Episodes

Today is a red day for space stocks, with a number of names down 12-15%; ASTS is down only about 9% because 'we paid our dues and took lumps on Friday.' He attributes the pullback to a natural consolidation after a tremendous run-up rather than anything company-specific.

SpaceX's funding roadshow kicks off Thursday, June 4th, with pricing expected June 11th; Anpanman guesses they'll spend 1-2 days in Europe and the rest in the US hitting major cities, possibly with Zoom meetings, which he expects will draw more institutional interest into the broader space sector.

Some traders were speculating that WallStreetBets participants were mistaking Virgin Galactic (SPCE) for SpaceX, driving up SPCE; Anpanman thinks it's more likely that heavily-shorted names like SPCE simply become trading vehicles, and he would not be surprised if Virgin Galactic announces a capital raise soon given the stock's rebound.

He recommends investors keep a watchlist of comparable sector names (e.g., for solar: TOYO, Canadian Solar, First Solar, SolarEdge, Enphase) so that a single stock's drop can be understood in the context of sector-wide beta rather than assumed to be company-specific.

The widely referenced '45 satellites by end of year' figure was always an approximate, stretch-goal number, not firm guidance; based on his own calculations, he thinks the company probably won't reach that number without New Glenn's contribution.

He pushes back on people demanding an 8-K or PR update on satellite counts, arguing the company doesn't need to disclose anything yet since it may still fill out additional launches and hit close to the original target; the company will update the market on its own timeline.

He argues the key metric to watch isn't the year-end satellite count but the production cadence between satellite batches — how quickly each new batch of 3 ships and the rate of change after that — and notes the company now has storage space at Cape Canaveral to hold satellites awaiting launch, implying a ramp in production.

If the year-end target slips from 45 to something like 35 or 40 satellites, or the timeline slips by a few months, Anpanman doesn't think that matters much in the grand scheme of things.

He estimates New Glenn's next flight (and thus its resumed contribution to AST's launch campaign) will be pushed out roughly 6-7 months, 'and that's probably optimistic' — potentially 7-8 months from the time of recording.

In the meantime, AST will rely on Falcon 9, and the company will need to negotiate with SpaceX for additional launches beyond what's already contracted; it's unclear whether the existing contract covers 5, 10, or 15 launches. Falcon 9's flight heritage and stable cadence make it 'a luxury' relative to newer vehicles.

Buying a dedicated (non-rideshare) Falcon 9 launch is achievable if you're willing to pay for it, even though the majority of Falcon 9 cargo is Starlink; finding a rideshare slot is much harder than buying an entire dedicated launch.

AST is on track to launch via Falcon 9 in about 2 weeks from the time of recording, with a firm target date expected by the end of that week, based on past precedent for how the company communicates.

He forecasts a Falcon 9 launch in about 2 weeks, another in July (probably early July), and then roughly one launch a month for the rest of the year, noting cadence (not per-launch satellite count) is what should reassure the market once it adjusts to Blue Origin being off the table for now.

ULA's Vulcan Centaur is currently grounded due to two anomalies (solid rocket booster nozzles popping off) on its prior two missions; the missions still succeeded, but an investigation is ongoing, which Anpanman thinks concludes 'sometime in September, or maybe August.'

Under National Security Launch (NSSL) rules, the US government could give AST launch priority on vehicles like Vulcan Centaur or Falcon 9 if deemed necessary for defense purposes; Anpanman speculates there could be related announcements in the next 2-3 months given ongoing defense work.

He acknowledges that neither he nor, he believes, the company itself yet knows which contingency path ('Plan B,' 'B-sub-1,' 'B-sub-2,' 'B-sub-3') will ultimately be used to backfill lost New Glenn capacity, and asks investors to give management time to work it out.

Starlink's V2 satellites can't be incorporated into direct-to-cell phone service using EchoStar's spectrum until 2028, and Starship still needs to reach commercial cadence, with second-stage reusability being the truly hard, unresolved part — Anpanman guesses that could realistically be 2029 or 2030.

As a rough capacity comparison (his own estimate): Neutron could carry at most about 3 BlueBird satellites in expendable form; Blue Origin's New Glenn 7x2 configuration could carry about 8, and the eventual 9x4 configuration around 12.

He speculates ('my money would be') that AST is likely booking launches with Arianespace, tied to supporting the European space program as part of AST's effort to secure 2 GHz of MSS spectrum allocation in Europe — describing it as a 'pay-to-play' dynamic.

He's been following Relativity Space's Terran R heavy-lift rocket (backed partly by Eric Schmidt), which he estimates could carry 6-8 BlueBirds if it performs as claimed, with a launch expected sometime in 2027.

Relaying a point he says Kook made (though he admits he half-fell asleep listening to Kook's own space and only caught it partially), the market has a short memory and will refocus positively on ASTS once it gets used to Falcon 9 handling the launch cadence in Blue Origin's absence.

Asked why Falcon Heavy isn't discussed more as a launch option, Anpanman said he isn't certain but guesses Falcon Heavy is more expensive than standard Falcon 9 and may not be the right economic choice, adding he 'could be wrong there.'

Asked whether AST should pivot to Falcon Heavy (cost aside) to launch more BlueBirds per flight, Anpanman said it's possible and that AST could find out with the next targeted launch confirmation for BB-8, 9, and 10, but noted stacking multiple satellites (e.g., up to 6) requires engineering time to ensure the bottom satellites can structurally support the ones on top.

Asked what stops SpaceX from refusing future launches once AST's contracted slots are used up, Anpanman argued SpaceX is subject to DOJ, FCC, and Department of War/government oversight, and that anti-competitive behavior would undermine SpaceX's own business model since it also launches competitors' payloads (Amazon LEO, Globalstar, Iridium); as long as a customer pays and its satellite won't jeopardize the vehicle, SpaceX will sell capacity.

As an example, he notes StarCloud (an in-space data center company) is solely dependent on Starship, which is why its CEO is friendly toward Musk — but SpaceX will also launch its own competing data centers, illustrating the broader industry dynamic.

T1 Energy is putting together a strategic funding package, with news expected in the next 3-4 weeks; he understands the most attractive option under consideration is primarily debt, possibly with some equity or equity-linked component, and possibly new strategic investors.

The funding package is intended to cover the remainder of T1 Energy's needs for phase 1 of its G2 Austin facility.

He describes a potential 'virtuous cycle': a strong funding package announcement could push the stock above $11.50, triggering the warrant exercise, further boosting the stock — calling this outcome 'ideal.' He expects T1 Energy news before quarter-end, June 30, 2026.

Kraken's pending acquisition of Covela (a complementary underwater-vehicle component provider) is expected to roughly double Kraken's revenue and profitability and is expected to close in the next few weeks; after closing, Anpanman expects Kraken to pursue uplisting to a major Canadian exchange and eventually to Nasdaq or NYSE.

He views the unmanned underwater drone market as less crowded than the aerial drone market, and sees Kraken as one of the few pure-play ways to invest in it.

He's been researching both older post-de-SPAC names (T1 Energy, the acquired Satisfye, Bridger Aerospace, Strata/SRTA) and newer SPAC deals; he cited USAR, a critical-minerals company now trading around $30, whose strength he attributes partly to a Trump administration equity stake, and says he plans to write up more SPAC ideas in coming weeks.

Ensilica designed AST SpaceMobile's AST5000 ASIC and, per Anpanman, collects both engineering fees and an ongoing royalty for every AST5000 chip produced — so if there are ultimately '300 Bluebirds... or 500' made with the AST5000 (a rough guess), that would represent a recurring revenue stream for Ensilica; the company also designs ASICs for other space, automotive, and industrial customers, including a recent EU award for a next-generation satellite constellation.

Asked about Gilat Satellite Networks (GILT), an Israeli company making satellite terminals (including phased-array antennas for commercial airliners), Anpanman said he did only cursory research; he's unsure whether the company acquired to add revenue is under competitive pressure, and it's unclear whether Gilat's terminal business is tied to Starlink or to Viasat/SES, which would affect whether he wants exposure.

Kook says that from what he could tell (while noting he's not an expert), the damage looked less severe than some feared, though probably still significant; he references online commentary arguing 'Blue Origin's toast' based on historical pad-explosion precedents, but says time will tell given Blue Origin's resources and motivation and the U.S. government's incentive to get New Glenn flying again for launch-provider diversity.

Kook divides negative exogenous stock shocks into two buckets: 'dilutive shocks' (e.g., a convertible bond issuance, an equity/ATM offering, or the Rakuten share sale) where new share supply takes roughly 5 to 10 trading days to fully settle via 'destabilizing arbitrage' as shares ricochet through the market, versus pure 'event shocks' (like a rocket explosion) where the stock can implode for minutes and then quickly recover once no actual new share supply is created.

Kook says AST SpaceMobile's exact launch commitments on New Glenn are unknown, but notes only one experimental satellite ('our sacrificial bird,' insured) had been placed on the earlier New Glenn 3 flight rather than a full batch, alongside other satellites on ISRO (successful) — suggesting the company had managed New Glenn-specific risk conservatively even amid excitement about New Glenn's performance back in April.

Kook estimates, based on his own 10-K analysis (cross-checked against independent work by a fellow Space Mob community member using down-payment schedule data), that AST SpaceMobile had roughly 6 to 8 Falcon 9 launches contracted as of December 31, 2025, potentially covering 25 to 30 satellites already hard-committed to SpaceX alone.

Kook built a model (using Claude Code, per his description) to explore whether, assuming AST SpaceMobile executes at 6 satellites/month of production, satellites might pile up in storage awaiting launch capacity, and finds that even in a conservative scenario of just 1 extra SpaceX launch per month plus other vehicles (MHI, ULA, ISRO, and potentially Ariane), there are multiple viable paths to getting the backlog into orbit.

Kook argues that even in a worst-case scenario where satellites accumulate in a warehouse awaiting launch, the market may eventually view this positively as proof the constellation buildout is inevitable rather than negatively as stranded inventory.

Kook argues the New Glenn-related uncertainty is really a 6-to-9-month-out risk to a 2027 timeline rather than an immediate near-term problem, since the company already has ample near-to-mid-term launch coverage via its Falcon 9 contracts and other vehicles.

Kook reiterates that AST SpaceMobile's core strategy has always been to be 'carrier neutral' and 'launch agnostic' — deliberately not vertically integrating into its own rocket (which he argues would be poor return on capital and not the company's core competency), and instead designing satellites compatible with essentially all available launch vehicles.

He draws an analogy to oil tanker economics (his professional background): the largest tankers (VLCCs) have historically had worse long-term returns than smaller ships (Aframaxes/Panamaxes) because too many get built purely for prestige ('ego'); he applies similar logic to the crowded rocket industry (New Glenn, Vulcan, Ariane, SpaceX, MHI, ISRO, Rocket Lab, Relativity, Stoke, Starship), arguing there will be no shortage of launch options for AST SpaceMobile to choose from.

He argues SpaceX (via Starlink/Starship) cannot fully match ASTS's satellite array size because Elon Musk would need an even bigger rocket, whereas ASTS avoids that constraint by not being tied to one launch vehicle.

Kook argues AST SpaceMobile also has strategic incentive to launch on vehicles from multiple countries (e.g., ISRO in India, prospectively Ariane in Europe) to build local political/regulatory goodwill with in-country mobile network operators and regulators, distinct from pure launch-cost optimization.

Kook speculates that AST SpaceMobile may be seeking or may have qualified for Lane 2 of the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program, inferring this from the company being newly explicit about ULA integration and about ongoing government/radar use (including active theaters of war) on its May earnings call — a shift he says wasn't merely a response to online pressure but likely reflects a real behind-the-scenes development.

AST SpaceMobile reportedly hired a 28-year Raytheon missile-defense veteran — previously Raytheon's radar program chief engineer and a lower-tier air-and-missile-defense radar integration director — as director of system integration, test and operations for federal programs, per a social-media post by 'Jonathan Cooper'; Kook interprets this as a deliberate, high-stakes hire signaling deeper Golden Dome-adjacent ambitions, not a routine hire.

Kook references a roughly $4.16 billion government contract award to SpaceX (unrelated directly to ASTS) in which the government stated it will 'not leverage any one single provider' and is 'partnering with a highly diversified pool of traditional and non-traditional vendors' for the AMTI architecture — Kook reads this language as bullish for AST SpaceMobile potentially receiving its own government/defense awards.

Kook mentions Trump's recent drone initiative and argues that since drones depend on connectivity and 'positive control,' AST SpaceMobile's infrastructure is well positioned to intersect with the drone/defense theme, though he cautions this alone isn't a reason to buy the stock.

Kook notes AST SpaceMobile is sitting on 'nearly $4 billion of cash,' which he says gives the company leverage when negotiating launch capacity and pursuing government programs even if per-launch costs rise.

Kook expects the approaching SpaceX IPO to draw significant Wall Street attention to the satellite/launch sector broadly, potentially benefiting AST SpaceMobile's visibility as investors research Falcon 9 launch demand and identify ASTS as a key cargo customer.

Kook floats (while calling it a low-probability, 'dream of dreams' scenario) the possibility of a splashy multi-launch contract announcement for ASTS coinciding with the SpaceX IPO discourse.

Kook argues ASTS, at roughly a $50 billion market cap, is a highly liquid ('trades like water') security compared to other satellite/spectrum names, which could make it an attractive pair-trade vehicle once SpaceX (valued conceptually around $2 trillion by some, versus Starlink's ~$1.5 trillion) begins trading — either as a hedge against SpaceX, or as the more 'obvious' long ASTS / short SpaceX trade given the valuation gap.

Kook argues ASTS has historically been mis-paired with Rocket Lab (both de-SPACs with vocal retail shareholder bases) despite differing business drivers, and hopes the market instead begins pairing/coupling ASTS with SpaceX given more overlapping (though not strictly zero-sum, in his view) business dynamics between broadband satellite (Starlink) and mobile satellite (ASTS).

Kook contrasts AST SpaceMobile's throughput (100 to now 200 megabits per cell) against Starlink's narrowband direct-to-cell solution (roughly 7 megabits), likening the difference to 'Facebook on desktop' (Starlink) versus 'Facebook mobile' (AST SpaceMobile).

Kook, while disclaiming expertise, says his and other Space Mob community members' (including lawyers within the community) reading is that AST SpaceMobile appears to have structured its SatCo/European ConnectNow joint venture to comply with the new rules' requirements around EU-member voting control, non-EU JV participation, and data access/security, suggesting the company anticipated this regulatory shift.

Kook believes AST SpaceMobile could plausibly receive a meaningful grant of EU MSS spectrum (though not the entirety of what's available), which he frames as a valuable, largely under-priced catalyst separate from launch-cadence concerns, drawing an analogy to Charlie Ergen's dark spectrum holdings, which traded for billions in value based on strategic asset value alone.

Kook highlights company/community social-media language describing '3 satellites officially arrived at Cape Canaveral ahead of the next Falcon 9 launch campaign' and notes an accompanying post used 10 rocket emojis; he argues the word 'campaign' (rather than 'mission,' which is singular) and the emoji count both imply multiple upcoming Falcon 9 launches (in the range of 6 to 10), not just one or two.

Kook expects a cadence of AST SpaceMobile Falcon 9 launches over the coming months: one in a couple of weeks, another in July or August, and further launches in September, October, and November as part of a larger SpaceX launch campaign.

Kook cites an outside tweet from a self-described former Ariane Group employee ('Jean Le Bon'), who called AST SpaceMobile's ~$50 billion market cap 'a point of great convexity' given the potential for it to become 'the number one subscription business worldwide,' and argued the company's manufacturing/PP&E investment (not just the satellites themselves) is the real underappreciated asset, calling AST SpaceMobile 'no science project.'

Kook states plainly that he does not believe AST SpaceMobile will hit 45 satellites by year-end 2026, and that he personally does not care whether they do — he argues what drives the stock price is the directionality of change (e.g., beating a more modest number like 30 with strong momentum) rather than hitting the specific stated target, drawing a parallel to Elon Musk's practice of setting extremely ambitious goals and still outperforming peers even at a 60% hit rate.

His guess is that it will take months, perhaps longer, for SLC-36 to be rebuilt and brought back into service.

Blue Origin was already building a second, larger launch pad nearby intended to accommodate both the current New Glenn configuration and the bigger future 9x4 New Glenn; he expects Blue Origin to prioritize finishing that new pad first (since there's no wreckage to clear) while rebuilding the destroyed pad in parallel.

His guess, explicitly labeled speculation, is that New Glenn will not fly again for probably the rest of this year.

The launch tower/strongback fell, which involves a lot of steel; if the deluge system (the flame trench) was significantly damaged, that could mean a long recovery, since flame trenches are structurally complex despite just handling water.

Speculates that during static fire, a design difference on this newly-built third booster (versus the twice-flown 'Never Tell Me the Odds' booster) may have caused an issue the investigation will need to identify.

Booster 1 was already lost previously; Booster 2 is believed safe since it was in the nearby integration facility away from the pad; this newly-destroyed booster (New Glenn 4/Booster 3) is now lost; Booster 4 is in production and Booster 5 is planned, with Blue Origin expecting to complete three more boosters this year.

On second stages, he estimates roughly 14 have been built with a 15th in progress; 4 have now been used (3 in successful flights plus this one destroyed in the anomaly), leaving roughly 10 available unless additional ones were damaged in the nearby facility.

Notes a possible silver lining: because Blue Origin has built up a backlog of boosters and second stages, and AST has satellites ready to go, once the pad reopens launches could cadence very quickly back-to-back rather than being spaced three months apart.

Notes Rocket Lab's Neutron program also recently had an issue where a casing reportedly cracked during development testing, framing this as the kind of thing investors should expect and even want to happen early in a program rather than later with important cargo or crew aboard.

The company is also talking with Arianespace and Mitsubishi Heavy as additional launch providers, though he's not sure how far those discussions have progressed; Ariane 5 satellites at a time, Mitsubishi Heavy 3 at a time.

News from 'yesterday' suggests that using Arianespace may be an important factor in AST/SatCo's bid for European 2 GHz spectrum allocation, since supporting the EU is likely to require using a European launch provider.

ISRO (which launched BlueBird 6 via LVM3) can carry 2 satellites at a time and remains a viable option; he wouldn't be surprised to see additional ISRO bookings.

If ULA Vulcan's BE-4 engine (which powers it) turns out to have a related issue, that could delay Vulcan by a few months as well, depending on the specific problem.

Suggests that with satellites ready to go, AST could potentially buy out launch capacity from other missions — for example paying a rideshare aggregator like Exolaunch more than they paid for their slot to take over an entire Falcon 9 rideshare launch.

Agrees this is plausible if you're buying out an entire dedicated launch, versus the much harder problem of coordinating a rideshare among many smaller companies.

The earliest New Glenn was going to launch an AST BlueBird, even before this anomaly, was probably August at the earliest, maybe September.

Expects a 'Batch 1' Falcon 9 launch within the next 2-3 weeks, with a 'Batch 2' of satellites shipping down to the Cape sometime in the following 2-3 weeks.

Believes the company will have to shift its timeline by about 2-3 months, and in an upcoming Q2 update will likely revise its 45-satellites target down to something like 25 to 30 by year-end, with the 45 target then sliding to around Q1 or early Q2 of the following year — explicitly framed as his own guess, not company guidance.

Argues this timeline shift does not meaningfully change the net present value of the business when viewed against the 2027-2029 horizon.

The key metric to watch, in his view, is production cadence — how quickly the company can build satellites in batches, and whether that inter-batch time continues to shorten — since with sufficient cash the company can always buy additional launches.

Reporter Eric Berger has speculated Blue Origin might abandon the current New Glenn design entirely in favor of the larger New Glenn Heavy, drawing a parallel to Relativity Space abandoning its Terran rocket after an anomaly; Anpanman says he previously ran Berger's speculation by AST management, who called Berger 'completely wrong.'

Speculates that at the $63 low, New Glenn delay risk was already heavily priced in, while he estimates the market had been roughly 60-65% confident New Glenn would return to the launch rotation and fly several missions this year — meaning some of that optimism now has to unwind.

Flags that sell-side research reports and possible price-target downgrades may follow in the coming days as analysts digest the news.

Notes NASA is heavily dependent on New Glenn and the MK1 vehicle for the Artemis moon-landing program; he speculates that, given the ongoing space race with China, this could act as a forcing function to expedite permitting and red tape around the rebuild.

Agrees, noting the current administration has moved quickly before — citing a roughly 30-day FAA investigation turnaround for a prior second-stage mishap — and that NASA has essentially bet its human spaceflight plans on Blue Origin New Glenn and SpaceX Starship with no real alternative.

Explains general IPO book-building mechanics (filing ranges get raised during the roadshow based on investor demand, oversubscription leads to reduced allocations, then aftermarket buying), guessing SpaceX's range could ultimately rise to $1.9-2 trillion and price around $2.1 trillion.

Speculates the executive nearly said something different before changing course, and wonders if Rocket Lab's confidential Neutron customer (which booked 5 launches, revealed last quarter) could be connected to this Viasat-related JV; also raises MDA as another possible 'bus provider' candidate — explicitly framed as pure speculation with no supporting evidence.

Asked how long it would take to rebuild a transporter/erector, he says he isn't sure, but notes an AI estimate (Grok) suggested 1 to 1.5 years; he speculates Blue Origin might already have one in process since they were building another pad, and that building a second one should be faster than the first.

Asked whether AST might need to raise capital to fund buying launches from other providers, he says he doesn't think so, citing roughly $4 billion in pro forma cash on the balance sheet.

Responds to a comment that 'ASTS is cooked' by disagreeing, saying the satellite rollout will be set back by a few months but the company is not in serious trouble, with production cadence and booking more Falcon 9 launches being the key levers.

Anpanman argues AST SpaceMobile could offer drone communications at a much more reasonable price than $25,000-$30,000 because its 3GPP-compatible, low-band service only requires a small receiver rather than a large dish terminal.

Anpanman says AST already has 13 different military contracts across agencies referred to by acronym (e.g. DIU, SDA, Department of War), and speculates the Pentagon is likely already in conversation with AST about the drone use case given its search for alternatives.

Anpanman notes Anduril unveiled a device last week that communicates over 4G LTE as its primary method, speculates this could support private battlefield LTE networks or satellite-relayed communications, and says he wouldn't be surprised to see a PR touting an Anduril/AST partnership in the coming months, calling AST the only satellite provider that can do 4G LTE in low-band.

Anpanman speculates the jump in production cadence from 6 satellites/month to up to 12 satellites/month could see the incremental 4-6 satellites/month go toward building this government shell, jokingly calling it 'Blackbirds' instead of Bluebirds.

Based on the podcast's own due diligence (not a company statement), Anpanman believes the FM1 and FM2 satellites were SDA satellites — likely prototypes for what becomes part of the government shell.

Anpanman argues this is a powerful application for AST specifically because, unlike Starlink, it reaches unmodified/older phones directly, which could help civilians in Iran, Venezuela, or potentially North Korea organize and access information — something he calls one of the fastest ways to help liberate a country.

Anpanman speculates (explicitly 'just making stuff up here') about implementation: AST satellites wouldn't be integrated into the Iranian MNO's core network, so a friendly neighboring country's network core might be used instead, or the satellite network could spoof the local MNO, or SIM cards could be physically distributed to people on the ground.

Anpanman contrasts this favorably with prior cases where Iranians caught setting up physical Starlink dishes faced arrest and punishment by authorities; using ordinary phones people already carry is far less conspicuous, and he suggests the local network could be taken down so citizens can only connect to the 'freedom network.'

The article states the drone use case alone could be worth hundreds of millions of dollars, which Anpanman frames as just one narrow slice of AST's total addressable market when multiplied across other products (direct-to-cell, PNT, radar sensing) and over 100 large phased arrays working together in low Earth orbit.

Anpanman draws a parallel to the May 2025 Musk-Trump spat that rallied the space sector, suggesting the drone pricing dispute has similar ingredients for a public falling-out between the Pentagon and SpaceX ahead of SpaceX's IPO.

Anpanman argues overreliance on one company for launch or communications (SpaceX) is bad for the country given founder control concerns, noting Elon Musk's conflicts with the EU as a relevant example.

He cites a headline he plans to tweet: 'EU to favor European satellite services to prevent Starlink's expansion,' regarding the EU's 2 gigahertz MSS spectrum allocation coming up in 2027, calling it very bullish for AST's satellite JV with Vodafone, Orange, and Telefónica, and expecting Deutsche Telekom to join that group as well.

Anpanman says there is speculation (which he thinks might be a bit early) that Blue Origin's New Glenn could launch as soon as that coming Friday; the FAA mishap investigation, which industry consultants estimated could take 4 months to a year, was reportedly resolved in about a month.

New Glenn is described as AST's primary launch vehicle expected to carry most of its satellites; 2-3 Falcon 9 launches are also coming up. The next New Glenn mission (New Glenn 4) is likely an Amazon LEO cargo mission, which Anpanman guesses could launch as early as July but more likely August, with a batch of 4 AST satellites potentially following by end of summer.

Anpanman recalls that after the earlier New Glenn 3 mission failed to deliver BlueBird 7 successfully, ASTS stock fell from around $90/high-$80s to $63; he expects that if New Glenn 4 succeeds in delivering the Amazon LEO cargo, the stock could see a relief rally of roughly 15-20% as the New Glenn overhang is removed, rather than the prior 20-30% drop repeating.

Anpanman notes the recovery barge 'Jacqueline' had been in for maintenance but as of the prior day was being pushed back out, suggesting a launch could be coming soon; a static fire still needs to occur first.

Anpanman discusses ASTS underperforming Rocket Lab on a relative stock-price basis due to New Glenn uncertainty, describing it as a 'reversion to mean' pair trade that has begun closing in recent days.

Real-time short interest has been stubborn at roughly 67-69 million shares, near all-time highs, with the latest report (as of the prior day) at 67 million shares — essentially flat even as the stock rallied from $63 to $126, suggesting convertible arbitrage shorts have offset any short covering.

Anpanman recalls that during a prior rally (last June) when the stock rose about 100% in a largely unidirectional move, a decent portion of that was short covering, as short interest fell from all-time highs to more moderate levels over that period; he believes a similar dynamic could be beginning now.

A listener poll asking for a predicted June peak stock price showed about 45-46% picking $175, about 26% picking $200, about 8.6% picking $250, and about 20% picking $300.

Anpanman notes an index reconstitution toward the end of the month: AST is currently in the Russell 1000, and its weighting cap is going up, which should create additional index-driven buying.

Anpanman relays a theory from someone referred to as 'Katya': using too many engines (Starship's first stage has 33 engines) increases the statistical probability of an individual engine failure, and due to how the engines are linked, this can create a cascading failure — which Anpanman says is what was observed in a recent Starship test.

Anpanman contrasts Blue Origin New Glenn (successfully landing/reusing its booster but currently using an expendable second stage, with a reusable second stage still in development) against SpaceX Starship, where recovering and refurbishing the heat-tiled second stage for rapid reuse is described as a much harder unsolved problem.

Anpanman notes Starlink's Direct-to-Cell V2 satellite is solely dependent on Starship becoming commercially viable at a regular cadence; the current Starlink direct-to-cell version is not competitive, and he guesses (spitballing) the next version using more spectrum most likely won't be online before 2028, maybe 2029 — and further Starship setbacks would push that timeline out further.

Anpanman notes T-Mobile's move to join the AT&T and Verizon satellite joint venture, which he interprets (though not explicitly confirmed, due to regulatory sensitivities) as a signal T-Mobile will end up on AST SpaceMobile's service.

Anpanman describes the direct-to-cell competitive-threat narrative as having shifted: it initially hit tower companies (American Tower, Crown Castle traded down starting mid-last-year on fears satellite connectivity would crimp tower demand), and has now shifted to MNOs themselves, who are now routinely asked on earnings calls about the competitive threat from Starlink — with executives typically downplaying expected traffic migration while emphasizing satellite as complementary/augmenting rather than competitive.

Anpanman frames SpaceX's roughly $2 trillion IPO valuation and investor roadshow (stops in Boston, Chicago, Denver, and LA) as introducing large institutional/mutual-fund investors to the space sector's TAM, including government applications and the emerging 'AI data centers in space' vertical.

Anpanman speculates that SpaceX's roadshow presentation includes comparable-company benchmarking that is introducing institutional investors to smaller pure-play space names like Intuitive Machines, Planet Labs, and Rocket Lab for the first time, prompting some to consider these as more direct/pure-play trades relative to SpaceX itself (which also carries xAI and other unrelated business lines/capex).

Anpanman raises governance concerns about SpaceX, noting Elon Musk effectively controls the shareholder vote and could pursue deals (citing the Cursor acquisition as a precedent) or even a Tesla merger without a shareholder vote.

Kook calls this a seminal scaling event and says the 'infamous constellation constipation is over,' describing it as the precursor to getting 'metal in orbit'; he expects satellites to keep rolling off the Midland production line 'like cans of tuna.'

Kook says this bear case was 'proven wrong instantly' because AST has multiple launch providers (SpaceX, ULA, MHI, and others) and this week's shipment of satellites to the SpaceX payload processing facility further proves the satellites fit on the rocket.

Kook attributes part of the recent strength to the Russell index rebalancing that occurs this time of year, arguing that as the stock's price and market cap rise, index/institutional buying requirements create a positive, self-reinforcing feedback loop.

Citing a seasonality chart from @HiriniPK, Kook notes ASTS has historically rallied every June, coinciding in 2025 with Block 1 launch activity and in 2024 with the AT&T and then Verizon SCS/DA authorizations; he expects a similar pattern this year tied to the end of 'constellation constipation.'

Kook describes a 'if it's worth $20, it's worth $200' framework: stock repricing isn't normally distributed, and clearing a big binary 'unlock' (e.g., US regulatory approval, or now the carrier JV) can cause the market to reprice the whole thesis rather than incrementally.

He speculates the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile JV could increase AST's effective US market exposure by roughly 50%, moving from 2 of 3 major US carriers (each roughly a third of market share) to all 3.

Kook explains his 'velocity of good news' framework: if the pace of positive surprises is accelerating, the stock is likely to keep rising; he believes de-risking has already occurred on market adoption, regulation, commercial deals, satellite performance, and balance-sheet financing, and that what the market hasn't yet priced in is what scaled execution (6-10 satellites/month) actually looks like.

He contrasts the stock's current dynamics ($112/share, ~$40 billion market cap) with its $2/share, roughly $600 million market-cap days, noting the earlier period carried real perceived bankruptcy risk that no longer applies, so 'rapid resolution of financial distress' type rallies are less likely now, but so is a collapse to zero.

Kook introduces the 'moon bag' concept, credited to an investor named Luttrell, describing it as maintaining a core long-term position rather than being fully in or fully out; he contrasts this with his own historically binary (0-to-1 / 1-to-0) trading style.

Kook cautions listeners nearing a potential rip to $130 not to sell covered calls or get 'too cute' with trading positions, recalling being 'obliterated' in October (a prior episode) on covered calls during a violent rally.

Referencing a Jeff Bezos comment that 'space-based data centers are very realistic, but 2-3 year timelines are probably too aggressive,' Kook lays out a framework of three space-economy pillars: telecom (already proven, AST's focus), military/defense infrastructure (radar, PNT), and power generation feeding AI data centers, which he views as the largest long-term opportunity.

He draws analogies to Amazon (books as an early test case before expanding to everything), Tesla, and Nvidia, arguing that companies that build deep infrastructure/scale advantages early gain 'degrees of freedom' competitors can't easily replicate; he argues only three companies can build satellites at state-level production scale.

Kook contrasts owning a great business long-term (citing Steve Ballmer holding Microsoft) versus trading it (citing Bill Gates as having destroyed wealth by not holding what he knew best), framing his own approach as 'think like an owner, not a trader.'

Kook frames the MNOs 'coalescing' around ASTS as analogous to chipmakers coalescing around ASML, arguing this creates a self-reinforcing commercial moat: as more MNOs join, AST becomes the low-cost best service, attracting still more MNOs and making it harder for competitors to be economically viable.

Kook highlights a tweet from community contributor 'Dr. Ali' noting that BlueBird satellites can operate on 4 different frequencies simultaneously, which Dr. Ali argues means AST functions more like a tower company than a traditional single-carrier partner — infrastructure that doesn't care which carrier is paying, as long as it's monetized.

Dr. Ali speculates this could evolve into a roaming-style framework where AT&T uses Band 71 satellite coverage while leveraging parts of T-Mobile's terrestrial network, in exchange for T-Mobile joining the AST network — theoretically enabling Band 5 (AT&T), Band 13 (Verizon), Band 14 (FirstNet), and Band 71 (T-Mobile/rural) traffic simultaneously on the same satellites.

Kook speculates that Anduril's newly unveiled tactical gateway product, which reportedly uses global cellular broadband connectivity (not MSS connectivity), could pair well with AST SpaceMobile, since AST is, to his knowledge, the only company offering that kind of connectivity — though no formal partnership has been announced.

Kook argues a longer satellite lifespan reduces future maintenance/replenishment capital expenditure, freeing more capital for growth, and contrasts this favorably with SpaceX's Starlink satellites, which fly at a lower altitude (he says around 300 km) and deorbit quickly, forcing SpaceX to dedicate significant Falcon 9 launch capacity just to sustain the existing constellation — part of why Starship matters so much to the Starlink business.

Kook revisits a recent letter from Hennessy (an investment firm that has held a large ASTS position), which estimates AST could generate $2.4 to $4.4 billion in annual revenue from worldwide military and first-responder opportunities, with additional US national-intelligence revenue on top of that.

Kook argues Hennessy's sustained large position (uncharacteristic for their risk management) suggests they have done deep diligence, and that a business line potentially worth billions in revenue wasn't even contemplated by investors five years ago — he estimates this could be worth roughly 2x the current stock price by itself.

Kook argues this sentiment shift — disruptive technology starting small before becoming existential — mirrors how American Tower recognized the threat and responded by becoming an AST investor/board participant, and that telecom carriers are 'bear-hugging' AST partly to keep SpaceX at bay while hoping AST honors a 'carrier-neutral' business model.

Kook notes SpaceX had not launched any new direct-to-device satellites since June 2025 (about a year at the time of this episode), and questions — half-seriously — whether SpaceX might eventually abandon the direct-to-consumer satellite market given the opportunity cost of dedicating launch mass to it versus core Starlink broadband.

Citing analysis from community contributor 'Katzy,' Kook discusses a theory that Starship's large number of engines creates a statistically higher risk of cascading failures from a single engine-out event, drawing a comparison to a 'Russian approach' to rocket design.

Kook poses an open question about Starship's underlying economics: whether SpaceX made the right design tradeoff by pursuing a fully reusable but expensive second stage (Ship) versus Blue Origin's approach with New Glenn, which pairs a reusable booster with a cheaper, expendable second stage, for the specific use case of launching satellites.

Kook notes ULA's Vulcan rocket is next up on the launch manifest, expecting AST to also launch satellites on Vulcan, though he isn't certain the launch happens this year.

Citing an estimate from community contributor 'Justin at JustBar23' (which Kook says he has not independently verified), a fully mature Block 2 satellite is projected to cost about $23 million to build and launch, equivalent in cost to roughly 16 Starlink satellites but with roughly 100 times the capacity; current satellites cost more than this long-term target as production scales up (Kook compares this to early, more expensive Rivian vehicles).

AST SpaceMobile was trading at $63 on May 5, 2026, a point of maximum pessimism ('the pits'), when Anpanman tweeted that the 'endless rally' was starting; he calls this tweet prescient in hindsight given the subsequent rally.

He argues SpaceMob members are fortunate to be early participants in a transformational industry shift, noting that space companies historically had to go public via SPAC (rather than traditional IPO) because banks like Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley considered the business models too risky or too early to underwrite.

US Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick tweeted about meeting with Gwynne Shotwell of SpaceX to discuss AI data centers in space; Anpanman argues that while AST should focus on its direct-to-device constellation and military applications now, the AI data center opportunity is a natural progression, not a pivot, likely to become relevant within 1-2 years.

AST SpaceMobile has almost 4,000 patents; he cites Elon Musk discussing satellites moving from 20 kilowatts toward eventually 100 kilowatts of onboard power (with competitor K2's first test satellite at 20 kilowatts aiming for 100), and estimates AST's Bluebird satellites, based on their Sharp solar cells, already generate 'a little over 100 kilowatts,' with his own estimate closer to 120 kilowatts.

He describes a partially confidential satellite element he calls 'the tail,' which he estimates adds roughly another 20 kilowatts of power on top of the phased array's output.

He acknowledges AST has not solved all heat-dissipation issues for continuous high-power operation, noting satellites cycle in and out of sunlight, but speculates the antenna elements on the underside of the Micron satellite bus could theoretically be re-architected as heat sinks in a sun-synchronous orbit to help dissipate heat.

He believes once AST finishes deploying its low-band, mid-band, and possibly a government-focused constellation and is generating 'billions' in free cash flow, the company should pursue AI data centers, potentially partnering with Google (already a strategic investor), Amazon/Blue Origin, or others; he believes a 'Skunk Works'-style internal team may already be exploring this, and guesses a new disclosure on this could come within roughly a year.

He argues the upcoming SpaceX IPO roadshow will introduce many institutional investors to the broader space sector for the first time, including comparisons to other space companies mentioned in the S-1, creating a 'halo effect' that draws institutional capital into pure-play space stocks like AST SpaceMobile, Rocket Lab, Firefly, BlackSky, Planet Labs, and Redwire.

He personally does not plan to invest meaningfully in SpaceX at its expected $2-3 trillion valuation (though he'll buy one token share to track it), arguing SpaceX is not a pure play since it bundles in xAI, X (Twitter), and the pending Cursor acquisition; he speculates SpaceX could eventually spin off xAI and X if the combined entity trades at a conglomerate discount.

He says AST's real-time short interest fell for the first time in 8-9 days, moving from an adjusted $69 million to $68.3 million and then to $66.8 million as of the episode; he attributes part of the elevated short interest to convertible-note arbitrageurs shorting stock as it rises to hedge deltas, and interprets the net decline as evidence of actual short covering beginning, potentially by short sellers or SpaceX-related investors who had used AST as a sector hedge ahead of the SpaceX IPO.

He states AST's prior intraday all-time high was around $128 and predicts the stock will break through that level in the next few weeks.

Bezos said his ambition is to eventually launch every week, then every day, then every hour; Anpanman notes that with 4 boosters in rotation and weekly launches of up to 8 Bluebirds each, a full constellation could theoretically be launched within about 3 months, though production cadence remains a gating factor.

He notes 5-6 engines were replaced/upgraded between New Glenn's first and second flights ('Never Tell Me the Odds'), and expresses skepticism that fully reusable upper-stage vehicles (referencing SpaceX's Starship) will be solved soon given the stress of re-entry, suggesting SpaceX could end up keeping Starship's upper stage expendable.

He believes AST is hiring staff at Cape Canaveral to handle payload receiving and processing given the volume of Bluebirds being shipped for integration with Falcon 9, Blue Origin New Glenn, or ULA Vulcan Centaur.

He expects a Falcon 9 launch of this Bluebird batch in mid-June, with another launch likely in early July, and notes a second batch of satellites is getting close to shipment readiness as well.

A new 2x leveraged AST SpaceMobile ETF launched; Anpanman warns that leveraged products decay toward zero over time in sideways/choppy markets due to volatility drag and compounding, even though they can significantly outperform more than 2x during sustained unidirectional rallies.

He advises these products are only appropriate for short-term traders with perceived edge during clearly unidirectional trends, and explicitly warns against using margin or options on top of leveraged ETFs due to compounded volatility risk.

He expects that once AST's mid-band constellation is up and using 45-50 MHz of L-band spectrum in North America (via the Ligado deal) plus some quantum of S-band spectrum globally, the network will be able to compete in the fixed-wireless market currently served by Starlink, OneWeb, and Viasat, at speeds he estimates around 200-300+ Mbps (shared), lower than dedicated Starlink dish service but still strong performance via a phone or hotspot.

He speculates that with AI optimization, carrier aggregation, and MIMO across the low-band, mid-band, and eventually a C-band constellation, per-cell throughput could exceed a gigabit per second, or possibly multiple gigabits, though he flags this as uncertain ('I don't know').

An $18 ARPU (average revenue per user) figure was cited for Starlink Mobile, which Anpanman calls unusually high compared to the roughly $5 (developing markets) to $10 (developed markets) ARPU most investors underwrite for AST SpaceMobile's own direct-to-device business, though he notes uncertainty over whether the $18 figure reflects a standalone product or a partner-channel arrangement.

Palmer Luckey is a disclosed investor in AST SpaceMobile, having revealed this roughly a year ago in response to someone asking him about it; Anpanman argues this shows Luckey saw the value of AST's constellation and dual-use potential for how Anduril-type products would connect.

The Voyager G1 is, in his view, 'made for AST SpaceMobile' because it is not connecting over MSS spectrum — not Iridium, not Globalstar, and as far as he knows not Starlink; he's unsure whether Starshield can use cellular spectrum since it's classified.

AST SpaceMobile is working with the Space Development Agency (SDA) around the 'proliferated warfighter' program, and any device used in a contested area would need secure satellite connectivity rather than local wireless carrier service — AST is the only satellite provider offering low-band cellular broadband connectivity.

His guess for how this plays out: in a contested environment, one device might broadcast a small local cellular network connecting warfighters, while satellite connectivity (from AST) provides redundancy or primary connectivity.

He expects other products beyond the Voyager G1 to also leverage the SDA's new constellation that AST is part of, calling this dual-use (commercial + military) trend 'a big tell' for where the industry is headed.

Based on signals from both AST management and people at Blue Origin, he believes the FAA investigation into the New Glenn second-stage anomaly is close to wrapping up, and Blue Origin's team appears to be lining up for a potential static fire of 'New Glenn 4' as soon as next week.

Per his own due diligence, the issue that prevented the second stage from initiating a second burn — involving one of the two BE-3 engines — was something simple that should have been caught in quality assurance before flight; it is not a design issue, more like a missed process step.

He expects the FAA to clear New Glenn 'any day now' — possibly today, tomorrow, or over the weekend.

Everyone is also waiting to see what SpaceX's Starship 'S1' test looks like, expecting some interesting details to come out of it.

Bezos did not discuss direct-to-device or direct-to-cell service; Amazon previously did a deal with Globalstar, and Anpanman speculates Amazon may still be figuring out its direct-to-device strategy or may have just acquired cheap spectrum via that deal.

Responding to a listener question about maximum satellite stacking per rocket and whether nearly all satellites could be in orbit by the end of next year at a 2x-launches-per-month cadence, Anpanman said that's incorrect — the company would actually get all satellites in place sooner than that.

New Glenn's maximum stack is 8 BlueBird satellites; if Blue Origin moves to the upgraded '9x4' New Glenn variant, that could rise to roughly 12 satellites per launch.

Falcon 9 can carry 3 composite BlueBirds per launch; ISRO can carry 2.

A new launch provider, ULA's Vulcan Centaur, can reportedly carry up to 5 composite BlueBirds in its maximum heavy configuration (with 6 solid rocket boosters) — roughly equivalent to Falcon Heavy's capacity, which surprised him.

Ariane 6 in its heaviest configuration can reportedly carry up to 5 BlueBirds.

Mitsubishi Heavy — a launch provider the company is reportedly in talks with, alongside Ariane — could carry up to 3 BlueBirds, though its last launch suffered an anomaly and failed to reach orbit.

If production reaches 6-10 satellites per month, the company could get to nearly 100 satellites by mid-year if 'really cooking,' or by mid-to-third-quarter otherwise.

His bull-case estimate: reaching 45-60 satellites by around Q2, and the full ~100-satellite constellation by late Q3 or early Q4.

Asked when ASTS could hit $1,000/share, he said he doesn't have an exact date but believes it's absolutely possible, citing massive addressable markets beyond phone connectivity — IoT devices, autonomous cars/trucks/drones, and defense (radar, early detection, electronic warfare/jamming) using 60-100 of the largest phased arrays in low Earth orbit.

He references Pierre Leonet, a France-based legacy space consultant/economist, who rebutted a 2021 Morgan Stanley report (by analyst Adam Jonas) point-by-point, arguing a $100 billion SpaceX valuation didn't make sense and that SpaceX would never get there.

That 2021 Morgan Stanley report was the source of the idea that Starlink made up the majority of SpaceX's economics — roughly 65-70% of revenue/profit contribution back then; today he estimates it's closer to 75% of revenue and perhaps around 80% of profit contribution.

SpaceX is now approaching a $2-3 trillion valuation (depending on the prediction market) via a potential IPO, up from the once-dismissed $100 billion 2021 estimate — roughly a 30x increase.

He argues xAI, which SpaceX has 'glommed onto,' probably carries a negative value relative to SpaceX today.

He predicts that within the next 3-4 years, SpaceX will spin off xAI and X into a separate entity once that business reaches financial independence/profitability, since it wouldn't make sense to keep it bundled with SpaceX at that point.

Drawing the parallel forward: if SpaceX was worth $100 billion with Starlink worth $65-70 billion of that, then AST SpaceMobile at $800 million (historically) looked cheap; today SpaceX is worth $2-3 trillion and AST SpaceMobile is at $30 billion, so a $1,000/share outcome for ASTS is not unreasonable, though he can't say exactly when.

His personal guess is that $1,000/share could be reasonable within 2 to 3 years, though he stresses this is not a firm prediction.

Anpanman argues that Lynk Global has the same architectural drawback as Starlink — it places the eNodeB/network brains in the satellite itself, making it operate like a roaming network rather than being integrated into a carrier's core, and says Lynk has 'hit a wall' with limited momentum in intermittent low-band texting.

Anpanman recounts that at yesterday's T-Mobile event, the CEO said T-Mobile might have spectrum in one area (e.g., a national park) but not another, whereas Verizon might have coverage there, so pooling resources could help — but Anpanman says this framing doesn't logically apply to Starlink, since T-Mobile's existing 5x5 MHz, 1.9 GHz PCS G-block spectrum committed to Starlink is already nationwide; he concludes the CEO must instead be referring to pooling low-band spectrum (specifically around 800 MHz) with AT&T and Verizon for use with AST.

Anpanman notes Starlink is acquiring EchoStar, which will give it roughly 60 MHz of spectrum in total, arguing there would be no need for Starlink to 'pool' additional spectrum since it will already have what it needs — reinforcing his view that T-Mobile's spectrum-pooling comments are about AST-related low-band spectrum, not Starlink.

Anpanman speculates that former T-Mobile CEO Mike Sievert was the original architect of the Starlink partnership, and suggests (without certainty) that Sievert's abrupt firing may have been connected to his having effectively 'birthed a competitor' in Starlink after Deutsche Telekom had approved the original deal.

Anpanman argues that if T-Mobile truly viewed Starlink as its key enabling technology, joining this AT&T/Verizon-centered joint venture would make no sense — concluding the JV is structured to let T-Mobile walk away from Starlink and align with AST instead.

Anpanman mentions that T-Mobile's exclusivity arrangement with Starlink is expiring this summer, which he suggests is when T-Mobile 'started to realize' it needed to shift toward working with AT&T and Verizon on AST.

Anpanman states AST SpaceMobile has a 50/50 revenue-share split with AT&T and Verizon, compared to what he describes as an 80/20 split favoring Starlink under its deal with T-Mobile, and argues the JV's 'keep pricing in check' language implicitly signals dissatisfaction with Starlink's economics.

Anpanman notes the AT&T commercial contract with AST runs through 2030, and the Verizon contract runs through 2030 or 2029 (he is not fully certain which), and speculates that if T-Mobile joins under a most-favored-nation clause, it would likely also get a 50/50 deal like AT&T and Verizon.

Anpanman speculates that even if the DOJ requires the carriers to negotiate pricing individually rather than collectively through the JV (to avoid cartel-like behavior), and even if AST has to give up some revenue-share percentage over time (e.g., in 2031-2032) to keep 100% of the US market, that trade-off would still be a good deal for AST and is not a long-term threat to its economics.

Anpanman contrasts coverage precision: Starlink can only address large geographic dead zones because it can't beam to specific fixed cells, whereas AST SpaceMobile can pinpoint small dead-zone areas (e.g., a beach or a specific neighborhood), something he says Starlink can't do today.

Anpanman argues the joint venture has national-security and emergency-response implications since FirstNet (AT&T's public-safety network) is powered by AST SpaceMobile, meaning pooled resources across all three carriers would help first responders and disaster victims when terrestrial towers fail during tornadoes, hurricanes, or fires.

Anpanman speculates that Starlink executives Gwynne Shotwell and Dave Goldman are upset about this standards-based, network-integrated, spectrum-pooling approach because it signals Starlink will lack an MNO partner willing to advocate for it, forcing Starlink into a direct-to-consumer sales strategy (advertising an eSIM add-on service) rather than deep carrier integration.

Anpanman states Starlink's second-generation satellite, which depends on Starship's success (including unresolved technical issues around returning and landing the second stage without heat-tile damage), is expected to launch around 2027-2029 and target roughly 150 megabits per second, an outcome he says 'remains yet to be seen.'

Anpanman speculates the joint venture could in the future work with other constellations such as Amazon's once they have a workable solution, but notes that once the deep network-core integration with AST is built out, it would be very hard to rip and replace; he also notes T-Mobile (unlike AT&T and Verizon, which have exclusivity with AST) could potentially offer consumers a choice between AST-based broadband service and a separate Starlink eSIM subscription.

Kook notes the stock hit $60 at the end of July (roughly a year prior) before a convertible bond announcement (attributed to Scott Wisniewski, 'the Lewski') knocked the stock down; he says the stock is now up nearly 30% from that prior high print on a year-over-year basis, and argues compounding at 20-30% a year while otherwise 'doing nothing' is the real source of outperformance.

Kook mentions reading a recent Hennessy (investment firm) letter that he felt was written 'as if they know something,' particularly around military/government use cases, suggesting the firm may have unusually specific insight into AST's government revenue opportunity.

Kook argues the JV cannot legally be structured as a single buyer's cartel facing AST or SpaceX because of Department of Justice antitrust risk, and predicts it will instead be a narrowly scoped layer handling spectrum coordination, technical specs, and possibly shared gateways — aimed at pooling spectrum to box SpaceX out rather than aggregating purchasing power over AST.

Kook says AT&T's and Verizon's existing commercial agreements with AST already run through 2030 and cannot be unilaterally changed by the new JV, unless AST itself proactively agreed to amend them, which is not yet known.

Kook relays a corporate-legal contact ('James Zington') independently concluding the JV press release is not about dead-zone coverage but about keeping SpaceX out, corroborating Kook's own read.

Kook says it has been confirmed (including via Starlink executives' own interviews) that T-Mobile only had a one-year deal with AST SpaceMobile with a lifetime value of about $100 million, and speculates T-Mobile's closing of a deal with Grain Management for 800 MHz spectrum (which Grain wants to operationalize quickly per an active FCC docket) points toward Grain doing a deal with AST, since AST is effectively the only company that can use low-band spectrum for direct-to-cell effectively.

Kook argues AST has no real competitor because it built a fundamentally different, larger and more powerful satellite (he cites a figure of roughly 60 times the performance of what Starlink presently has), and that the integration required (e.g., AT&T reportedly using about 200 people to make AST traffic run natively on its network, billing, IMS, voicemail, and lawful intercept) plus a 2-3 year minimum regulatory pathway for spectrum/constellation authorization make it very difficult for any MNO to commoditize or replace AST.

Kook cites a Sequoia partner, Sean Maguire, saying he believes direct-to-cell will be a bigger market than the original consumer internet business, a view Kook shares; he contrasts SpaceX's roughly $20 billion in spectrum investment with an increasingly unclear D2C path if it loses T-Mobile, comparing SpaceX's situation to Elon Musk's difficult position in AI (xAI/Grok) versus Anthropic and OpenAI, and speculates SpaceX's eventual answer for its IPO narrative could be building its own phone.

Kook says he was not disappointed by the Q1 2026 earnings call despite the stock trading off following a revenue miss, framing the report as an update from management to shareholders on a business already performing well (scaled manufacturing, strong technical progress, regulatory posture, and balance sheet) rather than a true disappointment.

Kook says imagery from the earnings materials showed the next batch of BlueBirds (after the first batch) in final integration and testing, with 'Bluebird 8' appearing already packaged; he stresses 'no one knows when they're going to ship' and speculates — based purely on the visuals — that two batches of satellites could be ready to ship in July, explicitly flagging this as his own guess rather than confirmed guidance.

Kook relays that Tanner (an engineer in the community) did an image breakdown suggesting the fifth satellite of the next launch batch is in final testing, which Tanner and Kook interpret as implying a July launch — again framed as inference from photos, not confirmed by the company.

Kook notes Blue Origin tweeted a photo showing two additional New Glenn boosters in its hangar, which he reads as Blue Origin standing up an aggressive launch cadence that will meaningfully add launch supply capacity given New Glenn's larger payload capacity versus Falcon 9.

Kook recalls past mockery of speculation (attributed to a commentator nicknamed 'Katzi') that AST satellites had suspicious flyover timing coinciding with sophisticated US electronic-warfare campaigns, and says the confirmed radar disclosure validates that these capabilities were already in use and will scale with AST's growing satellite coverage.

Kook says AST has effectively 'conquered' Africa contractually, naming carriers Vodacom, Safaricom, MTN Nigeria, Axian, and Orange as already locked in, comparable to the commercial JV-like dominance he says AST already has in the US and Europe, calling this global contractual head start before commercial satellites even launch an underappreciated barrier to entry.

Kook cites a commentator, Alex from Babylon, saying the market completely missed that AST locked down Africa in the same way it locked down the US and EU.

Kook cites Anpanman flagging a tweet from Daniel Thomas (sales/commercial, SatCo) about working with European partners, and says Anpanman predicts Deutsche Telekom will eventually join AST's European carrier roster, noting recent Deutsche Telekom comments Kook interprets as suggestive of that outcome — explicitly framed as prediction, not yet confirmed.

Kook notes that Verizon, AT&T, Vodafone, Telus (Canada), and Google all own AST stock, and Rakuten still owns a reduced stake after recently realizing what Kook estimates was roughly $400 million in gains from a partial sale; he argues this aligned cap table gives AST's largest commercial partners a financial incentive to want AST's stock — and by extension AST's business — to succeed rather than to squeeze it on commercial terms.

Kook cites research shared by 'Only 6 Inches,' attributed to Lynk's former founder Charles Miller, characterizing the direct-to-cell opportunity as a multi-hundred-billion-dollar business potentially serving up to 8 billion customers — the first satellite business in history with billions of potential paying customers.

Kook quotes a community member ('NotKen2024') who says he used to build and own rural cell towers, sold his tower portfolio after learning about AST years ago, and rolled a chunk of proceeds into AST stock, arguing MNOs will save billions per year in uneconomical tower spend by using AST instead.

Kook says roughly 60 million AST shares are currently sold short, which he estimates at over 30% of the free float, and argues this represents a large amount of 'synthetic dilution' since borrowed-and-sold shares are effectively outstanding; he argues that if short sellers are eventually forced to cover as the bullish thesis is validated, the reversal would act like a large stock buyback and could sharply move the market-clearing price.

Kook says the JV news reinforces his belief that AST is the carrier-neutral winner and that SpaceX, while a real competitor scaring the MNOs, is mainly a threat in the B2B market (competing to be a wholesale satellite provider to carriers) rather than truly threatening AST's position, because the MNOs' fear of Starlink is what is driving them toward AST — potentially giving AST something close to a monopoly on the B2B2C side.

Kook closes by predicting the following week will be unusually quiet with 'literally nothing' happening, joking there may be no weekly recap or X Space episode next week unless news breaks.

Abel Avellan, currently in New York City, gave a CNBC interview with reporter Morgan Brennan the morning of the episode disclosing the satellite shipment — notable because Avellan rarely makes public appearances (Anpanman recalls only a handful of times) and normally sends President Scott Wisniewski to investor conferences instead.

Notes that AT&T Chairman and CEO John Stankey is giving the keynote at the JPMorgan investor conference the next day and is expected to discuss the new AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture, and speculates that Abel Avellan being in New York at the same time as this conference, rather than in Midland, could indicate an important meeting or signing.

States he has confirmation that AST SpaceMobile pulled out of the B Rally investor conference (West Coast, scheduled for May 20-21) and canceled all its scheduled one-on-one investor meetings there, and floats as a hedge-fund-investor observation that when companies pull out of conferences it can sometimes (rarely) signal M&A activity, though he does not know what is actually happening.

Says that in his own conversations with AST management, it sounds like — without being stated directly — T-Mobile is on board, giving AST access to the entire US carrier market (AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile).

Recalls AST's existing exclusivity terms as roughly 3 years with AT&T (or possibly 4) and 2-3 years with Verizon, describing the specifics as uncertain from memory.

Guesses the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture will be structured similarly to 'Satellite Connect Europe' (the Vodafone/AST European JV), and attributes the idea for the JV to AT&T Chairman and CEO John Stankey specifically, noting Stankey chairs AT&T's board whereas the Verizon and T-Mobile CEOs do not chair their companies' boards, implying Stankey is driving the initiative.

Argues the carriers are motivated by fear of Starlink as a competitive threat, noting Starlink has acquired 60 MHz of spectrum and could next pursue scarce low-band spectrum; adds that former T-Mobile CEO Mike Sievert was a notable exception among carrier leadership in not viewing Starlink as a serious threat.

Explains that because Starlink operates as a separate network rather than being embedded in the MNO core like AST, Starlink can still compete for regulatory purposes by offering a separate eSIM-based service directly to consumers, though he calls this 'a very tough hill to climb.'

Predicts T-Mobile will quietly move users away from Starlink by offering both as a menu of options — e.g., Starlink's narrowband texting versus a new AST-powered broadband 'T-satellite' service for around $15 — rather than dropping Starlink outright, to avoid antitrust scrutiny; suggests full Starlink displacement may only happen once AT&T's and Verizon's AST exclusivity periods end.

Relays a weekend conversation with 'Katzi' concluding Starlink faces a tough political climb in Europe given Elon Musk's unpopularity there.

Predicts Deutsche Telekom will join 'Satellite Connect Europe' (the Vodafone/AST joint venture) within the next month or two, citing the head of Satellite Connect Europe alluding to additional MNOs joining, and Deutsche Telekom's CEO (who controls T-Mobile) publicly stating distrust of Starlink/Elon Musk and openness to other satellite providers offering superior broadband in Europe.

Argues that if AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile give AST 100% of the US market and Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone, Orange, and Telefonica jointly back AST in Europe, it becomes very difficult for EU regulators to deny AST spectrum, predicting AST secures a 10x10 MHz allocation when the May 2027 EU 2 GHz MSS spectrum renewal comes up — calling this close to 'fait accompli.'

Flags that Meredith Sharples, managing director and head of Satellite Connect Europe, is scheduled to speak at the ITW 2026 conference in Maryland the next day at 3:15pm, and wonders whether announcements could come out of that appearance.

Notes AST stock bottomed around $63 roughly two weeks before the episode, after which he tweeted 'endless rally'; observes the stock consolidated from its January 2026 all-time high through May, and argues the setup into the rest of the year is strong given the week's catalysts.

Predicts the stock will break past its intraday all-time high of roughly $129 in the coming weeks, citing accumulating catalysts including the satellite shipment, the carrier joint venture, and John Stankey's upcoming keynote.

Argued the industry transformation is about speed and capacity to the phone, not just coverage in remote areas — framing it as broadband connectivity mattering even in everyday scenarios like a drive, not just "the middle of nowhere."

Argued spectrum may be an even more prized commodity than energy going forward, given the connectivity needs of the AI revolution.

Called a SpaceX IPO a game changer that creates a new investable category and provides valuation visibility for recurring connectivity revenue from space, characterizing it as market expansion for the wireless ecosystem rather than a replacement of it.

AST brought Verizon into its US network alongside AT&T about two years prior (i.e., ~2024), and views the new AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile JV in the same vein — a way operators organize around a strategic growth opportunity. AST is supportive of the JV and sees it as expanding the US market further.

AST's strategy has always been to be carrier-neutral, despite having developed some early exclusivities with early investors; the new JV just means that neutrality dynamic is playing out sooner than expected in the US, which he views as a good thing.

Wisniewski argues the JV does not diminish AST's moat: AST expects to be the second LEO constellation operator ever to reach commercial scale without going bankrupt, has developed the largest satellites ever deployed in low Earth orbit, holds backing spectrum, and has first-mover advantage and existing partnerships. He expects a healthy, growth-oriented market over the next 5 to 10 years with AST in a leadership role.

Wisniewski says the tone hasn't changed — conversations with network operators globally have increased in depth and breadth every month since he joined, and AST is partnered with nearly every major operator outside China and Russia. He acknowledges large, well-capitalized competitors could pursue the opportunity, but says AST feels well-capitalized and positioned as the partner of choice with the largest phased arrays ever deployed in LEO.

Asked whether the JV helps device proliferation in the US ecosystem, Wisniewski says AST is 'already on that track' since device manufacturers and MNO partners already want to enable these frequencies; the JV mainly formalizes things AST was already helping enable, such as device availability and spectrum pooling — a key rationale for bringing AT&T and Verizon together on AST's network two years earlier.

If the launch timeline slips a month or two or three, Wisniewski says that does not materially impact the company's NPV, though it matters to customers and to AST because 'time is money'; he expresses confidence given the vertically integrated, multi-launch-provider strategy.

AST has a large funnel of partnership opportunities, including some companies without formal partnerships yet that AST hopes to bring on in coming months and quarters. AST has invested in its commercial and telecom operations teams over the last 12-18 months, and momentum is increasing as commercial service nears and MNOs plan their 2027 budget cycles.

Wisniewski contrasts AST's 'broadband first, broadband only' strategy (targeting 100 megabits per second to a phone) against existing text/emergency-only direct-to-device offerings from competitors, calling the difference 'not apples and oranges, it's apples and aircraft carriers.'

AST likes its current spectrum position and will continue to pursue S-band opportunistically country by country; L-band is heavily utilized globally, which is why the unused US/Canada piece was valuable. In Europe, allocated S-band spectrum hasn't been well used and its license is coming up; AST's partner in Saudi Arabia (stc) purchased S-band spectrum itself, which AST hopes to enable in the near future. Wisniewski says investors should not expect any expensive spectrum acquisitions — AST's approach is primarily to partner.

The joint venture's framing is deliberately open-ended (not excluding any satellite provider) so it doesn't appear anti-competitive to regulators, but one thing it explicitly cannot do is set prices for satellite providers like AST, since that would be illegal collusion.

Anpanman notes no press release has come from Starlink, Globalstar, Viasat, or Equatus in the hours since the JV announcement, which he argues proves those companies were not part of the coordination and only AST was — reinforcing that the JV is aligned with AST, not Starlink.

Anpanman contrasts AST's deep network integration (seamless tower-to-satellite handoff within the carrier's own network core) with Starlink's current T-Mobile arrangement, which operates as a separate roaming network via an eSIM handoff, arguing this technical difference is why AST becomes hard to displace once integrated.

Anpanman recounts that Charlie Ergen/EchoStar previously lost spectrum to the FCC because he couldn't meet build-out deadlines and had to sell to SpaceX, and argues Ergen could have avoided that outcome had he partnered with AST to light up the spectrum via satellite the way the new rules now allow.

Anpanman argues this regulatory shift means carriers like AT&T could ask the FCC to ease coverage build-out requirements for spectrum (e.g., 600 MHz bought from EchoStar) by using AST satellite service instead of constructing new towers.

Anpanman argues satellite build-out lets carriers avoid the cost of constructing and operating physical towers (citing $100,000 to $200,000 per year to operate a tower) in low-population areas, turning AST into a 'CapEx-saving machine.'

Using a hypothetical (his own illustrative math, not company figures), Anpanman argues that if satellite deployment increases the revenue extracted per unit of spectrum while lowering the cost to deploy it, the implied value of that spectrum rises accordingly (e.g., from $10 to $15 in his example) because carrier profit margins improve.

Anpanman says AST SpaceMobile is the only satellite provider today delivering true mobile broadband, using low-band cellular spectrum and large phased-array satellites, whereas Starlink and Globalstar are MSS/mid-band providers focused on SOS messaging and texting rather than broadband.

Anpanman notes Starlink take approximately 80 cents of every dollar T-Mobile charges customers for T-Satellite service, leaving T-Mobile only about 20 cents, which he says explains the weak reported economics of that service.

Anpanman cites an Amazon commercial showing a camper using AI to diagnose a skin rash via a connected phone in a remote location, arguing that use case (and others like remote medical diagnostics, professional Zoom calls, and FaceTime) requires true broadband connectivity that only AST can currently deliver.

Anpanman notes that competitors like Lynk and even Starlink initially tried small-satellite/small-phased-array architectures but are moving toward larger phased arrays because larger arrays make more efficient use of spectrum and deliver a cleaner signal to phones; Lynk in particular is described as struggling and not architecturally scalable.

Anpanman states current AST capability is around 100 megabits per second on the previous generation satellites, with 200 megabits per second on the new generation, and that with MIMO plus mid-band and C-band spectrum, throughput could eventually exceed 1 gigabit.

Anpanman says T-Mobile's exclusivity arrangement with SpaceX/Starlink ends around June/July 2026, and argues the JV timing and T-Mobile's softened public language toward AST are directly tied to that expiring exclusivity.

Anpanman speculates T-Mobile will publicly frame any shift as 'expanding T-Satellite to include AST SpaceMobile service' rather than abruptly dropping Starlink, since it can't leave customers without coverage when exclusivity lapses.

Anpanman estimates (his own assumption, not officially disclosed) that AST's exclusivity is roughly 3 years for AT&T and roughly 2-3 years for Verizon once commercial service launches, meaning if service launches around 2027, exclusivity could run to about 2029-2030.

Anpanman expects the joint venture will be pitched to FCC Chairman Carr as pro-consumer (aiming for a full seamless broadband experience) and to the DOJ as pro-competitive (creating a fourth credible competitor via Starlink Mobile), making approval likely, though he floats a possible extreme scenario where regulators could require carriers to let customers choose their satellite provider (an 'Internet Explorer bundling' analogy).

Anpanman guesses the JV has probably been socialized with the FCC at a high level already, but expects the formal review process (once a definitive agreement is signed) to be lengthy.

Anpanman says he was buying aggressively when the stock dipped to around $74-75 on the day of the announcement, believing the market failed to immediately grasp the significance of the JV since AST wasn't explicitly named in the carriers' release.

Anpanman argues the stock should be 'well north of $100' on this news alone given the implied lock-up of 100% of the US MNO market, and that it would be trading closer to $130 if AST had been explicitly named in the carriers' press release.

Anpanman expects the market to take a few days to fully digest the JV's implications, predicting the stock reaches new all-time highs in the near term as catalysts stack up.

Anpanman expects Blue Origin to get FAA approval for New Glenn very soon, with New Glenn 4 possibly launching as early as early June but more likely mid-to-late June 2026, following 2-3 SpaceX (and possibly ULA Centaur) launches disclosed at the Deutsche Bank conference.

Anpanman says the first Bluebird batch shipment is imminent (could come out the next day, over the weekend, or by Monday), with that batch launching in mid-June, and a second batch shipping soon after to support a July launch — potentially two launches in July.

Anpanman speculates that T-Mobile could announce a partnership with AST as soon as June or July 2026, contributing its PCS G-block mid-band spectrum (currently used by Starlink) on a non-exclusive basis, and/or freeing up low-band spectrum (800 MHz or its 600 MHz holdings) in non-covered areas for AST.

Anpanman theorizes that T-Mobile pushed to join the AT&T/Verizon-aligned satellite strategy because Starlink's growing spectrum position (from the AWS-3 auction) threatened to let Starlink become a full wireless competitor, and that T-Mobile used the implicit threat of enabling Starlink as a wholesale virtual network operator to force its way into the JV.

Anpanman notes MNO CEOs are expected to attend a JPMorgan conference the following week and may face questions about the JV that could bring more public detail to light.

AST SpaceMobile put out its own press release about two minutes after the carrier JV announcement, commending the framework being put forward and saying it looks forward to working with these companies — Anpanman argues a detailed press release that's gone through legal review couldn't be produced on short notice, implying AST knew in advance.

Abel Avellan retweeted the JV announcement and tagged T-Mobile along with Verizon and AT&T; Anpanman says an executive doesn't do that unless the company is actually working with T-Mobile.

AT&T and Verizon are typically fierce competitors who 'don't like each other,' but both dislike T-Mobile even more; Anpanman compares T-Mobile joining an AT&T/Verizon-led group to 'the Ayatollah of Iran taking a Jewish bride' — a pairing he calls previously unfathomable to anyone in the industry, a point he says he discussed with Kook.

AT&T and Verizon had already leased spectrum to AST; beyond that existing lease, if a mutual agreement is reached, T-Mobile would contribute spectrum as well and become part of the group.

No press release came from Starlink, Globalstar, Viasat, or other players for roughly 8-10 hours after the carrier JV news, which Anpanman takes as evidence Starlink was not included.

Anpanman's read on the sequence: Starlink learned about the JV today and called T-Mobile, T-Mobile told them the exclusivity is ending and it's moving to the new JV with AST; this, in his view, is why Shotwell 'crashed out' publicly rather than welcoming the JV as pro-competitive.

Anpanman argues Starlink is fully capable of competing on its own given its scale (roughly $2 trillion valuation, roughly 60 MHz of AWS-3 and H-block spectrum, and favorable FCC buildout treatment), so its 'David vs. Goliath' framing doesn't hold up.

Elon Musk has said in casual conversation that SpaceX wants to become an MNO and develop its own phones, but walked that back to 'we're going to work in partnership with them' when pressed publicly; Anpanman believes Musk, Shotwell, and Goldman all know where this is actually heading.

Anpanman says the T-Mobile/Starlink deal terms were lopsided: T-Mobile paid Starlink for access and received only 20 cents of every dollar generated, with Starlink keeping 80 cents, which he calls 'insane' for the level of service (roughly 3-4 Mbps across a large radius from an initial ~650-satellite constellation) versus AST's 50/50 revenue split with carriers.

T-Mobile CEO Mike Sievert 'made a mistake' by working with Starlink and, per Anpanman, was fired as a result.

The head of Satellite Connect Europe reportedly said the venture is planning to add some additional European MNOs in the coming weeks; Anpanman speculates this means Deutsche Telekom specifically will join Satellite Connect Europe.

Because T-Mobile (a Deutsche Telekom subsidiary) is now reportedly moving toward AST, Anpanman infers Deutsche Telekom's leadership authorized that move and is itself considering working with AST.

The carrier JV structure (multiple competing MNOs cooperating through a joint entity) mirrors the AST-Vodafone Satellite Connect Europe joint venture, which covers 27 EU countries; Anpanman would not be surprised to see a similarly structured 'Satellite Connect America' entity announced in the next few weeks.

The FCC (under Chair Carr) has been favoring Starlink with easy buildout requirements — allowing satellite coverage to satisfy buildout obligations for AWS-3 and H-block spectrum without requiring new towers — which Anpanman says is part of why the carriers banded together.

The FCC and DOJ will scrutinize the carrier JV, but Anpanman expects the carriers' regulatory attorneys to argue the collaboration is pro-competitive, framing it as fostering competition against Amazon and SpaceX/Starlink, and to publicly commit to an 'open framework' evaluating other satellite providers to help clear antitrust review.

Responding to a listener question (Juan Gonzalez) about antitrust risk from Chair Carr, Anpanman said Carr and the DOJ will look for holes, but the carriers' regulatory teams are strong and will position the JV as pro-competitive; the carriers are not obligated to actually work with Starlink, Amazon, Apple, or Globalstar even if they claim openness to other providers.

One possible regulatory compromise Anpanman floats: carriers could be required to offer Starlink as a consumer choice alongside AST, letting customers pick between cheaper, intermittent Starlink texting (~$10/month, his guess) and AST's more robust broadband (his guess: ~$12-15/month).

Abel Avellan stated on an earnings call that in one of AST's countries (which Anpanman interprets as the US), AST will have access to 100 MHz of spectrum; Anpanman pieces this together as roughly 50 MHz from Ligado plus roughly 50 MHz of low-band cellular spectrum combined from FirstNet, AT&T, Verizon, and now T-Mobile.

Satellite-enabled spectrum becomes more valuable because it can be used more efficiently (lighting up previously unused/dead-zone spectrum) and because FCC rules let satellite coverage satisfy buildout/coverage requirements, allowing carriers to reduce CapEx by decommissioning towers in some suburban areas while also serving previously unreachable customers, raising both margins and revenue — Anpanman estimates spectrum 'worth $10' could become worth '$12, $13, or $14' as a result.

On throughput: Starlink's initial ~650-satellite constellation delivers roughly 3-4 Mbps across a wide radius; AST's prior-generation satellites deliver around 100 Mbps, the new Block 2 satellites will deliver around 200 Mbps, and Anpanman expects this could rise to roughly 1 Gbps once the mid-band constellation launches, aided by AI-driven spectrum efficiencies.

If AST secures 100% of the US carrier market with a 50/50 revenue split, Anpanman speculates the stock (trading around $83 that day) could be underpriced and worth $100, $120, $130, $140, or $150.

A Deutsche Bank question asked whether carriers might squeeze AST on margins in the JV; Anpanman argues this is unlikely because direct-to-device is viewed by carriers as an ARPU and churn-reduction driver, not a cost to minimize, especially under a 50/50 revenue-share structure.

AST has a 3-year exclusivity arrangement with AT&T that starts when service starts, which Anpanman guesses will be around early 2027.

AST's exclusivity with Verizon is roughly 2-3 years, though Anpanman says 'no one really knows' the exact term — this is his sense from various discussions and research, not a confirmed figure.

T-Mobile's exclusivity with Starlink is ending next month or in July, which Anpanman ties directly to the timing of today's carrier JV news.

A new satellite batch shipment press release is expected imminently — could be later today, this evening, or over the weekend.

The FAA is expected to approve a Blue Origin launch 'very soon,' based on due diligence and conversations Anpanman describes as giving him and 'Space Mob' high confidence; he expects the Blue Origin (New Glenn) launch in early June 2026, likely carrying Amazon's LEO satellites first, with AST following.

Beyond the Blue Origin launch, AST has a handful of SpaceX (Falcon 9) launches and ULA (Centaur/Vulcan Centaur) launches lined up, with one launch expected in June and one or two more in July.

The prior guidance of averaging one launch every 1-2 months was actually meant as a full-year average; from now through year-end, Anpanman expects the actual cadence to be 1-2 launches per month.

Anpanman expects AST to have 45-50 satellites in orbit by early 2027 as production ramps toward a cadence of 60, and recalls Scott Wisniewski mentioning that starting in Q1 the company might begin 'dribbling out' the new mid-band BlueBirds, referred to as Block 3.

Anpanman was in Las Vegas when the JV news broke; the stock traded around $74-76 and he told friends and family to buy, personally missing a buy order at $75 in one account before buying at $81 — he says $82.5 is still a good entry given what he calls a 'clearing event' for the industry.

Anpanman says he told Kook that adding Verizon was a transformational event, and considers today's T-Mobile development to be similarly or more significant.

Anpanman notes three new military/defense contracts were signed during the quarter that the market largely overlooked because 'the stock price wrote the narrative.'

Sell-side reaction so far: Deutsche Bank (via a call with Scott Wisniewski) and Roth Capital appeared to engage with the implications, while Anpanman says Bank of America 'totally missed the mark' on the day's news but will 'eventually get it.'

Anpanman's closing conviction: if the market fully understood the implications of the day's news, the stock would already be at $100-$120, and he expects that realization to play out over the coming weeks, comparing his current excitement level to when the Verizon partnership was first announced.

Anpanman says the last time he felt this excited was when AST SpaceMobile added Verizon to AT&T, and now what SpaceMob had predicted for three years has happened: AST SpaceMobile has effectively added T-Mobile as a carrier, giving it effectively 100% of the US market locked up, though it is not yet definitive and still requires time and regulatory steps.

Reading the AT&T press release closely, Anpanman concluded it describes a joint venture being put together that will enable AST to bring T-Mobile into the fold, even though the companies can't explicitly say that for regulatory/antitrust reasons.

Anpanman says AT&T is the 'quarterback' of the joint venture, just as AT&T quarterbacked the earlier AT&T/Verizon partnership with AST, because AT&T was the leading-edge partner in developing the network-core integration that makes satellite handoff seamless.

When the press release went out, AST SpaceMobile was the only provider that immediately responded and coordinated PR — Abel Avellan and Scott Wisniewski retweeted it — while Starlink and Globalstar put out nothing because they learned about it only that day, 'on the outside looking in.'

The PR came directly from AT&T, not Verizon or T-Mobile, with the Verizon and T-Mobile CEOs quoted in the release — the same pattern Anpanman says occurred when Verizon joined, where AST put out the initial announcement and AT&T 'welcomed' Verizon into the fold.

He notes that over recent earnings calls, carrier CEOs (including AT&T's) had begun speaking more openly about working with other satellite providers, and T-Mobile recently said it was interested in AST SpaceMobile and Globalstar — statements he views as being made for the regulatory record to support a 'more competition' narrative.

AT&T and Verizon have exclusivity with AST for a minimum of roughly 3 years once commercial service launches, while T-Mobile's exclusivity (with Starlink) ends in the next month or two, which he says is part of the 'mosaic' explaining the deal's timing.

Anpanman speculates that T-Mobile may have told AT&T and Verizon it would enable Starlink to become a mobile network operator unless it was let into the JV, prompting AT&T and Verizon to 'cut them in.'

AT&T and Verizon previously contributed 850 MHz spectrum to AST; Anpanman guesses this spectrum could eventually be folded into the new JV.

He raises unused 800 MHz spectrum from Grain Management that is coming to market, reportedly in a transaction with T-Mobile, and speculates about whether that spectrum could be thrown into the JV.

He speculates T-Mobile could eventually pull its 1.9 GHz spectrum currently used with Starlink and redirect it to AST for mid-band use, alongside additional low-band spectrum and T-Mobile's roughly 800 MHz holdings.

He describes Starlink as amassing spectrum, including AWS-3 (~2 GHz range) and the recently purchased H-block (1.9 GHz), which sits next to T-Mobile's G-block — part of what he frames as Starlink's ambition (stated publicly by Elon Musk) to eventually go direct-to-consumer under the 'Starlink Mobile' brand.

Anpanman cites analyst Will Townsend (who was briefed ahead of the release) characterizing the alliance as a defensive move to mitigate any non-terrestrial network provider seeking to compete more directly with MNOs, distinguishing AST as a cooperative partner versus Starlink as the one satellite provider planning to sell direct to consumers.

He predicts Starlink will ultimately get cut out of T-Mobile's network but says Starlink customers could still access Starlink service by getting an eSIM directly, since Starlink already sells that today for roaming.

He argues the carriers can defend the JV to regulators as pro-competitive, since Starlink (with EchoStar spectrum and a stake in Boost Mobile's network) is becoming a facilities-based '4th carrier,' meaning consumers still have choice and no antitrust issue should arise.

He notes the JV will be structured to 'buy and negotiate satellite services from various competitors' for regulatory optics, name-checking Skylo (texting) and a hypothetical future Amazon/Globalstar satellite service (5-6 years out) as other options carriers could point to, while stressing AST SpaceMobile is the only cooperative direct-to-cell broadband solution actually working with MNOs today.

He concludes AT&T and AST SpaceMobile are 'in the driving seat' of the arrangement, with Verizon and T-Mobile 'along for the ride.'

Anpanman explains that carriers can now use satellite-to-cell coverage to help satisfy FCC spectrum build-out/deployment requirements, which he says lowers the bar for compliance considerably.

He contrasts this with Charlie Ergen's prior experience building out Dish Network/EchoStar's spectrum under population-coverage deadlines (50%, 65%, 75%, 80%, 90%) that ultimately forced him to sell the company; Anpanman speculates Ergen wishes he had pursued a direct-to-device build-out strategy sooner.

He argues satellite coverage could let carriers pull back on expensive rural towers, citing a SpaceMob member's estimate that each tower costs roughly $150,000–$200,000 per year to operate, representing large potential CapEx savings alongside improved 200 Mbps-class broadband access.

Anpanman pushes back on skeptics who argue the JV will crush AST's economics: AST has a 50% revenue share within the 3-year exclusivities with AT&T and Verizon, and he expects roughly 50/50 to hold for at least the next 3 years even with T-Mobile added.

He guesses that once the 3-year exclusivity period ends, the split could shift to something like 60/40, but frames this as immaterial given the scale of controlling the whole US market.

He contrasts this favorably with the roughly 80/20 split he says Starlink held (in its favor) in its deal with T-Mobile, noting that T-Mobile's T-Satellite service quality was poor (intermittent texting, low uptake) versus the broadband-class service AST is targeting.

In response to a listener question about unit economics under a shared multi-carrier D2D system, Anpanman says he expects roughly 50/50 for the next 3 years, with AST's negotiating leverage being very high given carriers can't easily 'rip and replace' the integrated satellite provider.

Anpanman expects the market to take time to digest the news, drawing a parallel to the Verizon announcement, when the stock's premarket reaction didn't fully reflect the news's significance until people understood the implications; he says he explained the deal to two hedge fund contacts that morning who initially didn't grasp it but did after explanation.

He expects AST to re-rate significantly higher once the market understands the deal, pushing back on bears who call the direct-to-device market 'niche,' pointing to the fact that all three major US carriers are now working with AST.

Anpanman recalls that former T-Mobile CEO Mike Sievert's decision to partner with Starlink was a 'huge tactical blunder' because it gave Starlink mindshare and helped enable its subsequent EchoStar acquisition and pursuit of AWS-3 spectrum; Sievert is no longer at T-Mobile.

He notes Deutsche Telekom installed a new, closer T-Mobile CEO who had publicly said the company was 'dancing with the tiger (or lion)' regarding Starlink and would eventually walk away from that partnership once the new JV could be negotiated.

He compares the US JV structure to AST's earlier European approach, where AST built a joint-venture framework (referencing 'Satellite Connect Europe') starting with Vodafone and later bringing in Telefónica and Orange — arguing the same playbook is now unfolding in the US.

Anpanman calls the Q1 2026 earnings call 'really great' and attributes the stock's decline to algorithmic trading and headline reactions to the quarterly revenue miss versus Street expectations, rather than any deterioration in the business.

He notes the Street's quarterly model for 2026 (roughly $39M, $41.2M, $46.5M, and $50M in Q4) implies a much smoother ramp than what the company actually guided; management said each quarter should be sequentially bigger, but the ramp will be less smooth and more backloaded than the Street assumes.

Anpanman compares AST's post-earnings selloff to recent patterns in Redwire and BlackSky, both of which reported weaker Q1 results; BlackSky fell from about $39-40 to as low as $30 before recovering to $41.38 after slightly raising full-year guidance.

Redwire fell to about $8.40 after a disappointing Q1 report (compounded by a large private-equity holder, AE Partners, dumping shares at around $11), but has since recovered to $12.16, which Anpanman cites as evidence that space stocks trade as a sentiment-driven basket and often overreact short-term.

Anpanman expects a similar rebound in AST's stock, noting the space sector has an underlying bid and that he personally plans to add risk on any near-term weakness, especially heading into the June launch and the SpaceX IPO.

Abel Avellan mentioned on the call that up to 5 Block 2 BlueBirds could be launched on a ULA Vulcan rocket; Anpanman speculates (with acknowledged uncertainty about the exact vehicle/configuration) this could involve a Vulcan Heavy configuration with multiple solid rocket boosters, and plans to research further.

Blue Origin is reportedly targeting a third New Glenn booster (GS1, the reusable first stage) in rotation by the end of summer 2026, and four boosters in rotation by year-end; on a roughly 30-day refurbishment cadence, that could theoretically support launching New Glenn up to 4 times per month by year-end.

The first AST launch on Blue Origin's New Glenn is expected to carry 4 BlueBird satellites, scaling up from there; Anpanman believes Amazon's Project Kuiper (Amazon Leo) will likely be the first commercial payload on New Glenn, not AST.

Company management (Scott Wisniewski) referenced dependency on Blue Origin New Glenn plus 'SpaceX equivalents,' which combined with Abel's ULA comments suggests ULA could fly BlueBirds in varying configurations (e.g., 3, 4, or 5 satellites) depending on booster count.

Anpanman expects AST could add Arianespace and possibly Rocket Lab's Neutron rocket as future launch providers; Rocket Lab's Neutron is expected to have its first test flight around Q4 2026, and he speculates Arianespace could get business if the SatCo European venture gains spectrum traction.

He notes AST is also making progress toward Relativity Space as a potential future launch partner, citing update videos from Relativity's Mike Schmidt, though nothing concrete was announced.

Anpanman estimates BlueBirds 11, 12, and 13 will be close to complete around late May/early June, supporting a second launch batch in early-to-mid July on Falcon 9, following the first batch's mid-to-late June launch.

The company expects to reach roughly twice the current peak performance (around 200 Mbps) on Block 2 satellites; Anpanman notes Abel avoided directly referencing BlueBird 6's performance, instead pointing to BlueBirds 8, 9, and 10 for future Block 2 validation, which Anpanman interprets as confirmation that BlueBird 6 is functioning primarily as a government-dedicated satellite.

Anpanman guesses the 3 new government awards, being newly granted, are more likely tied to in-space performance of BlueBird 6 and would-have-been BlueBird 7 rather than older satellites.

He notes EchoStar and Viasat appear positioned to get access to some global S-band spectrum, with OmniSpace also in the mix, while a decent amount of S-band remains available, which he believes is part of what AST is now targeting, including in Europe.

Anpanman speculates that AST and Amazon could potentially collaborate at some point in the future, though he thinks it's probably too early for that.

He argues AST's advantage over rivals is that it requires no new chipsets or hardware since it works with every existing phone via direct MNO network-core integration, giving it a frictionless go-to-market versus competitors who need new handset chipsets or separate satellite spectrum ecosystems.

Anpanman argues AST is the only company with proven space-based cellular broadband technology; he estimates SpaceX's upcoming second-generation direct-to-cell satellite is targeting performance in line with AST's current Block 2 (roughly 150 Mbps for Starlink versus an estimated 200 Mbps for Block 2), but expects that to take SpaceX 2-3 years, by which time AST will have iterated further and have its higher-throughput, mid-band Block 3 generation online.

He speculates that with carrier aggregation across multiple satellites and a denser future constellation, individual user data speeds could theoretically reach around 1 gigabit per second under ideal (low-congestion) conditions.

Abel Avellan was reportedly adamant in response to a handpicked retail investor question about the company's IP moat, emphasizing the patent portfolio's size relative to competitors; Anpanman speculates the company may be strategically allowing competitors to develop technology further before enforcing patents against them later.

JPMorgan and Morgan Stanley participated on the company's last convertible note deal, leading Anpanman to speculate they may be close to initiating research coverage, possibly timed around the SpaceX IPO.

He notes the SpaceX IPO is roughly a month away and views its roadshow and institutional exposure as a likely positive tailwind for the broader space sector, including AST.

AST's stock had been leading the space sector's performance early in the year but has since underperformed, particularly after-hours following this earnings report; Anpanman believes anyone selling around $74 post-market will regret it within a few months.

Andrew SpaceMobile's spectrum position combined with MNO partner spectrum can reach up to 100 MHz of allocated spectrum with some partners when combining IMT/3GPP MNO spectrum with AST's own MSS (L-band and S-band) spectrum, which the company argues is a materially different and larger proposition than competitors offering only narrow SOS-type spectrum allocations.

Asked which government programs AST could target given a large prospective defense budget increase, Abel Avellan said AST spans the full range from FirstNet to classified programs to Golden Dome, for both communications and non-communications capabilities, and expects significant growth in government revenue and opportunity.

Abel Avellan said the Globalstar/Amazon capability (already available via iPhone SOS emergency messaging) represents only a very small fraction of spectrum versus the hundreds of MHz needed for broadband, so he does not see it dramatically changing the competitive landscape in the foreseeable future; AST's combined MNO and MSS (L-band/S-band) spectrum access can reach up to 100 MHz with some partners, which he framed as a fundamentally different, broadband-focused proposition.

Kook said Bloomberg characterized Space Mob with a meme angle but also credited the group with doing research-level work that hedge funds cannot replicate, calling it a 'Skynet-type' globally distributed knowledge base of roughly 150 contributors, many of whom are senior engineers and lawyers with six-figure-plus day jobs, working for free.

Kook laid out that the bear thesis evolved in stages: first, skeptics (citing analyst Tim Farrar) said the technology would not work at all; second, after BlueWalker 3 proved it worked, skeptics said there were no regulatory rules to allow it; the FCC's Supplemental Coverage from Space framework and AT&T/Verizon/FirstNet support resolved that.

Kook said the next hurdle was whether any MNO would actually sign up, since AST cannot economically go direct-to-consumer (citing Iridium's costly 30-year-old go-it-alone attempt as a cautionary precedent); AST needed cross-sell partnerships with mobile network operators to work.

Kook said the final remaining frontier of the thesis is execution -- can the company build the satellites, and will the market actually use them -- calling the market-demand question one that remains genuinely speculative.

Kook noted that secondary-sale shares typically take time (previously 3-10 days after a convertible bond offering) to fully settle and recycle through the market, and this Rakuten sale was more of a protracted ATM-style overhang, which explained some Thursday stock weakness; he expects the overhang to clear quickly if earnings go well.

Kook speculated (without confirmation) that batch two might launch in July, and expects the pace to be described as 'constellation constipation' ending -- the market is hyper-focused on launch cadence, and once production is running, multiple launches will follow in quick succession.

Kook estimated (assuming a roughly 60% cancellation fee on a $300 million midpoint commitment, divided by a $74 million full sticker price per Falcon 9 launch) an implied count of secured Falcon 9 launches, while assuming no material minimum-committed launches with ISRO or other providers.

Kook said his understanding is that AST's Blue Origin New Glenn launch agreements are effectively options with no money down, since Blue Origin doesn't yet have a certified vehicle and needs the cargo, giving Blue Origin little leverage, whereas SpaceX (as the preferred, proven partner) commands standard deposits and minimum commitments.

Kook said AST released an unblurred image the Friday before earnings showing a Micron testing device labeled 'ASIC,' which he interprets as a deliberate signal to informed observers, given the company's awareness that Space Mob analyzes every disclosed image closely.