though he says he could be wrong.

The SpaceX decline has dragged down the broader space sector including AST and Rocket Lab, as some traders treat the whole sector as a proxy trade on SpaceX (long SpaceX/short other names).

As of yesterday, SpaceX's real-time short interest was approximately 298-300 million shares, which he estimates is approaching 50% of the float.

Institutions that participated in SpaceX's IPO (Fidelity, T. Rowe, Invesco, Vanguard, Massachusetts Financial, Jennison, ARK, etc.) only received small toehold positions since just 5% of the company was sold, and are expected to add to positions once lockup liquidity becomes available.

Anpanman believes insider selling from the lockup expiry will be fairly orderly rather than causing a 20% leg down, once shares are digested over the coming days.

There is a lockup milestone requiring the stock to sustain a certain premium to the IPO price for the next tranche to unlock; since the stock is trading below that level, Anpanman says that milestone has not been met.

Anpanman says it was already a foregone conclusion that T-Mobile would eventually join AST, and understands the company is also in talks with T-Mobile directly.

Deutsche Telekom owns 54% economic ownership of T-Mobile but, in his view, fully controls it, so Deutsche Telekom working with Satellite Connect Europe implies T-Mobile eventually will as well.

An analyst noted Starlink has complained it cannot provide adequate service over only a 10 MHz by 10 MHz S-band allocation; Anpanman contrasts this with AST, which he says is built to deliver full mid-band service efficiently over that same amount of spectrum, and notes a similar spectrum dispute is playing out in Brazil.

Pre-market algorithmic trading pushed AST SpaceMobile stock down to around $65 despite the Deutsche Telekom news; Anpanman noted Citadel was a top pre-market trader in the stock and said he was buying aggressively because he viewed the news as major and under-appreciated by the market.

Using an AI query, Anpanman estimates that adding Deutsche Telekom to AST's existing European partners would give AST coverage over roughly 70-80% of EU mobile connections overall, and 80-90% of subscribers in certain major EU countries — his own AI-assisted extrapolation, not company guidance.

Anpanman frames AST as potentially having effectively 100% coverage of the US market and 70-80% of the EU market, and speculates that even conservative subscriber uptake (3-10%) at roughly $5/month would be financially massive.

Anpanman speculates AST could become the largest wireless carrier in the world by subscriber count served (as a wholesaler working through MNO partners), envisioning a scenario years out with roughly 2 billion paying subscribers at $3-5/month ARPU and 85-90% gross margins — explicitly a long-term, speculative scenario.

Anpanman notes AST may generate $150-200 million of revenue in 2026 without any commercial service yet deployed, and argues bears mistakenly value the company on near-term revenue rather than the eventual multi-billion-dollar, high-margin endgame.

Anpanman references other AST skeptics, including Tim Farrar and a commentator he refers to as Stuart Taylor, questioning how they will explain the Deutsche Telekom development given their prior bearish framing.

Anpanman frames this as a European equivalent of the FirstNet public-safety use case, citing recent floods and fires in Spain and France as examples where resilient satellite connectivity for firefighters and first responders is critical when towers are down or destroyed.

Anpanman says Starlink offered its service to some fire-stricken areas, but argues AST's model of enabling first responders to communicate during disasters strengthens AST's case to regulators when seeking 2 GHz S-band spectrum (e.g. 10x10 or 15x15 MHz) up for renewal in May.

Anpanman speculates Satellite Connect Europe could eventually feature a defense 'kill switch' capability or a separate federated constellation of 'Eurobirds' for defense purposes, similar to arrangements in Japan, with potential manufacturing/final testing in Spain and possible Ariane 6 launch support (which he says can carry 6 satellites in its heaviest configuration) and Ex-Im-style funding.

A Bloomberg article from roughly two weeks prior reported Satellite Connect Europe is well positioned to receive a 2 GHz spectrum allocation, but noted current rules may require AST to modify the JV's ownership structure to qualify; Anpanman guesses this could mean Vodafone at 51% and AST at 49%.

Anpanman says MNOs are lobbying European regulators to change rules so Satellite Connect Europe could qualify for both the European-operator and US-operator spectrum allocation buckets, alongside a separate allocation reserved for the EU's own IRIS-2 constellation, which he says has had a slow start and drawn MNO skepticism.

Anpanman argues having Europe's largest MNOs (Vodafone, Orange, Telefonica, Deutsche Telekom) advocating with regulators is a powerful advantage for AST versus SpaceX.

Anpanman recalls Deutsche Telekom's CEO (whose surname he struggles to pronounce, referring to Tim Höttges) previously stating around April that SpaceX is heavily dependent on Deutsche Telekom to help it on regulatory matters in Europe.

Anpanman argues that if Deutsche Telekom shifts its advocacy toward AST, European MNOs who no longer trust SpaceX after its move to compete directly with them will work against, rather than for, SpaceX's EU regulatory interests, tying into broader European desire to protect national telecom champions.

Anpanman contrasts AST's 'bent pipe' architecture, where European-generated traffic stays within the country and returns to the ground locally, with Starlink's global network architecture where traffic can traverse Starlink's network globally, framing AST as more aligned with data sovereignty concerns.

Anpanman notes today's Globalstar architecture is a bent-pipe design similar in approach to AST's, but that in Amazon's newly filed roughly 5,000-satellite constellation, Amazon is adopting a Starlink-like separate roaming network architecture instead.

Anpanman argues this Starlink-like approach benefits Amazon by letting it bundle global connectivity into Amazon devices/Prime, but creates the same fundamental conflict with MNOs (loss of customer/data control) that limits Starlink's MNO partnership traction, which he expects will also limit Amazon.

Asked whether MNOs currently working with Starlink will drop it for AST now that SpaceX has confirmed it will compete for their customers, Anpanman says this is likely over the long run but not the short run, since carriers like T-Mobile and Japan's KDDI/NTT Docomo have heavily marketed Starlink and would find an abrupt reversal embarrassing.

Anpanman suggests T-Mobile could execute a gradual 'uncarrier' marketing pivot by offering AST's service (speculatively branded something like 'T-Space Mobile') as an additional broadband choice alongside its existing Starlink-powered T-Satellite texting service, which he thinks would also play well with regulators.

Japanese carriers other than Rakuten currently lack an AST alternative because Rakuten holds exclusivity in Japan, unless Rakuten chooses to open the relationship to other carriers.

Rogers in Canada rolled out Starlink without a wholehearted marketing push and could pivot to AST relatively easily; AST already works with Bell Canada and added TELUS earlier this year, and Canada has no carrier exclusivity.

Anpanman estimates Starlink is working with roughly 20-22 MNOs globally, some of which, such as Globe Telecom in the Philippines, also have longstanding non-exclusive relationships with AST and will decide which to emphasize once AST's service is live.

Anpanman acknowledges a past investor concern that MNOs might offer both AST and Starlink long-term as Starlink's service improves, but argues SpaceX's decision to publicly announce direct competition with MNOs now makes it easier for MNOs to choose not to push Starlink.

Asked when T-Mobile news might drop, Anpanman says he does not expect it soon, likely only once the Satellite Connect Europe/AST-Vodafone joint venture structure goes definitive, possibly announced alongside that.

Anpanman says today's Deutsche Telekom news is massive but not the biggest catalyst yet; he considers a definitive commercial agreement or MOU with Deutsche Telekom, and eventually T-Mobile, to be the bigger milestone, which he estimates is probably months away.

Anpanman reiterates his standing advice to avoid margin and options given macro uncertainty (citing potential Fed rate moves and the ongoing Iran conflict as examples), advocating for a position sized to be held through volatility without needing to sell.

Satellites 14, 15, and 16 are pretty close to shipping; Anpanman notes SpaceX's turnaround between launches from SLC-40 is roughly 30 days, and speculates there could be enough of a gap to fit in a September 2026 launch.

He does not expect any pre-earnings press releases or T-Mobile news before Monday's call, saying big strategic developments like a T-Mobile relationship will take time and should not be bet on in the near term.

The company confirmed it established communications with the three satellites and achieved nominal control after detumbling; Anpanman expects antenna unfolding in roughly 30 days, noting Bluebird 6 took about 49 days to unfold versus 28, 33, and 34 days for Bluebirds 8, 9, and 10, so he guesses these three might unfold in something like 26-28 days as the company's process improves.

Anpanman plans to listen to Deutsche Telekom's earnings call the next morning, expecting analysts to ask about the strategic implications of Starlink potentially competing with its T-Mobile subsidiary and its European business.

T-Mobile told The Verge it has some exclusivity remaining with Starlink, but per SpaceX's prospectus, MNO relationships (roughly 3 to 5 years) can reportedly be terminated by the MNO without penalty; Anpanman believes T-Mobile will likely exit the relationship sooner rather than later once it makes business sense.

He argues that continuing to actively market T-Satellite each day only provides free marketing and awareness for a company (SpaceX) that is becoming T-Mobile's direct competitor.

Timing for any T-Mobile-AST partnership (MOU then definitive agreement) will take time, partly because the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture structure means AT&T effectively has final say on whether AST can work with T-Mobile, though this would be enabled under the joint venture.

Anpanman initially thought it was unfortunate AST wasn't mentioned in coverage of SpaceX's carrier ambitions, but concluded it's actually beneficial: MNO executives don't want to feel pressured or told what to do, so it's better that the media and SpaceX frame the competitive threat while AST is not positioned as an obvious 'saving grace,' letting MNOs reach that conclusion themselves.

Anpanman says a Michael Pollack presentation (later taken down) indicated that after Verizon's investment, the Department of Defense, SDA, and DIU all began reaching out to AST, reasoning that if both AT&T and Verizon were on board, the technology must be real and viable.

Anpanman argues SpaceX's public comments mean it has 'crossed the Rubicon' — by openly stating it will build its own terrestrial network of small cells and a new Starlink terminal to get customers to act as cell repeaters and compete with carriers, SpaceX has foreclosed future MNO partnerships, making it easier for AST to have MNO conversations since operators globally now see a clear need for a strategic counter-partner.

He contrasts AST's pitch (partnering with local MNOs, offering a 'kill switch' for sovereign control, and keeping data in-country) against what he characterizes as SpaceX's approach of building a colossal global network that extracts value and market share from local incumbents, which he says regulators will resist.

Brazil's Anatel gave AST a 10x10 MHz spectrum allocation; Anpanman believes Europe will make a similar 10x10 MHz allocation, and says AST just received approval to work with Kenya's Safaricom on over 20x20 MHz of 700 MHz spectrum.

The EchoStar-SpaceX transaction has not yet closed and still requires international regulatory approval; Anpanman says SpaceX's aggressive Q&A comments about competing with MNOs could jeopardize that approval, joking that Charlie Ergen 'might be sweating bullets' if the deal gets held up.

In Europe, EchoStar and Viasat together hold a majority of S-band licenses, which face a 'jump ball' reallocation in early 2027; Anpanman speculates AST and Europe's IRIS will get a slug of that spectrum, while it's unclear whether EchoStar and Viasat will be reallocated any, especially given SpaceX's stated intent to compete with European MNOs.

Anpanman argues that to truly compete with MNOs, Starlink would need low-band spectrum, tower infrastructure, and new terminals capable of acting as small cells, plus customer incentives to buy and use that equipment — describing Bernstein's view of AWS-3 deployment as more of a 'low-end quality of service' offering rather than full MNO competition.

Responding to a point attributed to 'Mach33' that most data traffic occurs on Wi-Fi, Anpanman agrees but argues consumers pay a premium for mobile connectivity specifically for areas with no alternative coverage (dead spots, one-bar areas), which is where Starlink could have an initial edge over MNOs in coverage but would still need to build out expensive terrestrial infrastructure to compete in dense areas.

Anpanman frames the key open question as: if Verizon's 2024 decision was the unlock that took AST to the next level, what would a T-Mobile relationship do, given it would mean AST is important to all three of the largest and most profitable US carriers rather than just one.

He notes most TMT investors either don't know what AST SpaceMobile is or dismiss it as unable to compete with Starlink, forgetting that MNOs are the industry's gatekeepers.

Anpanman cautions that the AST-Rakuten J-LEO joint venture is happening but will take time to finalize, and asks listeners to be patient while more details emerge through regulators and eventual Rakuten statements.

He predicts a future Harvard Business School case study on what he calls one of the biggest strategic blunders of all time: former T-Mobile CEO Mike Sievert's decision to partner with SpaceX/Starlink, noting most executives who made that decision are no longer at T-Mobile or Deutsche Telekom.

Asked whether the company would release PRs before earnings, Anpanman said he doubts it since earnings are Monday and the company will likely hold news; he also does not expect T-Mobile news to come soon.

Asked how many Falcon 9 launches are scheduled, Anpanman said AST has a handful scheduled and has bought more, and can potentially take other constellations' launch slots if those other operators are not ready on time, meaning some AST launches could come on short notice in the coming months.

Asked whether Scott (Wisniewski) would provide color on reported Meta talks during the earnings call, Anpanman said he doesn't believe so, but encouraged shareholders to submit their own questions to the company about the status and impact of any Meta discussions.

Anpanman says he personally bought more ASTS shares that morning and the prior day, is not on margin, and urges other shareholders to avoid margin and derivatives so a forced decision doesn't occur right before major catalysts.

He compares the current moment to a shareholder selling Apple stock right before an iPhone announcement due to unrelated volatility, urging investors to just hold shares and trust the process through the earnings call and beyond.

Anpanman noted MNOs' dense terrestrial towers still deliver superior service in dense urban areas, but said Starlink believes its roughly 65 MHz of EchoStar mid-band spectrum, combined with a denser next-generation 'V2' satellite constellation launching next year, could let it match MNO-level service in suburban and rural areas.

Anpanman argued SpaceX going after MNO customers directly is 'the best news possible' for AST SpaceMobile, because AST fills the coverage gaps (dead zones and low-signal areas) that MNOs need to compete against Starlink, without being adversarial to the carriers.

He said SpaceX's public move is effectively forcing MNOs to work with AST, since AST already has superior direct-to-device technology and operates on a 50/50 revenue-share partnership basis rather than competing with carriers.

He explained AST's model lets it piggyback on an MNO's existing customer base and sales/support infrastructure, splitting revenue 50/50, versus SpaceX which must build its own costly customer acquisition and support model (estimated at $600-800 per acquired mobile customer).

He noted Chris Sambar, the former AT&T executive who orchestrated AT&T's AST partnership, is joining T-Mobile shortly, which he reads as a positive signal for a future AST-T-Mobile relationship.

Anpanman reasoned that SpaceX's aggressive, competitive public stance toward T-Mobile, AT&T, and Verizon on the earnings call implies its discussions with T-Mobile about extending their relationship, or with AT&T/Verizon about future partnership, are not going well.

Anpanman said SpaceX/Starlink discussed acquiring MNO customers over buying an MNO outright, since as a growth company it prefers a cost-efficient, share-taking strategy that the market will reward with a premium valuation, versus an outright purchase like Verizon (estimated ~$384 billion enterprise value, implying a roughly $500 billion deal) that the FCC and DOJ would likely block anyway and that would turn SpaceX into a slow-growth carrier overnight.

Anpanman argued SpaceX's public statement that it intends to build a competing 'fourth carrier' actually helps its own regulatory standing with the FCC (citing Chairman Brendan Carr) for spectrum and network investment, but simultaneously undercuts any future attempt by SpaceX to acquire an MNO like T-Mobile, since regulators could point to the public commitment to building a competitor.

Anpanman said SpaceX's public proclamation about competing for wireless customers now gives regulatory cover to the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture: since Starlink is a stated direct competitor, the FCC/DOJ should have no issue with the JV declining to buy satellite service from Starlink, and there should be increased urgency to move the JV to a definitive agreement and deepen work with AST SpaceMobile.

Anpanman said SoftBank and NTT Docomo in Japan are reportedly working with Starlink largely because Rakuten holds exclusivity with AST SpaceMobile in Japan, and that he does not believe Rakuten currently wants to give up that exclusivity given its still-small market share, though it could reconsider in the future.

He argued that European carriers like Deutsche Telekom, weighing AST versus Starlink, now have 'the nail in the coffin' against working with Starlink given its stated plan to build a terrestrial network and take carrier customers directly, comparing it to a Trojan horse.

Anpanman revisited T-Mobile's earlier decision (under then-CEO Mike Sievert) to grant SpaceX 5x5 MHz of PCS-G block spectrum and prominently market the Starlink-powered T-Satellite product to T-Mobile's own customers, calling it what he expects to become a Harvard Business School case study on a major strategic blunder, since it let SpaceX develop, test, and stand up a competing service using T-Mobile's own spectrum and customer base.

He noted T-Mobile's CFO and CEO have recently shifted tone from touting the Starlink partnership to being more defensive about the service and its adoption, which he reads as a strategic pivot.

Anpanman said that after the stock and space sector rallied, sentiment improved markedly, and that signs of a bottom were visible last week, including a long-time AST holder (since the 2021 NPA/de-SPAC days) who expressed deep regret about not selling near $130 and ultimately capitulated and sold as the stock fell toward $55.

Anpanman described a second holder who used margin and options and sold his position after the stock hit $51, having previously been warned repeatedly against holding a high-beta name like AST on margin; after selling, this person predicted a further drop into the 40s, then said 'now that I've sold, it's probably the bottom' — which Anpanman says proved true.

Anpanman said he deliberately does not block most bears or skeptics (with exceptions like Pivotal Capital and Hiro Nanda, whom he follows as reliable bottom signals), and that last week's wave of trolls predicting AST would fall to $30-40, plus negative posts from Lucky Stewie and 'Tim Ferrer' (Tim Ferriss referenced as a critic), reinforced his view that sentiment had washed out near a bottom.

Anpanman said that once it became known that hedge fund Situational Awareness ('Leo's' fund) had to sell its book to Citadel, the market could pinpoint a large institutional driver of the broader unwind (beyond retail liquidation, other hedge fund liquidation, and Korea-related selling), and the market began to bottom from there.

Anpanman said Citadel was the number one advertised trader in Situational Awareness's names (including AST, Rocket Lab, SpaceX, IonQ, Oclo, SMR, Rigetti, Circle, and Robinhood/'Hood') on Thursday and Friday but had largely disappeared from those names by the time of this recording, suggesting Citadel had finished unwinding shorts and selling longs from that book; he noted JPMorgan and Merrill were the top advertised AST traders the day of recording, with retail third.

Anpanman flagged ongoing macro risks including shifting Iran-US headlines (alternating between prospects of peace and conflict) and concerns that unwinding the Japanese yen carry trade could force Japan to sell US Treasuries, pushing yields up and forcing broader risk-asset selling.

Anpanman explained that some shorts are directional bets on the lockup expiry overwhelming demand, while others are 'boxed' positions from holders of pre-IPO shares via SPVs who are not bound by lockup restrictions and are shorting to lock in gains until they can collapse the box once shares are formally distributed.

Anpanman argued the lockup expiry narrative is overblown because major institutions — Fidelity (1.7% position), Baron Capital (0.8%), Vanguard (0.72%), Invesco (0.71%), and Valor Management (6.7%) — are underweight relative to their typical conviction sizing and are likely waiting to buy into the lockup expiry rather than sell, potentially producing a squeeze instead of a selloff.

Anpanman said SpaceX's first public quarterly earnings call was scheduled for the next day after market close, and predicted a 'beat and raise' given how IPO financial models are typically set conservatively by underwriting banks in the first several quarters, plus SpaceX's Google and Anthropic data-center leasing deals as tailwinds.

Anpanman said that with SpaceX trading at $115 (well below its IPO price), he would personally be a buyer of SpaceX at current levels if forced to choose, though he clarified he does not currently own or plan to buy it.

Anpanman argued that because some funds hold AST short as a hedge against long SpaceX positions, a strong SpaceX earnings print and stock rally would likely force those funds to cover their AST shorts, benefiting the broader space sector including AST.

Anpanman estimated AST's current production cadence at roughly 3 to 4 satellites per month, behind the company's stated 6-satellites-per-month goal, attributing the gap partly to the company deliberately slowing production following the Blue Origin New Glenn mishap since there was no need to rush shipping satellites without launch capacity.

Anpanman said Bluebirds 14, 15, and 16 were expected to ship 'fairly soon,' and that the shipment-to-launch timeline appeared to be compressing: Bluebirds 8 through 10 took approximately 27 days from shipment announcement to launch, while Bluebirds 11 through 13 would represent roughly 22 days if the Wednesday launch occurred as planned.

Anpanman said he had tweeted about upcoming Grain Management milestone dates, clarifying those are FCC-imposed deadline bookends and that actual developments could happen sooner; he expects an advisor selection and a decision, and guessed the companies (already testing together) could reach a decision well before the FCC's November deadline, potentially combining Grain's 800 MHz spectrum with AT&T's and Verizon's 850 MHz spectrum for added capacity.

Anpanman said Viasat's stock began re-rating after AST SpaceMobile's January 2025 announcement of an agreement for 80-year rights to Ligado's L-band spectrum, and re-rated further after AST's roughly $450-500 million payment to Ligado around July, causing Viasat's stock to rise from about $10 to $15 and eventually to $30.

Anpanman argued AST SpaceMobile single-handedly revalued the legacy satellite sector's spectrum holdings — Viasat, Globalstar, Iridium, and EchoStar (whose Charlie Ergen he said was 'on his deathbed' financially before AST's activity) — and said in hindsight he should have bought a basket of these legacy names.

Anpanman said Lucky Stewie's Twitter/X account, opened in 2022, never discussed AST SpaceMobile — focusing instead on poker and legacy satellite topics — until August 2025, when Viasat became litigious trying to get out of its spectrum deal with AST; Anpanman said he directly asked Taylor about this timing and received what he called a 'lame excuse' about prior familiarity with direct-to-device via a past EchoStar-related project that never materialized.

Anpanman characterized Lucky Stewie as consumed by tracking AST investors, noting he tweets about small trading gains (around $2,000 on one recent trade) as if 'rubbing it in' the community's face, and joked that the two most prominent AST critics happen to both be British.

Anpanman said he believes a future T-Mobile commercial deal with AST SpaceMobile is 'fait accompli' — inevitable, with the only question being timing — stating the companies are definitely talking, and predicted the stock reaction to a T-Mobile deal would exceed the rally seen after AST's Verizon agreement.

Anpanman closed by reiterating that anyone who liked AST at $100 should be happy buying or holding at $55-63 given improving fundamentals, and said he felt bullish heading into the Bluebird 11-13 launch and SpaceX's earnings call, framing the launch as 'execution' toward commercial service with Bluebirds 14, 15, and 16 following shortly after.

Kook says this reflects a basic factor-risk-management failure: the book was long the momentum and AI factors on both sides, so it behaved as if far more levered than intended.

Kook praises Ken Griffin as one of the best risk managers in the business, contrasting his platform's discipline with Aschenbrenner's apparent lack of a strong risk manager.

Kook explains the mechanics of a deleveraging 'vortex': as market volatility rises, VaR-based funds are forced to sell regardless of conviction, which cascaded through momentum names including the space sector; SpaceX's stock got hit partly on lockup-expiry selling, which dragged ASTS down too.

Kook warns against ever holding leveraged ETFs long-term due to time decay, calling them 'absolutely horrible instruments' outside of very short-term trades.

Kook admits he ran significant unintentional leverage during COVID via SPAC arbitrage trades (buying SPACs redeemable near a $10 floor funded at near-0% rates), but got 'sloppy' and held positions after the NAV floor protection went away, coming close to a lack of sufficient account collateral.

Kook says he later took deliberate, non-recourse leverage via LEAPS options on ASTS when the stock was $12, driven by high conviction after AST promoted Scott Wisniewski to President and Shanti Gupta to COO, which he read as confirmation Block 1 would not be a failure.

Kook contrasts himself with Aschenbrenner, who kept constant leverage even as his book's returns grew, arguing that if you're not a trained risk professional you should generally just own shares outright, and that leverage (if ever used) belongs when a stock is down significantly, not near highs.

Kook compares AST's manufacturing ramp to Tesla's Model 3 'production hell,' arguing AST has now beaten that phase and is delivering satellites at scale rather than just being a 'concept stock.'

Kook expects AST's upcoming earnings call (referenced as 'next Monday') to provide more clarity on 2026 launch cadence, speculating the company could announce it has booked additional Falcon 9 launches using proceeds from its recent convertible note.

Kook relays that an analyst referred to as Kevin Chen pointed out Vodafone CEO Margarita de la Valle stating Vodafone expects to have 45 satellites at the beginning of 2027, which Kook takes as a sign Vodafone has visibility into AST's launch plans; this is Vodafone's statement, not AST's own guidance.

Kook cites network consultant Joe Madden's analysis that ASTS's total addressable market is much larger than Starlink's because ASTS's superior link budget lets it work indoors, which Starlink cannot.

Kook summarizes: ASTS can close the link budget in a car, indoors, and outdoors ('3 for 3'), while Starlink can only close it outdoors ('1 for 3').

Kook explains that ASTS's network is architecturally integrated with MNO spectrum, so an underconnected phone seamlessly pulls from satellite slices without roaming, whereas Starlink's direct-to-cell service works as on/off roaming that a phone tries to avoid.

Kook argues AST's 248-satellite constellation can match what competitors need thousands (Starlink) or even a filed 1 million (SpaceX/AI data center constellation) satellites to do, making AST's fleet fundamentally more manageable for fleet operations.

Citing calculations by Anpanman comparing total array area: Globalstar's 25-satellite constellation (400 sq ft of array) equals about 0.17 of an AST satellite; Iridium's constellation (3,450 sq ft, built for over $3 billion nearly 30 years ago) equals about 1.4 AST satellites; and Starlink's 650-satellite Direct-to-Cell fleet (43,450 sq ft) equals about 18 AST satellites.

Kook recounts that AST engineers told him the small-array 'swarm' coordination approach AST originally considered 'just doesn't work,' which is why AST abandoned it in favor of large single arrays — implying rivals attempting a swarm approach may hit the same wall.

Kook explains what the community previously called the 'Scotiabank thesis' (now renamed after cutting ties with Scotiabank over perceived short-bias conflicts): that AST's real value to MNOs is capital efficiency, letting them deploy licensed spectrum without building towers, freeing up CapEx for uses like stock buybacks.

Kook argues spectrum holders such as Sirius, Grain Management, Ligado, and NexNav are all filing with the FCC to enable their spectrum for supplemental coverage from space, implying AST is the only current solution that can accommodate low-band spectrum for this use.

Kook notes community member Katzi found FCC documents suggesting testing has commenced in Japan, and cites recent APAC business-development and Japan-focused technical-lead hires as further circumstantial signals, while acknowledging he isn't certain what these hires mean.

Kook argues AST's system is designed 'sovereign first,' citing research (credited to Rocket Tank 123 and a researcher called Smith) on Canadian and Bahamian government documents emphasizing sovereignty and control, a pattern he says is echoed across Satellite Connect Europe, J-LEO, and US deals.

Kook says he only partially read Amazon's newly filed constellation documents but notes Amazon is seeking FCC approval only in L-band and S-band, not threatening AST's low-band position, and it remains unclear how Amazon reaches market with its service.

Kook speculates ('hopium') that these 18 launches could hint AST is finally close to a Golden Dome deal, noting AST has filed for 2 Sun-Synchronous-Orbit (SSO) shells with 28 satellites planned, requiring roughly 9 Falcon launches — about half of the just-awarded task order's launch count.

Kook says SpaceX appears to be stoking rumors about acquiring Verizon, which he and Anpanman believe is really pressure/noise aimed at securing an MVNO deal to resell wireless service as a 'SpaceX phone' using a major carrier's network plus Starlink satellites.

Kook expects SpaceX to ultimately pivot its TAM narrative toward AI data centers in space rather than the wireless business, which trades at a much lower revenue multiple than SpaceX itself.

Reflecting on Aschenbrenner's collapse, Kook says he constantly questions whether he could become 'the next Leo,' and discloses his own net worth is down about 50% over the past two months, which he attributes to a market correction rather than a new negative signal.

Kook argues July was an extreme tail-risk 'clearing event' (the hedge fund blowup, war, oil-price spikes) and that historically, forward market performance tends to be strong after such events, making him cautiously optimistic for August, while explicitly disclaiming any ability to forecast prices.

Redrum closes the episode asking listeners in the comments whether the 18 newly awarded SpaceX Falcon 9 launches could secretly be tied to an unannounced AST Golden Dome deal.

Kook speculates Citadel likely bought Situational Awareness's book at a discount, guessing it could have been in the 15-30% range, in a competitive process that also involved Millennium, Jane Street, and possibly banks bidding on the portfolio.

Kook noted Citadel was NOT a top trader in Sharon AI, a name where Situational Awareness had recently done a private placement, speculating any remaining Situational stake there may now be restricted or subject to a holding period from that private deal.

Kook theorizes that after absorbing several billion dollars of high-beta, high-momentum long positions from Situational Awareness, Citadel would not want to carry unhedged market-beta exposure, so it likely hedged using listed put options, custom swaps arranged through banks like Goldman, or over-the-counter puts on correlated names.

Kook offers an alternative explanation: that during Wednesday's rally, Citadel may have directly entered short positions in some of these correlated names, potentially including ASTS, specifically to hedge the beta of the book it was absorbing.

Kook draws on his own experience from the 2008 financial crisis, explaining that when a hedge fund is known to be in trouble, other funds first sell any cross-held long positions to get ahead of the distressed fund's forced selling.

Kook explains that disciplined funds may then go further and short the distressed fund's other positions, anticipating forced liquidation will drive the price down; this collective shorting creates a self-reinforcing overswing to the downside as the distressed fund is forced to accept whatever price it can get.

Kook notes that during deleveraging events, correlation between otherwise-unrelated stocks effectively goes to 1, because funds and retail accounts holding correlated momentum names sell down whichever ones they believe in least to meet margin calls.

Kook says AST SpaceMobile fell to around $50-51 on Wednesday during the forced-selling event, even though ASTS was not a confirmed Situational Awareness holding, attributing the drop to correlated margin-driven selling of momentum names rather than any AST-specific news.

Kook explains that after-hours on Wednesday, positions moved a further 3-5% lower even after markets had already closed at their lows, which he read as a sign someone was being forcibly liquidated overnight.

Kook estimates the deleveraging event was roughly an 8-to-10-sigma event, well beyond a typical 2-to-3-sigma move, though he caveats he would need to double check the exact figure.

Kook says Situational Awareness's gross book had grown to roughly $40-45 billion before the forced unwind; founder Leo reportedly came out the other side with about $10 billion of AUM remaining, which includes private holdings such as a stake in Anthropic.

Kook argues that now that unhealthy leverage has been flushed out of the system, risk-reward has become more attractive across high-beta names, including AST SpaceMobile, since fundamentals for many of these companies remain positive even as concerns about an AI bubble persist.

Kook advises investors not to fixate on making back paper losses from prior peaks, to avoid trading on margin, and to focus on riding out volatility while holding high-conviction positions, framing this as important for mental health during drawdowns.

Kook observes that cycles of market euphoria followed by deleveraging seem to be happening more frequently, citing the April tariff tantrum and an October crypto selloff as recent prior examples of similar dynamics.

Kook closes by estimating that roughly $45 billion of deployed capital came out of the market from Situational Awareness alone, a figure he says is further multiplied by other hedge funds and retail Korean margin investors also forced to liquidate correlated positions; he expects a healthier market going forward with AST's August catalysts still ahead.

He framed the AI CapEx spending debate as an 'arms race,' borrowing a framing from Reformed Trader comparing it to the US-Soviet Star Wars arms race, and said AI demand is 'inexorable' even if there are boom-bust cycles ahead.

He believes markets are closer to a bottom because a large amount of leverage has been taken out of the system — he cited tweets estimating hedge funds had unwound roughly 50-60% of the leverage deployed since the big run began in April — though he cautioned there could still be more shoes to drop.

He argued that if investors loved AST SpaceMobile at $130, they should love it more at $56-58, because he believes the company's fundamentals have improved, not deteriorated, since the stock's high.

He acknowledged the negative of losing Blue Origin as a launch partner (referring to the BlueBird 7 New Glenn anomaly) but noted AST has since raised money and bought additional Falcon 9 launches, plus has a launch coming up next week, as positives offsetting that setback.

He noted the Semafor article referenced SpaceX pursuing C-band spectrum (3.5-4 GHz), which he said is the wrong band for direct-to-device coverage (600-900 MHz is needed), suggesting the reporters don't fully understand what they're describing.

He believes SpaceX is the source of these leaks, aiming to pressure one of AT&T, Verizon, or T-Mobile into an MVNO agreement with Starlink and sow a 'prisoner's dilemma' among the three carriers ahead of their joint venture with AST SpaceMobile becoming a definitive agreement.

He recalled a similar prior leak: shortly after the AT&T-Verizon-T-Mobile joint venture was announced and Gwynne Shotwell said SpaceX would compete against it, a Bloomberg article surfaced claiming Starlink was in talks with Charter Communications about a working relationship, which he characterized as a similar psyop.

He estimated Verizon's enterprise value at about $384 billion versus SpaceX's roughly $1.5 trillion enterprise value; since Verizon shareholders would likely demand an all-cash deal rather than SpaceX stock, SpaceX would need to raise roughly $500 billion or more in cash to acquire it.

He projected SpaceX 2027 revenue at $72.6 billion (up from an estimated $38.9 billion in 2026), versus Verizon's projected $143 billion of 2027 revenue (versus $141 billion in 2026); buying Verizon would make SpaceX predominantly a wireless-service company and likely cause its valuation multiple to derate from about 39x 2026 revenue toward something closer to Verizon's own multiple (roughly 2.5x revenue).

For these reasons he considers it highly unlikely, though not impossible, that SpaceX buys T-Mobile, Verizon, or AT&T; he also noted regulators focused on sovereignty would resist a US entity like SpaceX controlling foreign MNOs if it set that precedent domestically.

Grain Management, which owns former T-Mobile 800 MHz spectrum, is awaiting FCC approval to test with AST SpaceMobile and is running a solicitation process, hiring advisors to determine how the spectrum will be deployed with a direct-to-device operator; the FCC requires deployment of most of the spectrum within a year, and he believes AST is the only qualified low-band direct-to-device satellite operator, likely for use in the AT&T-Verizon-T-Mobile joint venture or IoT applications.

He expects some military contract awards 'soon,' based on hints from due diligence that something is 'cooking and brewing.'

AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile executives said this past week that the satellite joint venture with AST SpaceMobile is 'coming along nicely' and being negotiated well, with a definitive agreement expected to be announced soon; he views the recent SpaceX spectrum/carrier noise as evidence the JV announcement is getting close and someone is trying to disrupt it.

Asked about short-squeeze potential, he said true squeezes require a structurally crowded trade or spiking borrow rates; he noted some hedge funds are long SpaceX and short AST as a hedge, and unwinding that pairs trade could contribute to a squeeze-like move, but he thinks a bigger driver would be markets simply refocusing on AST's fundamentals, which could take the stock back toward the $90s relatively quickly.

Asked whether the US beta service and Vodafone's stated need for 45 satellites in service imply an updated launch chart on the upcoming earnings call, he said the US beta service will likely launch with fewer satellites (aided by FirstNet-specific use cases) while Vodafone wants a more fulsome service and will wait for more satellites, but he is not sure AST will share an updated launch chart on this particular earnings call.

On how SpaceX's upcoming earnings release and insider lockup expiry might affect ASTS, he said this will be SpaceX's first public quarterly discussion of its business and competitive landscape; a strong quarter could be a relief for the space sector broadly, but the lockup unlock (with SpaceX shares heavily shorted at over 230 million shares) makes the net stock impact hard to call, especially since SpaceX stock is already trading below its IPO price.

Asked whether he expects AST to raise full-year revenue guidance, he said no, because launch timing has been delayed by the loss of Blue Origin as a launch partner, and guessed the company might instead sharpen guidance toward the lower end of its range, though he allowed there could also be additional contract wins.

Asked whether bigger market players deliberately target hot names once they get 'too close to the sun' (referencing Situational's blowup), he said he doesn't believe this was coordinated — it was a broad deleveraging event caused by multiple factors, though he allowed some detractors may have wanted to see Situational fail.

Anpanman calls this a regulatory placeholder — a common industry practice where companies file a large constellation to preserve spectrum rights and start the regulatory process, comparing it to failed launch company Astra's 2021 FCC filing for a 10,000-satellite fixed wireless broadband constellation that never came to fruition.

The filed architecture will reportedly be similar to Starlink's rather than AST's, and will also focus on mid-band spectrum in addition to the existing Globalstar bands; many details in the filing are confidential or redacted.

Anpanman expects other satellite operators such as Rocket Lab and Iridium to file similar large placeholder constellations (he guesses on the order of 4,000-5,000 satellites) with the FCC over the next few months to preserve their own spectrum rights and demonstrate expansion plans to regulators.

Mega Constellations (an outside account) speculated Amazon's filing could be a first move toward a deal for Viasat's ex-US L-band spectrum, but Anpanman notes the US rights to that spectrum are actually owned by Ligado, and AST already holds the 80-year rights to it via its Ligado transaction.

Anpanman calls this a "poison pill": anyone wanting to work with Viasat internationally would have to do so without the US market, which he describes as the most profitable market for mobile broadband, giving AST leverage over how that global spectrum gets used.

He separately notes AST also acquired a small company with global spectrum priority rights, putting AST at roughly number 3 or 4 in the international regulatory priority queue, which he says already produced results such as AST's 10x10 MHz S-band allocation in Brazil via Anatel.

Anpanman speculates AST could partner with or lease spectrum from Viasat for international deployment, or alternatively go country-by-country with regulators to secure allocations directly, since Viasat is not fully utilizing its L-band spectrum globally; he frames this as a longer but more economically attractive path.

He estimates nationwide deployment costs of $12-20 billion for low-band spectrum, $20-35 billion for mid-band, and $35-60 billion for C-band, with the step-up driven mainly by needing more towers; he expects the vast majority of mid-band and C-band deployment outside dense urban areas to happen via satellite instead of new towers.

He projects that layering AST's Block 3 (mid-band) and Block 4 (C-band) satellites as an overlay on top of low-band coverage could push per-cell throughput from roughly 200 megabits to well north of a gigabit, enabling genuine terrestrial network performance rather than just a coverage layer.

AST's Jared Wilson, a long-tenured AT&T executive who left AT&T about a year ago to join AST SpaceMobile, has discussed the opportunity of addressing terrestrial dead spots where local towers deliver only one bar of signal.

Based on an AI-assisted research estimate he cites as uncertain, approximately 25-35% of terrestrial coverage in the US is serviced by only one bar of signal, which he describes as effectively non-functional service beyond emergency voice calls.

He argues MNOs are not incentivized to admit coverage gaps, quoting the commonly cited 97-99% coverage figure but noting this reflects population/expected-location coverage rather than geography; he estimates true geographic land coverage is only around 75-80%.

Combining these figures (subtracting an estimated 25% one-bar-coverage share from a roughly 75% geographic coverage base), he arrives at a rough estimate that only about half of US land area gets genuinely strong terrestrial coverage, framing this as a large addressable opportunity for direct-to-device satellite service.

He adds that MNOs may also choose to shut down underutilized towers and switch to satellite coverage, and expects satellite to increasingly serve as an augmentation, bolstering layer, or outright replacement for terrestrial coverage outside dense urban/suburban areas.

Anpanman argues many institutional short sellers who hedge with a basket of space names don't need to know each name well since they're diversified, but warns this is dangerous since short losses are theoretically unlimited, unlike long positions.

He believes the broader market is similarly not pricing in AST's government business given the stock's recent performance, but doesn't expect the stock to stay depressed for long as long as the company keeps executing, caveated by macro factors like interest rates and the Iran conflict.

Last year's Q2 earnings were reported on August 11 (a Monday), and the company posted its earnings date on July 28 that year; Anpanman expects a similar pattern this year, guessing earnings will land around August 10 or 11, 2026, since the company prefers Monday reporting and August 10, 2026 falls on a Monday.

He expects a press release announcing the earnings date either the next day, the following Tuesday, or at the latest by the end of that week.

Based on shipment timelines and analysis with help from community member Tanner, he estimates the next BlueBird launch (carrying BlueBirds 11, 12, and 13) will most likely occur around August 6-8, 2026, at the latest around August 8, with a small chance of slipping to August 10 — potentially coinciding with earnings, which he calls unlikely but possible.

Responding to a listener question (Scott Powell) about how Amazon's and Starlink's D2D technology might avoid AST's patent portfolio, Anpanman said he doesn't know, noting Amazon appears to be following an architecture similar to Starlink's and would have to navigate both Starlink's and AST's patents.

He noted AST has not yet enforced any of its patents, speculating the company may be waiting for competitors to further develop their technology before pursuing licensing royalties or forcing a change in approach, but expects enforcement at some unspecified point in the future.

Anpanman describes the broader high-growth and space sector as correlated and down significantly, driven by uncertainty over the Iran conflict (with a possible pause for peace talks) and a July Fed meeting where the market-implied odds of a rate hike have risen from about 20% to about 40%.

He contrasts the current environment with the 2022 rate-hike cycle, when the Fed moved from roughly 0% to 5.25-5.5%, calling that an enormous move, and argues any near-term hikes now would be far smaller in magnitude.

He notes high-beta growth and space stocks broadly repriced downward regardless of company-specific news or catalysts due to the combined war and rate-related risk repricing.

He advises that margin should only be used tactically and short-term, with strict, pre-set risk limits (e.g., cutting a 5-10% margin position after roughly a week if it loses 10%, or trimming to cover margin if a position rallies 20-30%), not as a long-term investing strategy.

He warns that shorting covered calls or cash-secured puts effectively creates synthetic short-put exposure with capped upside and full downside, and that volatility expansion (not just adverse stock moves) can sharply increase losses on short options positions, requiring more maintenance margin.

He recommends that after a large portfolio gain (e.g., 10x an investor's prior net worth), investors set aside a multiple of their original net worth (e.g., 3x) after taxes, so they can psychologically tolerate future drawdowns on the remaining "house money" position.

He cautions that leveraged/inverse products like ASTX decay toward zero over time due to volatility drag and derivative costs, especially during choppy (non-unidirectional) price action, and should only be used briefly and never on margin.

He closes by urging listeners not to fixate on AST's prior highs (e.g., $100-130) as a target to "make back," calling those unrealized gains "funny money," and to instead stay patient, know what they own, and wait for clearer high-conviction entry points ("fat pitches") rather than using leverage to recover losses.

Kook discusses Jacob Keaton's public account blowup, noting the post about it got more impressions than his own DD document over almost a year; he believes Keaton made a lot of money via heavy leverage on near-perfect timing, then got wiped out when the market reversed violently.

Kook warns that if you don't understand derivatives or time-decay products, you shouldn't use them; he calls short-dated options products like 'ASTX' (leveraged ASTS instruments) 'total pieces of shit' that can lose 80-90% of capital from time decay even if the underlying stock ends up flat, and stresses fully-paid common stock can't 'kill you' the way leverage can.

Kook describes a cascading margin-call and forced-selling dynamic among overleveraged investors as the mechanical driver of last week's decline, drawing a parallel to South Korea's market deleveraging, and says he was surprised how many people in the ASTS ownership circle turned out to be highly leveraged.

Kook argues the fundamentals — TAM, business model, and proof points from SpaceX's own commercial traction — still support the roughly $50 billion valuation the stock had shown at $130, framing the crash as a leverage-driven 'blow-off' that culls weak-handed investors rather than a re-rating of the underlying business.

Kook states he has never been paid by AST SpaceMobile and says the same is true of Anpanman, Tut, and other named community researchers (Connor, Tanner, Kevin, Katzy); he notes ASTS traded $630 million in volume on the down Friday, arguing it's implausible that tweets from him or others are 'pumping' a stock that size.

Kook expects the in-assembly satellite count to eventually plateau while cumulative shipped satellites accelerate as the company reaches a cadence of between 6 and 12 satellites per month.

Kook speculates the mention of space AI edge computing points toward the US military as a likely first, high-paying customer for expensive AI compute in orbit, paving the way for later commercial applications.

Kook says the jump from 38 to 42 satellites in production within two weeks shows AST is 'well past production hell,' and reads Abel's comment that Bluebirds 14, 15, and 16 are 'right behind' as meaning additional launch vehicles are ready, not that satellites will sit idle for years awaiting a launcher.

Kook summarizes analyst Kevin Chen's thread arguing that Abel's comment about 'inventing a new way to design and manufacture at scale' reflects that AST had to invent its own assembly, integration, and testing procedure from scratch — explaining the long ramp delay — and that the process is now ready for mass scale, which Kook calls a hard-to-replicate competitive moat, achievable by maybe only two other companies.

Kevin Chen's own math maps launch groupings to specific vehicles: Blue Origin New Glenn's '7x2' fits 6-8 Bluebirds and a '9x4' configuration (not confirmed by Abel) could fit 12-14; MHI and Falcon 9 carry 3, Vulcan and Ariane 6 carry 5, and ISRO carries 2.

Kook cites a comparison from 'the tech investor' that a single ASTS launch of 3 satellites puts up roughly double the total array square footage of Iridium's entire constellation, which cost Iridium $3 billion to build; he contrasts Iridium's billions of dollars of revenue and government business against ASTS's much larger array capability.

Kook states his own personal estimate — explicitly not a buy recommendation or price target — that AST SpaceMobile could generate tens of billions of dollars of revenue and eventually be worth half a trillion dollars, describing it as his own probability-weighted directional bet given the size of his position.

Kook relays a theory highlighted by 'Tanner' that Starlink and Tesla could team up so every Tesla becomes a Starlink hub, creating a mesh network that, combined with Starlink satellite service, Wi-Fi in cities, and EchoStar's direct-to-consumer spectrum, could position SpaceX as a '4th MNO' in the US; he says Elon Musk appears to be confirming the plan, but such service would only work on newer phones with different chips and reliability is uncertain.

Kook cites industry consultant Walter Piechek's view that the T-Mobile/SpaceX Starlink JV relationship is 'just about dead,' based on T-Mobile's CEO stating the new AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile telco JV will source 'the vast majority' of future satellite partnerships.

Kook cites an unnamed AST SpaceMobile executive's Portuguese-language interview in which the executive referred to AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile together as the mobile operator partners AST will provide US coverage through, which Kook reads as an inadvertent confirmation that T-Mobile will also become an ASTS customer.

Kook explains T-Mobile's Starlink-based satellite service has seen low usage because it functions as a separate roaming network that activates only in complete dead zones, unlike AST SpaceMobile's design, which integrates natively with the carrier's core network to boost weak signal (roughly 1 bar) up to 3-5 bars without the phone needing to roam.

Kook estimates — recalling a conversation with Anpanman and admitting he 'forgets the exact number' — that roughly 25% of the market experiences the weak-signal (1-bar) problem versus only about 1% with zero coverage, arguing the weak-signal TAM is exponentially larger than the pure dead-zone TAM.

Kook argues that as AST SpaceMobile's network improves, mobile carriers will increasingly decommission 'uneconomic' terrestrial towers (citing base station power, fiber, and maintenance costs), continually shrinking their terrestrial footprint and expanding AST's addressable market at the expense of tower companies like American Tower.

Kook speculates the large Midland manufacturing expansion is partly aimed at dedicated capacity for undisclosed programs, naming Golden Dome and the JLEO sovereign Japanese constellation as known drivers and wondering whether Satellite Connect Europe might ultimately require its own separate constellation.

MNOs describe satellite as addressing only the 2% coverage gap based on population coverage, but geographic coverage gaps are much larger; AST's JR Wilson (recently joined from AT&T) has discussed a "1-bar opportunity" where satellite could serve users even in areas with weak (1-bar) terrestrial signal, which Anpanman guesses could be roughly 10-15% of covered area, though he stresses he hasn't researched the exact number.

MNOs have a marketing incentive to frame their terrestrial coverage as already excellent (98-99% of population) rather than admit dead zones, so they'll pitch satellite as making a great network "exceptional" rather than fixing a bad one.

Based on other comments, it sounds like the definitive long-form joint venture agreement among AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile will be announced soon.

The AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture must clear regulatory review once announced, so CEOs must be careful about competitive-landscape comments; Anpanman expects T-Mobile to keep supporting T-Satellite (powered by Starlink) as an opt-in service even after the JV with AST begins, though not marketed heavily.

T-Mobile said satellite represents only a fraction of 1% of network traffic, but Anpanman attributes this to Starlink's narrowband, texting-only service being low quality and low bandwidth; he expects utilization to rise significantly once AST provides broadband service across all three carriers, though usage will remain a premium, intermittent, edge-case service rather than a home-broadband replacement.

Anpanman speculates the continued exclusivity likely pertains to specific elements of the Starlink/T-Mobile agreement, such as the 5x5 MHz slice of T-Mobile's 1900 MHz PCS G-block spectrum allocated exclusively to Starlink, rather than a blanket restriction; he says nothing today precludes T-Mobile from working directly with AST SpaceMobile.

The AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture is reportedly structured so T-Mobile would contribute cash, intellectual property, and certain spectrum bands, with AT&T quarterbacking; Anpanman says this could let T-Mobile work with AST via AT&T/Verizon even if a Starlink exclusivity restriction remains on certain spectrum.

A key tell for whether T-Mobile is truly working with AST will be if T-Mobile contributes low-band spectrum (600-900 MHz, beyond the PCS G block) to the joint venture, since no satellite provider other than AST can service that spectrum.

Bluebirds 14, 15, and 16 are reported ready to ship soon, and a community-maintained chart Anpanman and "Cassie" put together shows the count of ready satellites has risen to 42, up from 39 just a few days earlier.

A Bloomberg article reported SpaceX is considering winding down Falcon 9 rideshare and dedicated launches heading into 2028 and beyond as it shifts focus to Starship; Anpanman views this as a natural transition, since most Falcon 9 launches support Starlink, which will eventually move to Starship, and because a wave of medium-lift competitors (Rocket Lab Neutron, Blue Origin 7x2/9x4, Relativity Vulcan, and Japan's Mitsubishi Heavy Industries targeting up to 30 launches/year) will crowd the market by 2028-2029.

Anpanman does not view this as a risk to AST because AST is a dedicated (not rideshare) Falcon 9 customer, has already bought down launches, and is diversifying across Blue Origin, ISRO, and other providers; if Starship doesn't reach commercial cadence, Falcon 9 will remain in service.

Based on roughly three weeks needed to integrate three Block 2 satellites into a Falcon 9 fairing after shipment, Anpanman expects the Bluebirds 11, 12, 13 launch around August 5-7, 2026, noting someone else had floated a "net August 1st" possibility.

Asked about short-term price expectations, Anpanman said he has none right now, citing a weak macro environment (sticky inflation, the Iran conflict) affecting all high-beta growth names, not just ASTS; he says near-term price moves are noise and he remains bullish based on the company's fundamentals.

Asked how many Bluebird satellites could stack on a Starship launch using composite stacking, Anpanman guessed 14-16 by weight, though he said he'd need to check Starship's fairing dimensions and it could be a long time before AST flies on Starship.

Asked how the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture would work and whether it obviates direct AST-carrier agreements, Anpanman said he believes the JV is a coordination layer (pooling spectrum and infrastructure, enabling joint satellite-access purchasing) while direct commercial agreements between AST and each MNO continue, though he's not certain of the exact mechanics.

Asked about low market volume, Anpanman expects it to persist due to macro uncertainty (Iran, rates, inflation) and summer vacations, but thinks it will be hard to ignore the number of upcoming AST catalysts as August approaches.

Kook notes the company can be assumed to have brought FM1 into formal operation, though this isn't confirmed; he frames the recent milestones as knocking down the last of the open technical questions.

Batch 2 is officially in motion, and notably the company hit a shipping/production deadline for the first time — which Kook takes as a sign the 'machine that makes the machine' (manufacturing ramp) is finally working, and that the 'production hell' phase (comparable to what Tesla went through) is essentially over.

Kook cautions there remain many uncertain variables in his cost model — how much can be charged per unit of data, the ability to oversell capacity (since he doesn't believe service will actually be priced strictly per unit of data) — and that launch costs are the one variable not yet moving favorably, though he expects them to normalize over time to previously expected levels.

Kook's stock holdings dropped to $56 amid the announcement and broader market weakness; he describes his emotional reaction as anger, which he initially aimed outward before realizing it was directed at himself, ultimately concluding the raise makes his investment safer rather than riskier.

Kook argues the extra capital funds things he wants the company to pursue aggressively: satellites, capacity for J-LEO and Golden Dome-type programs, an aggressive product roadmap, spreading launch-industry risk across providers, and hiring top talent — and avoids a scenario of debating 'how many quarters of cash are left,' which he calls a bad position versus modest dilution.

Kook expects the company to put down roughly $500 million on Falcon 9 launches, which will deplete cash but represent real assets for the company.

Kook explains convertible bond pricing depends partly on volatility and credit spread; he notes SpaceX's high-yield credit spread (the reference credit used to price such deals) has been blowing out, and that convertible-bond new issuance is spiking broadly because 'Mag 7' companies are raising capital for AI buildout — creating a large supply of competing new issuance.

Kook argues the company likely timed the raise deliberately because capital markets access effectively shuts down in August, faces volatility in September, and remains uncertain in October — making it sensible to raise now rather than risk being unable to issue later while cash burn continues.

Kook credits CEO Abel Avellan and President Scott Wisniewski for making the capital-raise decision despite knowing it would draw criticism, and credits the company's founder-controlled share structure (supervoting shares) with allowing management to make long-horizon decisions for perpetual shareholders rather than being dictated to by shorter-horizon hedge fund holders.

The stock has now traded around $130/share on three separate occasions, which Kook cites as evidence that level isn't an anomaly and that 'everything now is better than what it had been before.'

The broader momentum-factor sell-off (which Kook likens to a 'Lehman Brothers type crash' across similar high-beta names) was driven by South Korean margin calls cascading into de-risking of the AI complex — a form of 'co-owner risk' where other investors' forced liquidations hit unrelated holders' prices, rather than anything specific to AST's fundamentals.

Kook believes convertible-bond hedgers moved to put on hedges very quickly this time (versus getting 'nuked' on the prior convert when the stock traded up more than expected), which he thinks contributed to a sharp stock pop on Friday.

Community chart analyses from 'Tough for Us, Tough for R' and 'Reformed Trader' reportedly show that after previous AST convert issuances, once the stock had already been dragging, it tended to shoot up quickly afterward — cited by Kook as an encouraging historical pattern.

Kook initially speculated the launch-company investment could be participation in a Blue Origin fundraise, but talked himself out of that since AST is already heavily invested in Blue Origin as a launch partner; he now speculates it could instead involve Relativity Space, reasoning that Relativity's backer Eric Schmidt (also linked to Google, a major AST shareholder) could create an effective 'Google-owns-its-own-SpaceX' dynamic in combination with AST — explicitly flagged as speculation with many other possible outcomes.

Kook frames a broader global 'sovereignty' theme (countries wanting to reduce reliance on SpaceX) as core to his AST thesis, citing Anpanman's note that AST/SatCo is seen as the frontrunner for European satellite spectrum, and noting similar dynamics playing out with the EU, Japan, and South Korea seeking their own constellation access.

As a personal, unrelated small trade illustrating the same sovereignty theme, Kook disclosed buying a small position in IQMX, a recently SPAC'd quantum computing company he believes is a European leader, on the logic that Europe won't want to rely on the US (IBM) for quantum ambitions — explicitly described as a very small position and not a claim of quantum expertise.

Kook argues constellations are fundamentally global economies-of-scale businesses better run as multi-client platforms than built independently by individual sovereign nations, positioning AST as structured to serve that role — and speculates the company's rapid capacity additions are partly being built for specific government programs (like Golden Dome) rather than purely commercial demand.

Citing community analyst 'Another Smith' tracking FCC filings, Kook notes AST has responded to the FCC regarding 900 MHz matters with largely redacted content that appears related to radio-location capabilities for the Space Development Agency (SDA) and non-communication use cases — which he ties to the Golden Dome narrative.

Kook describes 'mosaic investing' as legally piecing together small, individually non-material but publicly available data points (as distinct from trading on insider information) to anticipate events before they're announced — citing past examples where the community correctly pieced together the Verizon deal and, in his view, now T-Mobile, ahead of official announcement.

Kook and Anpanman believe a T-Mobile partnership announcement is increasingly likely, citing: T-Mobile's one-year Starlink exclusivity deal expiring this week; signs the two companies are 'getting divorced'; Chris Sambar (AST's former champion at AT&T) joining T-Mobile; AST testing on T-Mobile's spectrum; and a stated T-Mobile joint venture with AT&T and Verizon — while acknowledging they could be wrong.

Citing an interview shared by 'Another Smith' titled 'Why MNOs Care So Much,' Kook explains carriers view the opportunity not just as fixing zero-bar dead zones but boosting one-bar coverage areas into usable data connectivity, which drives customer satisfaction and increased ARPU.

Kook argues skeptics undercount the TAM by looking at static coverage maps rather than how often people move in and out of connectivity, and by not accounting for a shift toward ubiquitous connected devices needing backup links, plus resistance to building more physical towers.

Noting rising political pushback on data centers over power and water usage (citing AOC cheering data-center bans), Kook speculates that if the cost of terrestrial data centers rises due to such opposition, the relative competitiveness of space-based data centers could increase — floated as a distinct, speculative future TAM vector for AST, not a near-term plan.

Kook revisits the landline-removal theme: MNOs want to eliminate expensive copper landline networks but are required to maintain 911 service; he cites an AT&T document (posted on his pinned tweet) describing a solution pairing AST with cell-tower backup to guarantee 911 service even if a base station loses power, which he says could save carriers billions of dollars.

California gubernatorial candidate Steve Hilton has raised the forced removal of landlines from Californians as a political issue affecting seniors and rural residents, which Kook flags as a dynamic where AST's technology could be a proposed solution — worth monitoring.

Kook's core investment framework, developed over 20 years, is to understand a position at an extremely deep level ('know what you own') so as to inoculate himself against volatility; he notes this is easier managing his own capital (a family-office-style structure where he answers only to himself) than for a hedge fund analyst accountable to a portfolio manager.

Kook describes the recent crash as driven by 'co-owner risk' — being hurt by other investors' forced deleveraging (South Korean margin calls cascading into AI-complex de-risking) rather than anything wrong with the underlying thesis — and stresses the importance of surviving such episodes without being liquidated or having options expire worthless.

Kook says the market has now fully reset expectations for 45 satellites by year-end 2026 (that target having slipped to early 2027), and argues that while frustrating, AST's own ramp difficulties will be dwarfed by even greater ramp difficulties faced by later competitors trying to catch up.

Drawing a historical analogy to early SaaS stocks (e.g., ServiceNow, Cadence, KLA) that repeatedly saw 30-40% drawdowns that knocked out most holders despite strong long-term compounding, Kook argues the same dynamic explains why holding AST through violent drawdowns is difficult but potentially very rewarding.

Kook estimates (explicitly spitballing) that he has been about 5 years early on AST SpaceMobile, contrasting with past experiences of being merely a year or two early on other investments — acknowledging this is a much longer early period than typical and not necessarily ideal.

Kook closes expressing excitement about the next three weeks, expecting a batch-two satellite launch and potential news catalysts around J-LEO, T-Mobile, or other developments, framing the recent capital raise as having reloaded the company's financial capacity right as multiple catalysts converge.

Anpanman advises anyone who has made life-changing or generational wealth to mentally set aside their prior net worth (or some multiple of it, after setting aside taxes) as untouchable, and treat anything above that as more disposable 'free money.'

He pushes back on the idea that he and Kook (referred to in the transcript as 'Cook'/'Hook') are unique geniuses, saying they aren't that different from the rest of SpaceMob -- they found the AST SpaceMobile thesis through some mix of luck and serendipity, researched it, had conviction, and were 'delusional enough to hold,' but everyone, no matter how smart or experienced, eventually gets humbled by the market.

Anpanman describes hubris -- feeling invincible after a run of success -- as the mechanism that causes people to press bets and take on outsized risk right before a pullback humbles them.

He notes the macro/space-sector environment has taken down AST SpaceMobile's stock even though company-specific news has been positive, and speculates that AST's management and board likely considered doing a convertible note raise a week or two before recording, reasoning that with a low coupon and high conversion strike, it makes sense to lock in financing rather than bet the company on a near-term stock rebound.

Anpanman says his own brokerage account and net worth hit an all-time high at the end of May (just before the Blue Origin New Glenn incident), and he has since seen people online expressing that they were up a large amount and now feel they 'have to make it back' -- which he calls the absolute worst mentality an investor can have.

He explains that no one can know the timing of when market momentum will reverse -- conditions can change (he cites the Iran conflict potentially worsening as one example) -- so treating a past peak as an entitlement to be reclaimed is akin to a gambler on tilt in a casino chasing losses.

For investors who do want to use margin, he suggests using it only tactically -- around 5-10% of an account when conviction is high -- with predefined guardrails set before the trade (e.g., cut the position if it falls 10%, take profits if it rises 20%) so as not to keep adding to a losing margin position hoping it turns around.

Anpanman argues margin deployed in size is guaranteed to eventually catch you, comparing it to motorcycle riding: every rider eventually falls, it's just a matter of how bad the fall is.

He attributes the scale of risk-taking in Korea partly to social/economic dynamics there -- intense academic and business competition with fewer alternate paths to success than in the US -- which pushes some people toward gambling-like market speculation as a perceived faster way out.

He also criticizes incentives on X/FinTwit where influencers flex about winning picks to sell subscriptions or gain followers, and urges listeners to think independently rather than get swept into momentum or get-rich-quick narratives; he says he personally should have checked in on more people sooner and that this space is partly an overdue effort to do so.

Anpanman warns traders sitting on large recognized gains (e.g., someone up 400-500% on meme stocks who has since given back some of it) to plan taxes before year-end: either sell enough of a still-up position to realize offsetting losses, or set aside cash to cover taxes on gains already recognized, rather than holding a losing position into the next year hoping it recovers and ending up owing taxes with no capital to pay them.

Closing the episode, Anpanman says the recent drawdown represents an all-time-extreme move to the downside in terms of momentum, and that he believes the market is probably closer to a bounce and potential reversal than it was a month prior, while stressing he is 'not a guru' and cannot know the timing.

Describes 'hindsight capital' — credit traders are focused on total new convertible-bond issuance; the 'Mag 7' (e.g. Google, Meta) becoming large new bond issuers (potentially ~$20 billion deals) is scaring credit markets used to buyback-driven capital return, creating oversupply that could cheapen converts broadly; combined with SpaceX credit widening and no clean unsecured reference credit for ASTS, this creates a narrow window forcing a binary now-or-later financing decision.

Agrees the SpaceX credit-widening angle wasn't something he'd contemplated; notes the space sector has broadly derated amid worsening conditions in Iran, even as company-specific opportunities are coming to a head; believes bankers and Scott Wisniewski likely saw credit conditions only getting worse, prompting them to act now.

Does mental math that the capped-call-adjusted effective cost is roughly 3.25%, and notes the structure still produces positive carry for AST.

Says two separate contacts independently raised SpaceX credit widening with him, suggesting it's front-of-mind for credit investors, comparing it to how Oracle's credit spread became a widely watched market proxy; argues SpaceX is a mixed credit profile given xAI ('a money vaporization machine'), Starship ('a company that blows up rockets for data'), a high-capex ISP business, and Cursor.

Argues the company can't run itself like a short-term option and must think long-term; acknowledges in hindsight they could have raised earlier at $80–100, but questions whether convert buyers would have been there then, and notes doing an offering at a lower price can be more attractive to buyers than a higher one.

Argues waiting into August/September was risky because of Iran-related uncertainty, US midterm elections potentially causing Congressional gridlock, and August being a historically slow/thin market period; notes the company disclosed advanced J-Leo discussions with Rakuten for the first time via a Reg FD filing, reflecting a real near-term opportunity worth funding ahead of macro uncertainty.

Agrees you can't count on conditions improving later; expects AST will need to quickly buy additional SpaceX Falcon 9 launch capacity to offset the Blue Origin loss (estimates this could burn through roughly half a billion dollars fast), reducing AST's cash cushion; argues the company now needs to be funded like a 'hyperscaler' needing 'adult money.'

Argues that a year or two ago, being late by even a quarter would have been a real competitive problem versus Starlink signing up MNOs, but today AST is in a position of privilege where every MNO wants to work with it because they see what Starlink/SpaceX is doing; says the US carrier JV was created as a competitive counter, not a race against Starlink, and that being delayed by a quarter or a few quarters is no longer as urgent as long as the product/service is delivered correctly.

Says this framing was emphasized to him in a brief conversation with AST management on the day of recording; states SpaceX CFO Brian Johnson is hoping the MNOs will defect from each other in a prisoner's-dilemma dynamic so one ends up working with Starlink, but believes MNOs are smarter than that because their core fixed wireless/mobile businesses are at risk.

Says Anpanman's MVNO framing clarified his prior confusion about the JV's purpose; previously worried (partly influenced by a critic he refers to only as 'he who shall remain unnamed,' apparently analyst Tim Farrar/'Tim Ferrara') that the JV could function as a buyer's cartel to pressure ASTS pricing, which he doubted the FTC would allow; now sees the real value as the implicit MVNO angle, which forces Starlink into a costly 'Charlie Ergen game of chicken' of building its own physical towers — a low-ROA business he thinks Wall Street would hate given SpaceX's other capital-intensive ventures (Cursor, a 'NeoCloud reseller' AI business, and Starship needed to keep Starlink viable).

Floats that SpaceX could instead buy Dish's unfinished terrestrial network build-out (estimates roughly 70% of US population covered) as a path to a credible terrestrial threat, though notes MNOs would view that very negatively; recalls a Bloomberg article about SpaceX-Charter discussions that he believes was floated by SpaceX/Starlink to scare MNOs into believing Starlink would build a real terrestrial network to force a prisoner's-dilemma defection.

Predicts that as this dynamic plays out in the US, other markets' MNOs (e.g., Japan's KDDI) will also come to see working with Starlink as too risky and eventually shift toward AST SpaceMobile; says he ran an informal poll asking when KDDI would move to AST.

Believes the recent capital raise now being 'cleared' makes for a good entry point for institutions, and that AST is clearly buying more SpaceX launch capacity.

Spitballs a theory that a reported roughly $10 billion Blue Origin capital raise might be connected to AST's timing — guessing AST could put in $100–150 million as a cap-table investment/vote of confidence, jokingly comparing it to a 'sidecar' Anthropic-style investment, and imagines Blue Origin could become the market's preferred 'clean' space company if New Glenn achieves cadence and if Amazon's Kuiper were eventually folded in.

Explicitly clarifies the company is not going to buy a launch company itself, but floats that AST could hypothetically be part of financial backing if Sierra Space or Blue Origin were to acquire ULA.

Notes that scaling manufacturing from 6 satellites/month toward 10–12/month only makes sense for government purposes, citing a Twitter comment suggesting classified programs might require a fully separate building.

Ties this to AST's cash position (roughly $3 billion, now down to about $2.7 billion) and the principle that a $25–30 billion market-cap company should never let cash fall below about $1 billion; connects recent moves around a 400,000-square-foot Midland production facility and previously mocked job postings for around 500 open positions as evidence the company is spending ahead of an anticipated (not yet disclosed) Golden Dome opportunity.

Notes Grain Management's spectrum deal got regulatory approval faster than expected; says AST is working with Grain, which will select a vendor to light up that 800 MHz spectrum, and speculates AST may need to contribute economically for rights to use it; also floats that a Department of War-linked Ligado settlement could shift more spectrum economics, or that Viasat could eventually spin off or merge its S-band spectrum with AST.

Says acquiring global S-band (e.g., via a hypothetical Viasat deal) would be thematically simple and valuable versus deals like Grain, whose value the market may not immediately recognize — comparing spectrum accumulation to 'digging out a riverbed' before it's clear there's 'water' (revenue) to fill it.

Argues AST likely doesn't need a Viasat transaction because it is independently accumulating S-band spectrum cheaply or for free in the markets that matter — citing an already-granted 10x10 MHz allocation in Brazil, an expected similar 10x10 MHz in Europe, and roughly 10 other markets being pursued — suggesting investors betting on a Viasat-AST S-band deal may be disappointed.

Says he hopes AST does not acquire whole companies (unless it's a pure spectrum deal), citing the operational-integration risk of absorbing a company like Iridium's 'legacy culture' (as Rocket Lab is doing) versus AST's current lean structure; believes gradual spectrum 'blocking and tackling' will be an underappreciated value-creation mechanism that the market only recognizes in hindsight.

Says the simplest driver of a stock rebound is likely still just launch; expects a 'Batch 3' shipment soon and possibly a new multi-launch agreement (MLA) with SpaceX or added launch certainty even if AST has to pay up, which would restore confidence after the Blue Origin-driven 'TAM deliverability' scare.

Clarifies AST already has an MLA with SpaceX; the open question is just purchasing additional launch options, which may not be separately publicized but could be disclosed in an earnings-call context (e.g., moving from a handful of purchased launches to two handfuls).

Says the market initially reacted very negatively to the Ligado spectrum deal (questioning why AST needed spectrum at all), yet the roughly $2 billion economic-equivalent deal is now believed to be worth around $20 billion, drawing a parallel to SpaceX buying EchoStar, Amazon buying Globalstar, and Rocket Lab buying Iridium; expects AST's other spectrum wins (Grain, Brazil/Europe S-band) to be gradually re-rated similarly.

Argues his core belief is that Abel Avellan and Scott Wisniewski are ethical, and there is 'not a chance' Avellan's prepaid forward transaction was executed knowing a convert would follow right after Andrew Johnson told investors no convert was planned, since that would risk securities misrepresentation; concludes something must have changed operationally or in market conditions in the prior two weeks — and that the successful satellite unfurl confirms it wasn't a defensive raise driven by bad news.

Theorizes that the aggressive short covering seen recently may reflect the unwinding of an index-arbitrage 'reverse conversion' trade (short stock plus long synthetic position, speculated to be run by funds like Millennium) rather than shorts anticipating the capital raise; questions whether the correlation with a Starship launch outcome (success or failure) would help or hurt ASTS.

Says the entire space sector has derated 50-60% (citing Planet Labs, Rocket Lab, Intuitive Machines as also down significantly), attributing part of it to the SpaceX IPO's liquidity-draining effect on the sector and part to macro factors; AST is down further on top of that because of the convert.

Says convert arbitrage buyers will need to hedge their positions, estimating hedging in the 5-7 million share range depending on how much of the issue they buy (70-80%), with likely more hedging activity over the next 2-3 days.

Explains that with Blue Origin offline until 'at best early next year,' AST may need to buy additional launches from alternatives — floats ULA, Relativity, Mitsubishi Heavy, and SpaceX as candidates — and that he and other institutional investors had urged management to procure more SpaceX Falcon 9 launches (with upfront prepayments if needed) for schedule certainty, even suggesting building enough of a buffer program (e.g., adding ~5 more Falcon 9 launches plus Mitsubishi Heavy/ISRO/Relativity) before bringing Blue Origin back once it has 3-4 successful commercial launches under its belt.

Pushes back on a tweet (attributed to 'Tim Ferriss') suggesting the expansion signals production isn't going well and is needed just to hit the original 6-satellites/month goal; Anpanman recalls Scott Wisniewski previously said going beyond 6/month (to 10-12/month) would only be required for government applications, and interprets the expansion as a signal that government work is materializing.

In Q&A, agrees with a listener's suggestion that the added 400,000 sq ft could be for a separate secure/classified facility required for government manufacturing programs, saying he hadn't considered that angle but it's plausible; also reiterates ramping to 10-12 satellites/month as an alternate explanation.

Says he believes AST will start manufacturing Block 3 mid-band BlueBird satellites sometime toward the end of this year, requiring the company to build two satellite 'shells' simultaneously, and that a third shell (enabled by the expanded space) would be a good use of the new capital.

Says that $100 million, which looks 'paltry' now, was absolutely necessary to fund the company for the next 5-6 months and ultimately led to Verizon joining as a partner, after which the stock rose from $6 to $8, $9, $10, and eventually to an all-time high of $133 (per the episode description).

Frames the current convert similarly: painful in the moment, but once investors understand the capped call gets the effective strike above $133 with only ~1.5% dilution, and that management is acting opportunistically ahead of several pending catalysts, he views it as 'smart management' — just poorly timed relative to the recent all-time high.

Says it took a few weeks for the market to realize the deal ('spectrum alchemy') was a no-brainer: the disputed 45 MHz of L-band spectrum (roughly 1.5-1.7 GHz) was tied up with the Department of War, and only BlueBird satellites could unlock it for its original satellite-to-terrestrial purpose via AT&T and Verizon, enabling higher-quality broadband beyond terrestrial spectrum alone.

Says AST's roughly $2 billion economic outlay on Ligado has since become worth about $20 billion, and the deal helped trigger sector-wide MSS spectrum consolidation: SpaceX buying EchoStar spectrum, Amazon buying Globalstar, and Rocket Lab buying Iridium.

Argues that if investors trust management as smart capital allocators who expand the business (as with Ligado, the military pivot, and Verizon), they should be willing to fund new opportunities as they emerge rather than insisting the company 'stick to its original plan' — framing this as the core test of whether AST is the right investment for a given shareholder.

States AST will not buy ULA — ULA exists partly because the U.S. wants launch-vehicle diversity, but it is behind on reusability; recalls ULA was rumored to be acquired by Sierra Space or Blue Origin back in 2024 at a price of roughly $2-3 billion, which he estimates is now more like $3-5 billion given additional government work.

Speculates that if Blue Origin (which is raising $10 billion) or Sierra Space were to acquire ULA, AST could make a strategic investment into that transaction to secure guaranteed launch capacity and possibly some equity, rather than buying a launch provider itself.

Says he thinks it's a high probability that AST/Rakuten's J-Leo joint venture will itself contract launch services, though Mitsubishi Heavy specifically doesn't need AST's capital.

Says a strategic investment in Blue Origin (already an important AST customer) could raise AST's profile and priority in Blue Origin's launch queue, though he isn't sure how much of the newly raised capital would go toward such an investment versus simply buying more launches.

Pushes back on the idea that SpaceX is being uncooperative on launch agreements, saying SpaceX is simply being commercial, that AST chose Blue Origin because it looked economical and promising despite its issues, and that the SpaceX launch-side team (as opposed to the competing Starlink business side) has been professional.

Frames the choice for investors as: if three highly accretive opportunities requiring capital appear, would you rather management stay in its lane or pursue them — he says he'd personally hand management the money to 'press their advantage.'

Tells a listener worried about dilution in the next six months that if that risk is unacceptable to them, AST may not be the right investment, since it's a growth company that may need to raise capital again; says the company likely wants to maintain $1-1.5 billion of cash buffer beyond stated needs, noting 'you don't run a $30 billion market cap company on a lean cash balance.'

Says he expects management to explain the rationale for the raise at the upcoming earnings call, and possibly sooner if additional news/color emerges.

Notes that unlike AST shareholders, Rocket Lab shareholders generally don't lambast management for raising capital and instead wonder what growth opportunities will follow — contrasting investor mentality across the two stocks.

Says MNOs globally are increasingly aligned with AST as a strategic counter to Starlink, as more of the market recognizes Starlink as a competitive threat.

References Chris Sambar's hiring at T-Mobile and an AT&T/Verizon joint venture pooling spectrum and infrastructure that is reportedly planning to work with multiple satellite partners, though he says it's clear there's one they are primarily working with (implying AST); says he's optimistic but unsure exactly when T-Mobile might formally come on board.

Kook said he backtested technical analysis (TA) approaches and concluded TA generally has little statistical edge, but that some TA-focused traders have genuine skill/instinct that gives them edge even if the raw technique itself doesn't have a proven statistical edge.

Kook explained idiosyncratic volatility: a REIT has low idiosyncratic vol (roughly 15-20%, in his framing) because its price is driven mainly by interest rates, whereas ASTS has extremely high idiosyncratic volatility, meaning company-specific developments — not macro factors — drive most of its price movement, which he says makes research-driven trading unusually profitable on this stock.

Kook said the SpaceX IPO had a bigger market impact on ASTS trading dynamics than he expected, and that his personal stock-loan desk showed shorts covered massive amounts of ASTS stock recently — surprising him since the stock didn't rally on the covering, and volumes have been very weak.

Kook interpreted the short covering combined with weak volume as forming a technical 'bull flag' pattern and a possible early signal that 'not all is lost,' reasoning that if bears truly believed the stock should fall further, shorts would be adding to positions rather than covering.

Citing a chart updated by community member Peter Lindmark, Kook said the count of shipped satellites is rising while the count of satellites still in assembly (work-in-progress, or WIP) has stayed roughly constant, which he interprets as a growing backlog of near-complete satellites that will translate into a surge of shipments over roughly the next two months.

Citing community member @TechInvestor's tracking of a Reddit post, Kook noted AST SpaceMobile leased a large warehouse in Titusville, Florida, and speculated it could be used for ground equipment storage or staging satellites closer to the launch site ahead of an extended launch campaign, rather than relying solely on payload processing facilities.

Kook said community researcher Tanner found that the formal grant decision for Japan's J.LEO sovereign satellite program appears to begin in mid-July, and that as of this recording (mid-July) it looks 'increasingly likely' the next hurdle/press release could come as soon as this week, though he stressed he didn't know for certain if or when it would happen.

Kook cited a slide Tanner found showing J.LEO funding of $900 million with matching investments, for a total of $2 billion, calling this 'gasoline on the financial model' for ASTS and a potential template for sovereign satellite deals to be replicated in other countries, which he framed as directly displacing SpaceX.

Kook said his financial model had been using a normalized spectral efficiency of about 2.5 to 3 bits per hertz with an upside case of 4, and that this result implies peak spectral efficiency of about 10 bits per hertz — a 'complete shock' to his model if AST's monetization scales with the quantity of data it can transmit (which he said is not strictly one-to-one with revenue, but 'sure as hell is not zero').

Kook cautioned he wouldn't necessarily expect the stock to immediately rally on this news, describing it as the type of event that may not trigger urgent buying since 'no one else seems to be driving the stock up higher' yet, but called it a major positive signal for the pace of technology improvement and the value of AST's vertical integration (ability to test/experiment/upgrade its own satellites in orbit).

Kook said he didn't know whether the stock would re-rate on the prospect of another leased spectrum band, noting this is 'embedded value' that may only be realized later once the system is operationalized, but called the sequence of events (FCC approval, AST's STA filing, and Chris Sambar's move to T-Mobile) 'a lot of coincidences.'

Kook speculated that once the Ligado/DoD lawsuit is resolved, Ligado could become more willing to trade back its royalty override and AST lease payments in exchange for ASTS stock, potentially leading to a consolidation of the two entities at a ratio to be determined — a scenario he said he would like to see as a long-term shareholder, but on a timescale of years, with nothing imminent.

Kook said the one-year anniversary of T-Mobile's SpaceX/Starlink Direct-to-Cell contract falls in August, and that per fellow host Anpanman's observation, T-Mobile's public tone toward SpaceX has shifted from favorable to 'flat out acrimonious' recently.

Kook noted Chris Sambar — the former AT&T executive he credits as singularly responsible for AT&T's engagement with AST SpaceMobile — has joined T-Mobile as Chief Enterprise Officer, exactly two years after leaving AT&T, which he framed as suspiciously well-timed relative to expectations of a possible T-Mobile/AST deal and coinciding with T-Mobile's existing direct-to-device joint venture with Verizon and AT&T.

Kook said he finds it unlikely the stock would fall 10% if T-Mobile signs a deal with AST SpaceMobile, calling it an event he's looking forward to, though timing remains uncertain.

Kook said SpaceX has effectively guided to only 1% penetration of the US direct-to-consumer (D2C) satellite market by 2030, which he interprets as SpaceX conceding it will lose T-Mobile, since T-Mobile's participation in a D2C joint venture with Verizon and AT&T implies (in his view) a roughly 99% probability T-Mobile secures a different D2C solution.

Kook described AST's stock chart (per an analysis he titled 'A Vesuvius of Milestones') as trading in roughly a $70-to-$120 consolidation band over about nine months despite a steady accumulation of positive milestones, and said he expects the stock to eventually resolve upward as the constellation is built out, but cautioned he doesn't expect it to 're-rate' to reflect future events overnight.

Kook cited a comparison (credited to 'Reform') noting Starlink added an estimated $500 billion in market cap following its IPO — equivalent to roughly 20 times AST SpaceMobile's own market cap — even though analysts view the mobile/D2C market as a key growth driver for Starlink, calling the valuation gap between the two companies 'huge.'

Kook argued AST SpaceMobile's greatest long-term leverage may come from becoming an open technology platform accessible via APIs, allowing third-party developers close to niche problems (e.g., pet-tracking collars, cattle/sheep herding, maritime beacons, shark-attack alerts for surfers) to build hardware/software solutions AST or its carrier partners wouldn't develop themselves.

Kook cited pet-tech startup Fi's new dog collar with Starlink satellite connectivity as an example of this dynamic already playing out with a competitor, arguing it's an obvious model for AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile to replicate by opening their networks via AST SpaceMobile, since it drives more cellular plan sales through their existing partnerships.

Kook said whether Blue Origin launches again before year-end doesn't materially matter to him, since a launch in January, February, or March would functionally be 'all the same' by that point.

Speculates a decent portion of the short interest in the space-stock basket (including ASTS) came from pre-IPO SpaceX shareholders hedging into SpaceX's August share-lockup unlock.

Theorizes those Millennium desks were short the space-stock sector while long SpaceX as a paired trade, and that as they've unwound (closing shorts, selling SpaceX), it explains SpaceX settling back down near its IPO price and space-stock short interest evaporating.

Said real-time ASTS short interest was in the 'low 70s' as of that morning, down from an '80s' peak.

Noted that short-seller/hedge-fund commentator Kiryu Onoda posted about AST being down again today, which Anpanman treats as a reliable contrarian signal that the stock is near a bottom.

Theorizes Onoda is likely a junior analyst at a 'pod shop' hedge fund whose long book gets hurt on days ASTS and similar names are down, prompting his negative posts.

Called Chris Sambar's hiring at T-Mobile as Chief Enterprise Officer (with an innovation mandate) 'huge news,' emphasizing the timing relative to Starlink's T-Mobile exclusivity ending this month — roughly '10 to 12 days' out from this recording.

Noted Sambar's hiring came shortly after AT&T and Verizon announced their joint venture and invited T-Mobile to join, implying T-Mobile needed someone who understands AST's technology and the players involved before entering that JV.

Said he personally reached out to AST SpaceMobile for comment on the Sambar hire and got no response, which he interpreted as a positive sign of sensitivity around communications and a hint that 'more stuff' is coming.

Cited past interviews where Sambar said AST 'has no competition' relative to Starlink, describing Starlink's approach as 'grafting' acquired Swarm technology onto existing satellites in a suboptimal way, and noting Sambar was aware of interference issues with that approach.

Framed Sambar's hire as the latest step in a pattern he's tracked since 2023: T-Mobile's original pro-Starlink executives (including Mike Katz, who architected the Starlink/T-Satellite partnership, and former CEO Mike Sievert) have been leaving, replaced by an AST-aligned executive, which he reads as building toward T-Mobile eventually partnering with AST.

Argued sell-side analysts mostly reflect investor/trader flow and conversations rather than original insight, and that the Starlink/SpaceX narrative is simply too dominant and fee-generating (large IPO, $20 billion debt refinancing) for analysts to bother researching AST as a competitor.

Suggested UBS's Europe-centric research focus is one reason it overlooks AST and Satellite Connect Europe, since AST is headquartered outside Europe.

Predicted this blind spot will become 'very hard to ignore' once the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture goes definitive and detailed plans are disclosed.

Said Japan's J-LEO program should get a formal grant and start being funded 'as early as mid-July' — about two days out from this recording, possibly a bit longer — representing $900 million to $1 billion of non-dilutive government funding.

Explained that once the JV has guaranteed Japanese government cash flow, it can borrow an equivalent amount from a bank such as Sumitomo at a very low interest rate, effectively doubling available capital, to be used for launch purchases (from Mitsubishi, SpaceX, etc.) and satellite construction.

Said Grain has buildout requirements at the 1-year and 2-year marks, and argued AST SpaceMobile is the only provider that can help Grain meet them since Starlink currently has no satellites capable of using low-band spectrum.

Expects the solicitation/decision on who gets to utilize the Grain spectrum to conclude before the end of November, guessing it will be some type of partnership with AST, with that spectrum ultimately folded into the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture.

Confirmed the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture has not yet gone definitive, but said 'it will.'

Said BlueBird 12 and 13 will ship imminently, with BlueBird 11 already on its way to Cape Canaveral, and that the next SpaceX launch is expected the first week of August.

Said he'd be 'shocked' if AST doesn't sign a multi-launch agreement with Mitsubishi for the H3 rocket (tied to J-LEO), and guessed a multi-launch agreement with ULA would follow soon.

Estimated the company's micron-production capacity is around 10 satellites' worth per month, but full assembly (composite ring plus control unit) currently caps actual output closer to 4-5 satellites per month.

Said hitting the 6-per-month manufacturing target doesn't matter right now because production isn't the constraining factor — launch capacity is — though it will matter once launch supply is abundant (noting Blue Origin may come back online in December).

Recalled that when Verizon joined AST SpaceMobile, it was a shock to the market and re-rated the stock from $5 to $39, and argued a similar (though not necessarily equally sized) re-rating is likely if/when T-Mobile signs.

Despite the broader risk-off environment, Anpanman said there were two pieces of genuinely positive AST SpaceMobile news that day that he believed the market hadn't yet processed.

Anpanman predicted that once research analysts fully digest what the spectral efficiency figure means for broadband speeds across the constellation, the market's view of AST's competitive differentiation will shift dramatically.

Anpanman speculated Sambar's career at AT&T had a ceiling because John Stankey was recently appointed CEO and is likely to hold that seat for a long time, making it a natural point for Sambar to move on.

Between AT&T and T-Mobile, Sambar spent close to two years (full two years as of this coming October) as Chief Operating Officer of Public Storage; Anpanman guessed this period served out a non-compete of roughly 1.5 to 2 years from AT&T while still drawing a paycheck.