Episodes

He expects some Golden Dome-related news for AST to trickle out, at a minimum within Q2 2026, though exact timing is unclear; broader macro uncertainty (e.g., Iran) is also weighing on sentiment.

He compares current Q1/Q2 2026 consolidation to 2024 (stock around $3 before AT&T, then Verizon partnership announcements in May, after which the stock never looked back and eventually peaked near $40 in August) and 2025 (stock bottomed near the mid-$20s at end of May, after catalysts including Trump threatening to pull SpaceX/Musk's government contracts, AST's addition to the Russell 1000, the Ligado spectrum term sheet finalizing, and the Vodafone Idea deal - then rallied into the 60s by July and hit $100 in October).

He believes AST is set up for a similar pattern in 2026: consolidation through April/May followed by a batch of catalysts that could reignite the stock, though he cautions macro shocks (e.g., a COVID-like event or armed conflict escalation) could override company-specific fundamentals.

He compares recovery timelines: Falcon 9 mishaps have historically had roughly 2-week FAA investigation turnarounds; the earlier New Glenn booster refire failure took a few weeks to investigate and roughly 1.5-2 months to fix. Based on indirect signals from AST management, he guesses New Glenn could fly again as early as August 2026.

Blue Origin now has two boosters (one named 'Never Tell Me the Odds'); if they reach a roughly 30-day refurbishment cadence per booster, they could launch roughly every two weeks. He estimates Blue Origin will complete about 6-8 launches in 2026 versus an original target of 8-12, with the first post-anomaly commercial launch likely reserved for Amazon's LEO constellation and four consecutive successful commercial launches required before Blue Origin can resume Space Force/government payload launches.

He lays out a speculative shipment/launch cadence: batch 1 (3 Block 2 satellites) ~May 19 via Falcon 9; batch 2 late May/early June; batch 3 mid-June; batch 4 (a larger 6-satellite batch) second half of July, corresponding to Falcon 9 launches in the second half of June, first half of July, and second half of July/early August, followed by the first New Glenn batch of 6 satellites in late August/early September.

He says he wouldn't assign a high probability to actually hitting the 45-satellite target given the New Glenn dependency, and argues the more important metric is how consistently the time between batches shrinks, rather than the arbitrary 45 number itself.

AST currently has 2 thermal-vacuum chambers (TVACs) with 2 more on the way; testing (roughly 2 weeks per satellite) is being done on every satellite in early production batches, following a path similar to Starlink's early testing approach, before shifting to sampling (e.g., every 2nd or 3rd satellite, eventually every 10th-15th) as confidence in the production process builds.

At 12 satellites/month (144/year), and given roughly 90 satellites needed for global coverage, AST would then move to densification satellites (enabling MIMO/carrier aggregation), Block 3 mid-band satellite production, and potentially dedicated government and ex-US sovereign satellite 'shells.'

Citing analysis credited to another X user ('another Smith'), he reads a recent FCC order as granting whoever holds current US MSS L-band or S-band rights (i.e., Ligado/AST) an FCC-recognized priority to pursue those same rights globally with the same US-flagged constellation; a competitor like SpaceX couldn't use its existing US-flagged constellation to operate on L-band in another country and would instead need to build and flag an entirely separate constellation abroad.

He argues this puts Viasat and Inmarsat, which hold pre-existing L-band rights outside the US but not within it, in a difficult position, while AST/Ligado - per their existing coordination agreement with Viasat (to avoid interference) - are not precluded from pursuing L-band rights globally, effectively backed by the FCC's stance.

Initial readings suggested the FCC order shut AST out of S-band entirely in favor of EchoStar, but a typo (also found by 'another Smith') meant the order only covers part of S-band; an additional 20 MHz x 20 MHz block of uplink/downlink S-band spectrum remains unruled-on and could go to EchoStar, Viasat, or AST.

He credits AST's regulatory lead Jennifer Manor, a former EchoStar regulatory-policy veteran with decades of experience, with confidence in navigating toward more L-band access and potentially another 10x10 or 20x20 MHz of S-band.

He frames terrestrial low-band cellular spectrum (600-900 MHz) as the core of AST's business, with carriers initially allocating small slices (e.g., 5 MHz, or 10 MHz for FirstNet) and expected to allocate more over time as AST demonstrates non-interfering, effective coverage; S-band/L-band access is described as incremental upside ('gravy') on top of that core thesis.

He expects Europe's reallocation of 2 GHz S-band MSS spectrum to occur around May 2027, with EchoStar's deal with SpaceX/Starlink expected to close around the end of summer 2027; regulators will assess who has actually deployed service (EchoStar reportedly has done nothing with the spectrum) when deciding allocation between Starlink/EchoStar and AST (partnered with Vodafone Satellite Connect Europe, Orange, Telefonica, and other European telcos).

AST's European vehicle, Satellite Connect Europe, is a Luxembourg-based entity that will be wholly owned/controlled by Europeans with its own 'kill switch'; if that governance structure isn't sufficient for European comfort, AST could build Europe its own dedicated satellite shell (e.g., roughly 30 satellites, his guess) once production cadence and costs allow.

He explains spectrum-band tradeoffs: L-band (~1,500-1,600 MHz) sits between low-band (better coverage/propagation) and mid-band (more data throughput/capacity); S-band spans roughly 1.9-2.2 GHz. AST's Block 2 satellites can communicate across a wide range - roughly 600-900 MHz on the low end and up to 1.5-2.4/2.6 GHz - while Starlink's smaller phased arrays focus on a narrower mid-band range (roughly 1.8-2.2 GHz), including the PCS block and T-Mobile's allocated 1.995 GHz 'G block.'

Starlink's acquisition of EchoStar and partnerships are centered on mid-band spectrum, consistent with its technical sweet spot; mid-band gives good data throughput but weaker propagation/coverage (e.g., in-building) compared to AST's low-band-centric approach.

Globalstar (relevant to Amazon's satellite plans) uses spectrum closer to Wi-Fi, requiring more direct antenna-to-sky pointing; Amazon/Globalstar will rely on MDA Space's older 17 replenishment satellites plus a new, not-yet-produced MDA Space 'Aurora' satellite (50 planned) with a small phased array - expected to improve beamforming efficiency somewhat but not to match AST or Starlink capability.

He expects Apple will eventually develop its own satellite service, but notes it takes significant time - citing that Starlink announced its direct-to-cell initiative in 2022 and is targeting Block 2 BlueBird-level performance only around 2029, partly because it needs its own ASIC and Starship to be ready.

He cites a claim that Starlink's V2 satellites, once operational, could achieve over 120-130 Mbps, compared to AST's current satellites already exceeding 150 Mbps on FPGA (pre-ASIC) hardware.

He argues AST's advantage is building satellites in-house rather than 'by purchase order': when a design issue arises (e.g., the composite shell problem AST previously encountered), AST can redesign and direct its own manufacturer to fix it quickly, whereas working through a prime contractor like MDA Space involves slow contractual processes and cost overruns.

Asked when AST could provide intermittent US coverage, he says it's technically possible today but would be very intermittent; he estimates roughly 25 satellites would support limited FirstNet/alpha-stage coverage, while reasonably good intermittent coverage for full-scale open beta testing with AT&T and Verizon customers would need around 45 satellites in view/service.

Asked about analyst Tim Farrar's recent criticism of AST on latency/altitude, he declines to engage in detail, saying he doesn't follow Farrar's commentary and considers him a consistently poor forecaster.

He characterizes Farrar as a paid consultant whose negative public positioning drives clients to hire him for due diligence calls, and says several SpaceMob investors sold at a loss in 2022-2024 after being influenced by his bearish commentary.

He expects the upcoming SpaceX IPO to remain a catalyst for the broader space sector, but expresses some concern that SpaceX is increasingly bundled with unrelated ventures (an option to acquire Cursor, and xAI), diluting its value as a 'pure space play'; he notes rumors of a $3-3.5 trillion valuation against roughly $15 billion of revenue last year, a high multiple reflecting future rather than historical expectations.

He points to Amazon's strong recent stock performance as partly reflecting growing investor perception of 'space exposure,' driven by its Globalstar deal (expected to close next year) and a growing cadence of Amazon LEO/Kuiper satellite launches (two recent launches cited).

He urges investors not to be overleveraged during volatile drawdown periods, not to fixate on daily stock price moves, and to use the consolidation period to read and deepen their understanding of the investment thesis rather than capitulate before the anticipated May catalysts.

He plans to attend the next three Falcon 9 launches (June, July, August) and the subsequent Blue Origin New Glenn launch (expected around August/September) carrying the first 6-satellite batch.

Kook recaps returning from Orlando exhausted after learning the fate of BB-7, framing the launch as a success in 99 ways and a failure in only one, while acknowledging his own bias as a hopelessly positive long-term holder.

Kook says the team was confident in the company's tech and future but 'confused' about how SpaceX or Amazon (using third-party contractor MDA) will build a competing solution.

Kook argues a common thread behind past constellation failures (Teledesic, ICO) was reliance on a prime contractor leading to protracted disputes; cites Viasat's antenna problems similarly, contrasting with AST's and SpaceX's vertical integration.

Kook explains 150 Mbps relates to per-beam capacity; each satellite can produce roughly 2,000 beams. He contrasts this with SpaceX Direct-to-Cell, which he recalls Musk described as roughly 4 Mbps per beam, framing AST's throughput as superior spectral efficiency per MHz.

Kook reiterates the hardest part is scaling AST's own satellite factory simultaneously with financing and team-building, comparing it to SpaceX's Starship infrastructure and Blue Origin's program.

Kook says FM1/FM2's value was shaking down the production line: phased arrays (Microns) seemingly ahead of schedule; composite rings a persistent bottleneck; satellite buses being shipped in via Antonov aircraft.

Kook jokes about predicting a production-cadence ramp for roughly 9 months without it materializing, but believes a steady cadence is coming soon and that the factory is a large, defensible source of value.

Kook guesses Abel did not call Bezos and 'chew him out,' and that AST and Blue Origin remain committed to working together, with Blue Origin now 'owing' AST after losing its satellite.

Kook notes Blue Origin landed its booster and reached orbit, but the second-stage circularization burn failed, leaving the satellite in an elliptical orbit; he states, with hedging, the orbit was roughly 116 km perigee by 400 km apogee, causing excess drag.

Kook notes the lost satellite was a copy/insurance satellite for the SDA program, a twin of FM1, and AST used a higher risk posture on it (hot-firing while mated), suggesting the mission wasn't make-or-break.

Kook recounts a past FUD claim (account 'Free Speech') that AST was missing an FAA debris-mitigation grandfather period; Kook researched it and found the claim false, with AST fully compliant.

Kook says the failure gave AST a real-world deorbit example, previously only hypothetical amid 'Kessler effect' concerns; cites a video (@MVCrisis) apparently showing the satellite breaking up, roughly matching a Harvard professor's tracked orbital path (with some timing discrepancy).

Kook concludes this closed the loop on a major debris-mitigation FUD question, and separately notes this is the company's first public launch failure, which he believes will teach investors such dips are buying opportunities.

Kook says hedge funds are fixated on whether AST will 'get to 45' satellites, but he personally focuses on pace and trajectory instead (e.g., 20-30 satellites up by year-end).

Kook notes the stock traded around $78 after the failed launch, referencing a tweet from Anpanman summarizing upcoming catalysts (Falcon 9 batches, Golden Dome, FirstNet, Ligado FCC approval).

Kook argues this creates an 'impenetrable moat': low-band requires wide phased-array element spacing (large satellites), and since ~80% of traffic is indoors, low-band penetration is crucial; SpaceX (S-band only) cannot access it the way AST can.

Kook recalls guessing in early 2021 the SCS approval would land by mid-2021 ('off by 5 years'), but the stock still rose ~8x on STAs even without satellites in orbit.

Kook says this strengthens AST's Ligado L-band lease, though AST also lost clean access to some prime international S-band (2 GHz) frequencies it had been pursuing; other S-band requests remain pending.

Kook emphasizes the order doesn't touch AST's core SCS model (leasing partner carriers' terrestrial spectrum), concluding AST's spectrum strategy 'got stronger... rather than weaker.'

Kook interprets this as bullish: naming AST specifically and disclosing R&D dedication signals AST is currently the only credible D2D partner, while competitors were framed as future/aspirational.

Kook also reads it as AT&T setting up FTC-friendly optics and negotiating leverage, referencing AT&T's 5-year exclusivity.

Kook speculates SpaceX's D2D focus may be diluted by Starship, Falcon 9, Starlink, xAI, and its new Cursor acquisition, though notes SpaceX has spent more on D2D (via EchoStar) than on Starship.

Kook cites a Deutsche Bank report: Amazon's D2D isn't coming soon, has no MNO partners, and it's unclear if Amazon has even designed a compatible satellite.

Kook discusses a report (surfaced by Redrum) that Meta is launching 'WhatsApp Plus,' speculating WhatsApp could become standalone, letting AST connect users directly outside an MNO relationship in high-WhatsApp-usage markets.

Kook says Rakuten's CEO has been selling AST shares to raise cash for Rakuten's core business, a key reason the stock has traded heavy; he expects the selling to be nearly finished and anticipates a rally once it concludes.

He says the stock was down on the news but 'fought its way back,' and argues losing the satellite was a galvanizing event that will motivate both AST and Blue Origin to make the rest of the constellation buildout (referred to as '7x2 and 9x4') successful.

Anpanman recalls the stock's history from around $2 per share during a period of investor hardship to a recent peak of $128, joking that $128 'is going to be a new 52-week low at some point' once the stock climbs further.

He jokes that the FCC may have granted the application partly because AST demonstrated it could deorbit a failed satellite properly (deorbiting BB7 promptly after the launch failure), which is a concern regulators have for satellite constellation applications.

He argues the grant is a true validation event that silences years of doubters, including industry consultant Tim Farrar, anonymous critics, legacy satellite executives (he names Alan Gottlieb and Charles Miller of Lynk), and short sellers who he says spread FUD claiming AST's satellites 'were going to melt' or that the company couldn't make a link budget.

This grant covers Block 2 satellites; Anpanman expects the company will begin building Block 3 satellites toward the end of this year, which would require a separate FCC application, though he expects that process to be easier given the FCC's demonstrated confidence.

He frames the FCC as a global 'gold standard' regulator — akin to holding a US passport for travel — arguing this approval will ease and speed up AST's regulatory approvals in other countries since foreign regulators will look to the FCC's decision as a template.

He credits FCC Chair Brendan Carr for 'getting shit done' on cutting red tape and encouraging competition, and urges SpaceMob community members to give Carr credit for the approval regardless of political affiliation.

Even if AST SpaceMobile ceased to exist, Anpanman argues the FCC grant itself would be a valuable acquirable asset for another company, since obtaining such spectrum/constellation authorization from scratch is difficult.

He expects the company will issue a press release on the FCC approval, and hopes it is held until the next morning (US market open) rather than released that evening, to maximize visibility with algos and investors.

On SatCo's European approvals, Anpanman notes AST/Vodafone's SatCo received UK Ofcom approval about two weeks prior to this episode, and he believes one more regulatory step remains before full EU approval, which he guesses will land in May.

Anpanman guesses the FirstNet contract (with AT&T) likely had conditions precedent tied to FCC approval, and now that the grant is in hand, he expects the contract to go definitive 'in the next few days or so' — though the economic terms of that FirstNet contract remain unknown.

He argues that once definitive commercial agreements with real economics are in place (e.g., FirstNet), the company can raise debt against those contracts, and the FCC approval brings increased institutional awareness and investor interest by de-risking the story from a 'developmental project' to an active commercial utility launching service this year.

Asked how much of the news was already priced into the stock, Anpanman says it was probably priced in 'to some degree' given Chair Carr's prior public comments about a 3-player market (Starlink, AST, Amazon), but argues a large pool of institutions and retail investors unfamiliar with AST will now learn about the company, partly due to attention generated by the BB7 loss coverage.

He says Amazon's deal with Globalstar will rely on Globalstar's existing NGSO constellation for the next 3-4 years, and it's unclear when Amazon's own next-generation direct-to-device satellites might be ready — spitballing perhaps 2030.

He states Starlink currently has about 650 first-generation direct-to-cell satellites and estimates it will take Starlink until roughly 2029 to get its V2 satellite generation operational, which he says is aiming to catch up to AST's current generation.

Anpanman speculates that if Deutsche Telekom reconsolidates T-Mobile, and given that T-Mobile's Starlink exclusivity ends this summer, there is a scenario where T-Mobile could eventually partner with AST SpaceMobile instead — though this would require agreement from existing AST partners AT&T and Verizon, and he stresses this is speculative ('crazy to say it').

He draws a parallel to how he once thought there was 'a negative chance' Verizon would ever join AT&T in partnering with AST, yet it happened; he suggests a T-Mobile/AST tie-up could similarly seem improbable but not impossible.

He notes SpaceX/Elon Musk is spending roughly $23 billion buying mid-band spectrum and may bid in the upcoming AWS-3 auction to acquire more, which Anpanman frames as Musk building toward a competitive wireless service that should give every MNO pause.

The second stage's first burn (to raise apogee) was successful, but the second burn (to circularize the orbit) failed; per Scott Manley and 'Robert McDowell' (names as stated, possibly garbled), had the mission only required a single burn to a higher ~500-600km orbit it would have succeeded, but this flight specifically tested a dual burn to insert into a lower 460km orbit as part of New Glenn's vehicle testing.

After the failed second burn, the satellite was left in an elliptical orbit with a perigee around 150 kilometers, which meant it would reenter within a short period; this is what caused BlueBird 7's loss.

This was Blue Origin's 3rd certification flight with the US government; without a successful outcome, Blue Origin needs two more successful flights to achieve certification, and government payloads booked with Blue Origin will have to wait -- which frees up manifest space that could, once New Glenn succeeds again, ironically lead to more AST satellites being flown sooner.

Anpanman asked the company whether they'd build another FM2-equivalent satellite; the response was that the company has already moved on to the next platform, which Anpanman speculates could point toward a dedicated government-only constellation shell, akin to SpaceX's Starshield.

Blue Origin has not issued a public apology or detailed post-mortem; Anpanman assumes Blue Origin is staying quiet until the FAA-led mishap investigation determines the cause (similar to their silence after New Glenn's first flight, when the booster failed to land), and expects private conversations have already occurred between Bezos and Abel Avellan.

Anpanman does not think AST or Blue Origin sabotaged the rocket, as some conspiracy theorists suggested, since becoming a reliable heavy-lift vehicle and achieving government certification is critical to Blue Origin's business.

Anpanman believes part of the downward pressure on the stock also came from Rakuten having sold a portion of its position.

Anpanman thought a roughly 15% drop was an overreaction to losing one satellite out of what will eventually be hundreds, though he acknowledges the market will extrapolate what the failure means for Blue Origin's reliability.

On 'hard catalyst' down days like this, some of the price support often comes from short sellers covering realized profits, and Anpanman expects it will be interesting to see where short interest stands the next day.

Anpanman criticized 'haters' and doubters who use AST's setback to promote rival stocks, singling out accounts like 'Cyber Prince' (a former bullish Rocket Lab promoter who got wiped out on leveraged options and pivoted to meme coins) and 'Deep Value Bagger' (a recurring Rocket Lab-aligned critic) for mocking AST's loss.

Anpanman warned against trading 'on tilt,' describing one investor who sold his AST shares at the overnight lows around $70, then went 'all in short' out of spite, and was subsequently down about 10% as the stock rebounded.

Anpanman treats extreme vitriol and gloating from detractors as a signal that sentiment is near a bottom; he noted some AST shareholders themselves were 'calling for blood' and criticizing management and Blue Origin, which he also read as a capitulation signal.

The delay in shipping BlueBird 8, 9, and 10 (and by extension 11, 12) stems from a composite support-ring stacking issue: original composite rings failed load testing, and the company (per Kasey, a community researcher, as referenced by Anpanman) resolved it in February by adding internal tubes to reinforce vertical strength while preserving weight savings versus the older, heavier metal rings used on the first five satellites.

New, redesigned composite rings arrived from the factory (believed to be in India) about one to two weeks before this episode and will be used for the next batch of satellites going forward.

Anpanman frames BlueBird 6 and 7 as having served to 'build the machine that builds the machine' -- establishing the Block 2 manufacturing process -- and expects production cadence to eventually reach an 'exit velocity' hockey-stick, though the company isn't there yet; he plans to watch how quickly the third batch follows the second.

Two Falcon 9 launches are expected to carry the next two satellite batches, likely in the June-July 2026 timeframe.

Working through the math live (correcting himself along the way, with an audience member helping confirm a figure), Anpanman estimated that starting from 6 satellites already in orbit (excluding BlueWalker 3 due to marginal performance), 2 more Falcon 9 launches plus 2 successful Blue Origin launches would bring the constellation to around 24-28 satellites, enough for cash-flow breakeven on the operating business (though not covering ongoing capex), likely landing in Q3 or, being conservative about space being hard, Q4 2026.

Anpanman does not think AST needs another New Glenn launch until roughly the August-September 2026 timeframe, and would be pleased if Blue Origin could complete 2-4 successful launches in that window, though he is 'not holding his breath.'

A standby heavy-lift launch vehicle (previously referenced by the company as possibly Mitsubishi Heavy, though it could also be Ariane or ULA) could be available to AST if that provider's own customers aren't ready when its rockets are, but this option likely won't be available until closer to the end of 2026, with real capacity coming in 2027.

Anpanman met AST's head of defense business, Michael Pollock, in person at Cape Canaveral, describing him as 'super sharp' and noting Pollock hinted, without specifics, that a lot of positive developments are coming soon -- which Anpanman guesses may include a Golden Dome-related award given the timing.

Anpanman expects additional government contract announcements in Q2 2026, noting the company seemed confident heading into the quarter and that Michael Pollock's upbeat demeanor before the launch may be a signal.

Anpanman believes AST is 'in the strike zone' for FCC approval of its expanded constellation application, saying it 'could happen any day, any hour,' and cites FCC Chairman Brandon Carr's public support for the company; the approval would move AST from special temporary authorities to full authority for a large constellation and US market access.

Anpanman argued Vodafone and other MNO partners (who sit on AST's board or have observer rights) are not surprised by the setback and have no better alternative to wait for: Starlink's V2/direct-to-cell broadband service is not expected until around 2029, contingent on Starship iterating successfully, AWS-3 spectrum regulatory approval, and Starlink's own ASIC development.

Amazon is expected to use Globalstar's replenishment satellites (referenced as 'X17', possibly garbled) and MDA Space's 50-satellite 'Aurora' constellation as an interim, likely non-broadband solution, with a true from-scratch direct-to-device satellite (and associated ASIC) not expected until around 2030.

Anpanman said once AST's service is integrated into an MNO's core network, it becomes difficult for that carrier to switch to a competing provider like Starlink, which he views as a durable competitive moat.

Anpanman said he holds no ill will toward toxic Rocket Lab-aligned critics' underlying company, noting he likes Rocket Lab, hopes its Neutron rocket succeeds (which could lower launch costs and make Rocket Lab a potential AST supplier), and acknowledged Rocket Lab has ambitions to build its own direct-to-device satellites for other customers.

Anpanman cited Street analyst consensus revenue estimates of about $176 million for 2026, $710 million for 2027, $1.6 billion for 2028, and $2.5 billion for 2029, noting the company reportedly feels comfortable with a $150-200 million range for 2026, with achievement of later years' figures dependent on constellation buildout progress and additional government contracts.

The mission profile called for two second-stage burns: a first burn to reach an elliptical apogee, a coast phase, then a second burn at the right point to circularize the orbit; it appears (not confirmed) that the second burn did not occur.

Speculation exists that the second-stage engine failed to reignite possibly due to propellant freezing during the coast phase (e.g., from a leak), though the exact cause is unconfirmed pending Blue Origin's investigation.

Prior to this launch, AST SpaceMobile had a perfect satellite-delivery track record (6 for 6); Anpanman argues the company can still be considered unblemished since the loss was due to the launch vehicle, not the satellite or AST's actions, though BlueBird 7 itself never got a chance to perform.

Referencing a write-up by 'SPAC Man,' Anpanman notes that in a pure DCF/financial-impact sense, losing one satellite might only represent a 2-4% valuation impact, but market sentiment will likely push the stock down further than that on the news.

Anpanman expects the New Glenn 3 second-stage investigation to take roughly one to two months, though it could be faster or slower depending on whether the root cause is minor or major.

This New Glenn 3 flight was a certification mission for Blue Origin to prove itself to the U.S. Department of Defense; because it failed to reach proper orbit, Anpanman believes Blue Origin will not be certified for government missions until it completes two more successful flights, though this ironically frees up more near-term Blue Origin commercial capacity for others including AST.

Existing FAA/launch agreements already cover New Glenn 4, 5, and 6; Anpanman expects those to fly after the investigation closes, guessing the next payload will likely be an Amazon/Kuiper LEO batch before AST's next multi-satellite BlueBird batch flies on New Glenn.

Because New Glenn is grounded pending investigation, AST's next two launches are expected on Falcon 9 (3 BlueBirds each), with the first roughly the second half of June and the next roughly the first half of July 2026, by Anpanman's estimate.

In a downside scenario where New Glenn is grounded for an extended period, AST could backfill with more Falcon 9 launches, but each Falcon 9 carries only 3 BlueBirds versus 6-8 on New Glenn, and additional Falcon 9 flights are more expensive — both factors that would make the ~45-satellite, year-end target harder to hit.

While launch costs themselves are not covered by the satellite insurance, it is customary industry practice for a launch provider to credit the customer a future launch after a lost mission; Anpanman expects Blue Origin will grant AST a future flight (potentially able to carry 6-8 satellites once the vehicle matures) as compensation.

Anpanman speculates (not confirmed) that AST may consider design changes for future satellites, such as additional propellant or thrusters, as a contingency in case of a similar second-stage failure in the future, especially since upcoming satellites are lighter, composite builds.

Anpanman met AST's government-business lead Michael Pollock at Cape Canaveral; while Pollock shared no material non-public information, he was bullish and positive about a number of upcoming government/defense programs in the pipeline.

As a comparison for how markets treat space-company setbacks, Anpanman cites Intuitive Machines, whose stock fell from the low $20s to roughly $6.50 in March 2025 after tipping two lunar landers, but which has since reached an all-time high (a figure he cites as roughly $2,750, which appears to be a garbled or mistaken value and should be treated as uncertain).

Anpanman argues that delays and setbacks are inherent to investing in any space company (SpaceX, Blue Origin, AST SpaceMobile, Rocket Lab, Intuitive Machines, Voyager, etc.) and that investors should expect optimistic public timelines to slip as a matter of course, rather than viewing slippage as evidence of dishonesty.

Asked whether SpaceX Starship could help AST's satellite launch cadence, Anpanman says that once Starship becomes operational (he references 2027), it could conceptually carry more than 12 satellites per launch, but AST intentionally maintains a diversified launch-provider strategy (Falcon 9, ISRO, Blue Origin New Glenn) and Starship still needs to prove out its own commercial-payload capability and configuration.

Asked what would happen to Blue Origin's stock price if it were public and experienced today's anomaly, Anpanman guesses it would only be down about 5-7%, since the successful reused-booster landing was viewed as the bigger achievement and second-stage issues are seen as a normal part of the iterative process.

Anpanman says he would not expect Rocket Lab's stock to fall 20% or more if its upcoming Neutron rocket experiences a setback, since reasonable investors should expect new rocket programs to have wins, setbacks, and delays.

Asked by a listener ('Arthur') whether new SatCo agreements will be announced next week, Anpanman says he believes new agreements are being worked on — citing a comment from the head of SatCo (Satellite Connect Europe) — but says no specific timing (e.g., 'next week') was actually given.

Blue Origin described the satellite deployment as 'off-nominal' rather than an 'anomaly,' which Kook says is an important distinction: an 'anomaly' would imply the rocket itself failed, whereas 'off-nominal' more likely means the satellite ended up at the wrong altitude or in the wrong orbital inclination rather than a rocket malfunction.

If the satellite is too low, drag could prevent it from unfolding or cause it to deorbit too quickly; if it's in the wrong inclination, the concern shifts to collision risk with other objects/satellites in that orbital 'neighborhood' — Kook says the company doesn't yet know which scenario applies.

Kook contrasts the negative internet reaction to this event with how a similar mixed outcome (successful booster landing plus orbit reached, but payload misplaced) would be received if it were a SpaceX Starship flight, speculating the market might even push SpaceX's valuation toward $3 trillion in that scenario due to a perceived double standard.

Kook argues the financial impact to AST SpaceMobile is 'effectively immaterial' regardless of the outcome, noting that if BlueWalker 3 or the original Block 1 satellites had failed the company likely would have gone bankrupt, but losing FM2 now is different because FM1 (BlueBird 6) already successfully proved out the Block 2 unfolding mechanics, making FM2 non-critical strategically as a backup unit tied to an SDA program.

Kook speculates the satellite could still be usable if it was placed in a sufficiently high orbit, allowing repositioning via onboard thrusters, though this could shorten its total operational life (e.g., 3 years versus 7 years).

Kook expects retail investors to sell heavily when markets reopen and anticipates public criticism, but says he personally is not concerned given his multi-quarter time horizon; he notes that in a prior professional life he would have sized positions lighter or hedged more heavily with convertible-bond delta ahead of a launch specifically because of this kind of one-off 'jump risk.'

Kook describes tracking satellite production via his own 'T-account' model of work-in-progress versus shipped units, informed by visibility into the arrival of composite rings and satellite buses; he estimates roughly 25 satellites are currently in various stages of production.

Kook argues the stock market is not discounting the loss of a single satellite (FM2) but rather discounting the entire path to the full ~243-satellite constellation and the time it's taking to get there.

Kook credits the speed gains to AST's integration with Nokia's AirScale system and direct integration into MNOs' 5G cores, meaning AST functions as 'just another cell site' to the carrier rather than a separate roaming network — a key technical differentiator from narrowband IoT satellite operators (e.g., Iridium, Skylo) and from SpaceX's 'parallel network' approach with carriers.

Kook views the deal as a smart, low-cost (about 5% of Amazon's capex budget) strategic move: it gains Amazon the N53 private 5G spectrum useful for its own data centers/warehouses/robotics without needing public spectrum, retains Globalstar's existing Apple contract (of limited near-term financial importance but preserves optionality and keeps the spectrum away from SpaceX), and adds 26 MHz of spectrum useful for Amazon's drones and IoT devices.

Kook says sell-side analysts and the broader market remain skeptical/negative on 'Amazon LEO' prospects, focused mainly on cash burn risk, though sentiment improved somewhat after this deal showed a possible forward path.

Kook compares buying spectrum to buying Bitcoin — a scarce asset that, once gone, can't be reacquired, but can be resold later if strategy changes, making it a low-risk 'strategic optionality' purchase for Amazon.

Amazon is retaining MDA as a third-party satellite manufacturing contractor; Kook argues no constellation has ever succeeded using third-party contractors due to cost overruns and misaligned incentives/slow iteration cycles, and that Amazon's satellites are known to be smaller-scale, making it very unlikely Amazon can replicate AST SpaceMobile's capabilities — a view he says was echoed by unnamed AST employees he spoke with.

Using a 'Waffle House cage fight' analogy, Kook says he'd generally prefer facing one known strong competitor (SpaceX) rather than adding a second (Amazon, led by Bezos), but notes AST has already proven itself against the toughest competitor in the field.

Amazon also signaled ambitions around a 'Fire Phone'-style consumer device strategy; Kook argues this could alienate MNOs like AT&T and companies like Apple, which in turn strengthens AST SpaceMobile's position as the 'carrier-neutral' satellite option that MNOs would prefer to partner with instead.

Citing a tweet from 'Alex from Babylon,' Kook relays the view that Amazon and SpaceX are not buying/holding spectrum just to white-label it to legacy MNOs, but to power their own competing LEO connectivity bundles (e.g., 'Leo Prime') and edge-AI ambitions, directly threatening MNOs long-term — positioning AST SpaceMobile as the MNOs' 'white knight' against being cut out of the rural/edge customer base.

Citing commentary from 'Mega Constellations' and Justin Barrett, Kook notes AST SpaceMobile could itself become an acquirer of remaining legacy satellite operators, and is separately pursuing S-band spectrum rights in dockets covering Chile, Brazil, and the EU, reportedly at low or no cost.

Kook floats — explicitly labeling it speculative ('hopium bucket') — the possibility that Amazon could end up using AST SpaceMobile as a service provider to 'light up' its newly acquired spectrum rather than building its own competing satellites, given the friendly relationship between the two companies.

Kook notes Amazon has already had some success winning airline/aero connectivity customers away from Starlink, underscoring that Amazon remains a formidable competitor not to be dismissed.

Kook argues Rakuten's selling is unrelated to the New Glenn/FM2 event and instead reflects Rakuten being an overleveraged holding company with a struggling, interest-rate-pressured Japanese telecom subsidiary — not SoftBank-style permanent capital — rather than any loss of confidence in AST's technology.

Kook describes this as creating a 'syndicate trade' dynamic: once Wall Street knows a large, publicized seller exists, dealers pull bids and lean short, creating technical downward price pressure distinct from the fundamentals — an environment sophisticated investors can navigate but that may tempt retail investors to 'crash out' prematurely.

Drawing on his banking/hedge-fund background, Anpanman describes a predictable pattern with large sellers: the stock gets 'cleaned up' as the seller works through their shares, and once they are close to done (he estimates Rakuten had about 2-3 of several tranches left), the stock tends to start ramping up again — the 'coiled spring' he keeps referencing.

He says the stock would probably be around $110-$120 heading into this launch if the Amazon-related news hadn't come out and if Rakuten weren't selling, but is not upset about the current pressure and considers it a normal part of owning the stock.

He personally has been buying shares daily during the dip, characterizing his daily buys as a tiny fraction of his overall position, and declined to disclose his exact position size.

Rakuten needs the cash: it must turn around its core mobile business (requiring more capex), and Bloomberg reported in March 2026 that Rakuten needs to monetize up to half of its AST SpaceMobile stake and likely also needs to spin off or reorganize its fintech business.

In response to a listener question about whether Rakuten tipped off AST management to delay positive news, Anpanman says he doesn't think so — Rakuten no longer sits on the board, though it may have given AST an informal heads-up — and he doesn't believe the company would withhold good news because of Rakuten's trading, though it may be mindful of timing; possible news post-launch.

This will be his first time seeing a Blue Origin New Glenn launch in person, after having attended two prior Falcon 9 launches (BlueWalker 3 and the five Block 1 BlueBirds); he expects it to be 'next level.'

He estimates this launch event invited several hundred attendees, down from an estimated 1,000+ at a previous launch event.

He notes AST SpaceMobile has raised $4 billion and jokes he hopes there will be memorabilia handed out at the event, while acknowledging he's not saying the company should spend money on it.

A Bloomberg photographer who visited his home turned out to be Indian and, upon recognizing his LVM3 and PSLV rocket models, told him that the December BlueBird 6/FM1 launch on ISRO's LVM3 was a major source of national pride in India and widely followed there.

A Bloomberg journalist has been working on a feature article about the SpaceMob community since roughly Q4 2025, having interviewed a number of SpaceMob members; Anpanman doesn't know how the piece will portray the community but expects humor and 'lore.'

He met with a Bloomberg photographer and took (hopefully anonymous-looking) photos that will appear in the article, which he believes may run in Bloomberg Magazine, making it more in-depth; a photographer may also attend the Hyatt Sunday night to photograph other SpaceMob members who consent.

He reminds listeners the next batch of satellites is nearing readiness for shipment, noting it's mid-April and shipment should happen soon.

He reiterates later that the next satellite batch shipment is expected 'in the next week or two.'

Recent 'Amazon news' is contributing to stock pressure, but Anpanman calls it noise that likely won't impact AST SpaceMobile for 4-5 years unless Amazon does additional deals; he frames it as validating the direct-to-device market and expanding the addressable market rather than being purely negative.

He speculates that a Globalstar-related deal (implied to involve Amazon) would likely close sometime in Q2 of next year, reasoning that acquirers typically complete one deal (avoiding messiness or antitrust risk) before announcing another — implying any further Amazon deal (e.g., involving Iridium or Viasat) would wait until after that closing.

He describes a trading correlation ('pair trade') between AST SpaceMobile and Rocket Lab stock, where the two tend to move together, and notes that when the price gap between them narrows or widens too far, traders rotate between the two names.

He dismisses a small, vocal subset of Rocket Lab investors who compare Rocket Lab favorably to AST SpaceMobile (e.g., on delays, comparing to Rocket Lab's Neutron program) as making an unfair, 'stupid' comparison between unrelated businesses.

He references a meme he made about toxic Rocket Lab holders shifting their criticism toward Firefly (another space company that some in his circle, including Michael Scand, are long) once Firefly's stock rebounded as part of a broader 'SpaceX IPO trade' rally across space names.

He mocks social-media 'panickins' (panicking posters) on Twitter and Reddit, saying sentiment has cratered simply because 'nothing changes sentiment like price,' citing a tweet from an account he calls Cut Capital.

He calls out a poster ('Sasso') claiming Rakuten is 'panic selling,' countering that Rakuten's need to monetize its stake and fix its balance sheet has been telegraphed since 2025, making it a planned sale rather than panic.

He argues that daily Twitter use is 'the height of brain rot' and can subtly shift a person's views (using his own perceived drift toward more conservative views as an example), and warns against 'doom maxer' rhetoric such as predictions of imminent market crashes or war, which he says have repeatedly failed to materialize.

His closing advice: if a friend is panicking about the stock while the broader market is up, ask them to explain why they originally invested — reconnecting with those reasons should make them feel better.

The process has been long-running: Globalstar reportedly put itself up for sale around spring of last year (2025), and Anpanman believes confidentiality agreements led to earnest discussions between Amazon and Globalstar starting in fall 2025.

Some legacy pundits had speculated Starlink would be the one to buy Globalstar instead of Amazon.

The deal is not expected to close until at earliest the end of Q1 2027, with the possibility of extension well into summer or even fall 2027, given a long regulatory review process involving both Amazon and Apple.

Apple and Globalstar reportedly cannot risk waiting for the deal to close without continuing to build out the replenishment and new constellations, so Anpanman expects the C3 constellation buildout to continue regardless of deal timing.

By committing publicly to a D2D rollout, Amazon helps its own regulatory approval odds, since regulators view enabling a competitive multi-player market favorably.

Anpanman joked that Carr's 'three-player market' framing implicitly excludes Globalstar as a standalone player, since it's now being folded into Amazon, and views the comment as 'saying the quiet part out loud' — a positive signal that AST's regulatory approval could be coming any day.

Amazon's Globalstar deal brings globally-harmonized MSS spectrum in the 2.4 GHz range that is roughly a third of the spectrum AST SpaceMobile now holds in the US via its Ligado lease, and roughly a third of what Starlink currently has.

This acquired spectrum is mid-band, meaning it's good for data capacity but not great for penetrating buildings or vehicles compared to low-band spectrum; Amazon gets no low-band spectrum from the deal.

The Amazon deal highlights the implied value of AST's 80-year Ligado L-band lease — Anpanman floats a figure around $20 billion — relative to AST's roughly $30 billion market cap, while also raising the profile of Iridium's ~7.8 MHz of L-band spectrum and Viasat's ex-US MSS spectrum as potentially valuable, underused assets.

Amazon announced it will start rolling out direct-to-device satellites in 2028, but Anpanman notes Amazon only began listing D2D-related jobs a few months ago at most, making 2028 a very ambitious target; he views 2029-2030 as more realistic.

As a comparison, Starlink announced its own direct-to-cell plans in summer 2022 but didn't bring the service to fruition until roughly the end of 2025 — a multi-year gap Anpanman expects to be similarly understated for Amazon.

Amazon's own LEO broadband service has already taken much longer than originally expected, reinforcing skepticism about the stated 2028 D2D target.

T-Mobile's exclusivity with Starlink is set to expire this summer (2026).

AT&T and Verizon also contributed their 850 MHz spectrum to their AST agreements, which locks them in further; once exclusivity periods eventually expire, Amazon could potentially pursue AT&T, Verizon, or T-Mobile as future D2D customers, though MNOs are wary of the disintermediation risk Amazon poses given it already owns the consumer relationship.

Amazon (like Starlink) lacks access to low-band terrestrial spectrum, which is the key advantage AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon hold — a structural constraint on both companies' D2D ambitions relative to AST's MNO-partnered approach.

The addressable market isn't just cell phones — it's every device that will ever need connectivity, and the growth over the next decade or 15 years is hard to overstate; even if AST got all 90 of its satellites up next month, they'd still face a capacity issue because market growth will outpace what any single company can serve.

Amazon's press release specifically mentioned Internet of Things use cases; Amazon likely has keen interest in IoT, drones for delivery, and other connected devices, many of which sit off the terrestrial network or face capacity constraints.

With three D2D players now active, AST's commercial focus will likely remain the consumer mobile phone market plus other connected devices like watches, while Amazon's use case looks more internal (AWS enterprise campus connectivity via N53 spectrum) alongside its own direct-to-device consumer offering serving Apple devices.

Beyond the commercial side, the defense and first-responder business (not discussed in depth this episode) will be a significant driver of demand; AST's technology is expected to be unaffected by increased commercial competition in that vertical.

The real value of Globalstar's spectrum for Amazon is that it's permanent and global — Amazon could differentiate by offering global roaming on its own network, something AST can't offer today without MNO partnerships (e.g., an AT&T customer roaming onto Rakuten's network in Japan).

It remains unclear whether Amazon would sell service directly to consumers, resell through Apple, or route it through MNOs, and whether Amazon might eventually try to bundle some service into a Prime membership — all of which would likely require an eSIM and add friction versus AT&T/Verizon's seamless, network-core-integrated switching, similar to how Starlink's roaming for non-T-Mobile customers reportedly costs around $20/month.

Anpanman doesn't think a near-term Blue Origin/Amazon acquisition of AST is likely, partly because Amazon needs to get the Globalstar deal through regulatory approval first — acquiring AST on top of that would risk a regulatory mess.

One possible longer-term (2-3 year) scenario: if Amazon's internal D2D R&D effort proves not good enough, Amazon could approach AST once its Block 3 mid-band constellation is up and ask AST to 'light up' Amazon's spectrum; alternatively, Bezos could eventually make Avellan an acquisition offer he 'couldn't refuse,' though Anpanman views this as unlikely near-term.

On margins, a third player likely does compress ASPs somewhat (e.g., $15 vs. $12 vs. $10), but shifting a few dollars in AST's financial model wouldn't make a huge difference; more importantly, Amazon's entry may signal that the TAM is bigger than people think, similar to how multiple companies entering AI expanded rather than shrank that market.

AST holds a large number of fundamental patents (roughly 3,800 cited elsewhere in the discussion), while Starlink has developed maybe one or two patents specific to its own architecture; competitors will likely need to engineer around AST's patents, and whether AST offers fair-and-reasonable licensing terms is an open question the company hasn't focused on yet.

With Amazon now entering, legacy/smaller satellite spectrum players (SES, Viasat, EchoStar/former Yahsat, Iridium) that previously announced D2D ambitions now face a market that's effectively 'game over' for them against three well-capitalized players, which may push them toward leasing spectrum or selling themselves.

AST is also booked with another heavy launch provider, most likely Mitsubishi Heavy, though there's also a chance it's Arianespace.

The Amazon news announced 'yesterday' (relative to this episode) spooked the market and caused an overreaction; ASTS stock dropped from the $90s to $85 on the news, which Anpanman calls an overreaction to a deal that is far from an immediate competitive threat.

Deutsche Bank had what Anpanman calls a 'pretty rational' reaction but lowered its ASTS price target, assuming roughly a 15% long-term margin impact from the Amazon/Globalstar entry into the market.

Amazon's stock traded up on the deal announcement by about $120 billion in market cap, which Anpanman frames as validation of how large investors believe the direct-to-device/satellite market opportunity is, contrasting it with skeptical sell-side analysts.

Anpanman notes Elon Musk/SpaceX is spending about $23 billion on spectrum (referring to the pending Starlink-EchoStar AWS-3 spectrum acquisition) while Amazon spent roughly $11 billion to acquire Globalstar, framing both as evidence of the market's perceived scale.

Legacy competitors like Viasat, EchoStar, and Space 42 ('this battle of the bastards') are pursuing a non-vertically-integrated, multi-party solution and are spending about $1 billion, which Anpanman believes is not enough to seriously compete and may be more about propping up Viasat's stock to enable further fundraising or a buyout.

Anpanman's initial gut reaction was that Amazon might cut MDA Space out of the satellite-building picture, but after reviewing the deal documents he found nothing pointing to removal of that contract.

The Amazon-Globalstar transaction itself is expected to take time to close, probably sometime mid-next-year (2027), pending a rigorous regulatory and antitrust review; Anpanman thinks it's highly likely to close as-is but acknowledges it could take longer or in theory not close.

Amazon's 2028 rollout target is actually a service rollout date, not a satellite-development date — it depends on using the existing Globalstar constellation and MDA Space's next-generation C3 constellation, since Amazon's own satellites won't be ready by then.

Amazon has posted only one or two job listings in recent months seeking direct-to-device RF experience, suggesting it is early in building out the team needed to develop its own D2D satellites.

Amazon acquired MSS spectrum via the Globalstar deal but does not have access to cellular spectrum; while the resulting service may offer some data throughput, it will lack the coverage and propagation of a cellular-spectrum-based service like AST's.

Overall, Anpanman estimates a real Amazon-built, ASIC-based direct-to-device competitor is unlikely before 2029-2030, and possibly not until 2030-2031 if things don't go perfectly.

Spinning up a custom ASIC takes roughly 4 to 5 years of development; Elon Musk has said Starlink's V2 satellites will have an ASIC ready around 2028 if development goes perfectly, but Anpanman thinks it could slip to 2029, and Starship also needs to be operational at commercial cadence for the buildout to proceed.

Exclusivity terms, as Anpanman understands them (with some uncertainty), are 5 years for Vodafone, roughly 3-4 years for AT&T and Verizon (not entirely sure), and possibly indefinite for Rakuten (also not entirely sure); the clock starts at the beginning of commercial service.

AST SpaceMobile is integrated directly into the MNO network core — the eNodeBs that route traffic between cell towers also route traffic to AST's satellites — enabling seamless handoffs, whereas Globalstar and Starlink operate as separate roaming-style networks that are not seamlessly integrated with the phone's home network.

MNOs want full network integration so they retain control over the customer relationship (billing, service tiers, throttling by plan level); Starlink, by contrast, controls that relationship itself, functioning more like an eSIM handoff to a separate provider.

Anpanman states Starlink provides only about 20% of the revenue economics to T-Mobile, keeping 80% itself, whereas AST SpaceMobile's model with MNO partners is roughly 50/50 — a more attractive deal for MNOs.

Once an MNO integrates AST into its core network, there are real switching costs that make it hard to 'rip and replace' AST for a rival service, even if a competitor eventually catches up technically.

Globalstar's total spectrum is roughly a third of what AST SpaceMobile is deploying in the US, and also roughly a third of what Starlink will eventually deploy once it moves off T-Mobile's 1.9 GHz spectrum onto the AWS-3 spectrum it is buying from EchoStar — a deal Anpanman says won't close until the end of summer 2027, with a new satellite generation not arriving until 2028.

Lower orbits reduce latency (faster satellite-to-device turnaround) but shorten satellite lifespan due to faster orbital decay, and shrink each satellite's field of view — unless the satellite has a very large phased array to compensate.

Starlink's current-generation phased arrays are only about 2.5m x 2.5m, forcing SpaceX to fly at a much lower ~350 km altitude to make the link budget work; this trade-off limits Starlink satellite lifespan to roughly 2-3 years, which conveniently also keeps Falcon 9 launch demand high.

Because Globalstar's satellites orbit so much higher (1,400 km), the resulting latency would be poor for voice calls ('no bueno') and for broadband applications sensitive to packet loss or delay, even though it may be acceptable for data/emergency texting.

If Amazon wanted to lower a new constellation's orbit from 1,400 km down toward 500-700 km to improve performance, that would require a lengthy regulatory review process, including input from other operators already occupying those orbital altitudes over collision-risk concerns.

Anpanman reads Carr's comments as major validation for AST SpaceMobile — being named as one of only three 'facilities-based' players by the FCC chairman — and as a signal that regulatory approval of AST's pending applications is likely coming, though the timing is unknown.

Anpanman notes Carr also mentioned other potential entrants (e.g., Iridium, the Viasat joint venture) after his initial 3-player framing, suggesting the field could technically expand, though he implied Globalstar in its current form and Iridium are not true competitors today.

As pure speculation, Anpanman raises the possibility that Amazon could eventually approach Abel Avellan (said to be personal friends with Jeff Bezos) to pay AST SpaceMobile to 'light up' Amazon's spectrum using AST's mid-band Block 3 constellation, rather than build a competing satellite fleet from scratch.

Amazon's Globalstar S-band spectrum carries a unique authorization (referred to as the N53 band) allowing repurposing for terrestrial private enterprise networks, a use case Anpanman thinks may be part of Amazon's real interest in the deal, alongside a defensive motive to avoid ceding the market entirely to Starlink.

Anpanman speculates that Google, as an AST strategic investor, could see enough strategic fit — direct-to-device connectivity, edge computing, and AST's patents around heat dissipation and high-power (100 kilowatt) satellites relevant to AI data centers in space — to potentially acquire AST SpaceMobile outright someday.

Anpanman believes Abel Avellan is not a seller today, but speculates that a sufficiently large all-cash offer (he floats a range of roughly $200-400 per share, guessing an offer around $300) could be hard to refuse, while he'd prefer to see the company develop further and reach $300-500 per share on its own within the next year or two.

When Elon Musk had public friction with political figures, non-Musk-related direct-to-device names like AST SpaceMobile rallied, and the US government separately signaled a need to diversify satellite suppliers rather than rely solely on SpaceX — a positive catalyst for AST.

Anpanman expects the current sell-off (stock at $85) to reverse within 2-3 days as the market digests the Amazon news, similar to the EchoStar-related rally, with a return to roughly $120-130.

A second batch of 3 additional Block 2 BlueBirds is expected to be shipped to Florida shortly after the first, for launch on another Falcon 9.

Based on his own 'due diligence' (tracking public sightings), Anpanman believes an Antonov An-124 recently arrived from India carrying a batch of newer, reinforced composite rings — guessing 6 to 8 rings — intended for BlueBirds 14 through 21, to be integrated with micron components and other hardware, tested, and shipped, with the first batch of those likely going out sometime in May.

AST SpaceMobile is 'in a race against itself' — the near-term risk is execution on its own launch and rollout campaign, not competition, since Block 2 BlueBirds already exceed what Starlink's planned V2 satellites are expected to deliver.

Anpanman urges investors who are distressed by the stock's volatility to examine their own position sizing and investment thesis rather than spread negativity on social media, recalling that in April 2024, near an all-time low, vocal negative Twitter voices convinced some holders to sell right before the AT&T definitive agreement and Verizon deal news sent the stock sharply higher.

He expects the regulatory review to be long — 'at a minimum, maybe 9 months' — covering FCC review and likely DOJ antitrust scrutiny, which he thinks will cause the deal to trade at a wide spread.

He thinks a rival SpaceX bid to top Amazon's offer post-IPO would be 'kind of like a fool's errand' since SpaceX would be competing against Amazon's balance sheet, so he doesn't expect that to happen, though he calls it 'possible.'

He calls the Apple-Amazon arrangement 'a bit of an odd marriage' since the two are consumer competitors elsewhere (and Amazon has discussed re-entering the phone/AI-device market), meaning conflict could grow later, but 'at least for this particular business, they seem to have worked out something.'

Amazon will continue paying for replenishment of the current Globalstar constellation, which he calls 'a mild positive for MDA Space,' Globalstar's satellite manufacturer.

He identifies AST SpaceMobile and Starlink as the current market leaders, with Amazon becoming 'a late player, but very powerful player' once its service launches.

He is unsure which US MNOs, if any, would partner with Amazon, since AT&T, Verizon, or T-Mobile might be wary given Amazon's LEO business could compete with their home-broadband (fiber/5G) offerings or eventually their wireless business; he suggests Amazon might instead pursue an MVNO-style deal or look to international MNO markets.

He doesn't think Abel Avellan is selling AST, and argues that staying independent is where AST's strategic value lies, since MNOs want to work with a satellite partner that isn't owned by a Big Tech company seeking to eventually compete with them for the customer relationship.

He theorizes that as consolidation continues around one vertical stack (SpaceX/Starlink/xAI/Tesla) and now Amazon/Blue Origin, AST becomes the remaining independent 'one-of-one' D2D company, raising its strategic value to companies without their own D2D network like Google, Meta, OpenAI, and Microsoft (noting Google is already a strategic investor and Meta already works with AST).

On Iridium: its spectrum is a single unpaired L-band swath (not paired spectrum), and only a small part is needed for Iridium's own operations; citing past comments from Iridium CEO Matt Desch, he speculates Iridium will eventually lease most of that spectrum to another player or get consolidated itself, though he doesn't know the timing.

He argues antitrust review likely would have blocked a SpaceX purchase of Globalstar given Starlink's dominant LEO position, whereas Amazon's deal is more likely to be approved since Amazon's LEO business is more nascent and it has no existing direct-to-device foothold.

He estimates that 45 MHz Ligado spectrum position represents 'what, 20, let's just say $20 billion out of $38 billion in enterprise value' — his own rough valuation — and separately characterizes AST's military business as covering about '10 different use cases around electronic warfare, jamming, sensing, communications.'

AST's Ligado lease runs 80 years — 'the life of that lease is going to be longer than I'm alive' — and he pegs Ligado's value, 'once it's fully deployed, let's say it's $20 billion,' explicitly framing this as his own estimate rather than a disclosed figure.

He notes AST satellites are the only ones able to use that Ligado spectrum on a non-interference basis, something that had previously 'plagued Legato [Ligado] in the past,' and credits management for closing the Ligado transaction plus other MSS spectrum rights globally.

He argues the total addressable market is broader than mobile phones — IoT devices already outnumber mobile subscribers globally and will keep growing to include drones, robots, vehicles, and tractors — which is why Amazon's entry validates rather than shrinks the opportunity.

He flags that Amazon's N53 spectrum for private networks (roughly 11 MHz, power-limited) can be used for either MSS or terrestrial use, raising a possible synergy where Amazon could sell home routers using Amazon-only spectrum for better in-home service.

He explains AST has been quiet because it's waiting for a successful Blue Origin New Glenn static fire before announcing a launch date, calling it 'foolish' to hype up a specific date and then have the static fire fail or need to be redone.

Asked whether early-stage, high-potential companies get acquired on future rather than current value, he says yes, drawing a biotech analogy where companies with no revenue get acquired for billions based on Phase 2/3 trial potential.

Asked if AST is acquirable given its valuation, he says it's technically acquirable but he doesn't think the company is selling, since Abel Avellan is the controlling shareholder and sees more value in continuing to build the company out.

Asked about the timing of the Amazon-Globalstar announcement coinciding with AST's own satellite awaiting launch atop a Blue Origin rocket, he thinks the timing is coincidental, noting Blue Origin is a separate company from Amazon (though related).

Asked what Amazon could realistically do commercially by 2028 without MNO partners, he speculates on options like a paid add-on for Apple device owners, bundling with Amazon Prime, or a roaming-style network for coverage outside MNO terrestrial footprints — while questioning whether AT&T/Verizon would allow that and what specific rights Apple retains (e.g., whether Apple still owns 85% of the network or gave that up for a service agreement, and what recourse Apple has if Amazon underdelivers).

He views the deal as a net negative for MDA Space (builder of Globalstar's Aurora satellite platform), since Globalstar — having already lost EchoStar as a prospective buyer — is now likely to be phased out for an Amazon-built satellite, leaving Aurora without its anchor customer; he notes MDA Space last traded around $32.98 and says he 'might even look at shorting' the stock.

Asked if this sparks an 'arms race' among the remaining Mag 7 to acquire AST, he thinks it raises strategic conversations and could prompt inbound calls to Abel Avellan about partnership, investment, or acquisition in coming quarters, but reiterates he doesn't think Abel is a seller.

Asked if AST is 'going to be crushed,' he says no — MNOs will be 'very worried,' not pleased, about Amazon and Apple entering the market, which increases the importance of AST succeeding as their independent alternative.

Asked if Amazon is 'now a space play,' he says partially — Amazon is a massive conglomerate (e-commerce, video/content, AWS) where space/LEO is a growing but still small piece.

On Amazon's LEO execution timeline, he wouldn't be surprised if D2D entry slips well past 2028 toward 2030, citing reports that Amazon's current-generation LEO satellites have issues and may need to be retired/replaced, even as Amazon must keep deploying satellites to meet FCC constellation deployment deadlines or risk losing its license.

Closing thought: he believes the companies wanted to announce this deal before SpaceX goes public, and expects it to bring more institutional attention and dollars into the space sector generally.

This is Blue Origin's third certification flight for New Glenn. Kook hopes it 'upends' a bearish thesis he's seen circulating that AST SpaceMobile 'has a Blue Origin problem'; instead he frames it as an upside opportunity.

If New Glenn succeeds, AST SpaceMobile becomes anchor customer of a highly capable launch vehicle while still using SpaceX, and is also expected to diversify into another heavy launch vehicle not yet named — possibly Ariane, or possibly a Japanese rocket.

Blue Origin had a tank explode during pressure testing last week, blowing off a siding door; Kook says this is a known type of testing incident, does not expect it to impact New Glenn 3, and believes it may relate to a much later vehicle (New Glenn 4 through 8, possibly 9 — he wasn't sure and said he needed to research further).

Blue Origin has filed initial documents to build a new launchpad, which Kook reads as further evidence the company is building for scale; he expects the market may (incorrectly, in his view) start treating ASTS stock as a loose derivative of Blue Origin's success given it is a major customer.

Kook says recent launch delays have been attributable to AST SpaceMobile satellite readiness, not launch-vehicle issues, and that reschedule fees are paid as needed under the launch contracts (which are not detailed in an 8-K to his knowledge).

Closing the episode, Kook says all eyes are on New Glenn this week: hot-fire first, then launch. He notes Blue Origin is 2-for-2 in reaching orbit and 1-for-2 in landing the booster on prior flights, and is hoping for 3-for-3 (orbit) and 2-for-3 or better (landing) on this flight given the heavy incentive to succeed on this certification flight.

The community reconnaissance effort ('Space Mob') photographed a shipping container en route to Midland, which Kook views as a positive sign since container movement can indicate satellite shipments.

Kook argues this demonstrates how a best-in-class operator's production/launch cadence can go from near-zero to a regular monthly (or faster) cadence once early engineering challenges are solved, and believes AST SpaceMobile is at a similar tipping point — framing recent delays as normal 'new things' engineering resolution (composite/stacking issues) rather than a red flag.

Kook cites a chart from community member Katsy showing the AST SpaceMobile subreddit's subscriber count correlating closely with the stock price, and speculates the Reddit community could eventually reach 200,000 to 400,000 members.

Kook says he believes the space secular theme is still in its early discovery phase, and that finding a clear winner in a large secular theme (rather than niche/illiquid trades) is his preferred way to generate strong stock returns, tying liquidity and price discovery to broader investor discovery of the story.

Kook highlights Google as a strategic investor in AST SpaceMobile, drawing a comparison to Google's early investment in SpaceX (both plotted on a log-scale chart given how much value each company created), and suggests Google could ultimately be a strategic acquirer or at least wants a 'front row seat' to the business.

Kook frames both Google and Meta as having 'missed the boat' on space; unlike Google, Meta is still run by founder/owner-operator Mark Zuckerberg, who bet heavily on VR and, in Kook's view, is now making up for lost time in space by engaging with AST SpaceMobile.

Kook connects this to Meta's need to find new growth for WhatsApp, particularly in emerging markets, where WhatsApp's asynchronous message-queuing works better on unreliable connections and where the platform is foundational to commerce.

Kook speculates Meta may want to move closer to the infrastructure layer (as it has previously done via subsea cable investments and its Jio partnership in India, some of which 'haven't gone anywhere'), possibly to open new opportunities alongside AST SpaceMobile's expanding spectrum access — but stresses 'we just don't know' whether a specific deal will result.

Kook emphasizes Vinod is an operational leader (not merely a corporate-development/financial evaluator) actively assessing whether the technology works, which he views as a more meaningful form of validation than a purely financial investment.

Kook cites a quote (from the same or a related article) that soldiers must choose between carrying bullets, MREs, or communications gear when packing, and argues that shrinking communications equipment (via unmodified-handset connectivity) frees soldiers to carry more ammunition and food.

Kook says the Department of Defense/'Department of War' increasingly views LEO satellites as strategic, wanting to deploy next-generation commercial technologies on the battlefield in a hardened but still fundamentally commercial form.

Citing commentary from Mario Nawfal, Kook argues the costliest part of the Iran conflict wasn't fuel but the destruction of hard-to-replace US assets — radar systems (roughly $500 million each) struck in Jordan and Qatar, and an early-warning aircraft (roughly $700 million) struck in Saudi Arabia — arguing Iran correctly targeted radar to degrade broader warfighting capability.

Kook concludes that a resilient, multilayered, hard-to-destroy radar/communications architecture is the logical response, and believes LEO satellites (with AST SpaceMobile positioned to benefit) will be part of that solution as a 'burgeoning secular theme,' though he says he doesn't know the size of this specific opportunity.

Kook frames this hire as evidence the defense opportunity is real (companies don't hire against opportunities that don't exist) and references his past practice of tracking AST SpaceMobile's hiring (a past 'Meet the Team' thread) as a way of building investment conviction through personnel quality.

Citing an article found by community member Kevin Shen about New Zealand carrier One NZ, Kook highlights that AST SpaceMobile's 'bent pipe' architecture (reflecting signals between handset and ground base station without processing user data) preserves data sovereignty, since data never leaves the host country's jurisdiction — a selling point versus SpaceX, which Kook says is viewed as a 'foreign entity' by countries like New Zealand.

Citing an article by industry consultant Joe Madden (found by community member Kevin Chen), Kook says Madden argues that if AST SpaceMobile can achieve strong indoor performance, the size of the total addressable revenue pool for the direct-to-device opportunity could double or triple.

Citing community member Katsy's analysis, Kook explains MNOs spent heavily on C-band spectrum but have struggled to deploy it due to interference with aircraft avionics near airports, requiring years of avionics retrofits to resolve.

Kook draws a parallel to the Ligado spectrum situation, where ground-based deployment caused GPS interference, but satellite-based deployment (with the signal source far from the ground) avoids that interference — suggesting MNOs could similarly light up underused C-band-type spectrum via satellite much faster than via terrestrial buildout.

Kook says FCC filings show SpaceX repeatedly characterizing AST SpaceMobile as a competitive threat, especially regarding global 2 GHz spectrum, which he interprets as a sign SpaceX feels vulnerable, though he says he doesn't take the filings very seriously as substantive risk.

Citing an account called 'Lost Fundamentals,' Kook says Starlink's days-to-add-a-million-net-new-customers metric troughed at 47 days during a promotional period and has since leveled off at a high but no-longer-accelerating rate, suggesting SpaceX's consumer growth is running into the law of large numbers even as the company remains hugely successful overall.

Kook speculates Elon Musk may shift his public narrative toward AI data centers rather than direct-to-cell, since SpaceX lacks MNO partnerships to showcase for the D2C story.

Kook raises the possibility of a dedicated 'SpaceX phone,' partly motivated by Grok's planned WhatsApp competitor (which Kook says he's interested in trying because it reportedly wouldn't require a phone number), and frames a hypothetical SpaceX-vs-MNOs battle as one where AST SpaceMobile would effectively be 'arms dealer' to the MNO side.

Kook says if the FCC does loosen the power-flux-density limits (citing figures of roughly -120 to -110 dBW/m2, describing this as a logarithmic and thus large increase in allowed power), he believes AST SpaceMobile — due to its superior beamforming — would be the primary net beneficiary, since its indoor performance would go from 'really good to astounding.'

Kook notes spectrum holders Grain Management (which controls certain T-Mobile-related 800 MHz spectrum) and Anterix are both seeking authorization to use their spectrum for direct-to-device service, framing this as more spectrum finding its way toward satellite-enabled deployment, a trend he credits Brendan Carr with encouraging.

Kook raises a speculative 'Flippening' scenario — whether T-Mobile might eventually contract with AST SpaceMobile (in addition to, or instead of, SpaceX) — citing hints in FCC documents suggesting such analysis is occurring, but calls it low-probability given how sensational the idea sounds, while saying he's watching it closely and jokingly suggests a prediction market on the outcome.

Informal launch-tracking websites are now pointing to a Blue Origin New Glenn launch date of April 15th or 16th, 2026 for BlueBird 7; this has been pushed back from an earlier expected date because Blue Origin's booster refurbishment of 'Never Tell Me the Odds' (its first-ever booster reuse) took longer than expected due to some first-time mistakes the company is learning from.

Once the company has full confidence in the launch date, it will announce a formal date and a signup process for an official viewing event; those without an invitation can still watch from vantage points within several miles of the launchpad.

Extrapolating from the batch timeline, Anpanman guesses the first Falcon 9 launch of the next satellite batch could occur around May 2026, with a second Falcon 9 launch potentially later in May or in June; he notes informal launch-tracking sites have begun placeholder listings for these two Falcon 9 launches.

AST previously ran into structural integrity issues with satellite composite 'rings' during stacking tests -- under vertical, horizontal, and angled pressure the initial round of composites did not perform as needed, so engineers modified the rings with additional reinforcements, which then passed testing; once rings passed, folded Micron modules and other payload parts were installed and put through environmental testing.

Anpanman's understanding is that the ring-stacking issue was solved around late February 2026 by reinforcing rings already on hand, and that the company is now changing the design to build reinforcement in at the point of production so future rings won't need retrofitting.

The first next-generation satellite batch is on target to be shipped/delivered in April 2026 (Anpanman is not certain which); Reddit community due diligence spotted a shipping container en route to Midland, and several containers are now on-site apparently ready to receive BlueBirds 8, 9, 10 (exact batch size unconfirmed), suggesting shipment is imminent within one to two weeks.

Anpanman estimates roughly a 20-40% probability that T-Mobile eventually joins AT&T and Verizon as an AST SpaceMobile partner, calling it a low-probability but non-zero scenario.

Bringing in Verizon validated AST's technology and lowered its cost of capital (from raising at $5-6 to the $30s and now $90s per share), while giving AT&T a partner whose success elsewhere (Asia, Europe, Latin America, Middle East, Africa) helps amortize costs supporting the US service both companies have board seats and equity in.

Vodafone, Rakuten, and AT&T embedded their own engineers with AST since around the summer of 2018 to help build the seamless MNO-network integration, which Anpanman contrasts with Starlink's separate roaming-network approach that doesn't integrate into an MNO's core network.

T-Mobile's exclusivity with Starlink runs through roughly July 2026; the executive (Mike Sievert) who signed that deal is no longer T-Mobile's CEO, and Anpanman argues the decision favored short-term marketing over long-term strategy, since Starlink's fixed-wireless/5G-home business also directly competes with T-Mobile.

Deutsche Telekom (T-Mobile's parent) has publicly stated it is wary of Starlink ('dancing with the tiger') and is open to working with other satellite providers, which Anpanman sees as an opening for eventual AST cooperation; he also notes the irony of Starlink's regulatory counsel David Goldman criticizing foreign influence over AST when T-Mobile itself is owned by Germany's Deutsche Telekom.

Starlink is simultaneously bidding in the upcoming AWS-3 mid-band spectrum auction against AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile, which Anpanman reads as evidence Starlink ultimately intends to compete directly with MNOs (including its own T-Satellite partner) rather than remain purely a satellite backhaul/roaming vendor.

One path to T-Mobile joining: if AT&T and Verizon refuse T-Mobile access, T-Mobile could retaliate by helping Starlink become a full MVNO on its network, which would threaten AT&T/Verizon enough that they might instead choose to admit T-Mobile to avoid a stronger four-way Starlink-enabled competitor.

A second path: if the FCC ruled that emergency (E911) access requires AST's network be opened to T-Mobile because Starlink lacks native voice calling, T-Mobile could be forced in as a customer -- though Anpanman thinks this is unlikely under current FCC Chairman Brendan Carr, a known SpaceX supporter, though possible under a future administration.

If T-Mobile did join AT&T and Verizon on AST SpaceMobile, it would create a de facto monopoly over the most profitable wireless market in the world; Anpanman won't estimate a specific price target but calls it a potential 'game over' scenario for the stock, with the T-Mobile exclusivity expiration around June/July 2026 as the earliest plausible timing window.

Anpanman notes the company has hired engineers from SpaceX, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and other aerospace primes (per conversations with a headhunter a few months prior), and that AST has successfully built, tested, shipped, launched, deployed, and operated 7 satellites total (BlueWalker 3 plus the five Block 1 BlueBirds and BlueBird 6) with a 100% success rate, undercutting claims the company overlooked basic engineering issues like heat dissipation or fairing fit.

Anpanman names consultant Stuart Taylor as a recent, vocal AST critic who never mentioned the company on social media in the prior five years until November 2025, when his first post specifically defended Viasat's position in the Ligado dispute; Anpanman believes Taylor is a paid consultant for Viasat and possibly Iridium, both of which he says are most threatened by AST.

Anpanman criticizes analyst Tim Farrar as a paid consultant for Globalstar whose track record has been consistently negative on AST SpaceMobile, Starlink, and SpaceX and, in Anpanman's view, has generated negative returns for anyone following his calls; he contrasts Farrar's media-quoted 'expert' status with what Anpanman calls a lack of real predictive value.

Viasat (which Anpanman calls 'Viachat'), led by CEO Mark Dankberg, is described as financially distressed with roughly $6 billion in debt and losing market share in its core in-flight/broadband business to Starlink; Anpanman says Viasat has used legal challenges ('lawfare') against the AST-Ligado spectrum settlement, breaching a bankruptcy-court cooperation agreement to try to frustrate regulatory approval, with judges rejecting Viasat's positions and Viasat reportedly continuing to appeal.

Anpanman frames Viasat's and EchoStar's high share prices despite operational distress as reflecting investors betting on eventual spectrum-asset monetization (companies 'worth more dead than alive') rather than belief in their direct-to-device strategies; he views the roughly $420 million AST-to-Ligado payment (which flowed partly to Viasat) as an ironic lifeline funding the very party now litigating against AST.

Kook describes watching news of the rescue of a pilot shot down (in what he implies is Iran) and connects it to AST capabilities studied previously, including one he refers to as 'MOUS' (garbled/uncertain term), related to transmitting below the 'noise floor' — as he recalls being told by Michael Pollack at AST, a satellite with very high receive sensitivity/power can pick up a very low-power transmission that looks like background noise to anyone else listening, allowing covert location signaling.

Kook says AST has also demonstrated encrypted 'up-down' transmissions allowing direct warship-to-warship communication, and believes a mobile land radio could do something similar, potentially transmitting an encrypted waveform directly to a rescuing vessel.

Kook explicitly says he doesn't know how difficult today's rescue actually was for the pilot (e.g., whether it required only a brief 'chirp' before other assets took over) and wonders whether future AST technology could allow more continuous communication and shorten the 'loop to safety' for downed personnel — framed as an open, unanswered question.

Kook says AST is next 'getting ready to release [BlueBird 6] for customer use' and speculates — explicitly labeling it speculation on his part — that the customer being referenced is the US government, and that this release could be a milestone that unlocks additional funding and government contracts.

Kook argues the FCC docket is already 'replete with evidence' of a coming FirstNet contract, making this tweet a public confirmation rather than new information for close followers.

Kook cites Starship, Artemis, and New Glenn all being active in the same period as evidence of a broader 'new space economy' moment, and argues this decade-long 'billionaire hobby' phase (Musk and Bezos) is now becoming visible to the broader market, comparing it to companies like Google, Microsoft, and Meta lacking an equivalent owner-operator-driven space bet.

Kook says SpaceX has now filed for its IPO, and argues that while some worry this could pull roughly $30 billion of capital out of the market, that capital would come from large institutional accounts rather than from small-cap ASTS holders, so the dominant effect will be drawing broad new attention and capital to the space sector generally, benefiting ASTS.

Kook frames his long-standing thesis as 'SpaceX is Facebook Desktop, but can they transition to mobile?' — arguing AST SpaceMobile is positioned as 'Facebook Mobile' to SpaceX's fixed-broadband ('desktop') Starlink business.

Citing a tweet from @AlexFromBabylon referencing a PCMag article, Kook notes that SpaceX's growth curve is 'starting to flatten' and that the article quotes SpaceX CEO Gwynne Shotwell suggesting broadband-focused Starlink 'might be nearing its ceiling' — Kook flags this as a notable, uncertain-sourced claim given it's attributed to SpaceX's own CEO rather than a critic.

Kook predicts SpaceX will pivot its public narrative toward an 'AI data center' pitch (talking about a million satellites, etc.) because it is a more exciting story than direct-to-cell, while betting that other financial analysts will realize AST SpaceMobile has quietly dominated the more exciting LEO-telecom opportunity.

Kook reiterates his 'constellation constipation' metaphor — arrays and satellite buses are being built and the company has worked through composite/stacking engineering issues — arguing the manufacturing pipeline is about to start 'spitting out satellites' as a major operational unlock, though not the last one still needed (e.g., ARPU and competition questions remain).

Kook argues that bears have repeatedly had to 'shift the goalposts' to decreasingly important questions (e.g., debating whether ARPU is $10 vs. $15) at increasingly higher stock prices, after earlier existential bear theses (FCC would never approve it, technology wouldn't work) were disproven.

Kook says ASTS stock fell to roughly $79 at one point during the week before closing at $92, which he attributes to broader market volatility tied to the Iran situation rather than company-specific news; he personally expects the Iran conflict to escalate into a ground war but argues it is 'pretty silly' to trade ASTS based on that geopolitical timeline.

Kook characterizes the ruling as bad for Viasat but essentially neutral for AST, since AST is not seeking anything beyond the deal it already has, and says he still expects the Ligado transaction to close and receive FCC approval.

As a hypothetical, Kook says that if AST SpaceMobile were to acquire Viasat outright, he would view it as a smart move given Viasat's global S-band holdings — explicitly framed as speculation, not something he expects.

Kook lays out a 'Net Asset Value' (NAV) investment framework: as AST secures more spectrum (Ligado L-band, S-band ITU rights, etc.), analysts will apply a 'megahertz-per-pop' valuation to that spectrum, creating a downside floor for the stock — a thesis Kook says was reinforced by how Wall Street ultimately valued EchoStar's spectrum holdings in a separate situation.

Kook mentions Grain Spectrum, a private-equity-backed vehicle that purchased spectrum from T-Mobile, is now asking the FCC for flexibility to lease or sell that spectrum to satellite direct-to-device operators, which he says would presumably include AST SpaceMobile; he also notes SiriusXM repurposing its own spectrum as a parallel industry trend.

Kook references a Bloomberg/WSJ article reporting AT&T pledging up to $2 billion to upgrade cellular networks as part of an arrangement with the FCC that reportedly included a comment about faster approvals in return, and wonders aloud whether AST SpaceMobile's FirstNet-related regulatory approvals could be connected to these broader negotiations, while noting this is unconfirmed speculation on his part.

Kook notes FCC Chairman Brendan Carr posted a photo from West Texas referencing the FCC's 'Build America' agenda, and speculates — while explicitly noting there was no confirmation — that the visit's timing could relate to AST SpaceMobile and upcoming SCS approval activity.

Kook says New Glenn 3 is now slotted for around April 14th or 15th, 2026, by his understanding, and jokes he might be able to attend if it slips a day.

Kook says the company is 'very, very close to Batch 1' following FM2, and expects the market to quickly shift focus from FM2's launch to Batch 1 developments as the resolution of 'constellation constipation.'

Anpanman argues it probably doesn't make sense for SpaceX to buy Globalstar right now given its upcoming IPO and its effort to close the EchoStar spectrum deal, which he says is targeted to close around the end of summer 2027 — layering on another acquisition could complicate the FCC regulatory process and raise antitrust concerns, especially with rumors SpaceX might also be interested in Iridium.

Amazon could be interested in Globalstar largely for that 11.5 MHz of terrestrial spectrum, separate from any satellite-service ambitions.

Amazon likely doesn't want to build a full retail mobile network requiring low-band (600-900 MHz) spectrum to match MNO-grade service; it might instead become a virtual network operator partnering with Verizon or AT&T, or partner with AST SpaceMobile or Bell Canada to 'light up' spectrum it acquires via Globalstar.

Anpanman speculates Amazon could eventually build its own direct-to-device/IoT constellation (not necessarily mobile-phone focused, but 3GPP compatible) once Starlink's fixed-wireless buildout matures, potentially serving military use cases too — spectrum optionality is valuable regardless of near-term plans.

MNOs are wary of Amazon owning the customer relationship (similar to their wariness of SpaceX), making a direct Amazon-MNO tie-up for this service less likely; Amazon is also reportedly contemplating new AI devices and possibly another mobile phone (after its earlier Fire Phone), adding complexity to Apple's calculus if it allows Amazon to acquire Globalstar.

A defensive motive for Amazon could be pre-empting a scenario where SpaceX buys Globalstar instead, even though Globalstar isn't losing large amounts of money.

Anpanman notes the Globalstar-side leaks (a year after the original spring rumor) look like classic sell-side tactics from bankers/lawyers to pressure a deal forward or draw out other bidders (e.g., SpaceX, Google).

Apple's structuring makes clear it doesn't want to own Globalstar outright or become an FCC-regulated service provider competing with its own MNO customers.

Because Globalstar's roadmap can't match AST SpaceMobile's or Starlink's broadband capability, Anpanman thinks Apple may be looking to exit the relationship, drawing an analogy to Apple's AI strategy of letting others build the technology while Apple acts as gatekeeper.

Anpanman notes it's paradoxical that consultants at industry events like SAT Show who dismissed direct-to-device as a niche market one or two years ago are now the ones spreading rumors that SpaceX, Amazon and others are racing into the space.

SpaceX is reportedly spending over $20 billion on spectrum (referencing the EchoStar deal), and Amazon is in talks to acquire Globalstar for $10 billion-plus; Iridium is also mentioned as a possible acquisition target, though Anpanman is unsure if that happens, noting Iridium CEO Matt Desch discussed leasing out the company's spectrum on its last earnings call.

Legacy satellite players like Viasat and SES, who dismissed direct-to-device for years, are now touting their own direct-to-device strategies.

If Amazon buys Globalstar, Anpanman suggests it could spur further strategic moves, noting AST SpaceMobile is already testing with Apple and Meta and has an existing partnership with Google — an Amazon deal could make AST more strategically interesting to other big tech players, or Amazon could even approach AST to use its satellites to light up newly acquired spectrum.

Anpanman thinks the market may be misreading MDA Space's stock rally (up Friday) on the Amazon-Globalstar news; he argues Amazon already has satellite-manufacturing scale (hundreds, eventually thousands, of LEO satellites) and could bring Globalstar's satellite design/production in-house, putting MDA Space's future 50-plus satellite Aurora order at risk.

Anpanman says he caught up on 'Kook's Space' and agrees with Kook's point that AST's production challenges are inherently difficult, not a sign that Abel Avellan or management are slow-rolling — the company prioritizes doing things right the first time.

AST's satellites use composite 'rings' (nicknamed 'tuna cans') to save weight for launch; composites are very difficult and expensive to work with but offer superior weight savings and strength once solved, compared to alternatives like steel or aluminum (referencing Elon Musk's recent comments on Starship material tradeoffs).

An initial batch of composite rings tested by AST were found not to be structurally strong enough, which forced the company back to the drawing board on the ring/'stacking' design — the issue being that stacked satellites in a rocket fairing must withstand tremendous vertical load (the bottom satellite supporting multiple satellites above it) plus horizontal/lateral loads during launch.

Anpanman says, based on his understanding, AST solved the stacking issue sometime in February 2026 by reinforcing the rings with tubes (composite or metal) so each ring can bear the load of the satellites stacked above it.

As part of the fix, future rings starting around BlueBird 13 will have the reinforcement designed into the composite from the source, rather than retrofitted with added tubes.

Anpanman believes AST has already built enough 'Microns' (satellite payload modules) for approximately 30 satellites, and with the stacking issue solved, remaining rings can now be used; the company still needs to integrate Microns and payloads into the ring structures and complete testing.

Anpanman says the company is on target to complete its first new batch of satellites by the end of April, after which they'll ship to Florida for a Falcon 9 launch, with another batch following shortly after.

The Blue Origin New Glenn 3 launch — carrying a satellite for AST's refurbish-and-relaunch demonstration — has been delayed and is now targeted for around April 12-14; Anpanman says the delay is out of AST's hands and reflects Blue Origin wanting to be careful given the mission's importance in proving booster refurbishment/relaunch capability.

Blue Origin has reportedly obtained an STA (special temporary authority) for New Glenn missions 4, 5, and possibly 6; Anpanman estimates that even two of those missions carrying 6-8 AST satellites each would go a long way toward the 45-satellite 2026 target.

Anpanman believes AST's guidance of reaching 6 satellites-per-month manufacturing cadence will likely be reaffirmed by the end of Q2 2026, even if the company is only at 4 or 5 satellites per month before eventually reaching 6, given the delays experienced.

Anpanman frames the surge in Space Force spending as underscoring the strategic importance of space for the US, benefiting dual-use companies with both commercial and government/defense applications, including AST SpaceMobile, Rocket Lab, Planet Labs, and BlackSky.

Anpanman cites a comment from Michael Pollack at a presentation (at SAT Show) that ongoing conflicts in Iran and Venezuela highlight the importance of what AST SpaceMobile is doing, without Pollack specifying exactly what he meant.

Kook says he only uses this strategy around his untouched core long-term ASTS position, describes ASTS trading like 'bull riding' — long stretches of nothing followed by explosive moves — and says he tries to time Torques around periods of rock-bottom sentiment (citing Twitter sentiment, e.g., people 'harikari-ing' their technical-analysis calls) rather than doing it constantly.

Kook says he plans to avoid covered calls heading into the next few months because he believes ASTS is 'still behind the gate' before a big move, and covered calls have hurt him badly in the past when the stock ran hard.

Kook says the prior week's space-sector rally (stocks up 15-20% as a basket) was driven by a rumored SpaceX S-1 filing that, as far as he could tell, did not actually happen, followed by a sharp Thursday/Friday selloff tied to Iran-war headlines and quarter-end CTA/technical-level selling.

Kook says he personally added exposure into the weakness using his usual Torque strategy, and expects sentiment to flip in April as a new quarter begins, though he notes he has been wrong on this call before.

Kook speculates, based on observed Marine unit movements near where he lives and military friends becoming suddenly unavailable, that a U.S. ground invasion related to the Iran conflict may be imminent, and guesses the broader market could bottom once that invasion is confirmed as a 'peace dividend' trade — explicitly framed as his own guess.

Kook revisits this later, noting he thinks the SpaceX-IPO-anticipation rally caused a 'hangover' selloff Thursday/Friday and that other space stocks (e.g., cited as up roughly 20% and 18% mid-week) were part of the same hot-money basket trade, and repeats his belief that a confirmed ground invasion could mark the market bottom.

Kook notes a briefly shown camera angle in the Vodafone Ireland video revealed a signal-to-noise-ratio / power-flux-density graphic, which community accounts (Tomster000 running AI-assisted analysis, later amplified by Katzi, with bonsai03 possibly the original source) used to confirm strong in-band gain with a sharp rolloff (no interference 'shoulders') in adjacent channels — validating the beamforming technology underlying Bluebird/BlueWalker 3.

Kook says he hopes AST will start showing progress toward a Batch 1 satellite shipment by the end of April, which he frames as opening the door to the broader constellation deployment, but explicitly says this is his own hope rather than confirmed guidance.

Kook notes historically ASTS and other space stocks trade well heading into launch events, but cautions investors shouldn't own the stock just for a launch-driven run-up since that could disappoint; he separately notes an Artemis launch is expected in 2-3 days and a Falcon Heavy launch is also upcoming, adding to near-term space-sector media attention.

Kook jokes that some named milestones for Scott Wisniewski and CFO/Chief Legal Officer Andrew Johnson (e.g., completing the ATM program or a large convertible bond) are not necessarily wins for shareholders even though they trigger executive compensation, whereas COO Shanti Gupta's milestones (tied to build progress like FM1/FM2 or Batch 1 advancement) and Abel Avellan's (technical, commercial, and regulatory progress) are framed as more directly aligned with company progress.

Kook argues technical guidance misses stem from the difficulty of engineering next-generation satellites with new composite materials for the first time, not from a lack of effort or intent to mislead, and says he'd rather the company delay than launch a satellite with unresolved technical risk.

Kook compares SpaceX to a 'pet tiger' — a partner that is smarter and more dominant than its counterparties and will act in its own interest the moment it no longer needs them — arguing SpaceX's first principle is vertical integration and owning the customer, not being a carrier-neutral infrastructure provider.

Kook cites a post (flagged by Anpanman, originally from Mike Dono) noting SpaceX is bidding against its own MNO partner T-Mobile for AWS-3 spectrum, which he says illustrates why MNOs shouldn't fully trust SpaceX as a long-term partner.

Kook speculates Elon Musk could eventually launch a SpaceX-branded phone/MNO-style service that would worry incumbent carriers like AT&T and Verizon, but personally guesses Musk will avoid the low-return, capital-intensive MNO business in favor of higher-margin 'greenfield' opportunities like orbital AI.

Kook highlights an account ('One More Smith') noting Grain Management LLC holds a nationwide block of 800 MHz spectrum and is petitioning the FCC to free it up for direct-to-device services, with some speculation this spectrum could eventually go to ASTS; Kook says this shouldn't move the stock on its own but is another data point supporting his 'spectrum land grab' thesis.

Kook restates his long-running (partly joking, but increasingly sincere) view that ASTS is positioning itself to become a global spectrum-holding company and could ultimately become one of the world's most valuable companies.

Kook cites a New Zealand Network Operators Group presentation (from account NPMN) quoting: 'If you dial 911 ... and you're on Starlink, we believe the call will fail. Your mobile device will then try other carriers and eventually hit the AST SpaceMobile network and produce the emergency call' — used as evidence of a network-uptime/reliability advantage for AST over Starlink.

Kook discusses Europe's sovereign satellite effort (Iris²), citing Eutelsat stating at Mobile World Congress that it lacked the financial means to build a D2D-capable constellation on its own, and argues Europe's fallback options are effectively AST SpaceMobile or Starlink; he expresses optimism about the Vodafone JV (now called Satellite Connect Europe) and credits community contributor Peter Lindmark for detailed tracking of European developments.

Kook says the FCC's Supplemental Coverage from Space (SCS) docket / market access award is showing late-stage meeting activity that suggests an FCC decision could come 'in the next couple of weeks,' while explicitly caveating that he has guessed this timing before and could be wrong.

Kook discusses recent Iran conflict headlines — Iran reportedly destroying an early-warning AWACS aircraft on a Saudi Arabian airbase and hitting ground-based radar systems and a U.S. embassy — as evidence adversaries are targeting radar/early-warning infrastructure, and argues LEO satellite constellations like AST's offer a resilient alternative approach to AWACS/ground radar for the U.S. military.

Kook notes continued momentum in the Golden Dome missile-defense program (which he sizes at roughly $175-185 billion), including added air/moving-target-indicator sensor capacity and space-based communications architecture, and says he expects (but doubts AST will win all of) some of these award opportunities.

Kook discusses a direct-to-cow tracking use case (solar-powered smart livestock collars, priced around $5-8/month, likely in New Zealand dollars) raised by industry contact 'Arne,' as one example of many IoT applications for AST's network.

Kook discusses an OnStar-style vehicle emergency-connectivity use case where the average budgeted data usage for a vehicle's entire life was cited as roughly 5 megabytes, illustrating how AST can charge a recurring fee (likened to insurance) for capacity that is rarely actually used, allowing the network to be oversold well beyond his own conservative 30%-utilization assumption in his personal unit-economics model.

Kook reiterates his personal (self-described non-analyst, non-price-target) unit-economics framework — estimating data output per satellite, pricing that data against capex — which leads him to believe each satellite is highly profitable, and says the ability to oversell capacity via IoT/low-usage applications likely makes his own model's revenue estimates too conservative.

Kook references a tweet from Ben Jowanda walking through high-level math for why ASTS could become a trillion-dollar company, and says he finds this type of top-down, simple-math analysis valuable alongside detailed subject-matter research.

Kook compares current ASTS valuation skepticism to skepticism he witnessed around Google's IPO, where value investors argued Google's market cap was absurd relative to buying baskets of commodity/industrial stocks, and says those critics missed Google's nonlinear platform/aggregator dynamics — drawing a parallel to why he believes ASTS bears are similarly missing the bigger picture.

Kook mentions he is separately researching a company called Merlin (aviation AI, dealing with air-traffic-control natural-language processing without reliable internet connectivity) purely as an educational aside unrelated to ASTS, saying its share price could plausibly go to $5 or to $50 and that he doesn't yet understand its business model or milestone path well enough to have a view.

Wisniewski argues combining backwards-compatible 3GPP partner spectrum access with AST's own owned spectrum is "the right strategy for the industry" going forward.

Demand for connectivity appears consistent across markets, whether from consumers seeking convenience, underserved users willing to spend disposable income on connectivity, or people wanting connectivity as both a marketing draw and a genuine network solve; AST will prioritize the largest markets first.

Spitballing, Anpanman guesses New Glenn 3 (carrying BlueBird 7) will launch in the first or second week of April, at latest, and that this timing could coincide with the first one or two batches of BlueBird 8-and-beyond satellites being shipped to Cape Canaveral, making April a busy month.

The key thing to watch is when New Glenn 3 is rolled out to the launch pad for a static-fire test; a firm launch date should follow within days to at most a week after that. Anpanman advises anyone planning to travel to book only refundable flights and refundable hotel reservations since the schedule can still move.

Anpanman's understanding (his own inference, not confirmed by the company) is that the 'stacking problem' refers to the composite rings ('donuts') that house each satellite's internals: once fully loaded with microns, batteries and processing hardware, the bottom rings in a stack must be strong enough to support all the rings above them both vertically and sideways (since rockets are stacked horizontally before being raised vertical), requiring extensive multi-angle load testing.

Anpanman believes the company has now solved the stacking issue and is integrating the payload (microns, processing, batteries) into the composite rings, with testing and shipment of the first two batches expected in April.

Anpanman is fairly certain, based on work done by the SpaceMob community, that the first two batches of three satellites (BlueBird 8 and beyond) will launch on Falcon 9 rather than New Glenn, and guesses the first shipment will occur sometime mid-to-late April.

Anpanman frames the composite-material investment as part of AST's competitive moat: the company has been hiring composite specialists in production and design over recent months, and he is not aware of other satellite manufacturers building at this scale using composites rather than metallic shells (he notes he isn't sure about K2's approach).

Anpanman estimates the company has built a backlog of microns sufficient for roughly 20-30 satellites (he is not certain of the exact disclosed figure), meaning microns are not the bottleneck -- the composite ring production is.

He estimates the composite rings reduce satellite mass from roughly 6,000 kilograms (as with FM1/FM2, i.e. BlueBird 6 and 7) down to around 4,000 kilograms.

For the 2026 manifest, Anpanman estimates something on the order of 4-5 Falcon 9 launches (possibly more) plus New Glenn launches; he notes STAs have been filed for New Glenn 4, 5 and 6, some of which will be dedicated AST launches.

AST has publicly disclosed signing an additional heavy launch vehicle provider; Anpanman guesses it is likely Mitsubishi Heavy, though he floats Ariane and/or United Launch Alliance as other possibilities, noting that community member 'Katya'/'Kasey' has pointed out that only Arianespace (launching from French Guiana) could support AST's planned equatorial orbital shell.

Referencing a recent O2 disclosure, Anpanman says Starlink's Direct-to-Cell service delivers about 4 megabits per second per cell and can only project 40 cell beams per satellite, which he characterizes as far behind AST's underlying technology even though Starlink was first to offer a (minimally viable) commercial service.

Anpanman notes the space sector has outperformed the broader market (versus the 'Mag 7') year-to-date, and while he can't guarantee it continues, he believes it will.

Anpanman expects SpaceX to file an S-1 IPO prospectus, confidentially at first and later publicly, and believes SpaceX is planning to go public in June or July, which he expects to be a major catalyst bringing institutional awareness and capital into pure-play space companies, contrasting today's investable space sector with the past when only diversified primes like Lockheed Martin and Boeing were options.

Anpanman says the company feels good about potentially receiving a Golden Dome-related award in the second quarter, and mentions he has shared an updated, long and growing catalyst list with the community.

Anpanman cites Michael Pollack, described as AST's head of government, who spoke on a panel at the SAT Show and said the conflicts in Iran and Ukraine have made AST's importance to the government even higher; Anpanman interprets this as suggesting some aspect of AST's service has been used in those theaters, though he was not present when Pollack spoke and frames this as his own inference.

Kook says he is largely ignoring macro volatility (S&P down about 30 bps overnight, reports of Marines heading toward the Strait of Hormuz/Kharg Island amid Iran tensions), viewing such 'macro tempests' as confusing and unproductive to trade around, and reiterates there are 'no nukes in Iran.'

Kook argues that in six months (heading into midterms/back-to-school season), the acute Iran/Strait of Hormuz situation will likely be resolved, and that investors should focus on long-term thinking rather than reacting to short-term geopolitical headlines; he also flags that rising GPS-denial/electronic-warfare awareness should be bullish, not bearish, for defense-adjacent names, noting reports that Steve Feinberg is looking to deploy $200 billion of capital (referred to as 'Deal Team Six').

Kook cites a 'Texas hedge' suggestion he attributes to a follower, framed around a rumored (per Polymarket) $2 trillion Starlink IPO; he argues that if the D2D market is effectively a duopoly between ASTS and SpaceX, and SpaceX/Starlink could IPO at roughly 40x ASTS's price, investors bullish on SpaceX should also buy ASTS to hedge/capture upside if the overall market value 'cuts higher,' analogous to distressed-debt investors buying equity as a hedge in a bankruptcy.

Kook distinguishes SpaceX's business lines: launch services, fixed broadband (core Starlink), and a comparatively small direct-to-consumer (D2C/D2D) toehold. He argues ASTS has one-way optionality to move into SpaceX's fixed-broadband/launch markets over time, whereas SpaceX has more difficulty expanding further in D2D because that model depends on partnering with MNOs (mobile network operators), with EchoStar spectrum cited as one open variable for SpaceX.

Kook notes SpaceX has roughly 3,500 satellites in orbit and ample time to have captured ASTS's prospective customers, but 'the bullet bounced off the armor' — implying SpaceX hasn't meaningfully displaced ASTS's commercial opportunity despite ASTS's launch delays ('constellation constipation'), with Batch 1 satellites now expected to ship in April or May.

Kook draws an analogy to Facebook's early desktop-versus-mobile shift, arguing mobile will prove to be the larger and more important market than fixed broadband, and that ASTS is already 'trouncing the competition in mobile' before commercial service has even started, while the stock isn't priced for that outcome.

Kook highlights a tweet from an account called 'CK Capital' laying out a simplified valuation model: ASTS is pointed toward roughly 5 billion addressable subscribers versus SpaceX's approximately 10 million; assuming 1 billion subscribers at $5/month (implying a 20% attach rate) yields about $60 billion in annual revenue.

Per the same tweet, at a 15x revenue multiple that implies a roughly $900 billion market cap, and at 20x revenue roughly $1.2 trillion, compared with Starlink reportedly trading at about 120x revenue — a multiple Kook says reflects extreme growth expectations rather than a stable long-term valuation metric, drawing a comparison to Snowflake's past ~100x-revenue valuation.

Kook says he doubts CEO Abel Avellan is running a detailed discounted-cash-flow model internally, and instead frames the 'owner's math' as simple: with an estimated 5 billion addressable subscribers, the priority is maximizing service quality and attach rate to capture value, rather than precise spreadsheet modeling.

Blue Origin (founded by Jeff Bezos) has filed for a constellation of roughly 51,000 (Kook says '51.5-6,000') satellites intended to host AI data centers, operating in sun-synchronous orbit (SSO) to stay continuously in daylight; Kook pushes back on skeptics ('Substack bros') who call this uneconomical, noting Blue Origin is putting real capital behind it.

Kook says ASTS, per a post from an account called Katzy, also holds a position/shell in SSO, which he argues could become valuable 'prime real estate' for both military applications and future AI data center use, comparing early orbital-slot claims to historical land grabs (e.g. the Permian Basin, the Bakken) that were valuable to stake out before their value was widely recognized.

Citing an account called Dr. Ollie, Kook argues ASTS's Bluebird satellites are well-positioned as a space-AI platform because of (1) large power generation capacity and (2) solved heat-dissipation/radiative cooling challenges (with patents), noting these thermal engineering problems were previously cited by skeptics as reasons the company might fail, especially given satellites cycling between hot and cold as they pass in and out of sunlight (a problem SSO avoids).

Kook discusses 'Satellite Connect Europe' (which he abbreviates 'SCE'), noting via Peter Lindmark (described as ASTS's 'chief European correspondent on the ground') that more employees are joining and building out this entity, which he frames as a vehicle to capture more MOUs and subscribers in Europe.

Kook notes that, as with AT&T and Verizon in the US, competing European MNOs are willing to share ASTS's infrastructure ('enemies can work together'), and expects ASTS to achieve dominant market share in Europe given its scale economics as a shared backbone.

Kook says Golden Dome program funding was increased by an additional $10 billion to $185 billion 'just even last week,' and expects ASTS to receive additional Golden Dome-related contract awards in the coming quarter (Q2), which he thinks would further validate the company as a bona fide military prime and reinforce the 'Texas hedge' thesis relative to SpaceX.

Kook draws an analogy to Quanta Services stock roughly '5-bagging' after the Biden-era IRA Act directed money into utility/grid infrastructure, arguing government-directed capital flows (like Golden Dome funding) can be a powerful and underappreciated tailwind for a stock, in hindsight regretting not applying that lesson sooner.

Kook describes the Bluebird constellation as capable of rendering Russia's GLONASS satellite navigation system ineffective (jamming) while not interfering with U.S. GPS, attributing this capability to the specific spectrum bands ASTS uses, particularly Ligado spectrum, which he says the Department of War (Defense) is already using and which is subject to contentious litigation with pre-petition Ligado investors.

Kook cites a post from Katzy showing that with ASTS's forthcoming mid-band satellites, a US government customer of ASTS could jam GLONASS channels entirely — described as position-navigation-and-timing (PNT) denial — while noting Anduril has separately developed workarounds to GPS-denial for drones after experiencing jamming issues in Ukraine.

Kook says FirstNet 'will happen soon' and notes FirstNet held a meeting last week, though the timing or structure of any deal remains unknown; he cites public FCC docket details on Band 14, changes to FirstNet's own website highlighting the service, and multiple YouTube videos of FirstNet personnel with titles referencing an 'ASTS project' as evidence a deal is imminent.

Kook estimates FirstNet could represent almost $1 billion of revenue for ASTS, based on roughly 6 million FirstNet subscribers and a relatively high ARPU for what he calls a high-value first-responder affinity group.

Kook argues IoT tracking (e.g., AirTags, asset tracking along remote trade routes and shipping lanes) is a major underappreciated opportunity for ASTS, since moving goods are more likely than people to pass through terrestrial 'dead spots.'

Kook argues the 'game theory' is that executives filing to sell stock typically do so with knowledge that good news is likely coming soon after (since selling ahead of bad news would create legal liability), calling this pattern something he no longer reads much into given his familiarity with it; he estimates Wisniewski's current stock position is worth almost $60 million and speculates it could eventually be worth $250 million to $500 million.

Kook says he is watching closely for a New Glenn hot-fire test this week, which would then be used to lock in a launch date for New Glenn 3; he notes he may be unable to personally attend that launch due to a scheduling conflict if it slips.

Kook says the company has been finalizing composite materials work needed for Batch 1 satellites to withstand launch stresses (which also helps reduce satellite weight, allowing more satellites per launch), based on a conversation with an acquaintance who works at another publicly traded launch company; he expects Batch 1 to ship in April, roughly coinciding with anticipated SpaceX-related news flow.

Kook closes by saying he expects Q2 to be an exciting period for the stock and jokes he hopes the stock reaches $250 per share.

Kook frames the current competitive environment as a 'World Spectrum Classic,' arguing AST SpaceMobile has surprised the world and rivals are now struggling to catch up.

Kook's framework: AST SpaceMobile has three compounding moats — technology, regulatory savvy, and business strategy — where regulatory-friendly European structuring plus superior technology lets the business model become a further competitive advantage, allowing ASTS to capture MSS spectrum others can't use.

Kook speculates, based on unspecified deep due diligence into a public filing that he says wasn't obviously intended to reveal this, that AST SpaceMobile may be inserting itself into the IRIS² (EU sovereign satellite) project, citing multiple European partners beyond MNOs as suggestive but not confirmed evidence.

Kook says forecasting AST SpaceMobile's future is like 'drawing up estimates in a crayon, not a scalpel' — he frames 2030 revenue as plausibly $1 billion, $10 billion, $20 billion, or $30 billion, explicitly calling this a rough order-of-magnitude guess rather than a real forecast.

Kook floats that the Satellite Connect Europe opportunity alone could be worth roughly $10 billion, and combined with U.S. commercial and military opportunity, could support a trillion-dollar market cap thesis for AST SpaceMobile — explicitly caveated as not a foregone conclusion or a price target, but something he believes management/the board may be thinking about.