Episodes

Charter got into its current position by focusing on financial engineering over time — raising a lot of debt and buying back stock on the assumption growth would continue indefinitely; the company now has about $100 billion of debt against an equity value of only about $18 billion, making it, in his words, 'pretty much a distressed company right now.'

Instead, Charter entered a partnership with Verizon: Charter gave Verizon the spectrum it had accumulated, and in exchange Verizon lets Charter operate as an MVNO, using Verizon's towers and spectrum while running a decent amount of network traffic on Charter's own network fabric. Anpanman estimates Charter has 'maybe around 10 million subscribers or so' through this arrangement.

One possibility Anpanman raises: Charter itself leaked it to show equity and bondholders it has options to salvage the business by partnering with Starlink — though he notes this is complicated because Starlink is itself one of the causes of Charter's subscriber losses, and it's unclear what agreements would let Starlink use Charter's infrastructure while it's still contractually tied to Verizon/T-Mobile as its MVNO backbone.

Anpanman's main view is that Starlink is most likely the source of the leak, intending to show 'they've got options' and to pressure T-Mobile not to walk away from its existing agreement, while also signaling to the broader market and other carriers that Starlink has alternatives if carrier relationships don't work out.

Anpanman calls the leak 'quite desperate' and 'another strategic blunder' for Starlink. He contrasts two interpretations: one view is that leaking a Charter partnership threatens carriers into acquiescing; his own view is the opposite — it will galvanize carriers, making them refuse to enable Starlink as an MVNO (viewing it as an existential threat) and prompting them to reevaluate their existing MVNO agreements with cable companies to close off any 'end around.'

On the idea that Starlink could simply buy an existing MVNO to bypass carrier resistance, Anpanman argues it's 'not as simple as' it sounds: MVNO contracts likely contain change-of-control clauses letting the underlying mobile network operator evaluate and potentially terminate the agreement if a new, unwelcome party (e.g., Starlink) steps in. He also reiterates a prior view that Starlink acquiring a mobile network operator outright would cause its own valuation to derate, would likely be blocked by regulators, and would further galvanize all MNOs against it.

Anpanman argues the pieces instead fit a different narrative: the T-Mobile/Starlink exclusivity is ending around June/July (he says 'I think it's July'), the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile JV formed just before that, Starlink has become vocal about going direct-to-consumer with a mobile offering, and now Starlink is reportedly talking to cable companies — all of which he reads as carriers closing ranks against a Starlink mobile threat rather than cooperating with it.

Anpanman predicts there will likely be another article in the coming days specifically reporting Starlink talking to Spectrum (Charter's brand).

Anpanman's closing take: regardless of these short-term maneuvers, AST SpaceMobile's strategic value 'continues to go up by the day' as Starlink Mobile becomes 'more toxic' to potential MNO partners; when the broader market/Street catches up to this, he expects the stock to 'massively re-rate higher' as AST's service becomes a critical strategic asset for every MNO and for tech companies outside the Tesla/SpaceX vertical stack.

Anpanman's key takeaway: AST SpaceMobile's strategic value 'has gone up exponentially' as a result of this disclosure, because it confirms Starlink's long-term intent to compete with, not complement, MNOs.

He expects this FT article to circulate to every board member at every global MNO, forcing them to reassess whether working with Starlink was a strategic error ('enabling' a future competitor).

General market/investor reaction will likely be that this news is broadly negative for AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, Google, Amazon, and Apple — which he says is mostly true — but he argues AST SpaceMobile is the exception because it is the only competitor offering true broadband to an unmodified phone using low-band spectrum, versus Starlink's current narrowband texting service (with broadband coming later, but capacity-limited by mid-band spectrum).

Anpanman states T-Mobile is joining AT&T and Verizon in AST SpaceMobile's joint venture, describing it as T-Mobile recognizing that enabling the 'Trojan horse' (Starlink) inside its own network made no sense; he ties this to T-Mobile's Starlink Direct-to-Cell exclusivity (announced August 2022) ending 'this or next month.' This is presented as Anpanman's own analysis/claim rather than a cited company announcement.

He notes former T-Mobile CEO Mike Sievert is no longer at the company, speculating (without certainty) that he was pushed out, though he says it 'doesn't seem like' Sievert left entirely on his own.

As Starlink pursues the terrestrial mobile business, AST becomes increasingly important not just to MNOs but to any company that competes with the integrated SpaceX/Tesla stack — robotics, autonomous drones, IoT, and AI edge-case connectivity providers — since working with SpaceX risks being 'hollowed out' by them.

Existing strategic investor Google, plus Meta (which he says has visited AST's Midland facility and is testing apps like WhatsApp with AST in Spain), Microsoft, and Amazon (which bought Globalstar for spectrum) are all cited as tech players with growing strategic interest in AST, though he says it's unclear if Amazon can stand up a real competing service via Globalstar.

Referencing a call with Ben Devron about Bridger Aerospace, Anpanman relays that firefighters lose connectivity during wildfires because dense forest canopy blocks Starlink's fixed-wireless service, whereas AST's low-band cellular approach can penetrate trees and foliage — illustrating a real-world use case for AST's spectrum advantage.

AST currently has relationships with roughly 60 global MNO partners (including Vodafone, Orange, Telefonica, Telenor, CK Hutchison, Saudi Telecom, MTN, Rakuten, Globe, an unnamed Korean carrier, and Vodafone Idea in India), and he expects that number to keep growing as Starlink's stated ambitions push more carriers to hedge by working with AST.

He describes a likely near-term model: consumers would buy Starlink mobile service directly (speculating a price point of roughly $30-50/month), set the Starlink eSIM as their phone's primary network, and keep a cheaper backup carrier (an MVNO or AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile) as a fallback for when Starlink's line-of-sight service drops (indoors, in cars, in tunnels).

This handoff would not be seamless — an active call would drop and the phone would need to re-search for the backup network — meaning users would effectively pay for two services ('dual bill') unless a carrier agreed to lease network space to Starlink as an MVNO host, which AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile have all said they are not interested in enabling.

Because Starlink's mid-band spectrum has line-of-sight limitations, its service would work well outdoors with a clear sky view but become 'patchy' indoors or under tree cover; to truly build a terrestrial-competitive network Starlink would need to erect radio towers (or lease space from companies like American Tower) and, critically, acquire scarce low-band spectrum.

He flags Grain Management as a company going through FCC approval to sell roughly 800 MHz of spectrum, and floats the possibility that either AST/its partners or SpaceX could acquire it; if SpaceX buys it, he says that would be an 'unequivocal shot across the bow' against T-Mobile/AT&T/Verizon and a signal to buy more AST stock, since it would definitively end any chance of those carriers cooperating with Starlink.

He argues this history is exactly why the DOJ/FCC would block any SpaceX acquisition of T-Mobile: regulators only recently approved SpaceX's AWS-3 spectrum purchase on the premise that Starlink would become a competitive 4th player, and buying T-Mobile would collapse the market back to 3 large carriers, the opposite of that stated goal.

He references a Wall Street note (he believes from TD Cowen) speculating that SpaceX could acquire T-Mobile, which he calls 'harebrained' and says is 'dead on arrival' from a U.S. regulatory standpoint for the reasons above.

He argues Deutsche Telekom (T-Mobile US's parent) previously considered selling down its T-Mobile stake but reversed course in recent years and has been buying back T-Mobile shares because the U.S. market is more attractive than Europe's tougher regulatory/economic environment for telecom — making a sale unlikely even before considering approval odds.

He argues European regulators would similarly block any attempt by SpaceX to acquire Deutsche Telekom itself, given sovereignty/national-champion protections and Elon Musk's polarizing political profile in Europe.

Using Street projections, he estimates T-Mobile's 2026 revenue at roughly $95 billion with ~63% gross margin, ~$37 billion EBITDA, and ~$10-11 billion annual capex, trading around 7.5x EBITDA, versus SpaceX trading at roughly 160x projected 2026 EBITDA; folding a slow-growing wireless business into SpaceX would badly 'de-rate' SpaceX's valuation multiple.

He describes SpaceX as now roughly 60-70% a 'neo-cloud leasing' company via compute-leasing deals with Google, Anthropic, and a third party he refers to as 'Relative AI' (name possibly garbled), a shift from connectivity being about 69% of revenue previously; SpaceX has also acquired Cursor as it moves toward higher-value tools.

He concludes that buying an incumbent like T-Mobile would be a value-destructive path for SpaceX versus organically taking market share, which the market would reward with an even higher valuation multiple; he doesn't believe Elon Musk wants to destroy SpaceX's valuation this way.

AST's roughly 50/50 revenue split with AT&T and Verizon reflects true partnership economics, versus the roughly 80/20 split (Starlink keeps 80 cents, T-Mobile keeps 20 cents) in T-Mobile's Direct-to-Cell deal, which he attributes to Starlink owning all the infrastructure (satellites, gateways) with no integration into the carrier's core network.

He argues foreign regulators will become far more sensitive to sovereignty and 'national champion' protection now that Starlink has openly declared its intent to compete with (not just partner with) local carriers, making it much harder for Starlink to get approvals to become an MVNO or acquire local carriers abroad.

He contrasts this with past cross-border ownership that regulators did allow — e.g., SoftBank (Japan) owning Sprint, and Deutsche Telekom (Germany) owning T-Mobile US — because those were allied-nation owners, unlike a scenario where a foreign (or politically controversial) entity like SpaceX would seek to acquire a domestic carrier abroad.

Because Starlink must seek country-by-country approval to use the S-band spectrum rights it acquired from EchoStar, and it is now openly saying it intends to compete with each country's domestic wireless carriers and send profits back to the U.S., he expects many regulators to simply deny those S-band approvals, calling the spectrum acquisition's global-harmonization thesis effectively 'toxic' now.

He notes the FCC could threaten reciprocity (blocking foreign carriers from the U.S. market if foreign regulators block Starlink), but argues this leverage is weak since most foreign carriers have no interest in offering service in the U.S. anyway.

AST's partnership/JV model — such as Satellite Connect (Europe, with Vodafone) and the Rakuten-AST J-LEO joint venture in Japan — lets local partners own ground infrastructure, command-and-control, and even a 'kill switch' over satellites while over their territory, which he argues is the key structural reason regulators will favor AST's approach over Starlink's 'take it or leave it' model.

He cites the potential for dual-use military/defense value in these JV structures (e.g., a European or Japanese 'Golden Dome'-style capability) and references a Spain flooding event roughly one to two years earlier where terrestrial infrastructure was wiped out, arguing AST satellites could have restored mobile service and helped first responders locate victims during the outage.

He acknowledges smaller (3rd/4th place) carriers in some countries may still choose to enable Starlink as an MVNO to gain subscriber share even without full economics, but argues this dynamic actually increases the strategic urgency for the larger 2-3 carriers in that market to partner with AST as a counter.

He briefly notes a competing direct-to-device player, referred to as 'NBA Space' with 'Aurora' satellites, saying it's too early to assess since those satellites haven't launched or been tested, and that the company does not appear to be working with local partners the way AST does.

He closes with a Napoleon Bonaparte analogy — 'don't interrupt your enemy while they're making a mistake' — framing Starlink's decision to openly reveal its terrestrial mobile ambitions as a strategic blunder that will make its global rollout much harder to execute than its domestic one.

He recalls AST's stock moving from roughly $5-6 to $39 after the market recognized the significance of the AT&T and Verizon partnerships, framing the recent stock 'malaise' as similar pre-recognition uncertainty that he expects to resolve once the market understands the implications of Starlink's disclosure.

He notes AST's constellation compute capacity/data delivery capability is up over 100% in recent months as more satellites have launched, and frames current stock volatility as 'a feature, not a bug' rather than a sign the news is actually bad.

He says he personally bought more AST stock following this news and remains highly bullish despite the broader space-sector and stock-price pullback.

Short interest in ASTS is around 81 million shares in real time, and as the stock has moved lower, convertible arbitrageurs covering their shares suggests there is still net additional shorting happening.

He attributes some of the shorting/hedging activity to pre-IPO SpaceX holders hedging their positions ahead of an expected liquidity event — the first SpaceX lockup expiration, which he says is coming in August.

The entire space sector — not just AST SpaceMobile — is down and correlations across space stocks are essentially at 1, so materially positive news for companies like Rocket Lab or Planet Labs isn't moving those stocks either; he believes the market is at or close to a bottom.

He views this as reinforcing Satellite Connect Europe's attractiveness to EU regulators ahead of the upcoming 2 GHz spectrum allocation decision.

Rakuten is forming a joint venture with AST SpaceMobile to serve as the vehicle for Japan's J-LEO project; per press reports, the Japanese government is expected to invest $1 billion into the JV, which the JV would use to buy Bluebird satellites, ground station/command-and-control equipment, and stand up staff in Japan.

An internal Japanese government decision on J-LEO was expected at the end of June (2026), and he believes AST is very well positioned to win the program, partly because he does not think Starlink can meet the program's requirements.

Under the JV structure, satellites procured for J-LEO would be fully owned and controlled by the Rakuten/AST joint venture (not AST, the US, or any other entity), including a 'kill switch' to turn off service, addressing his earlier confusion about how Mikitani's comment on 'rolling out global service' would work.

He speculates Mikitani's board departure may have been partly to allow him to sell stock to help capitalize the JV, and/or to enable more arm's-length negotiations, and/or because it was a requirement of the J-LEO tender — he is not certain which.

When the JV's satellites fly over regions outside Japan (e.g., the US, Europe, Africa), AST (or other MNO partners) would pay the JV to lease that capacity — explaining Mikitani's 'global service' remark as monetizing fly-over capacity rather than Rakuten operating a roaming network directly.

As a rough, explicitly speculative estimate, he guesses the $1 billion Japanese investment could pay for 'somewhere around 30-some-odd satellites,' though he frames this as a guess ('I don't know').

In response to a listener question about how satellite-sharing economics might work (e.g., a JV leasing a satellite to Verizon), he sketches a hypothetical: if Verizon charges its customer $10, Verizon might keep $5 and give AST $5; AST would then pay some portion — maybe $1 — to the relevant regional JV for use of that satellite, with the split depending on which party funded more of the satellite's construction/launch.

He suggests the JV likely gets less economics in regions like the US in exchange for keeping more economics within its home market (e.g., Japan), and that a fully-paid-for satellite effectively becomes incremental, high-margin network capacity for AST.

He expects an EU decision in May of next year (2027) on renewing roughly 30 MHz by 30 MHz of 2 GHz spectrum currently used by EchoStar, Viasat and others, with about 15 MHz expected to go to European-owned entities and the remainder to other users.

He believes Europe's own IRIS sovereign satellite constellation project is unlikely to materialize on its stated timeline given the bureaucracy and number of companies involved ('like herding cats').

Published EU criteria for the 2 GHz allocation reportedly require EU ownership of the constellation, European operations/control centers, traffic that originates and lands within Europe (not routed through other regions), and a constellation flagged in an EU country — which AST has pursued via Germany.

Deutsche Telekom has not yet joined Satellite Connect Europe, but he expects it eventually will, given the competitive threat MNOs see from Starlink.

As part of positioning as a 'fully European solution,' Satellite Connect Europe plans to launch its satellites on Ariane rockets where possible.

If granted, he expects Satellite Connect Europe could receive on the order of 10 MHz by 10 MHz of S-band spectrum.

Using a hypothetical Brazil example to illustrate how sovereign JV structures could get around FCC/EchoStar reciprocity disputes over global spectrum rights, he states that a 10 MHz by 10 MHz S-band allocation for local Brazilian MNOs 'is actually what has happened' — though he introduces this as a hypothetical, so the specific claim should be treated as uncertain/unclear.

He argues this creates a sovereignty risk with Starlink around data interception/filtering and around the network being unilaterally turned off if a country's leadership were at odds with SpaceX's owner, whereas AST's regional JV structure gives local partners full control including a kill switch.

He states Starlink has not formed joint-ownership structures with local MNOs anywhere and does not integrate into an MNO's core network, unlike AST's model.

He says he is 'almost 100% certain' AST's J-LEO proposal will commit to launching a meaningful share (he floats 50-80%) of Japan's satellites on Mitsubishi Heavy, framing this as a win-win for regulators supporting both communications and launch sovereignty.

He believes most global MNOs now see SpaceX as a direct competitive threat since its IPO prospectus and presentations targeted terrestrial cellular service, and expects early Starlink-aligned carriers in Japan (KDDI, NTT Docomo, SoftBank) to begin leaving the 'Starlink train' if AST wins J-LEO.

An Antonov large cargo plane from India — where the company's composite 'donut rings' are made — was expected to land in Midland the day of recording; he guesses 7 to 10 rings (possibly more) will be unloaded now that a prior stacking issue has reportedly been solved.

Going forward, the company does not plan to rely on Antonov flights for all ring shipments; as the composite ring design finalizes and production stabilizes, he expects more shipments to move by boat, noting some rings may already have arrived that way.

Because Rakuten was an early seed investor in AST, AST ceded control/exclusivity of the Japanese market to Rakuten, meaning AST could not previously sign direct agreements with KDDI, SoftBank, or NTT Docomo.

He says the J-LEO program's requirement that service be available to every carrier is expected to open the Japanese market to AST, allowing it to earn economics from KDDI, NTT Docomo, and SoftBank users — though probably not from Rakuten itself — a dynamic he thinks the market doesn't fully appreciate.

He notes Deutsche Telekom had previously been reducing its T-Mobile stake but reversed course over the last 3-4 years to increase ownership, viewing T-Mobile as strategically important given weaker profitability in the European market.

If SpaceX did acquire a large carrier like T-Mobile (which he estimates at roughly $95 billion of revenue and $37 billion of EBITDA), he argues SpaceX's valuation would likely get 'derated' toward wireless-carrier multiples (roughly 6-7x EBITDA, maybe a blended ~12x) from its current much higher multiple, since a majority of pro forma revenue and EBITDA would become traditional wireless-carrier economics.

He compares a hypothetical SpaceX/T-Mobile deal to AOL's acquisition of Time Warner during the dot-com bubble — financially accretive in some ways but ultimately associated with significant value destruction.

He argues that if Starlink acquired T-Mobile, it would put every Starlink-partnered MNO globally 'on notice' of SpaceX's competitive intent, potentially accelerating adoption of AST SpaceMobile among remaining incumbent carriers.

He discusses broader macro context — crude oil having round-tripped back to pre-Iran-conflict levels (potentially deflationary) even as the market's Fed outlook has shifted from rate cuts toward possible rate hikes of 25-50 basis points by year end — as part of why high-beta sectors like space have underperformed defensive/cyclical names recently.

In response to a listener question, he says AST will not hit a previously floated target of 45 satellites in orbit by year-end, expecting that milestone more likely in Q1 or Q2 of next year; he attributes the lack of updated public guidance to the company being in active discussions for additional launch capacity and not yet knowing if the eventual count lands around 20, 25, or 30.

Responding to a question about whether the J-LEO award is $1 billion split across multiple companies, he clarifies his understanding that the award goes to one company/joint venture — $1 billion upfront plus ongoing economics — not split among multiple firms.

Asked whether Starlink could preserve data sovereignty simply by using only Japanese gateways, he responds that Starlink owns all of its own gateway infrastructure in every market and has never entered into MNO joint-ownership structures, so architecturally and business-wise it doesn't achieve the same sovereignty as AST's model.

The derating across space stocks kicked off at the end of May, triggered by the Blue Origin New Glenn 4 hot-fire test explosion that destroyed Blue Origin's launch pad at SLC-36; since then, positive company-specific news (from AST, Rocket Lab, Planet, etc., including defense contracts) has not moved the stocks.

Part of the sector weakness reflects liquidity draining out as fast money that had owned space stocks ahead of the SpaceX IPO sold them to buy SpaceX instead; SpaceX has traded as high as about $220 and was recently around $158, and is likely to remain volatile given its public float is only slightly above 5% of the company (after the green shoe was exercised).

To hedge or monetize a locked-up SpaceX position, a holder would typically need to establish a relationship with a bank like Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley to get margin/collateral against the private stock (e.g., roughly 30% margin against a $100 million SpaceX position), then use that collateral to short a basket of other space stocks (not SpaceX itself).

AST has taken the brunt of this hedging versus other space names like Rocket Lab, Redwire, and Planet because AST is one of the few pure-play public proxies for SpaceX's connectivity/Starlink business, which is the largest piece of SpaceX's financials; short interest in Rocket Lab has also risen materially (notably around Friday/Monday), but not as much as in AST.

EchoStar is another popular indirect proxy to short SpaceX given EchoStar's SpaceX stake, but Anpanman cautions the EchoStar sum-of-the-parts arbitrage trade (long EchoStar, short SpaceX to close the valuation gap) is difficult — citing trading discount, liquidity, and tax considerations, plus the historical example of the multi-year Alibaba/Yahoo arbitrage — and says these trades need a clear catalyst or corporate event to unlock value, which is unclear here (also flagging uncertainty about what Charlie Ergen would do with proceeds if SpaceX stock were sold).

The first SpaceX lockup expiration is expected around August 20, unlocking 20% of total shares outstanding, with a further 10% unlocking if the stock price holds at a certain level; people are expected to start unwinding hedges before that date to get ahead of others doing the same.

AST's short interest is at all-time highs versus when the stock was near $130 at the end of May, even though the share price has fallen about 49% since then.

There are 4 outstanding convertible bond issuances; the first two have largely been retired, leaving two large tranches of roughly $1.1 billion each. Assuming convert-arb desks hold about 80% of those issuances, they would have had to cover an estimated 7 million shares of their delta-hedge short position as the stock fell from about $130 to about $70.

Because overall net short interest actually grew despite convert-arb covering, Anpanman estimates outright shorts/hedgers have added about 23-24 million shares short since the $130 top — roughly $2.3 billion of hedge notional at an assumed average price of $100 — a figure he says is consistent with sophisticated SpaceX holders hedging via a basket of comps.

Ideally this hedging is done via a diversified basket to avoid idiosyncratic risk, but in practice AST has taken an outsized share of the hedging; more recently the hedging appears to be broadening to other names too (e.g., Rocket Lab down about 9% on the day discussed).

Anpanman views the short position as temporary — once insiders' SpaceX shares unlock and are sold, the hedges should be covered (unless holders have an independent bearish view on space names), which he sees as a coming positive catalyst.

Anpanman estimates that going forward, over 60% of 'new SpaceX's' revenue could come from leasing compute infrastructure (apparently built originally for xAI) rather than from space/connectivity, meaning SpaceX is becoming more of a terrestrial data-center company than a pure space company, at least for now.

This shift introduces 'basis risk' for anyone shorting a basket of space names purely to hedge SpaceX connectivity exposure: a sophisticated hedger should arguably reallocate roughly 60% of their short basket into compute/data-center names (e.g., IREN, NBIS, MARA, CoreWeave) and only about 40% into space names like AST, Rocket Lab, and Firefly, but Anpanman says the relative price action suggests this reallocation has not really happened yet, or has only occurred gradually.

Combined with the AST-Rakuten joint venture announced the prior day, Anpanman believes today's 700 MHz approval strongly positions the venture (which he expects will be branded something like 'Satco Japan') for Japan's J-LEO contract, a public-private partnership allocating over $1 billion of Japanese government capital to build a satellite backup network functioning as Japan's equivalent of the U.S.'s FirstNet, addressing risks like earthquakes, tsunamis, and potential conflict-driven network outages.

Anpanman argues AST has a decisive architectural edge over Starlink for J-LEO because AST's system works with existing, unmodified phones already in the hands of Japan's (including elderly) population, and because low-band spectrum penetrates rubble/buildings far better than the mid-band spectrum Starlink's satellites use — citing an earthquake/building-collapse scenario as the clearest illustration.

An internal J-LEO decision is expected around the end of June, with the winning bidder likely made public in July or August; Anpanman speculates the result could leak via Japanese reporters (e.g., Nikkei) before an official announcement, and jokingly suggests watching Abel Avellan's demeanor at the upcoming launch as a possible tell.

A formal Rakuten-AST JV announcement (i.e., a full commercial unveiling) is not expected until either AST/Rakuten win the J-LEO project or get closer to commercial service; the regulator is expected to revisit today's 700 MHz approval at a meeting in September, which may be when formal commercial-service approval and a bigger JV announcement follow.

Rakuten and AST have reportedly been testing service using SoftBank's spectrum, which Anpanman reads as a signal that SoftBank is likely to eventually join the joint venture; he expects other Japanese carriers (SoftBank, NTT Docomo, and possibly even KDDI) to defect from their current Starlink partnerships and join the Rakuten/AST venture over time, partly because Japanese users have given Starlink poor reviews and because emergency-network law may require interoperability during a terrestrial network outage.

As part of J-LEO's domestic-industry support angle, AST (per prior comments from Abel Avellan in Q3 of last year) has been in talks with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, whose H3 rocket in its heaviest configuration could carry roughly 3 BlueBirds to LEO; Anpanman suggests J-LEO government funding could subsidize AST launches on a Japanese vehicle, an option not really available to SpaceX/Starlink.

Anpanman expects a similar joint-venture structure to emerge in Brazil, likely centered on 1-2 key MNOs who would then invite other Brazilian carriers to join, contributing additional low-band spectrum to complement AST's existing S-band grant; he notes AST has been hiring employees in Brazil, consistent with this expansion.

Anpanman frames the emerging pattern (Europe's Satellite Connect, an unnamed U.S. venture, and Japan/Brazil) as AST building regional joint ventures market by market.

BlueBirds 11 through 13 are close to complete; the next SpaceX launch is expected in the first week of August, which Anpanman says matches AST's own due diligence despite some investor hope for a July launch.

Anpanman estimates 4 total SpaceX (or equivalent) launches for AST this year, including the upcoming one, implying roughly one launch every 1.25 months for the rest of the year depending on production; he expects the company may announce additional SpaceX launches, plus new launch agreements with ULA, Relativity, and MHI (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries), and possibly Ariane.

The prior '45 satellites by year-end' target is not going to happen this year, in Anpanman's view; he expects the milestone to shift to around March or April of next year, which he characterizes as not a big deal, with Blue Origin's New Glenn expected to resume launches for AST once it completes roughly 2-3 successful commercial missions after fixing its pad (hoped for around December).

The T-Mobile/Starlink deal is believed to be ending this month or next month, though Anpanman doesn't expect T-Mobile to fully abandon Starlink immediately; he thinks an AST-T-Mobile arrangement could be announced a few months out, but notes the AST/MNO joint-venture structure (which would enable T-Mobile to work with AST) has not yet gone definitive.

On the recent AWS-3 spectrum license auction (remaining licenses), Anpanman guesses a single primary bidder purchased most licenses and speculates it was likely AT&T given its relatively lower mid-band exposure; he flags that if SpaceX itself had bought the licenses, that would be a notable signal underscoring MNOs' need to partner with AST to counter SpaceX's move into terrestrial spectrum.

Kook recalls that when ASTS first gapped up (he believes in 2024), he faced a large short-term capital gains tax bill and considered a prepaid forward with his private bankers, but ultimately did not do it — a decision he's glad about since the stock later rose from around $40 to around $70 at time of recording (noting he views the current price as a temporary drawdown from a higher 'real' value).

Kook says exact put and call strike prices for the new transaction are not yet known, but could be reverse-engineered on Bloomberg to find strikes that net out to approximately $0 cost.

Kook states this is 'absolutely not a CEO selling out' — Avellan has not actually sold shares; he would only part with the 2.5 million collared shares if the stock price rises well above the call strike by expiry and he chooses not to roll the position again.

Avellan takes no salary from AST SpaceMobile — paying himself cash would require issuing shares to fund it since the company lacks positive cash flow, and would therefore be dilutive; he also takes only a modest amount of stock compensation. His true 'income' comes from the wealth generated by his stock ownership as founder, monetized periodically via structures like this prepaid forward rather than via company-paid compensation.

Kook believes that when Avellan's prior 2.5 million share prepaid forward was disclosed, it was also executed the same day, because pre-announcing such a structure would let the market front-run the hedging flow; he assumes with '99% probability' the new transaction was also executed on the day it was disclosed, which he believes explains unusual weakness in ASTS that day even though it outperformed other space stocks.

Kook notes the timing is coming up against an approaching quarter-end blackout period (exact blackout dates unknown to him) during which a CEO typically cannot transact, which he believes factored into the timing.

Kook praises Avellan for not executing this transaction at the stock's prior all-time highs (ahead of the recent launch and before the New Glenn pad explosion), calling the chosen timing — after a successful Block 1 BlueBird launch — a 'gentleman's move' and an expression of respect toward retail shareholders.

Kook frames the combination of a panicked/rock-bottom sentiment environment plus this hedging-driven selling as a possible 'market clearing event' for ASTS, and says he was personally adding to his position today using a strategy he calls 'Torques' (selling a put spread to buy an out-of-the-money call), though he held back from full size to think it over further.

Kook draws a parallel to his own experience selling covered calls last September that got deep in-the-money after the stock ran through $100, forcing him to repeatedly roll the calls to avoid assignment; he expects Avellan will have similar 'avenues' to roll his structure, likely expiring in about one year's time.

If the stock price rises too far above the call strike (using a hypothetical example of the stock at $250 against a made-up $95 strike), it becomes very hard to roll the call, and the structure would settle by delivering the 2.5 million shares to the counterparties at the upper strike band — which would then represent an actual sale of Avellan's stock at that time.

Kook describes very negative retail sentiment ('the kook bottom') and notes ASTS often trades inversely to SpaceX-related news/sentiment; he has been checking with brokers on stock-loan flow and observed ASTS trading volumes starting to normalize, which he interprets as selling intensity coming down.

Kook says he personally is 'fully lent out' on his own ASTS shares (owning a portion of the float below the 13G disclosure threshold) and uses that information about short positioning to inform his trading, refusing to sell while he knows shorts haven't covered.

Kook credits an X account 'Reformed Trader' for good work identifying turning points, and says they had been discussing that today or tomorrow would likely mark the bottom even before knowing about Avellan's transaction.

Kook recounts a lesson from a former Pequot Capital portfolio manager (he recalls the name as possibly 'Arthur Pettit,' expressing uncertainty about the exact name) that 'bad news travels in packs,' and applies this framework to argue that a rock-bottom sentiment environment plus Avellan's filing together represent the kind of clearing event he looks for.

Kook says he did not expect the New Glenn pad explosion and feared it would 'suck the energy' out of the market for space stocks, but chose not to trade around that fear since he doesn't trade his core position; he now views the combination of events as a 'complete reset' and is 'setting up for an exciting summer.'

Kook contrasts Avellan's behavior with 'enormous stock sales' by executives at Intuitive Machines ('the Lunar guys') and a roughly $100 million stock sale by Rocket Lab's CFO, saying the latter would scare him if he saw it from AST SpaceMobile management, even though it didn't stop Rocket Lab's stock.

Kook likens Avellan's compensation philosophy — foregoing stock grants because he already owns enough — to Jeff Bezos's approach at early Amazon, calling it a top-class corporate governance model and saying this alignment gave him extra confidence in what was a risky, and is increasingly a de-risked, investment.

Kook says that if he ever saw 'piggy' executive behavior at AST SpaceMobile, it would turn him off and could make him reconsider his position sizing, but that so far governance and executive alignment have been top-tier on the issues he cares about most.

Kook estimates Avellan's stock holdings at roughly '$7 billion... $4, whatever it is, $5 billion' worth (garbled/uncertain figure), and argues that owning that much concentrated, illiquid stock creates real tax and estate-planning complexity, justifying a need for some liquidity via structures like the prepaid forward.

Kook believes (his own guess) that the next batch of BlueBirds could ship the first week of July, and thinks the market isn't focused on delivery cadence because it's still fixated on launch-vehicle availability, when satellites leaving the facility for launch is actually the best test of both launch-vehicle access and operational cadence; he believes ASTS has at least 5 Falcon 9 launches lined up in succession.

Citing a third-party analysis by 'Kevin Chen,' Kook says each BlueBird adds 20-30 minutes of daily coverage in key markets, so 3 satellites add 60-90 minutes; 20-25 satellites would enable initial non-continuous coverage with some consumer beta service, and 45-60 satellites would deliver continuous coverage in key markets — contrasted with Starlink's model needing hundreds of much smaller satellites.

Kook reflects on the tendency to get bored or anxious with a slow-moving growth stock and sell too early, describing his own past mistake of selling covered calls and only capturing 30% gains before a stock re-rated sharply higher; he credits a retail acquaintance ('Littrell Spackwell') with teaching him to keep a 'moonbag' position for asymmetric upside scenarios.

As an example of a moonbag-worthy idea, Kook mentions he owns Horizon Quantum (ticker HQ), a roughly $500 million market cap company (his figure), acquired partly by being lazy about selling after Anpanman and 'Tutte' sold their positions.

Kook explains his long-running personal joke/thesis that ASTS represents 'competition for the internet,' an idea he jokingly conceived with a friend in high school in the 1990s, and which he sees Elon Musk having realized with Starlink at an implied valuation of roughly $2 trillion (his figure); he argues AST SpaceMobile represents his chance to invest in a similarly transformative, low-friction consumer satellite connectivity business.

Kook articulates his belief that the biggest investment returns come from betting on the management team ('the jockey') rather than the specific current technology ('the horse'), arguing AST SpaceMobile's leadership has repeatedly solved engineering problems (like the casing redesign) that go far beyond what he understood to be possible when he first invested.

Kook speculates — explicitly labeling it pure speculation — that AST may be developing dedicated on-orbit power-generation satellites ('data birds'), floating the idea that AST could act as an independent power platform provider hosting other companies' payloads rather than selling connectivity itself for those satellites.

Citing commentary from 'Reform Trader' and 'Chris Knight,' Kook notes the batch-one launch press release specifically highlighted the satellites' 'high power generation in orbit,' which he interprets as an intentional signal (a 'Scott move') hinting that dedicated power/data-bird satellites are coming, since power itself isn't the RF connectivity product AST normally sells.

Kook mentions that 'Decatzee' has decoded new symbolism on the mission patches (an 'ACE' / Non-Terrestrial Network reference, following a prior patch with MILNET in Morse code), consistent with AST's previously disclosed non-communication use cases.

Kook references research shared by Anpanman on a reported joint venture among AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile (announced in May, per Kook, exact date not given), speculating the arrangement is structured to satisfy antitrust/FTC requirements (separate individual contracts, no price-fixing) and may function as a mechanism to box out SpaceX — which Kook argues would indirectly benefit AST SpaceMobile.

Kook says he still doesn't know the specific structure of an eventual FirstNet commercial deal, but his strongest guess is that it could represent roughly $1 billion a year in revenue through usage and subscription agreements.

Kook introduces Japan's 'J-LEO' program from the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a roughly billion-dollar subsidy for operators bringing direct-to-device satellite constellations under Japanese management, and speculates AST could be positioning to win it given its existing Rakuten partnership and the Connect Europe/SatCo sovereign-JV model as a template.

Kook argues AST's new head of APAC business development being based in Tokyo (a former NEC employee, NEC being AST's key Micron manufacturing partner) only makes sense if a bigger Japan opportunity is in play, since he characterizes AST's existing Rakuten commercial contract (from the Series B) as a weak deal that gave away the service component in exchange for capital.

Kook mentions speculation (attributed to community 'cards flipping into place,' including a point from Anpanman) around a possible AST agreement with Mitsubishi Heavy for the H3 launch vehicle, framed as building Japanese local content and value chain to support a Japan-sovereign constellation narrative.

Kook cautions this entire Japan J-LEO thread is speculative, was not previously on his radar, and is unlikely to be priced into the stock; he says if AST does not win it, he doesn't think it matters much, but winning would be a positive surprise.

Kook discusses Europe's competing sovereign satellite effort (the IRIS2-style constellation involving Eutelsat, SES, and Hispasat), describing it as burdened by 'pork complexity' from having to satisfy multiple national governments (e.g., France, Italy), and notes SpaceX has criticized the EU's plan for distributing 2 GHz satellite spectrum.

Kook argues Vodafone/AST have effectively already found a 'fast track' sovereign model in Europe (via legal structuring so the JV is treated as sovereign) and suggests the same approach should be repeatable in Japan.

Kook says ASTS shares are effectively 'max lent out' (every available share borrowed for short-selling), which he attributes largely to investors with large private SpaceX holdings hedging that exposure by shorting ASTS (and similar names like Rocket Lab) rather than to bearishness on AST's own fundamentals.

Kook compares the current SpaceX-hedging dynamic to Goldman Sachs partners setting up funds specifically to short Goldman stock around its IPO as a workaround to trading restrictions, and predicts that as SpaceX-linked liquidity events resolve and people cover lazy/basis-mismatched short positions, ASTS could see a sharp squeeze-like move higher, especially heading into a period of low summer liquidity and pending Russell 2000 inclusion.

Kook describes his own sentiment as currently 'crap' / a possible 'Kook Bottom' capitulation low, similar to a feeling he had a few weeks earlier when the stock was in the 80s just before it ran to the 90s and 100s, and says this dynamic often precedes a rebound ('snapback').

Kook expects the first week of July and summer generally to be historically strong periods for ASTS, and reiterates his guess that the next BlueBird shipment/launch could occur around August, while cautioning he habitually pushes his own launch estimates back a month.

Kook restates that his goal isn't just building community but achieving a 10x to 20x return on his ASTS investment from current levels.

Anpanman's guess is the Falcon 9 is scheduled for either the first or second week of August, since the satellites are close to being completed and tested.

Anpanman expects the next batch of BlueBirds to ship (or get a shipment-readiness PR) around the second week of July.

Anpanman notes memory is inherently cyclical (boom periods lead to overbuilding of fabs, then demand drops), and questions whether AI demand data-center pullthrough for memory has peaked, though he says the current boom cycle could still run longer than expected.

Anpanman argues leveraged Korean retail investors getting margin-called can cascade into selling of unrelated US holdings, including ASTS and IonQ (IONQ), which he says is widely held by Korean retail investors, similarly to what was observed around the last Bluebird launch.

Anpanman believes space stocks broadly have been de-rated as SpaceX-related enthusiasm has drained out of the sector, and thinks ASTS may have reached at least a near-term bottom because sentiment is 'completely bombed out.'

Anpanman explains that convertible-note arbitrageurs delta-hedge against the underlying warrant/bond: as the stock falls (from $104 toward $77), they become less long and have to cover (buy back) shares, meaning some of the raw short-interest change already reflects covering, not just new shorting.

Because convert arbs were likely net covering several million shares as the stock fell, the rise from 64 million to 77 million shares short implies there are a lot more outright shorts (fundamental shorts or hedged 'space basket' shorts, e.g. via Goldman swaps) than the headline number alone suggests.

Anpanman flags an upcoming SpaceX share lockup: a minimum of 20% of SpaceX shares become tradable on August 20, with up to an additional 10% (30% total) unlocking depending on SpaceX's trading performance.

Anpanman theorizes that when SpaceX shares unlock, investors holding a hedged 'space basket' short (including ASTS) against private SpaceX stakes will sell their newly liquid SpaceX shares and cover their ASTS shorts, creating a potential squeeze dynamic given how heavily shorts have piled into AST.

This JV structure mirrors Satellite Connect Europe, which AST formed with Vodafone and later brought in additional partners including Orange, Telefónica, CK Hutchison, and Telenor; Anpanman guesses Deutsche Telekom will also eventually join the European JV.

The JV is intended to be established within 2026, likely within the next few months, and was clearly designed to help win Japan's J-LEO project, with a decision expected within about a week (end of June).

The JV structure allows competitor carriers (KDDI, NTT Docomo, SoftBank) to access Rakuten's exclusive AST network during disaster/emergency roaming scenarios via pooled spectrum protocols, even though Rakuten remains the exclusive commercial user.

Criterion 1 — Japanese ownership/operational control: the winner must be a Japan-incorporated entity that owns, operates and manages the LEO infrastructure itself, with all ground facilities (gateways, operational/payload/network control centers) located in Japan; Anpanman argues AST's bent-pipe architecture and the new Japan-owned JV satisfy this, while Starlink's model (fully owned/operated by Starlink, providing only an eSIM to carriers like T-Mobile) does not, unless Starlink creates a new Japan-controlled entity.

Criterion 2 — direct-to-smartphone service by March 2029: both AST and Starlink can plausibly meet this deadline; Anpanman is skeptical MDA Space and Telesat (speculated as possible bidders) could build a full constellation and launch service in time.

Sub-criterion — video calling for roughly 70% of each day nationwide (about 16.8 hours/day): Anpanman argues this effectively disqualifies Starlink's current 650-satellite V1 direct-to-device constellation, which he says only supports narrowband data (not video calling with multiple users in a cell), while AST believes it can deliver continuous coverage over Japan with 45-60 satellites.

Sub-criterion — service to general (existing) users: AST's service works with unmodified existing phones, whereas Starlink's approach requires a new chipset for V1 and an entirely new one for future V2 satellites (targeted around 2028-2029), which Anpanman argues makes Starlink poorly suited for near-term, backwards-compatible disaster/emergency use.

Low-band spectrum: AST's Block 2 satellites use low-band spectrum, which Anpanman argues is critical for penetrating rubble/debris in disaster scenarios, versus Starlink's current mid-band-only architecture, which he says can't penetrate obstacles as effectively and would require a new, larger phased-array satellite and MNO partnerships to access low-band.

Criterion 3 — disaster roaming across Japanese operators: the winning system must support Japan's planned emergency interoperator roaming, letting any Japanese carrier's subscribers roam onto the JLEO operator's satellite service during a terrestrial outage; Anpanman notes Starlink has not formed an equivalent joint venture with KDDI to serve this role.

Criterion 4 — spectrum licensing path: bidders need a credible path to uplink/downlink spectrum (own, lease, or JV contribution), not necessarily ownership today; Rakuten holds 700 MHz low-band plus some mid-band spectrum, while Anpanman argues this likely disqualifies MDA Space, which lacks an MNO partner.

Deployment plan / launch vehicle criterion: AST and Rakuten could contract Mitsubishi Heavy (whose 6-SRB configuration can launch 3 Block 2 satellites per launch) for part of the constellation, supporting Japan's domestic space program and economy — something Anpanman says Starlink/SpaceX would not do given its own launch capacity.

Criterion 5 — financial stability/post-subsidy operation: bidders must show technical capability, staffing, a fully funded plan, and a viable commercial model; Anpanman says AST/Rakuten meet this given demonstrated video calling in Japan and financial capacity.

Anpanman does not believe the market is currently pricing in a potential J-LEO win for AST, since the stock hasn't reflected it over the last few weeks; he'd be disappointed if Starlink wins but sees AST as clearly better positioned on the stated criteria.

Anpanman frames sovereignty/control as central to why countries like Japan (and comparably India) want their own governed satellite infrastructure rather than relying on Starlink, citing Elon Musk's past unilateral decision to turn off Starlink service related to the Ukraine-Russia conflict as the 'kill switch' scenario nations want to avoid.

Under AST's model, the local JV/MNO effectively owns, operates, and controls the network in-country, so there's no external kill switch; data goes directly from the phone up to the satellite and back down to the local network operator rather than routing through Starlink's own separately-owned global network infrastructure.

Anpanman argues a US-company-provided (AST) solution winning J-LEO would still be a net positive for the US government's interests as a Japan ally, versus concerns about a foreign (e.g., Chinese) constellation, though he acknowledges Elon Musk's political influence in the US government could theoretically factor into any decision.

Anpanman recalls that around February 2026, AST filed with the FCC to test on T-Mobile's spectrum, which was puzzling at the time; he now thinks this makes more sense in light of the announced AT&T/Verizon JV, and speculates T-Mobile could eventually defect from Starlink toward AST.

Asked about SpaceX buyout rumors, Anpanman assigns a very low likelihood, citing US antitrust law (Sherman Act, Clayton Act), the DOJ, and the FCC's preference for supplier diversity; he says this could only change if either SpaceX or AST became financially distressed, which he doesn't foresee.

Responding to a listener who noted the August launch seems late relative to a 45-satellites-by-year-end target, Anpanman says AST will not hit 45 satellites by year-end; he guesses 20-25 satellites by year-end 2026 and 45 by late Q1/early Q2 2027, with the company still procuring additional SpaceX launches and other launch-provider agreements (MLAs), and watching how quickly Blue Origin returns to the pad.

Anpanman disputes a listener's suggestion that the August launch represents 'another delay,' saying he does not recall the company ever guiding to two launches in July; he expects the Q2 earnings call to land in early August, around the same time as the BB11-13 launch, and guesses another batch of ready-to-launch Bluebirds could be announced before that August launch.

Asked why Elon Musk has never commented on AST SpaceMobile, Anpanman theorizes Musk avoids the topic because Starlink's direct-to-cell effort (built by acquiring narrowband IoT provider Swarm, whose team was later let go) followed AST's, and because Musk used wording similar to AST's own marketing when announcing the T-Mobile service in August 2022 — implying he doesn't want to legitimize a competitor that got there first.

He calls this a testament to the company's engineering, noting no other operator has, to his knowledge, built a satellite that deploys a massive phased array without needing a separate launch vehicle adapter (LVA).

The company currently can stack 3 to 4 satellites and is iterating toward stacking a full 8, which would fill a Blue Origin New Glenn fairing; for a New Glenn 9x4 configuration he guesses a 6x6 stacked arrangement.

The deployed phased array is roughly 200 meters squared in size; there is also an unadvertised tail extension carrying additional solar arrays, which he speculates may also have some phased-array functionality (unconfirmed).

AST's large phased array is what lets it communicate with unmodified, low-power phones on low-band spectrum from 26,000-27,000 km/hr orbital speeds, whereas Starlink's phased array (roughly 2.5m x 2.5m) is optimized for mid-band spectrum, requires FCC waivers to operate, and only works with newer phones carrying a specific chipset — not older phones.

He ties AST's backward compatibility with existing/older phones to AST and Rakuten being well-positioned to win Japan's J-LEO contract, and to disaster-recovery/national-security use cases where new-phone requirements are a liability; he notes EchoStar's planned spectrum deployment (sometime 2028-2029) will also require a new phone.

He argues competitors who dismissed the need for large phased arrays are now all moving toward larger arrays themselves, but says AST's existing patent portfolio (an updated patent count was included in the day's press release, number not stated) creates a 'massive moat,' and speculates the company may eventually enforce or monetize those patents once competitors' roadmaps are locked into covered technology, rather than doing so now.

For comparison, he says current Starlink satellites top out around 7 Mbps per cell (narrowband texting/SOS/some pictures), while next-generation Starlink is targeting around 150 Mbps, contingent on Starship achieving commercial-cadence success.

Whether those satellites ship immediately depends on the next Falcon 9 launch date: if it's in July they'll likely ship soon, but if the next launch slips to early August the satellites may be held rather than shipped before the launch site is ready to receive them.

He believes the company is procuring offsite storage/processing space near Cape Canaveral (citing a job posting for a payload integration/receiving manager there) to handle logistics as launch cadence scales toward deploying 248 satellites over the next 2-3 years.

With Blue Origin New Glenn offline for a projected several months, he expects AST to announce additional Falcon 9 launches and formal multi-launch agreements with ULA and Mitsubishi in the near term, with Arianespace as another possible addition and more frontier providers like Relativity Space potentially added later — all framed as his own guesses, not confirmed.

He notes Relativity's Terran R (a heavy-lift rocket he estimates could carry around 6 Bluebirds) is expected to have its maiden flight sometime in Q3 or Q4 (his guess, year unstated but implied 2026).

His expected strategy: anchor launches on Falcon 9, layer on Blue Origin after further successful missions, then add ULA, Ariane, Mitsubishi, Relativity and ISRO to avoid concentrating risk in one or two providers.

He recalls (uncertain/approximate) that BlueBird 6 launched around December 23 (2025) and the company issued a PR confirming successful deployment around February 10 (2026), roughly 49 days later; he guesses the actual unfolding happened closer to 40-45 days post-launch with a short buffer before the PR.

Applying a similar but possibly shorter timeline (accounting for three satellites instead of one), he estimates confirmation of BlueBird 8/9/10's successful deployment in roughly 35-45 days, putting it around mid-to-second-half of July 2026 — a milestone he plans to add to his catalyst tracker.

Real-time short interest data shows ASTS hit an all-time peak the prior day; the previous high was around 69 million shares, set in mid-May 2026 when the stock price was much higher (he estimates near $100). The current all-time-high figure was stated as approximately '72.2 [million]' shares, though the exact number was garbled/unclear in the audio.

He attributes elevated short interest partly to convertible-note arbitrageurs shorting the stock to hedge the bonds' embedded conversion option, and partly to hedge funds hedging long SpaceX exposure around its IPO by shorting a basket of space comparables (AST SpaceMobile, Rocket Lab, Planet Labs) or running a direct long-SpaceX/short-ASTS pair trade.

He argues many of these shorts don't understand the underlying business (e.g., that AST partners with roughly 60 mobile network operators and could eventually reach a subscriber base numbering in the billions), and expects the trade to eventually 'blow up' on them as the story de-risks, similar to prior short squeezes at $2, $20, $30, $40, and $50 per share.

Upcoming catalysts listed: (1) Bluebird 11, 12, 13 being announced ready to ship; (2) Japan's J-LEO project decision, worth over $1 billion potentially, expected at the end of this month (within about 2 weeks of the episode); (3) confirmation of BlueBird 8-10's successful antenna unfolding and operations; (4) an update/confirmation of the 200 Mbps performance milestone, possibly during a quarterly earnings call; (5) a possible FCC Special Temporary Authority grant for 900 MHz military-application testing, whose application was filed about a week prior, with fast turnaround expected 'given the new world at the FCC'; and (6) a T-Mobile definitive commercial agreement, which he guesses is two quarters or more away, though hints may surface sooner.

He also expects additional multi-launch agreement announcements in between these catalysts.

Asked how many satellites are needed for full North America service, he answers approximately 45 for near-continuous service, with beta/intermittent service achievable at around 20-25 satellites.

Responding to a listener (Ben Deverin) about whether SpaceX could buy EchoStar's remaining paired AWS-3 spectrum, he notes EchoStar received about 2.2% of SpaceX's outstanding stock in the existing AWS-3 transaction, and that EchoStar's sum-of-the-parts (spectrum plus Dish Network) trades at what he estimates as a 40-50% discount; he speculates SpaceX buying more EchoStar spectrum wouldn't surprise him, but this is unconfirmed guesswork.

With New Glenn out of commission for what he estimates as about the next 6 months, the entire space sector derated from all-time highs at the end of May (2026); ASTS itself fell from around $133 pre-mishap to about $86.

He believes AST will produce a Block 3 (mid-band constellation) satellite by the end of this year, and a future Block 4 built around C-band (3.5 GHz) spectrum in partnership with AT&T and Verizon and 'soon' T-Mobile, eventually reaching gigabit-level speeds comparable to fiber — framed as his own expectation, not confirmed guidance.

He refers informally to a government-only satellite constellation as 'Blackbirds' (a name he isn't sure the company will officially use), suggesting FM-1 and FM-2 were effectively early Blackbirds, with more of that constellation coming in the following months.

He expects additional defense-contract news soon, related to Golden Dome and other communications, radar, or sensing applications.

Successful satellite separation itself demonstrates the composite structure held up under launch loads, which is notable given this is a new spacecraft design.

Confirmation that satellites are under control and nominal (powered up, flying) typically comes not long after release, but full deployment/unfolding and successful operations confirmation could take weeks to months; Anpanman guessed operational confirmation would arrive in a few weeks.

Anpanman recalled BlueWalker 3's launch (which he described as approximately 4 years earlier, i.e. around September 2022) as a company-defining event — he and Kook were both there in person with their children, and a mission failure at that stage would likely have been fatal to the company's ability to continue.

A rumored 'JLEO' program has recently come up in the community; one possible 'tell' is that AST SpaceMobile recently hired an APAC program manager based in Japan with significant manufacturing experience at a large Japanese company, which Anpanman suggests could be linked to timing around a JLEO-related decision, though he cautions this connection is unconfirmed speculation.

Anpanman's understanding is the company can currently manufacture around 10 satellites' worth of 'microns' (the phased-array/solar-panel payload) per month, but the composite 'donut' structures housing the phased array plus the control bus are produced at 'just under 6' per month (roughly 4-5).

Reaching 6 satellites/month is a company goal, but is less urgent right now given Blue Origin's New Glenn is offline after the Bluebird 7 loss, reducing available launch capacity; Anpanman guesses the 6/month rate is reached sometime in Q3 2026, over the next month or two.

Longer-term, once additional launch providers come online, Anpanman expects the company to scale toward roughly 10-12 satellites per month at full capacity, factoring in a planned dedicated 'government shell' production line in addition to low-band and mid-band Block 2 Bluebirds.

There is a possibility of a PR disclosing that 'batch 2' satellites are finished/ready but awaiting shipment, since satellites can be ready before the next Falcon 9 slot; the company reportedly hired or was looking to hire a processing manager at Cape Canaveral and may rent or build an integration/storage facility there because AST may ship more Bluebirds than can be immediately launched.

Anpanman predicts AST SpaceMobile will reach a deal with T-Mobile — an MOU and/or definitive agreement — before the end of 2026, most likely in Q4; he called this 'pretty much fait accompli.'

AT&T and Verizon invited T-Mobile to join their new joint venture focused on pooling spectrum and sharing infrastructure for direct-to-cell satellite connectivity, with AT&T 'quarterbacking' the effort; the JV will be positioned to regulators as important for US broadband connectivity and national security.

Anpanman does not expect a visible, fanfare 'breakup' between T-Mobile and Starlink; instead he expects Starlink to remain available as a non-exclusive add-on for T-Mobile customers to appease regulators, while AST SpaceMobile becomes T-Mobile's default full-broadband satellite option.

T-Mobile's exclusivity arrangement with Starlink ends in June or July 2026; Anpanman expects a possible T-Mobile MOU with AST as soon as this month or next, but not a definitive agreement immediately, since the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile JV itself must first become definitive and clear regulatory review before a commercial deal with AST for T-Mobile would follow, pushing definitive terms potentially to Q4 or later.

Anpanman guesses the next Bluebird batch launch will occur in late July or early August 2026.

Integration time from satellite shipment to launch is roughly 3 weeks, which Anpanman describes as fast because the satellites ('tuna cans') are self-contained and stack directly on each other atop the Falcon 9, without needing a custom launch-vehicle adapter structure.

Bluebirds 11, 12, and 13 are expected to be ready for shipment fairly soon, with shipment timed roughly 3 weeks ahead of the next Falcon 9 launch slot, likely putting shipment/launch around late July or early August 2026.

The next launch is expected to be a company-sponsored/hosted event; Anpanman expects launch parties to become less frequent (every 2-3 batches rather than every batch) as launch cadence increases.

Anpanman noted that some hedge funds, via expert-network calls, had taken these skeptics' claims seriously enough to ask whether the satellites would even fit in a Falcon 9.

Anpanman says he participated in the SpaceX IPO and flipped his shares at $165, then reconsidered as the price kept rising overnight, and now thinks SpaceX could be 'the greatest meme stock of all time' because it touches multiple sectors people care about (space, AI, data centers) and has universal brand recognition.

He notes that for a company valued around $3 trillion (as of recording), the tradable float is only about 638 million shares, meaning the stock can be pushed around significantly by trading flows until the first lockup expires, which he guesses is sometime in August or September.

He describes SpaceX's broader business mix as an investment vehicle: dominant positions in launch and communications, a 'call option' on AI data centers, and xAI, which he says has pivoted to leasing its large compute buildout to Anthropic and Google to show revenue growth (margins unclear to him), and which acquired Cursor (programming tools) for $60 billion to build out AI coding functionality.

He compares X (Twitter) within the SpaceX/xAI ecosystem to Reddit, as a platform generating user content that can be used to train AI models.

Anpanman says liquidity has been draining out of the space sector (though not out of neocloud names like IREN and NBIS that SpaceX also competes with) as SpaceX absorbs attention and capital ahead of and after its IPO.

He agrees with a recent comment from Rocket Lab CEO Peter Beck that the space sector will bifurcate into higher-quality names (which he identifies as Rocket Lab in launch/space systems, AST SpaceMobile in communications, and Planet Labs in Earth observation, plus other names like Voyager) versus lower-quality/speculative trading vehicles such as Virgin Galactic and Sidus Space.

He says AST's real-time short interest has jumped over the last few days, nearing its all-time high of roughly 68.4 million shares (versus an all-time high of about 69 million shares reached a few weeks earlier), which he attributes partly to hedge funds running a long-SpaceX/short-space-basket momentum trade that he expects to unwind once SpaceX pulls back or new space investors look for other pure-play names.

He relays a point Kook made over the weekend comparing the space trade to the AI trade: just as Nvidia was the obvious pure-play AI name before capital rotated into AMD, energy/gas-turbine component makers, and optical names, he expects capital to rotate from SpaceX into pure-play space names like AST SpaceMobile, Rocket Lab, and Planet over the summer.

He suggests that if Blue Origin gets its launch pad rebuilt and completes a few commercial launches, Jeff Bezos should take Blue Origin public given SpaceX's valuation, which he says would be a watershed moment creating a genuinely investable public space sector.

He expects a shipment announcement for the next batch (BlueBird 11, 12, 13) soon, noting the company has recently achieved about a 3-week turnaround between shipping satellites and having them integrated into a launch fairing; he guesses that next launch happens in late July or early August.

Anpanman states that after this launch, the constellation count changes ('by getting these 3 satellites up, we have 6... increase it by 50%... got another 3, so we're basically double the constellation in the next 2 months') — the specific figures are somewhat garbled/inconsistent as stated and should be treated as uncertain.

He expects a handful of multi-launch agreements (MLAs) to be announced in the next few months, adding specificity that talks with Ariane and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) are progressing and that Relativity is likely also in the running.

He speculates that if AST wins the roughly $1 billion Japanese LEO (JLEO) project, he 'wouldn't be surprised' if AST buys launches from Mitsubishi Heavy as part of that package deal.

Under ARK's scenario, a consumer would buy a separate Starlink eSIM as their primary network with an MNO (AT&T, Verizon, or T-Mobile) as fallback; Anpanman argues this would be friction-heavy and non-seamless (dropped calls/data at handover, no indoor coverage) unless Starlink secured an MVNO deal with a major carrier, which he says AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile do not want to grant.

He identifies AST SpaceMobile's key differentiator as delivering service via low-band spectrum leased from MNO partners, which provides strong propagation/coverage in tunnels, forests, and buildings without Wi-Fi — coverage he says a standalone Starlink service would lack.

He notes Starlink's second-generation satellites use a 5m x 5m phased array serving mid-band/S-band spectrum, and that serving low-band would require a much larger array (roughly 10x10m or 15x15m, comparable to AST's Block 2 satellites) — technically possible for Starlink to build, but he says there isn't much available low-band spectrum globally since most is already locked up with carriers.

He discusses spectrum holder Grain Management seeking FCC approval to light up spectrum for direct-to-device use, saying the highest-value user of that spectrum would be AST SpaceMobile, but that if Starlink instead bought it, that would effectively be an admission Starlink is entering the mobile wireless business and would push all MNOs to fully align with AST SpaceMobile.

He argues only AST SpaceMobile currently has a constellation capable of deploying low-band spectrum for direct-to-device service, which excludes Starlink (mid-band/S-band only) and any newer entrants, based on a requirement in a recent FCC filing calling for a direct-to-device provider that can deploy spectrum in the near term.

Anpanman predicts (as a guess) that T-Mobile will sign a definitive commercial agreement with AST SpaceMobile, likely in a 3-6 month timeframe, but that AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile likely need to finalize their joint venture and clear regulatory review first, which could delay a T-Mobile/AST definitive deal even though an interim MOU to explore working together is more plausible near-term.

He argues that if AST locks up commercial agreements with all three major US carriers (AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile), that would be 'game over' / game-changing for AST's value, and speculates that revenue-share economics with carriers could shift from roughly 50/50 today toward something like 40/60 over time (explicitly framed as a guess), though AST's existing AT&T and Verizon agreements are locked for the next 3-4 years and unlikely to be renegotiated near-term.

He observes that satellite-disruption risk to carriers has gone from essentially unmentioned on earnings calls 2-3 years ago to occupying roughly 20% of the conversation on recent carrier earnings calls and investor conferences, citing (with some uncertainty, 'was it Oppenheimer') an analyst downgrade of AT&T tied to competitive concerns from Starlink, and noting all three major carriers' market caps have come down on this concern.

He says the Varda Space CEO (attribution stated with some uncertainty) commented that Starlink would capture the entire direct-to-device market and compete with MNOs, but had no view on AST SpaceMobile when asked, which Anpanman cites as evidence the market doesn't yet understand this space.

Anpanman frames this as a template for how AST can secure streamlined regulatory review and free spectrum allocations in other countries by partnering with local MNOs, calling the free spectrum a 'massive windfall' that the market has not yet priced in.

Anpanman relays a conversation with a sell-side research analyst covering T1 Energy, who said institutional investors view the Fuzzy Panda short report as a 'non-factor' and are focused instead on execution and the company's opportunity.

He discusses Section 232 solar tariffs potentially taking effect as early as the end of the current month, which could raise the US spot solar module price from about 28 cents/watt to roughly 38-40 cents/watt (about a 40% increase); if T1's G2 Austin fab were fully ramped alongside its Dallas solar module plant, he says EBITDA could go 'well north of a billion dollars' at that pricing, though this remains speculative since the final tariff structure isn't yet known.

He and the analyst push back on the concern that higher module pricing would hurt demand, arguing solar panels are a small share of a data center's overall bill of materials, so a 40% price increase likely wouldn't meaningfully dent demand.

The analyst's view (which Anpanman says matches his own) is that if T1 Energy executes this year and gets credit for both phase 1 and phase 2 of G2 Austin, the stock could triple from current levels.

With fire season in full swing, Anpanman says he plans to do an X Space with Ben Deverin (couldn't schedule it the prior day) and believes Bridger's financial performance will come in ahead of where the Street currently expects.

He says he continues to add to his Bridger position, viewing it as significantly undervalued by the market despite limited institutional interest currently.

Responding to a listener question, Anpanman confirms liquidity is being drained from the space sector by SpaceX, attributing it partly to 'fast money' investors who bought into the sector expecting a ramp and are now exiting, and partly to some investors shorting the space basket to hedge long SpaceX positions.

Asked whether a SpaceX pullback could take the whole space sector down with it ('double whammy'), Anpanman says that's a real risk, but notes the sector has already given back much of its gains since the end of May.

He attributes the run to end-of-May highs to a 'rising tide' of sentiment ahead of the SpaceX IPO, with the pullback arriving earlier than expected due to the Blue Origin New Glenn pad mishap rather than waiting for post-IPO developments.

He expects the current downtrend to reverse as the upcoming BlueBird 8/9/10 launch and other catalysts land, mentions expecting 'big news around defense awards soon' without a specific date, and reiterates that the market has yet to understand what the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture means for AST if it results in T-Mobile opening its network to AST SpaceMobile — which he calls the biggest unpriced catalyst.

Kook argues that while a superficial look makes displacing the world's MNOs look like a huge disruption opportunity, deeper diligence reveals it's an extremely complex proposition, with the most basic obstacle being SpaceX's lack of available spectrum.

Kook predicts the MNOs' response to SpaceX's public 'we are coming for you' messaging will be a 'great global bear hug' of AST SpaceMobile, as carriers rally around the company that partners with them rather than competes with them.

Kook cites a tweet (via 'The Spectator' account) from Sequoia Capital partner Sean Maguire projecting massive growth for SpaceX's direct-to-cell technology, and a follow-up from Anpanman asking 'Sean, have you heard of AST SpaceMobile,' arguing that VC/analyst attention on SpaceX will inevitably lead these same people to discover and study AST.

Kook speculates the company likely has a press release ready for a successful Batch 1 deployment and possibly a Batch 2 shipping-readiness release coming soon, though he says he doesn't actually know if Batch 2 is fully ready to ship.

Kook believes Bluebird 6 (FM1) has likely already commenced commercial operations, noting this had not yet been confirmed as of the Q1 10-Q; he expects a possible confirming press release soon and says the market likely won't care much, but he personally views FM1's operational status as important to his long-term thesis.

Kook says he'd personally like to see the company's cash balance stay above $2 billion given its strong balance sheet, and isn't eager to see cash drawn down, believing there are multiple paths to that outcome.

Referencing a Banyan Lane Capital tweet comparing Tesla's and SpaceX's minimum-viable-product-to-breakaway-growth trajectories, Kook maps BlueWalker 3 as AST's 'proof' phase and the current/next-gen Bluebirds as the 'first product' phase, arguing AST has already been through its 'production hell' and is entering the nonlinear compounding phase of value growth.

Referencing his own May 19th tweet, Kook floats that ASTS could reach $900/share by next May — roughly a 10x from the ~$90 level at the time — explicitly framing this as speculative ('not saying we hit 900, but I think it's reasonable'), predicated on the idea the hardest early scaling work is largely behind the company.

Kook speculates AST may be close to a T-Mobile partnership, suggesting the timing could align with the anniversary of T-Mobile's exclusivity period with SpaceX Direct to Cell lapsing, and argues that with SpaceX now public, any AST/T-Mobile deal would draw outsized market attention as investors ask 'what is AST.'

Citing a seasonal study from the account @CleverNameTBD, Kook notes ASTS has historically been a 'summer stock,' with stronger news flow and stock performance in the summer months, and expects this pattern to hold again this year.

India paused Starlink approvals the prior week over national-security concerns; Kook frames this as part of a broader global 'data sovereignty' trend that he argues favors AST's model of working within individual sovereign nations' spectrum/regulatory regimes, versus what he characterizes as SpaceX's more borderless design.

Kook relays an unnamed expert's comments from a call stating that AST's large arrays are proving valuable to high-paying customers, that telecommunications remains the single biggest commercial payer for space infrastructure, and that defense programs including Golden Dome initiatives could also benefit, referencing AST's existing roughly $30 million SATCOM-related government contract.

Kook discusses FirstNet's continued public references to AST SpaceMobile satellite coverage, arguing FirstNet represents a large, high-ARPU revenue opportunity given the high current cost of deploying temporary communications infrastructure in disaster areas; he states there is still no formal FirstNet contract but expresses confidence one will eventually materialize, noting FirstNet already references AST's technology in its documents and AST has tested and gained approval for FirstNet's spectrum.

Kook notes AST requested a Special Temporary Authority (STA) from the FCC to support non-commercial Space Development Agency (SDA) programs, now visible in the FCC docket, and speculates this filing is the 'tip-off' that Bluebird 6/FM1 has begun operational activity.

Citing a Katzy-authored thread, Kook compares AST's satellites to the Space Development Agency's PWSA 'T1TL' satellites built by York: York's array measures about 3.4 cubic feet versus AST's 'control' satellite at about 800 cubic feet, making AST's satellites roughly 100 times more powerful; he notes the government is reportedly spending about $1.8 billion on the York satellites.

Kook speculates that AST's 'avoided cost' advantage relative to programs like York's could let it capture significant government revenue, floating — while stressing he doesn't know the actual figure and is 'taking Scott [Wisniewski] at face value' — that the company could plausibly bridge to 'over a billion dollars' of revenue from these narrower government programs.

Kook notes SpaceX unveiled renderings/details of a proposed AI satellite, with an accompanying video reportedly reaching 25 million views; he says he's unsure if it's 'vaporware' but believes SpaceX's known solar-array expertise makes it plausible, identifying chip radiation-hardening and overall efficiency as the biggest open engineering questions rather than the solar/radiator hardware itself.

Kook argues terrestrial power constraints make it 'intuitive' that AI compute will eventually need to move to orbit, and believes AST SpaceMobile — given its IP and large array sizes — is well positioned to become a leading third-party infrastructure/launch-cargo partner (potentially even for SpaceX itself) for companies pursuing orbital AI compute, which could also help such partners lower their own launch costs through higher cargo volume.

Relaying comments via 'European correspondent Peter Lindmark,' Kook notes a view that Europe tends to over-regulate new markets before they exist, and that fragmented national interests among countries like France and Germany could hinder growth of the space industry there, unlike the US's more unified, risk-capital-friendly aerospace market.

Kook argues Satellite Connect Europe (the AST/Vodafone joint venture) is likely Europe's fastest path to a working direct-to-device market, and says that despite some noise around new FCC S-band rules and EU rules on foreign-owned joint ventures, he is optimistic these can be structured around and that the venture will secure meaningful spectrum, which Wall Street analysts would value highly.

Relativity Space, which Kook says had looked like a likely failure, has been revitalized by investor Eric Schmidt's backing and is advancing its Terran R rocket, which Kook describes as bigger than Rocket Lab's Neutron.

Rocket Lab was added to the Nasdaq 100 index on the strength of its market cap and revenue (though Kook notes much of that revenue comes from lower-margin engineering services, under about 30% margin); Kook speculates AST could similarly qualify for Nasdaq 100 inclusion once its own revenue ramps.

Kook notes ASTS stock 'got absolutely mauled' the prior week, attributing the selloff to investors rotating capital out of the broader 'space basket' to fund new SpaceX allocations, compounded by weak buying interest on an options-expiration Friday; he compares this to the Nvidia-to-'pure play' rotation pattern seen in the AI trade and expects a similar rotation into AST relative to SpaceX.

Calls the IPO a 'watershed event' for the space sector that will bring sustained daily media coverage (Bloomberg, WSJ, Investor's Business Daily) and institutional/retail mindshare to adjacent names like AST SpaceMobile, Rocket Lab, and Planet Labs, which he says would not have gotten this level of coverage otherwise.

Having watched the SpaceX IPO roadshow as an E*Trade/Morgan Stanley client, he came away 'very bullish' on SpaceX despite some skepticism about the pitch, and expects strong IPO demand since TMT investors will feel obligated to own at least some exposure.

Argues space-based AI data centers represent a very large, largely untapped market opportunity beyond communications or Earth observation, which he says undercuts bearish arguments that there isn't enough economic demand to support all the launch capacity being built.

Speculates (explicitly a guess, prompted by asking ChatGPT) that the strong jobs number could be inflated by temporary World Cup-related hospitality hiring in the US, which might reverse once the tournament ends.

Mentions Iran having downed a US Apache helicopter and the US responding overnight, with Trump using tough rhetoric as a negotiating tactic; flags this as a macro/oil-price risk to watch given Trump's sensitivity to stock-market reactions.

Says (from what he understands, unofficial) the next batch of 3 satellites ('batch 2') is progressing well and the company could indicate within the next 1-2 weeks that it's done and ready for testing/shipment.

Believes the company can now produce Micron modules 'well north of 6 satellites worth a month,' possibly approaching double that (near 12/month), while bus/composite-ring production (which houses the control set) is only nearing a 6-per-month cadence, making buses the near-term production bottleneck.

Expects launch capacity to soon become the binding constraint once production cadence ramps, and believes the company is working to secure more guaranteed launches, including additional SpaceX slots.

Expects a formal multi-launch agreement (MLA) with United Launch Alliance in the near term, given the companies are already working together informally.

Names Arianespace, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and Relativity Space as other launch providers he expects AST to sign agreements with in the coming weeks and months.

Relativity Space, now under Eric Schmidt's leadership (whom he compares to Elon Musk/Jeff Bezos in execution ability), is developing the Terran R rocket, which he guesses could launch in the next 2-3 months or possibly closer to year-end.

Given the timing of these multi-vendor award announcements, he 'would not be surprised' if AST SpaceMobile announces a fairly large Golden Dome-related contract award within the next 1-3 weeks.

Speculates T-Mobile could announce a non-exclusive MOU or commercial agreement with AST SpaceMobile once the exclusivity window closes, potentially timed to coincide with the conclusion of the AT&T-Verizon-T-Mobile joint venture negotiations; under such a deal T-Mobile would continue working with Starlink as well.

Argues carriers need to publicly maintain they'll keep offering Starlink alongside AST to avoid antitrust concerns as they present the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile spectrum-pooling joint venture to regulators as pro-consumer and non-exclusionary.

Views SpaceX's 'Starlink Mobile' ambitions (global roaming positioning referenced by SpaceX's CFO) as a serious competitive threat to MNOs, reinforcing his view that AST SpaceMobile is the logical strategic counter for MNOs globally and eventually large tech companies like Google, Apple, and Amazon.

In response to a listener question, says he doesn't see regulators forcing an MNO to grant SpaceX MVNO wholesale access, since the FCC/DOJ favor facilities-based (spectrum- and tower-owning) competition over resale arrangements, citing Dish Network's failed attempt (after buying Sprint assets and spectrum) to become a viable 4th facilities-based carrier.

Notes game theory could still cause one carrier to 'break' and offer Starlink Mobile wholesale access if it calculates the wholesale volume gain outweighs losing subscriber share to the other two carriers, but believes none of the three currently want to make that trade-off given the long-term competitive risk.

In response to a listener's suggestion that SpaceX's ~$75 billion IPO raise could fund a US MNO acquisition (e.g. T-Mobile), argues this would likely crater SpaceX's valuation by roughly 30-40% since it would get re-rated as a slow-growth telecom rather than a space/data-center growth story; cites T-Mobile trading around 7.5x EBITDA with guided revenue of about $95 billion and EBITDA of about $37 billion this year as the kind of valuation compression that would result, so he doesn't expect SpaceX to pursue it.

In response to a question about Amazon/Blue Origin's direct-to-cell timing, says a partnership between AST and Amazon doesn't make sense near-term since Amazon/Kuiper still needs regulatory approval for its Globalstar-related deal and must first launch older Globalstar satellites plus roughly 50 next-generation 'Aurora' satellites built by MDA Space, which he believes are narrowband-focused rather than full broadband direct-to-cell; he guesses (spitballing) an AST-Amazon tie-up could happen around 2028-2029, after Amazon works through its fixed-wireless buildout obligations and Apple commitments.

In audience Q&A, when asked when the next PR for the following Bluebird batch might come, Anpanman said he expects it sometime in the middle to back half of the month (June), but was not certain.

He discusses a broader pattern of pseudonymous anti-AST accounts (naming 'Philip Lyle Free Speech' and 'Sprites/Shorts Manager' as examples) who have spent years trying to spread FUD and short the stock, claiming some of these accounts are actually SpaceX employees moonlighting online; he frames the persistence of the SpaceX Starlink direct-to-cell business as validation that this market is real, undercutting years of claims that direct-to-device would never matter.

Anpanman expected the stock to close that day above $100 (potentially above $105, with $120-130 possible depending on macro factors like Iran-related news or a Trump-related de-escalation), meaning the trader's puts would likely be worth only $2-3 at the open, translating to an estimated loss of roughly $150,000-$160,000, around 70-80% of his position.

He explains that for the joint venture to clear antitrust approval, the carriers likely have to frame it as open to working with multiple satellite providers (e.g., possibly Viasat), but says it's clear AT&T and Verizon are focused on AST, given their existing 2-3 year AST exclusivity.

T-Mobile's exclusivity arrangement with Starlink is expiring this month or next, but Anpanman doesn't expect T-Mobile to drop the Starlink-based service soon, expecting them to keep it running through the regulatory process while also joining the AT&T/Verizon-AST joint venture.

He argues Starlink can compete with MNOs 'to a degree' in low-coverage or non-dense areas using roughly 50-60 MHz of mid-band spectrum, offering decent data service, but the service won't work well indoors or through obstructions.

Low-band spectrum (600-900 MHz) is described as essential for carrier-grade coverage — able to penetrate trees, walls, and subways — and Starlink's satellites are not architected to use it and won't be for the foreseeable future, even as they add more satellites and throughput.

AST's spectrum strategy layers low-band (for coverage/propagation, currently being launched), mid-band via L-band and pursued S-band globally (for capacity, planned to start production/launch around Q2 of the following year), describing this as two spectrum 'shells.'

AST has demonstrated 100 Mbps with Block 1 satellites; the Block 2 satellites now launching are expected to deliver around 200 Mbps, versus Starlink targeting roughly 150 Mbps with a next-generation satellite that isn't expected to deploy for about two to three years.

Starlink will require new handsets to use its newly acquired EchoStar spectrum, and getting that spectrum incorporated into chipsets requires buy-in from MNOs (who drive chipset requirements with Apple and Samsung); AST, by contrast, uses patented techniques that trick existing, unmodified phones into treating the satellite as a terrestrial tower, so current and older devices already work with AST without new hardware.

He describes Starlink's approach as high-friction compared to AST's — requiring a new handset, a separate bill/eSIM, and manual network switching that can create rough handoffs (citing user complaints about T-Satellite/T-Mobile handoff issues) — versus AST's model, which integrates into the MNO's core network for seamless handoff and a single bill, likening AST's ease-of-use to Netflix's subscribe-and-use model.

One path for Starlink to get low-band spectrum access would be a wholesale MVNO agreement with a carrier (similar to Mint Mobile/Boost), but he says AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile's CEOs have publicly said there's no strategic rationale to offer Starlink such a deal, since it would erode average selling prices industry-wide once 'the genie is out of the bottle.'

He speculates that AT&T and Verizon reasoned that if they didn't let T-Mobile join their AST-aligned joint venture, T-Mobile might instead deepen its relationship with Starlink via an MVNO deal, which would be a net negative for the whole industry — part of why T-Mobile was allowed in.

He describes AST's revenue split with carriers as roughly 50/50, versus what he says is Starlink's arrangement with T-Mobile of keeping about 80 cents on the dollar and passing 20 cents to the carrier, calling AST's economics 'far more superior' even if pricing pressure eventually pushes AST's cut down toward 35-40%.

He recaps that AST originally had a 5-year mutually exclusive deal with AT&T alone (roughly a third of the market), then added Verizon (two-thirds), and now with T-Mobile joining the carrier joint venture, AST is positioned to work with effectively 100% of the major US MNO market.

He includes Google (a strategic AST investor working on handset compatibility) and Apple as effectively aligned with AST's side of the market, noting Apple is partnered with Amazon, and Amazon committed to providing some minimum level of service for Globalstar as part of that arrangement.

Globalstar is replenishing its older satellites and moving to second-generation MDA Space 'Aurora' satellites, but Anpanman guesses that service will remain narrowband, given limited spectrum, until Globalstar can develop a more robust constellation, which he estimates could be around 2030-2031.

He speculates that Amazon and AST SpaceMobile may ultimately partner directly, reasoning that Amazon/Apple's dearth of spectrum and lack of MNO relationships could make combining with AST's satellite network and MNO ties a win-win over the long run.

He notes SpaceX is competing across many verticals simultaneously — fixed wireless (Starlink), mobile (Starlink Mobile), AI, AI data centers in space, robotics, and solar cell/module production — describing SpaceX as a 'do-all and do-everything' company.

He says xAI (Grok) built out significant computing capacity but has had 'somewhat limited traction,' and speculates that as a result SpaceX entered short-term, cancellable (roughly 1-3 month notice) compute-leasing agreements with Anthropic and Google, citing a figure of roughly $900 million a month from the Google deal, and later describing combined Anthropic/Google leasing revenue as on the order of $1.5 billion a month; he adds he's speculating that recent departures of original and newer xAI staff may be related.

Anpanman says this description closely mirrors his own longstanding thesis (discussed for several months) that AST's Block 2 satellites could similarly be repurposed into AI-compute satellites by swapping the phased-array Micron elements for heat sinks and swapping the ASICs for GPUs or TPUs, calling the parallel a validating moment.

He frames SpaceX's simultaneous competition with and leasing to Anthropic/Google as normal 'co-opetition' in tech, and applies the same logic to SpaceX launching AST's competing satellites on Falcon 9 — cooperation and competition can coexist, and antitrust law (citing the Sherman and Clayton Acts) would prevent SpaceX from using launch access to block competitors like AST.

He criticizes a Rocket Lab shareholder referred to as 'Stan,' who he says routinely argues that AST SpaceMobile and SpaceX are overvalued, calling this self-defeating since Rocket Lab's own valuation and investor interest are boosted by proximity to SpaceX, and space-sector valuations tend to move in tandem.

He argues SpaceX/Starlink deserves a valuation premium given the difficulty of running a reliable launch vehicle (citing challenges faced by competitors' vehicles, referenced as 'Lourdes' and New Glenn), and says AST SpaceMobile currently trades at a relatively lower valuation that he expects to eventually catch up if projections hold.

Kook says he expected the market to open Sunday night with a 'total implosion of security prices' (a feared 'Black Monday') after a stressful week, but instead checked and found the market — and ASTS — were up, joking that feared negative catalysts ('King Tut's tweets') turned out to be overblown.

Kook frames his overall philosophy as 'focusing on the fundamentals' rather than reacting to short-term panic, e.g. geopolitical fears like a potential Israel-Iran strike, which he says shouldn't drive decisions to sell positions like the S&P 500.

Kook reiterates his recurring framework for the ASTS thesis: identify a large secular wave plus a 'crazy founder' (i.e., Abel Avellan) with a vision others don't see who refuses to accept conventional wisdom that the vision can't succeed.

Kook acknowledges ASTS cannot be justified as cheap by conventional valuation metrics (e.g., P/E, 'Intelligent Investor'-style value investing) since it currently has little revenue, and says shorts are correct on that narrow point — but argues the thesis is about the secular trend and founder conviction rather than near-term valuation.

Kook recaps last week's panic over the New Glenn 3/New Glenn 4 anomaly, saying initial reports suggest the delay 'is not as bad as feared,' estimating roughly a 3 to 6 month delay versus AST's original schedule, though he notes it could still end up more delayed than that.

Kook describes a dynamic where alternate heavy-launch providers (he names MHI, ULA, ISRO) were reportedly eager to court AST SpaceMobile as a large customer immediately after the New Glenn anomaly, but that urgency eased somewhat once Blue Origin's recovery update came out; he views AST SpaceMobile's multi-launcher strategy (not relying on one provider) as a positive regardless.

Kook predicts the market won't re-rate the stock day-to-day on incremental international spectrum wins like this, but that they are building toward a 'gradually, then suddenly' recognition event, comparing it to how Citadel's Ken Griffin built his market-making business quietly for years before a sudden, obvious dominance.

Citing a tweet from an account called 'Tech Investor,' Kook notes that in the roughly two months before this episode, ASTS had a satellite placed in the wrong orbit and its launch partner (Blue Origin/New Glenn) suffered a pad anomaly, yet the stock was up about 40% over that timeframe — which Kook argues should create cognitive dissonance for short sellers, since even a psychic short thesis based on those two negative events would have failed.

Kook argues this pattern shows the market is looking through near-term setbacks to a bigger picture, and that the same dynamic can work in reverse for companies that 'over-earn' right before a business collapses (citing Blockbuster as an example).

Kook notes China recently launched its Long March 12B rocket, which he says visually resembles a Falcon 9 and may use similar blueprints, reportedly carrying Starlink-shaped satellites (implying a Chinese Starlink-clone constellation); he frames this as evidence of a real global space race that argues for the US space industry to remove artificial barriers and coalesce to win.

Kook says Blue Origin remains in contention for the NSSL (national security launch) program as long as it stops experiencing launch failures.

Kook cites a post noting ULA stacked its first (uncertain figure, possibly garbled) 'LEO-optimized Centaur 5 upper stage' for an Amazon mission, and says Vulcan — a vehicle he says will also carry AST SpaceMobile satellites, with capacity for roughly 5 satellites per launch (Kook's estimate) — is expected to return to service after July 2026.

Referencing a post by an account called 'Leo Edge,' Kook explains AST's patented 'Micron sandwich' satellite design: solar cells on one side, heat-transfer components in the middle, and the RF/signal-processing electronics on the earth-facing side, so every square foot of the array does double duty (power generation and signal processing) — unlike most competing satellites, which use their area for either solar or communications, not both.

Kook says no other company has replicated this design, and it's unclear whether that's due to patent protection or genuine technical difficulty; he ties this efficiency advantage to what he calls the 'Catseye theorem' — that spectrum flows to the most efficient system, citing the Brazil spectrum award as a supporting example.

Kook says he's increasingly thinking about space-based AI data centers as a long-term (multi-trillion dollar) opportunity, citing a SpaceX video/comments describing space AI data centers as a 'no-brainer' race to power, since space offers abundant power without the terrestrial constraints of liquid cooling, grid buildout, and environmental impact from chip/precious-metal usage.

Kook explicitly states he currently assigns zero value to this opportunity in ASTS and would not pay for it today, but believes AST SpaceMobile 'owns' this business-development angle given it operates the largest phased arrays in low Earth orbit, framing it as a longer-term 'inflection of perception' rather than a near-term catalyst.

Kook compares this dynamic to Amazon Web Services, which the market ignored for years until Amazon broke out separate segment reporting (stock reportedly up about 11% that day) — arguing markets consistently misprice inflection points on day one, giving patient investors time to act.

Kook notes Marvell's CEO has called connectivity the 'next AI bottleneck,' and that Jensen Huang's comments reportedly moved Marvell's stock up about 50% quickly, questioning whether such large-cap reactions are becoming frothy.

Kook argues Musk fundamentally does not respect 'dumb,' 'stodgy' partners like MNOs (comparing this to how he treated auto-parts suppliers and car dealers at Tesla) and will always seek to disintermediate them — joking that Musk has floated making a 'SpaceX phone.'

Kook's view is that ASTS's moat holds as long as spectrum and end customers remain controlled by MNOs; the real risk to the thesis would be if SpaceX obtained its own low-band spectrum, built a phone, and had massive marketing resources, which he characterizes as a '20 or 30-year type of problem' unlikely within his investable time horizon.

Citing an article shared by 'Alex from Babylon,' Kook argues private markets have been indiscriminately funding many space ventures, including satellite-bus manufacturers, and distinguishes those low-margin contract bus manufacturers (just engineering hours) from a company like ASTS with its own proprietary satellite system and commercial rent-capture model, which he expects to have far better margins, scalability, and enterprise value creation over time.

Kook interprets this shift as connected to T-Mobile and SpaceX's roughly one-year direct-to-cell contract nearing its end, predicting T-Mobile (and Deutsche Telekom) will move toward a carrier-neutral satellite solution — implicitly AST SpaceMobile — either dropping SpaceX outright or making the relationship non-exclusive.

Kook references a tweet-thread response from Scott Powell critiquing Starlink's reliance on high-band spectrum, which requires a clear line of sight to the sky (e.g., doesn't work under tree cover), versus the BlueBird architecture's massive phased arrays, low-band spectrum, and beamforming, which Powell argues is specifically designed for strong, penetrating, high-capacity real mobile broadband.

Kook notes that Jennifer Manner was 'liking posts' about MilSatCom (SDA-related programs), and that the SDA's Halo Europa contract — originally awarded in February — is resurfacing in social-media activity; Kook says he agrees with an account called Peter Lindmark that 'something is up,' speculating this could foreshadow new contract news.

Kook expects an AST SpaceMobile satellite launch within about the next two weeks from the episode date, followed by the next batch of satellites shipping in early July 2026 based on his own research/estimates, and a subsequent launch he expects before September 2026, while cautioning that space-industry timelines typically slip and he's assuming roughly August for the next shipment as a conservative guess.

Kook says he hopes for news in the coming week about 'encapsulating batch 1' and a confirmed launch date.

Anpanman argues Scott was asked a direct question on the spot and answered honestly; he believes the company isn't ready to formalize guidance via 8-K yet because it's still working on assigning additional launch capacity and possibly signing new multi-launch agreements (MLAs) — an update might come when the company names a target launch date for BB-8, 9, and 10.

Anpanman states his personal guess is that the company's prior BB-45 (satellite count) 'stretch goal' target will drift into the first half or first quarter of next year, but stresses this is only his own guess, not company guidance.

Anpanman disagrees with fully isolating AT&T, noting all three major carriers (AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile) have fixed-wireless and mobile exposure to Starlink, which is why T-Mobile is shifting toward AST SpaceMobile — he argues this underscores why none of the three carriers will ultimately work with Starlink and why AST is their chosen bet.

AST has a baseline of Falcon 9 and some ULA Centaur launches and is working to add more capacity while waiting for Blue Origin New Glenn to return; Anpanman guesses the company will sign new MLAs with Relativity, MHI, and Arianespace (existing MLAs are already in place with ISRO, SpaceX, and Blue Origin, but not yet with ULA, Relativity, Arianespace, MHI, or Rocket Lab).

Regarding the next Falcon 9 launch, due diligence had suggested June 15, but that may slip one day to June 16 because a same-day Starlink mission was delayed by weather; the last Block 1 launch date was announced 8 days in advance, so an announcement is expected around June 7-8 or the following Monday.

If Blue Origin says it will launch again before year-end 2026, Anpanman's guess is the real date probably lands in January or February 2027, since 'space things take time'; SLC-36A pad construction progress (cranes clearing debris) will be visible and trackable.

Anpanman estimates that by year-end 2026, Blue Origin will likely have about 3 completed boosters (Glenn Stage 1 units 4 and 5, referred to as GS1-4/GS1-5) and upper stages numbered into the high teens/low 20s, meaning the launch pad itself — not booster/upper-stage supply — is the real bottleneck.

He frames a strategic tradeoff for AST: buy down (pull forward) roughly 15 SpaceX launches now at an estimated cost of about $60-70 million total, versus waiting 1-2 months to see Blue Origin's pad progress before committing further capital, noting the market likely rewards both near-term launch certainty and optionality.

Regarding a prior SEC filing referencing prepayments for 10 launches, Anpanman clarifies this is Space Mob speculation, not company confirmation — such prepayments do not necessarily mean all 10 launches occur within the next 6 months; some could span into next year's Q1/Q2.

He raises the possibility that AST could pay SpaceX an incremental $5-10 million per launch to pull forward already-scheduled future launches, which the company would weigh economically before deciding.

Anpanman expects the next batch of Bluebird satellites (Block 2, following BlueBird 6/7) to ship in the next 2-3 weeks (potentially by end of June) in order to make a July Falcon 9 launch, based on an estimated ~3-week satellite-to-rocket integration timeline.

In response to an audience question about NSSL (National Security Space Launch), Anpanman says it's a possibility given AST's ongoing defense-side work — if AST wins a significant defense contract deemed important to national interests, it could gain priority access ('front of the line') for Falcon 9 and ULA launches.

Anpanman expects a broad space-sector rally into and around the SpaceX IPO, followed by a cooling-off/consolidation period, though he's uncertain whether pullbacks will be 10-20% or just a few percent.

On the idea that investors might sell existing space holdings (including AST) to buy SpaceX at the IPO, Anpanman says he personally is not doing so and considers himself a long-term holder who isn't trading around the IPO; he says he's not interested in owning SpaceX given his lack of enthusiasm for the X/xAI exposure that comes bundled with it.

Asked whether EchoStar (SATS) benefits from the SpaceX IPO, Anpanman says yes if the IPO goes well (and it would suffer if the IPO goes poorly), given EchoStar sold spectrum to SpaceX in exchange for stock; he flags concern about EchoStar management (Charlie Ergen and a colleague referred to as Hamid) potentially turning the company into an investment vehicle post-monetization, which is why the sum-of-the-parts trades at a discount.

Asked if AST will dilute shareholders in coming months to pay for additional SpaceX launches, Anpanman says no near-term need since the company has over $3 billion in cash.

If the stock reaches $150-200, Anpanman believes management would likely raise more capital opportunistically, noting the last billion-dollar convertible note was done at what he recalls as under 3% dilution — he calls this a good move in hindsight given subsequent events like the Blue Origin mishap.

He recalls (with some uncertainty, saying 'was it like $96?') that the recent convertible note was priced around a $96 conversion price with a conversion premium bringing it to roughly $120.

Asked if AST will issue another ATM given the delay, Anpanman says it would be smart to have one in place as a backup, but guesses the company likely won't do so near-term since it already has ample cash; he speculates a new ATM is more likely near Q4 2026 if launches proceed smoothly and the stock is trading around $150-200.

After the Blue Origin mishap/explosion of New Glenn and destruction of the launch pad, a number of respected industry journalists and pundits, including Eric Berger, made claims Anpanman says were stated as fact rather than speculation; Anpanman has found Berger's past reporting on Blue Origin to be wrong before (citing 2024/2025 claims he cross-referenced with AST SpaceMobile management and was told were incorrect).

Eric Berger and others suggested the pad rebuild could take 18 months to 2 years, with more optimistic 'doom maxers' saying 1 to 1.5 years.

Eric Berger claimed within the first hour after the explosion that Blue Origin sources told him the company would skip the 7x2 New Glenn configuration and move straight to 9x4 — Anpanman calls this illogical given a full manifest of paying missions on 7x2 and boosters already completed or nearly so (booster with 2 successful flights/returns already, booster 4 expected mid-to-late summer, booster 5 expected fall/early winter), plus Bezos's tour comment about working on the 15th second stage implying ~11 already produced or in production.

Anpanman argues against pundits speculating SpaceX would retire Falcon 9 once Starship reaches regular cadence, saying Falcon 9 remains a profitable, in-demand program and that vehicle diversity is valuable in case any one vehicle is grounded by an FAA investigation.

Anpanman names Tim Ferriss and 'Pierre Leonet' (described as 'the Space Economist') as examples of what he calls FUD merchants who manufacture negative narratives; note this attribution/spelling may reflect transcription uncertainty.

The company pivoted to the Block 2 design, where the LVA becomes a permanent donut-ring-shaped part of the satellite itself (housing the control bus, with a tail), eliminating any discarded material in orbit; Anpanman notes FUDster Tim Farrar predicted this new design wouldn't get FCC approval or fly for another two years, which he says was wrong.

Because the Block 2 satellite fits essentially any launch vehicle (Soyuz, Relativity Terran, Rocket Lab Neutron, Blue Origin New Glenn, SpaceX Falcon 9/Falcon Heavy, ISRO LVM-3, Ariane 6/5, ULA Vulcan Centaur), this launch-agnostic design functions as an insurance policy against exactly the kind of single-provider setback caused by the New Glenn pad explosion.

Anpanman expects the company will likely need to update or push out its previously stated stretch goal of 45 satellites in orbit by year-end 2026, possibly into Q1 2027, given Blue Origin New Glenn delays; he frames a few months' slip as immaterial against AST's roughly $750 billion commercial TAM (over $1 trillion including military/other use cases).

Anpanman advocates that AST sign additional launch services agreements (MLAs) with providers such as Ariane, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), and Relativity Space to build launch 'optionality' on top of a Falcon 9/ULA Vulcan Centaur baseline, noting Ariane and Vulcan Centaur are largely booked with government payloads that often slip, creating openings AST could step into; he also notes NSSL-designated missions get priority queue placement.

Anpanman notes Relativity Space, now under new leadership including Eric Schmidt, plans to test its Terran R vehicle before the end of 2026, which if successful could open further launch optionality for AST, though a successful test doesn't guarantee near-term commercial cadence.

Anpanman notes the company has over $3 billion of cash and a large market cap, arguing it's worth paying a premium for additional guaranteed Falcon 9 launch slots to lock in launch cadence certainty for the market.

Anpanman expects the company to stop holding large in-person launch events for every mission (given increasing launch frequency) in favor of less frequent celebratory events, roughly once every other month.

Anpanman distinguishes 'smash-and-grab' short sellers — who publish sensational reports (sometimes very long, e.g. 300 pages, to appear credible) designed to drop a stock 20-30% so they can quickly cover a short position or put options — from fundamental, long-term activist short sellers like David Einhorn (vs. Lehman Brothers' toxic assets) or Bill Ackman (vs. Herbalife), who commit to a thesis over years regardless of near-term outcome.

Anpanman notes Fuzzy Panda's report disclaimers state they may immediately cover their position and lock in profits after publishing, which he argues is a legal cover that doesn't change the underlying predatory dynamic.

Anpanman argues the Andrew Left guilty verdict is a watershed, 'shot across the bow' moment that should curb the most aggressive tactics of smash-and-grab short sellers, including baseless claims that a company is worth zero or is fraudulent.

Anpanman credits the AST SpaceMobile retail investor community ('SpaceMob') with leveling information asymmetry against institutions through deep crowdsourced due diligence, sometimes learning material information before institutional investors do, which he says makes smash-and-grab tactics less effective against this stock specifically.

Anpanman frames solar as the near-term backbone for meeting AI data center power demand on Earth while the industry works toward space-based compute, noting T1 Energy's solar module manufacturing plant is in Dallas and its solar cell fabrication facility is being built in Austin, both within the fast-growing Texas solar buildout.

Anpanman says he hopes for an update on T1 Energy's financing package in the next few weeks, which he believes would remove an overhang currently weighing on the stock.

Today is a red day for space stocks, with a number of names down 12-15%; ASTS is down only about 9% because 'we paid our dues and took lumps on Friday.' He attributes the pullback to a natural consolidation after a tremendous run-up rather than anything company-specific.

SpaceX's funding roadshow kicks off Thursday, June 4th, with pricing expected June 11th; Anpanman guesses they'll spend 1-2 days in Europe and the rest in the US hitting major cities, possibly with Zoom meetings, which he expects will draw more institutional interest into the broader space sector.

Some traders were speculating that WallStreetBets participants were mistaking Virgin Galactic (SPCE) for SpaceX, driving up SPCE; Anpanman thinks it's more likely that heavily-shorted names like SPCE simply become trading vehicles, and he would not be surprised if Virgin Galactic announces a capital raise soon given the stock's rebound.

He recommends investors keep a watchlist of comparable sector names (e.g., for solar: TOYO, Canadian Solar, First Solar, SolarEdge, Enphase) so that a single stock's drop can be understood in the context of sector-wide beta rather than assumed to be company-specific.

The widely referenced '45 satellites by end of year' figure was always an approximate, stretch-goal number, not firm guidance; based on his own calculations, he thinks the company probably won't reach that number without New Glenn's contribution.

He pushes back on people demanding an 8-K or PR update on satellite counts, arguing the company doesn't need to disclose anything yet since it may still fill out additional launches and hit close to the original target; the company will update the market on its own timeline.

He argues the key metric to watch isn't the year-end satellite count but the production cadence between satellite batches — how quickly each new batch of 3 ships and the rate of change after that — and notes the company now has storage space at Cape Canaveral to hold satellites awaiting launch, implying a ramp in production.

If the year-end target slips from 45 to something like 35 or 40 satellites, or the timeline slips by a few months, Anpanman doesn't think that matters much in the grand scheme of things.

He estimates New Glenn's next flight (and thus its resumed contribution to AST's launch campaign) will be pushed out roughly 6-7 months, 'and that's probably optimistic' — potentially 7-8 months from the time of recording.

In the meantime, AST will rely on Falcon 9, and the company will need to negotiate with SpaceX for additional launches beyond what's already contracted; it's unclear whether the existing contract covers 5, 10, or 15 launches. Falcon 9's flight heritage and stable cadence make it 'a luxury' relative to newer vehicles.

Buying a dedicated (non-rideshare) Falcon 9 launch is achievable if you're willing to pay for it, even though the majority of Falcon 9 cargo is Starlink; finding a rideshare slot is much harder than buying an entire dedicated launch.

AST is on track to launch via Falcon 9 in about 2 weeks from the time of recording, with a firm target date expected by the end of that week, based on past precedent for how the company communicates.

He forecasts a Falcon 9 launch in about 2 weeks, another in July (probably early July), and then roughly one launch a month for the rest of the year, noting cadence (not per-launch satellite count) is what should reassure the market once it adjusts to Blue Origin being off the table for now.

ULA's Vulcan Centaur is currently grounded due to two anomalies (solid rocket booster nozzles popping off) on its prior two missions; the missions still succeeded, but an investigation is ongoing, which Anpanman thinks concludes 'sometime in September, or maybe August.'

Under National Security Launch (NSSL) rules, the US government could give AST launch priority on vehicles like Vulcan Centaur or Falcon 9 if deemed necessary for defense purposes; Anpanman speculates there could be related announcements in the next 2-3 months given ongoing defense work.

He acknowledges that neither he nor, he believes, the company itself yet knows which contingency path ('Plan B,' 'B-sub-1,' 'B-sub-2,' 'B-sub-3') will ultimately be used to backfill lost New Glenn capacity, and asks investors to give management time to work it out.

Starlink's V2 satellites can't be incorporated into direct-to-cell phone service using EchoStar's spectrum until 2028, and Starship still needs to reach commercial cadence, with second-stage reusability being the truly hard, unresolved part — Anpanman guesses that could realistically be 2029 or 2030.

As a rough capacity comparison (his own estimate): Neutron could carry at most about 3 BlueBird satellites in expendable form; Blue Origin's New Glenn 7x2 configuration could carry about 8, and the eventual 9x4 configuration around 12.

He speculates ('my money would be') that AST is likely booking launches with Arianespace, tied to supporting the European space program as part of AST's effort to secure 2 GHz of MSS spectrum allocation in Europe — describing it as a 'pay-to-play' dynamic.

He's been following Relativity Space's Terran R heavy-lift rocket (backed partly by Eric Schmidt), which he estimates could carry 6-8 BlueBirds if it performs as claimed, with a launch expected sometime in 2027.

Relaying a point he says Kook made (though he admits he half-fell asleep listening to Kook's own space and only caught it partially), the market has a short memory and will refocus positively on ASTS once it gets used to Falcon 9 handling the launch cadence in Blue Origin's absence.

Asked why Falcon Heavy isn't discussed more as a launch option, Anpanman said he isn't certain but guesses Falcon Heavy is more expensive than standard Falcon 9 and may not be the right economic choice, adding he 'could be wrong there.'

Asked whether AST should pivot to Falcon Heavy (cost aside) to launch more BlueBirds per flight, Anpanman said it's possible and that AST could find out with the next targeted launch confirmation for BB-8, 9, and 10, but noted stacking multiple satellites (e.g., up to 6) requires engineering time to ensure the bottom satellites can structurally support the ones on top.

Asked what stops SpaceX from refusing future launches once AST's contracted slots are used up, Anpanman argued SpaceX is subject to DOJ, FCC, and Department of War/government oversight, and that anti-competitive behavior would undermine SpaceX's own business model since it also launches competitors' payloads (Amazon LEO, Globalstar, Iridium); as long as a customer pays and its satellite won't jeopardize the vehicle, SpaceX will sell capacity.

As an example, he notes StarCloud (an in-space data center company) is solely dependent on Starship, which is why its CEO is friendly toward Musk — but SpaceX will also launch its own competing data centers, illustrating the broader industry dynamic.

T1 Energy is putting together a strategic funding package, with news expected in the next 3-4 weeks; he understands the most attractive option under consideration is primarily debt, possibly with some equity or equity-linked component, and possibly new strategic investors.

The funding package is intended to cover the remainder of T1 Energy's needs for phase 1 of its G2 Austin facility.

He describes a potential 'virtuous cycle': a strong funding package announcement could push the stock above $11.50, triggering the warrant exercise, further boosting the stock — calling this outcome 'ideal.' He expects T1 Energy news before quarter-end, June 30, 2026.

Kraken's pending acquisition of Covela (a complementary underwater-vehicle component provider) is expected to roughly double Kraken's revenue and profitability and is expected to close in the next few weeks; after closing, Anpanman expects Kraken to pursue uplisting to a major Canadian exchange and eventually to Nasdaq or NYSE.

He views the unmanned underwater drone market as less crowded than the aerial drone market, and sees Kraken as one of the few pure-play ways to invest in it.

He's been researching both older post-de-SPAC names (T1 Energy, the acquired Satisfye, Bridger Aerospace, Strata/SRTA) and newer SPAC deals; he cited USAR, a critical-minerals company now trading around $30, whose strength he attributes partly to a Trump administration equity stake, and says he plans to write up more SPAC ideas in coming weeks.

Ensilica designed AST SpaceMobile's AST5000 ASIC and, per Anpanman, collects both engineering fees and an ongoing royalty for every AST5000 chip produced — so if there are ultimately '300 Bluebirds... or 500' made with the AST5000 (a rough guess), that would represent a recurring revenue stream for Ensilica; the company also designs ASICs for other space, automotive, and industrial customers, including a recent EU award for a next-generation satellite constellation.

Asked about Gilat Satellite Networks (GILT), an Israeli company making satellite terminals (including phased-array antennas for commercial airliners), Anpanman said he did only cursory research; he's unsure whether the company acquired to add revenue is under competitive pressure, and it's unclear whether Gilat's terminal business is tied to Starlink or to Viasat/SES, which would affect whether he wants exposure.

Kook says that from what he could tell (while noting he's not an expert), the damage looked less severe than some feared, though probably still significant; he references online commentary arguing 'Blue Origin's toast' based on historical pad-explosion precedents, but says time will tell given Blue Origin's resources and motivation and the U.S. government's incentive to get New Glenn flying again for launch-provider diversity.

Kook divides negative exogenous stock shocks into two buckets: 'dilutive shocks' (e.g., a convertible bond issuance, an equity/ATM offering, or the Rakuten share sale) where new share supply takes roughly 5 to 10 trading days to fully settle via 'destabilizing arbitrage' as shares ricochet through the market, versus pure 'event shocks' (like a rocket explosion) where the stock can implode for minutes and then quickly recover once no actual new share supply is created.

Kook says AST SpaceMobile's exact launch commitments on New Glenn are unknown, but notes only one experimental satellite ('our sacrificial bird,' insured) had been placed on the earlier New Glenn 3 flight rather than a full batch, alongside other satellites on ISRO (successful) — suggesting the company had managed New Glenn-specific risk conservatively even amid excitement about New Glenn's performance back in April.

Kook estimates, based on his own 10-K analysis (cross-checked against independent work by a fellow Space Mob community member using down-payment schedule data), that AST SpaceMobile had roughly 6 to 8 Falcon 9 launches contracted as of December 31, 2025, potentially covering 25 to 30 satellites already hard-committed to SpaceX alone.

Kook built a model (using Claude Code, per his description) to explore whether, assuming AST SpaceMobile executes at 6 satellites/month of production, satellites might pile up in storage awaiting launch capacity, and finds that even in a conservative scenario of just 1 extra SpaceX launch per month plus other vehicles (MHI, ULA, ISRO, and potentially Ariane), there are multiple viable paths to getting the backlog into orbit.

Kook argues that even in a worst-case scenario where satellites accumulate in a warehouse awaiting launch, the market may eventually view this positively as proof the constellation buildout is inevitable rather than negatively as stranded inventory.

Kook argues the New Glenn-related uncertainty is really a 6-to-9-month-out risk to a 2027 timeline rather than an immediate near-term problem, since the company already has ample near-to-mid-term launch coverage via its Falcon 9 contracts and other vehicles.

Kook reiterates that AST SpaceMobile's core strategy has always been to be 'carrier neutral' and 'launch agnostic' — deliberately not vertically integrating into its own rocket (which he argues would be poor return on capital and not the company's core competency), and instead designing satellites compatible with essentially all available launch vehicles.

He draws an analogy to oil tanker economics (his professional background): the largest tankers (VLCCs) have historically had worse long-term returns than smaller ships (Aframaxes/Panamaxes) because too many get built purely for prestige ('ego'); he applies similar logic to the crowded rocket industry (New Glenn, Vulcan, Ariane, SpaceX, MHI, ISRO, Rocket Lab, Relativity, Stoke, Starship), arguing there will be no shortage of launch options for AST SpaceMobile to choose from.

He argues SpaceX (via Starlink/Starship) cannot fully match ASTS's satellite array size because Elon Musk would need an even bigger rocket, whereas ASTS avoids that constraint by not being tied to one launch vehicle.

Kook argues AST SpaceMobile also has strategic incentive to launch on vehicles from multiple countries (e.g., ISRO in India, prospectively Ariane in Europe) to build local political/regulatory goodwill with in-country mobile network operators and regulators, distinct from pure launch-cost optimization.

Kook speculates that AST SpaceMobile may be seeking or may have qualified for Lane 2 of the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program, inferring this from the company being newly explicit about ULA integration and about ongoing government/radar use (including active theaters of war) on its May earnings call — a shift he says wasn't merely a response to online pressure but likely reflects a real behind-the-scenes development.

AST SpaceMobile reportedly hired a 28-year Raytheon missile-defense veteran — previously Raytheon's radar program chief engineer and a lower-tier air-and-missile-defense radar integration director — as director of system integration, test and operations for federal programs, per a social-media post by 'Jonathan Cooper'; Kook interprets this as a deliberate, high-stakes hire signaling deeper Golden Dome-adjacent ambitions, not a routine hire.

Kook references a roughly $4.16 billion government contract award to SpaceX (unrelated directly to ASTS) in which the government stated it will 'not leverage any one single provider' and is 'partnering with a highly diversified pool of traditional and non-traditional vendors' for the AMTI architecture — Kook reads this language as bullish for AST SpaceMobile potentially receiving its own government/defense awards.

Kook mentions Trump's recent drone initiative and argues that since drones depend on connectivity and 'positive control,' AST SpaceMobile's infrastructure is well positioned to intersect with the drone/defense theme, though he cautions this alone isn't a reason to buy the stock.

Kook notes AST SpaceMobile is sitting on 'nearly $4 billion of cash,' which he says gives the company leverage when negotiating launch capacity and pursuing government programs even if per-launch costs rise.

Kook expects the approaching SpaceX IPO to draw significant Wall Street attention to the satellite/launch sector broadly, potentially benefiting AST SpaceMobile's visibility as investors research Falcon 9 launch demand and identify ASTS as a key cargo customer.

Kook floats (while calling it a low-probability, 'dream of dreams' scenario) the possibility of a splashy multi-launch contract announcement for ASTS coinciding with the SpaceX IPO discourse.

Kook argues ASTS, at roughly a $50 billion market cap, is a highly liquid ('trades like water') security compared to other satellite/spectrum names, which could make it an attractive pair-trade vehicle once SpaceX (valued conceptually around $2 trillion by some, versus Starlink's ~$1.5 trillion) begins trading — either as a hedge against SpaceX, or as the more 'obvious' long ASTS / short SpaceX trade given the valuation gap.

Kook argues ASTS has historically been mis-paired with Rocket Lab (both de-SPACs with vocal retail shareholder bases) despite differing business drivers, and hopes the market instead begins pairing/coupling ASTS with SpaceX given more overlapping (though not strictly zero-sum, in his view) business dynamics between broadband satellite (Starlink) and mobile satellite (ASTS).

Kook contrasts AST SpaceMobile's throughput (100 to now 200 megabits per cell) against Starlink's narrowband direct-to-cell solution (roughly 7 megabits), likening the difference to 'Facebook on desktop' (Starlink) versus 'Facebook mobile' (AST SpaceMobile).

Kook, while disclaiming expertise, says his and other Space Mob community members' (including lawyers within the community) reading is that AST SpaceMobile appears to have structured its SatCo/European ConnectNow joint venture to comply with the new rules' requirements around EU-member voting control, non-EU JV participation, and data access/security, suggesting the company anticipated this regulatory shift.

Kook believes AST SpaceMobile could plausibly receive a meaningful grant of EU MSS spectrum (though not the entirety of what's available), which he frames as a valuable, largely under-priced catalyst separate from launch-cadence concerns, drawing an analogy to Charlie Ergen's dark spectrum holdings, which traded for billions in value based on strategic asset value alone.

Kook highlights company/community social-media language describing '3 satellites officially arrived at Cape Canaveral ahead of the next Falcon 9 launch campaign' and notes an accompanying post used 10 rocket emojis; he argues the word 'campaign' (rather than 'mission,' which is singular) and the emoji count both imply multiple upcoming Falcon 9 launches (in the range of 6 to 10), not just one or two.

Kook expects a cadence of AST SpaceMobile Falcon 9 launches over the coming months: one in a couple of weeks, another in July or August, and further launches in September, October, and November as part of a larger SpaceX launch campaign.

Kook cites an outside tweet from a self-described former Ariane Group employee ('Jean Le Bon'), who called AST SpaceMobile's ~$50 billion market cap 'a point of great convexity' given the potential for it to become 'the number one subscription business worldwide,' and argued the company's manufacturing/PP&E investment (not just the satellites themselves) is the real underappreciated asset, calling AST SpaceMobile 'no science project.'

Kook states plainly that he does not believe AST SpaceMobile will hit 45 satellites by year-end 2026, and that he personally does not care whether they do — he argues what drives the stock price is the directionality of change (e.g., beating a more modest number like 30 with strong momentum) rather than hitting the specific stated target, drawing a parallel to Elon Musk's practice of setting extremely ambitious goals and still outperforming peers even at a 60% hit rate.