Episodes

Abel Avellan, currently in New York City, gave a CNBC interview with reporter Morgan Brennan the morning of the episode disclosing the satellite shipment — notable because Avellan rarely makes public appearances (Anpanman recalls only a handful of times) and normally sends President Scott Wisniewski to investor conferences instead.

Notes that AT&T Chairman and CEO John Stankey is giving the keynote at the JPMorgan investor conference the next day and is expected to discuss the new AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture, and speculates that Abel Avellan being in New York at the same time as this conference, rather than in Midland, could indicate an important meeting or signing.

States he has confirmation that AST SpaceMobile pulled out of the B Rally investor conference (West Coast, scheduled for May 20-21) and canceled all its scheduled one-on-one investor meetings there, and floats as a hedge-fund-investor observation that when companies pull out of conferences it can sometimes (rarely) signal M&A activity, though he does not know what is actually happening.

Says that in his own conversations with AST management, it sounds like — without being stated directly — T-Mobile is on board, giving AST access to the entire US carrier market (AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile).

Recalls AST's existing exclusivity terms as roughly 3 years with AT&T (or possibly 4) and 2-3 years with Verizon, describing the specifics as uncertain from memory.

Guesses the AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile joint venture will be structured similarly to 'Satellite Connect Europe' (the Vodafone/AST European JV), and attributes the idea for the JV to AT&T Chairman and CEO John Stankey specifically, noting Stankey chairs AT&T's board whereas the Verizon and T-Mobile CEOs do not chair their companies' boards, implying Stankey is driving the initiative.

Argues the carriers are motivated by fear of Starlink as a competitive threat, noting Starlink has acquired 60 MHz of spectrum and could next pursue scarce low-band spectrum; adds that former T-Mobile CEO Mike Sievert was a notable exception among carrier leadership in not viewing Starlink as a serious threat.

Explains that because Starlink operates as a separate network rather than being embedded in the MNO core like AST, Starlink can still compete for regulatory purposes by offering a separate eSIM-based service directly to consumers, though he calls this 'a very tough hill to climb.'

Predicts T-Mobile will quietly move users away from Starlink by offering both as a menu of options — e.g., Starlink's narrowband texting versus a new AST-powered broadband 'T-satellite' service for around $15 — rather than dropping Starlink outright, to avoid antitrust scrutiny; suggests full Starlink displacement may only happen once AT&T's and Verizon's AST exclusivity periods end.

Relays a weekend conversation with 'Katzi' concluding Starlink faces a tough political climb in Europe given Elon Musk's unpopularity there.

Predicts Deutsche Telekom will join 'Satellite Connect Europe' (the Vodafone/AST joint venture) within the next month or two, citing the head of Satellite Connect Europe alluding to additional MNOs joining, and Deutsche Telekom's CEO (who controls T-Mobile) publicly stating distrust of Starlink/Elon Musk and openness to other satellite providers offering superior broadband in Europe.

Argues that if AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile give AST 100% of the US market and Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone, Orange, and Telefonica jointly back AST in Europe, it becomes very difficult for EU regulators to deny AST spectrum, predicting AST secures a 10x10 MHz allocation when the May 2027 EU 2 GHz MSS spectrum renewal comes up — calling this close to 'fait accompli.'

Flags that Meredith Sharples, managing director and head of Satellite Connect Europe, is scheduled to speak at the ITW 2026 conference in Maryland the next day at 3:15pm, and wonders whether announcements could come out of that appearance.

Notes AST stock bottomed around $63 roughly two weeks before the episode, after which he tweeted 'endless rally'; observes the stock consolidated from its January 2026 all-time high through May, and argues the setup into the rest of the year is strong given the week's catalysts.

Predicts the stock will break past its intraday all-time high of roughly $129 in the coming weeks, citing accumulating catalysts including the satellite shipment, the carrier joint venture, and John Stankey's upcoming keynote.

Argued the industry transformation is about speed and capacity to the phone, not just coverage in remote areas — framing it as broadband connectivity mattering even in everyday scenarios like a drive, not just "the middle of nowhere."

Argued spectrum may be an even more prized commodity than energy going forward, given the connectivity needs of the AI revolution.

Called a SpaceX IPO a game changer that creates a new investable category and provides valuation visibility for recurring connectivity revenue from space, characterizing it as market expansion for the wireless ecosystem rather than a replacement of it.

AST brought Verizon into its US network alongside AT&T about two years prior (i.e., ~2024), and views the new AT&T/Verizon/T-Mobile JV in the same vein — a way operators organize around a strategic growth opportunity. AST is supportive of the JV and sees it as expanding the US market further.

AST's strategy has always been to be carrier-neutral, despite having developed some early exclusivities with early investors; the new JV just means that neutrality dynamic is playing out sooner than expected in the US, which he views as a good thing.

Wisniewski argues the JV does not diminish AST's moat: AST expects to be the second LEO constellation operator ever to reach commercial scale without going bankrupt, has developed the largest satellites ever deployed in low Earth orbit, holds backing spectrum, and has first-mover advantage and existing partnerships. He expects a healthy, growth-oriented market over the next 5 to 10 years with AST in a leadership role.

Wisniewski says the tone hasn't changed — conversations with network operators globally have increased in depth and breadth every month since he joined, and AST is partnered with nearly every major operator outside China and Russia. He acknowledges large, well-capitalized competitors could pursue the opportunity, but says AST feels well-capitalized and positioned as the partner of choice with the largest phased arrays ever deployed in LEO.

Asked whether the JV helps device proliferation in the US ecosystem, Wisniewski says AST is 'already on that track' since device manufacturers and MNO partners already want to enable these frequencies; the JV mainly formalizes things AST was already helping enable, such as device availability and spectrum pooling — a key rationale for bringing AT&T and Verizon together on AST's network two years earlier.

If the launch timeline slips a month or two or three, Wisniewski says that does not materially impact the company's NPV, though it matters to customers and to AST because 'time is money'; he expresses confidence given the vertically integrated, multi-launch-provider strategy.

AST has a large funnel of partnership opportunities, including some companies without formal partnerships yet that AST hopes to bring on in coming months and quarters. AST has invested in its commercial and telecom operations teams over the last 12-18 months, and momentum is increasing as commercial service nears and MNOs plan their 2027 budget cycles.

Wisniewski contrasts AST's 'broadband first, broadband only' strategy (targeting 100 megabits per second to a phone) against existing text/emergency-only direct-to-device offerings from competitors, calling the difference 'not apples and oranges, it's apples and aircraft carriers.'

AST likes its current spectrum position and will continue to pursue S-band opportunistically country by country; L-band is heavily utilized globally, which is why the unused US/Canada piece was valuable. In Europe, allocated S-band spectrum hasn't been well used and its license is coming up; AST's partner in Saudi Arabia (stc) purchased S-band spectrum itself, which AST hopes to enable in the near future. Wisniewski says investors should not expect any expensive spectrum acquisitions — AST's approach is primarily to partner.

The joint venture's framing is deliberately open-ended (not excluding any satellite provider) so it doesn't appear anti-competitive to regulators, but one thing it explicitly cannot do is set prices for satellite providers like AST, since that would be illegal collusion.

Anpanman notes no press release has come from Starlink, Globalstar, Viasat, or Equatus in the hours since the JV announcement, which he argues proves those companies were not part of the coordination and only AST was — reinforcing that the JV is aligned with AST, not Starlink.

Anpanman contrasts AST's deep network integration (seamless tower-to-satellite handoff within the carrier's own network core) with Starlink's current T-Mobile arrangement, which operates as a separate roaming network via an eSIM handoff, arguing this technical difference is why AST becomes hard to displace once integrated.

Anpanman recounts that Charlie Ergen/EchoStar previously lost spectrum to the FCC because he couldn't meet build-out deadlines and had to sell to SpaceX, and argues Ergen could have avoided that outcome had he partnered with AST to light up the spectrum via satellite the way the new rules now allow.

Anpanman argues this regulatory shift means carriers like AT&T could ask the FCC to ease coverage build-out requirements for spectrum (e.g., 600 MHz bought from EchoStar) by using AST satellite service instead of constructing new towers.

Anpanman argues satellite build-out lets carriers avoid the cost of constructing and operating physical towers (citing $100,000 to $200,000 per year to operate a tower) in low-population areas, turning AST into a 'CapEx-saving machine.'

Using a hypothetical (his own illustrative math, not company figures), Anpanman argues that if satellite deployment increases the revenue extracted per unit of spectrum while lowering the cost to deploy it, the implied value of that spectrum rises accordingly (e.g., from $10 to $15 in his example) because carrier profit margins improve.

Anpanman says AST SpaceMobile is the only satellite provider today delivering true mobile broadband, using low-band cellular spectrum and large phased-array satellites, whereas Starlink and Globalstar are MSS/mid-band providers focused on SOS messaging and texting rather than broadband.

Anpanman notes Starlink take approximately 80 cents of every dollar T-Mobile charges customers for T-Satellite service, leaving T-Mobile only about 20 cents, which he says explains the weak reported economics of that service.

Anpanman cites an Amazon commercial showing a camper using AI to diagnose a skin rash via a connected phone in a remote location, arguing that use case (and others like remote medical diagnostics, professional Zoom calls, and FaceTime) requires true broadband connectivity that only AST can currently deliver.

Anpanman notes that competitors like Lynk and even Starlink initially tried small-satellite/small-phased-array architectures but are moving toward larger phased arrays because larger arrays make more efficient use of spectrum and deliver a cleaner signal to phones; Lynk in particular is described as struggling and not architecturally scalable.

Anpanman states current AST capability is around 100 megabits per second on the previous generation satellites, with 200 megabits per second on the new generation, and that with MIMO plus mid-band and C-band spectrum, throughput could eventually exceed 1 gigabit.

Anpanman says T-Mobile's exclusivity arrangement with SpaceX/Starlink ends around June/July 2026, and argues the JV timing and T-Mobile's softened public language toward AST are directly tied to that expiring exclusivity.

Anpanman speculates T-Mobile will publicly frame any shift as 'expanding T-Satellite to include AST SpaceMobile service' rather than abruptly dropping Starlink, since it can't leave customers without coverage when exclusivity lapses.

Anpanman estimates (his own assumption, not officially disclosed) that AST's exclusivity is roughly 3 years for AT&T and roughly 2-3 years for Verizon once commercial service launches, meaning if service launches around 2027, exclusivity could run to about 2029-2030.

Anpanman expects the joint venture will be pitched to FCC Chairman Carr as pro-consumer (aiming for a full seamless broadband experience) and to the DOJ as pro-competitive (creating a fourth credible competitor via Starlink Mobile), making approval likely, though he floats a possible extreme scenario where regulators could require carriers to let customers choose their satellite provider (an 'Internet Explorer bundling' analogy).

Anpanman guesses the JV has probably been socialized with the FCC at a high level already, but expects the formal review process (once a definitive agreement is signed) to be lengthy.

Anpanman says he was buying aggressively when the stock dipped to around $74-75 on the day of the announcement, believing the market failed to immediately grasp the significance of the JV since AST wasn't explicitly named in the carriers' release.

Anpanman argues the stock should be 'well north of $100' on this news alone given the implied lock-up of 100% of the US MNO market, and that it would be trading closer to $130 if AST had been explicitly named in the carriers' press release.

Anpanman expects the market to take a few days to fully digest the JV's implications, predicting the stock reaches new all-time highs in the near term as catalysts stack up.

Anpanman expects Blue Origin to get FAA approval for New Glenn very soon, with New Glenn 4 possibly launching as early as early June but more likely mid-to-late June 2026, following 2-3 SpaceX (and possibly ULA Centaur) launches disclosed at the Deutsche Bank conference.

Anpanman says the first Bluebird batch shipment is imminent (could come out the next day, over the weekend, or by Monday), with that batch launching in mid-June, and a second batch shipping soon after to support a July launch — potentially two launches in July.

Anpanman speculates that T-Mobile could announce a partnership with AST as soon as June or July 2026, contributing its PCS G-block mid-band spectrum (currently used by Starlink) on a non-exclusive basis, and/or freeing up low-band spectrum (800 MHz or its 600 MHz holdings) in non-covered areas for AST.

Anpanman theorizes that T-Mobile pushed to join the AT&T/Verizon-aligned satellite strategy because Starlink's growing spectrum position (from the AWS-3 auction) threatened to let Starlink become a full wireless competitor, and that T-Mobile used the implicit threat of enabling Starlink as a wholesale virtual network operator to force its way into the JV.

Anpanman notes MNO CEOs are expected to attend a JPMorgan conference the following week and may face questions about the JV that could bring more public detail to light.

AST SpaceMobile put out its own press release about two minutes after the carrier JV announcement, commending the framework being put forward and saying it looks forward to working with these companies — Anpanman argues a detailed press release that's gone through legal review couldn't be produced on short notice, implying AST knew in advance.

Abel Avellan retweeted the JV announcement and tagged T-Mobile along with Verizon and AT&T; Anpanman says an executive doesn't do that unless the company is actually working with T-Mobile.

AT&T and Verizon are typically fierce competitors who 'don't like each other,' but both dislike T-Mobile even more; Anpanman compares T-Mobile joining an AT&T/Verizon-led group to 'the Ayatollah of Iran taking a Jewish bride' — a pairing he calls previously unfathomable to anyone in the industry, a point he says he discussed with Kook.

AT&T and Verizon had already leased spectrum to AST; beyond that existing lease, if a mutual agreement is reached, T-Mobile would contribute spectrum as well and become part of the group.

No press release came from Starlink, Globalstar, Viasat, or other players for roughly 8-10 hours after the carrier JV news, which Anpanman takes as evidence Starlink was not included.

Anpanman's read on the sequence: Starlink learned about the JV today and called T-Mobile, T-Mobile told them the exclusivity is ending and it's moving to the new JV with AST; this, in his view, is why Shotwell 'crashed out' publicly rather than welcoming the JV as pro-competitive.

Anpanman argues Starlink is fully capable of competing on its own given its scale (roughly $2 trillion valuation, roughly 60 MHz of AWS-3 and H-block spectrum, and favorable FCC buildout treatment), so its 'David vs. Goliath' framing doesn't hold up.

Elon Musk has said in casual conversation that SpaceX wants to become an MNO and develop its own phones, but walked that back to 'we're going to work in partnership with them' when pressed publicly; Anpanman believes Musk, Shotwell, and Goldman all know where this is actually heading.

Anpanman says the T-Mobile/Starlink deal terms were lopsided: T-Mobile paid Starlink for access and received only 20 cents of every dollar generated, with Starlink keeping 80 cents, which he calls 'insane' for the level of service (roughly 3-4 Mbps across a large radius from an initial ~650-satellite constellation) versus AST's 50/50 revenue split with carriers.

T-Mobile CEO Mike Sievert 'made a mistake' by working with Starlink and, per Anpanman, was fired as a result.

The head of Satellite Connect Europe reportedly said the venture is planning to add some additional European MNOs in the coming weeks; Anpanman speculates this means Deutsche Telekom specifically will join Satellite Connect Europe.

Because T-Mobile (a Deutsche Telekom subsidiary) is now reportedly moving toward AST, Anpanman infers Deutsche Telekom's leadership authorized that move and is itself considering working with AST.

The carrier JV structure (multiple competing MNOs cooperating through a joint entity) mirrors the AST-Vodafone Satellite Connect Europe joint venture, which covers 27 EU countries; Anpanman would not be surprised to see a similarly structured 'Satellite Connect America' entity announced in the next few weeks.

The FCC (under Chair Carr) has been favoring Starlink with easy buildout requirements — allowing satellite coverage to satisfy buildout obligations for AWS-3 and H-block spectrum without requiring new towers — which Anpanman says is part of why the carriers banded together.

The FCC and DOJ will scrutinize the carrier JV, but Anpanman expects the carriers' regulatory attorneys to argue the collaboration is pro-competitive, framing it as fostering competition against Amazon and SpaceX/Starlink, and to publicly commit to an 'open framework' evaluating other satellite providers to help clear antitrust review.

Responding to a listener question (Juan Gonzalez) about antitrust risk from Chair Carr, Anpanman said Carr and the DOJ will look for holes, but the carriers' regulatory teams are strong and will position the JV as pro-competitive; the carriers are not obligated to actually work with Starlink, Amazon, Apple, or Globalstar even if they claim openness to other providers.

One possible regulatory compromise Anpanman floats: carriers could be required to offer Starlink as a consumer choice alongside AST, letting customers pick between cheaper, intermittent Starlink texting (~$10/month, his guess) and AST's more robust broadband (his guess: ~$12-15/month).

Abel Avellan stated on an earnings call that in one of AST's countries (which Anpanman interprets as the US), AST will have access to 100 MHz of spectrum; Anpanman pieces this together as roughly 50 MHz from Ligado plus roughly 50 MHz of low-band cellular spectrum combined from FirstNet, AT&T, Verizon, and now T-Mobile.

Satellite-enabled spectrum becomes more valuable because it can be used more efficiently (lighting up previously unused/dead-zone spectrum) and because FCC rules let satellite coverage satisfy buildout/coverage requirements, allowing carriers to reduce CapEx by decommissioning towers in some suburban areas while also serving previously unreachable customers, raising both margins and revenue — Anpanman estimates spectrum 'worth $10' could become worth '$12, $13, or $14' as a result.

On throughput: Starlink's initial ~650-satellite constellation delivers roughly 3-4 Mbps across a wide radius; AST's prior-generation satellites deliver around 100 Mbps, the new Block 2 satellites will deliver around 200 Mbps, and Anpanman expects this could rise to roughly 1 Gbps once the mid-band constellation launches, aided by AI-driven spectrum efficiencies.

If AST secures 100% of the US carrier market with a 50/50 revenue split, Anpanman speculates the stock (trading around $83 that day) could be underpriced and worth $100, $120, $130, $140, or $150.

A Deutsche Bank question asked whether carriers might squeeze AST on margins in the JV; Anpanman argues this is unlikely because direct-to-device is viewed by carriers as an ARPU and churn-reduction driver, not a cost to minimize, especially under a 50/50 revenue-share structure.

AST has a 3-year exclusivity arrangement with AT&T that starts when service starts, which Anpanman guesses will be around early 2027.

AST's exclusivity with Verizon is roughly 2-3 years, though Anpanman says 'no one really knows' the exact term — this is his sense from various discussions and research, not a confirmed figure.

T-Mobile's exclusivity with Starlink is ending next month or in July, which Anpanman ties directly to the timing of today's carrier JV news.

A new satellite batch shipment press release is expected imminently — could be later today, this evening, or over the weekend.

The FAA is expected to approve a Blue Origin launch 'very soon,' based on due diligence and conversations Anpanman describes as giving him and 'Space Mob' high confidence; he expects the Blue Origin (New Glenn) launch in early June 2026, likely carrying Amazon's LEO satellites first, with AST following.

Beyond the Blue Origin launch, AST has a handful of SpaceX (Falcon 9) launches and ULA (Centaur/Vulcan Centaur) launches lined up, with one launch expected in June and one or two more in July.

The prior guidance of averaging one launch every 1-2 months was actually meant as a full-year average; from now through year-end, Anpanman expects the actual cadence to be 1-2 launches per month.

Anpanman expects AST to have 45-50 satellites in orbit by early 2027 as production ramps toward a cadence of 60, and recalls Scott Wisniewski mentioning that starting in Q1 the company might begin 'dribbling out' the new mid-band BlueBirds, referred to as Block 3.

Anpanman was in Las Vegas when the JV news broke; the stock traded around $74-76 and he told friends and family to buy, personally missing a buy order at $75 in one account before buying at $81 — he says $82.5 is still a good entry given what he calls a 'clearing event' for the industry.

Anpanman says he told Kook that adding Verizon was a transformational event, and considers today's T-Mobile development to be similarly or more significant.

Anpanman notes three new military/defense contracts were signed during the quarter that the market largely overlooked because 'the stock price wrote the narrative.'

Sell-side reaction so far: Deutsche Bank (via a call with Scott Wisniewski) and Roth Capital appeared to engage with the implications, while Anpanman says Bank of America 'totally missed the mark' on the day's news but will 'eventually get it.'

Anpanman's closing conviction: if the market fully understood the implications of the day's news, the stock would already be at $100-$120, and he expects that realization to play out over the coming weeks, comparing his current excitement level to when the Verizon partnership was first announced.

Anpanman says the last time he felt this excited was when AST SpaceMobile added Verizon to AT&T, and now what SpaceMob had predicted for three years has happened: AST SpaceMobile has effectively added T-Mobile as a carrier, giving it effectively 100% of the US market locked up, though it is not yet definitive and still requires time and regulatory steps.

Reading the AT&T press release closely, Anpanman concluded it describes a joint venture being put together that will enable AST to bring T-Mobile into the fold, even though the companies can't explicitly say that for regulatory/antitrust reasons.

Anpanman says AT&T is the 'quarterback' of the joint venture, just as AT&T quarterbacked the earlier AT&T/Verizon partnership with AST, because AT&T was the leading-edge partner in developing the network-core integration that makes satellite handoff seamless.

When the press release went out, AST SpaceMobile was the only provider that immediately responded and coordinated PR — Abel Avellan and Scott Wisniewski retweeted it — while Starlink and Globalstar put out nothing because they learned about it only that day, 'on the outside looking in.'

The PR came directly from AT&T, not Verizon or T-Mobile, with the Verizon and T-Mobile CEOs quoted in the release — the same pattern Anpanman says occurred when Verizon joined, where AST put out the initial announcement and AT&T 'welcomed' Verizon into the fold.

He notes that over recent earnings calls, carrier CEOs (including AT&T's) had begun speaking more openly about working with other satellite providers, and T-Mobile recently said it was interested in AST SpaceMobile and Globalstar — statements he views as being made for the regulatory record to support a 'more competition' narrative.

AT&T and Verizon have exclusivity with AST for a minimum of roughly 3 years once commercial service launches, while T-Mobile's exclusivity (with Starlink) ends in the next month or two, which he says is part of the 'mosaic' explaining the deal's timing.

Anpanman speculates that T-Mobile may have told AT&T and Verizon it would enable Starlink to become a mobile network operator unless it was let into the JV, prompting AT&T and Verizon to 'cut them in.'

AT&T and Verizon previously contributed 850 MHz spectrum to AST; Anpanman guesses this spectrum could eventually be folded into the new JV.

He raises unused 800 MHz spectrum from Grain Management that is coming to market, reportedly in a transaction with T-Mobile, and speculates about whether that spectrum could be thrown into the JV.

He speculates T-Mobile could eventually pull its 1.9 GHz spectrum currently used with Starlink and redirect it to AST for mid-band use, alongside additional low-band spectrum and T-Mobile's roughly 800 MHz holdings.

He describes Starlink as amassing spectrum, including AWS-3 (~2 GHz range) and the recently purchased H-block (1.9 GHz), which sits next to T-Mobile's G-block — part of what he frames as Starlink's ambition (stated publicly by Elon Musk) to eventually go direct-to-consumer under the 'Starlink Mobile' brand.

Anpanman cites analyst Will Townsend (who was briefed ahead of the release) characterizing the alliance as a defensive move to mitigate any non-terrestrial network provider seeking to compete more directly with MNOs, distinguishing AST as a cooperative partner versus Starlink as the one satellite provider planning to sell direct to consumers.

He predicts Starlink will ultimately get cut out of T-Mobile's network but says Starlink customers could still access Starlink service by getting an eSIM directly, since Starlink already sells that today for roaming.

He argues the carriers can defend the JV to regulators as pro-competitive, since Starlink (with EchoStar spectrum and a stake in Boost Mobile's network) is becoming a facilities-based '4th carrier,' meaning consumers still have choice and no antitrust issue should arise.

He notes the JV will be structured to 'buy and negotiate satellite services from various competitors' for regulatory optics, name-checking Skylo (texting) and a hypothetical future Amazon/Globalstar satellite service (5-6 years out) as other options carriers could point to, while stressing AST SpaceMobile is the only cooperative direct-to-cell broadband solution actually working with MNOs today.

He concludes AT&T and AST SpaceMobile are 'in the driving seat' of the arrangement, with Verizon and T-Mobile 'along for the ride.'

Anpanman explains that carriers can now use satellite-to-cell coverage to help satisfy FCC spectrum build-out/deployment requirements, which he says lowers the bar for compliance considerably.

He contrasts this with Charlie Ergen's prior experience building out Dish Network/EchoStar's spectrum under population-coverage deadlines (50%, 65%, 75%, 80%, 90%) that ultimately forced him to sell the company; Anpanman speculates Ergen wishes he had pursued a direct-to-device build-out strategy sooner.

He argues satellite coverage could let carriers pull back on expensive rural towers, citing a SpaceMob member's estimate that each tower costs roughly $150,000–$200,000 per year to operate, representing large potential CapEx savings alongside improved 200 Mbps-class broadband access.

Anpanman pushes back on skeptics who argue the JV will crush AST's economics: AST has a 50% revenue share within the 3-year exclusivities with AT&T and Verizon, and he expects roughly 50/50 to hold for at least the next 3 years even with T-Mobile added.

He guesses that once the 3-year exclusivity period ends, the split could shift to something like 60/40, but frames this as immaterial given the scale of controlling the whole US market.

He contrasts this favorably with the roughly 80/20 split he says Starlink held (in its favor) in its deal with T-Mobile, noting that T-Mobile's T-Satellite service quality was poor (intermittent texting, low uptake) versus the broadband-class service AST is targeting.

In response to a listener question about unit economics under a shared multi-carrier D2D system, Anpanman says he expects roughly 50/50 for the next 3 years, with AST's negotiating leverage being very high given carriers can't easily 'rip and replace' the integrated satellite provider.

Anpanman expects the market to take time to digest the news, drawing a parallel to the Verizon announcement, when the stock's premarket reaction didn't fully reflect the news's significance until people understood the implications; he says he explained the deal to two hedge fund contacts that morning who initially didn't grasp it but did after explanation.

He expects AST to re-rate significantly higher once the market understands the deal, pushing back on bears who call the direct-to-device market 'niche,' pointing to the fact that all three major US carriers are now working with AST.

Anpanman recalls that former T-Mobile CEO Mike Sievert's decision to partner with Starlink was a 'huge tactical blunder' because it gave Starlink mindshare and helped enable its subsequent EchoStar acquisition and pursuit of AWS-3 spectrum; Sievert is no longer at T-Mobile.

He notes Deutsche Telekom installed a new, closer T-Mobile CEO who had publicly said the company was 'dancing with the tiger (or lion)' regarding Starlink and would eventually walk away from that partnership once the new JV could be negotiated.

He compares the US JV structure to AST's earlier European approach, where AST built a joint-venture framework (referencing 'Satellite Connect Europe') starting with Vodafone and later bringing in Telefónica and Orange — arguing the same playbook is now unfolding in the US.

Anpanman calls the Q1 2026 earnings call 'really great' and attributes the stock's decline to algorithmic trading and headline reactions to the quarterly revenue miss versus Street expectations, rather than any deterioration in the business.

He notes the Street's quarterly model for 2026 (roughly $39M, $41.2M, $46.5M, and $50M in Q4) implies a much smoother ramp than what the company actually guided; management said each quarter should be sequentially bigger, but the ramp will be less smooth and more backloaded than the Street assumes.

Anpanman compares AST's post-earnings selloff to recent patterns in Redwire and BlackSky, both of which reported weaker Q1 results; BlackSky fell from about $39-40 to as low as $30 before recovering to $41.38 after slightly raising full-year guidance.

Redwire fell to about $8.40 after a disappointing Q1 report (compounded by a large private-equity holder, AE Partners, dumping shares at around $11), but has since recovered to $12.16, which Anpanman cites as evidence that space stocks trade as a sentiment-driven basket and often overreact short-term.

Anpanman expects a similar rebound in AST's stock, noting the space sector has an underlying bid and that he personally plans to add risk on any near-term weakness, especially heading into the June launch and the SpaceX IPO.

Abel Avellan mentioned on the call that up to 5 Block 2 BlueBirds could be launched on a ULA Vulcan rocket; Anpanman speculates (with acknowledged uncertainty about the exact vehicle/configuration) this could involve a Vulcan Heavy configuration with multiple solid rocket boosters, and plans to research further.

Blue Origin is reportedly targeting a third New Glenn booster (GS1, the reusable first stage) in rotation by the end of summer 2026, and four boosters in rotation by year-end; on a roughly 30-day refurbishment cadence, that could theoretically support launching New Glenn up to 4 times per month by year-end.

The first AST launch on Blue Origin's New Glenn is expected to carry 4 BlueBird satellites, scaling up from there; Anpanman believes Amazon's Project Kuiper (Amazon Leo) will likely be the first commercial payload on New Glenn, not AST.

Company management (Scott Wisniewski) referenced dependency on Blue Origin New Glenn plus 'SpaceX equivalents,' which combined with Abel's ULA comments suggests ULA could fly BlueBirds in varying configurations (e.g., 3, 4, or 5 satellites) depending on booster count.

Anpanman expects AST could add Arianespace and possibly Rocket Lab's Neutron rocket as future launch providers; Rocket Lab's Neutron is expected to have its first test flight around Q4 2026, and he speculates Arianespace could get business if the SatCo European venture gains spectrum traction.

He notes AST is also making progress toward Relativity Space as a potential future launch partner, citing update videos from Relativity's Mike Schmidt, though nothing concrete was announced.

Anpanman estimates BlueBirds 11, 12, and 13 will be close to complete around late May/early June, supporting a second launch batch in early-to-mid July on Falcon 9, following the first batch's mid-to-late June launch.

The company expects to reach roughly twice the current peak performance (around 200 Mbps) on Block 2 satellites; Anpanman notes Abel avoided directly referencing BlueBird 6's performance, instead pointing to BlueBirds 8, 9, and 10 for future Block 2 validation, which Anpanman interprets as confirmation that BlueBird 6 is functioning primarily as a government-dedicated satellite.

Anpanman guesses the 3 new government awards, being newly granted, are more likely tied to in-space performance of BlueBird 6 and would-have-been BlueBird 7 rather than older satellites.

He notes EchoStar and Viasat appear positioned to get access to some global S-band spectrum, with OmniSpace also in the mix, while a decent amount of S-band remains available, which he believes is part of what AST is now targeting, including in Europe.

Anpanman speculates that AST and Amazon could potentially collaborate at some point in the future, though he thinks it's probably too early for that.

He argues AST's advantage over rivals is that it requires no new chipsets or hardware since it works with every existing phone via direct MNO network-core integration, giving it a frictionless go-to-market versus competitors who need new handset chipsets or separate satellite spectrum ecosystems.

Anpanman argues AST is the only company with proven space-based cellular broadband technology; he estimates SpaceX's upcoming second-generation direct-to-cell satellite is targeting performance in line with AST's current Block 2 (roughly 150 Mbps for Starlink versus an estimated 200 Mbps for Block 2), but expects that to take SpaceX 2-3 years, by which time AST will have iterated further and have its higher-throughput, mid-band Block 3 generation online.

He speculates that with carrier aggregation across multiple satellites and a denser future constellation, individual user data speeds could theoretically reach around 1 gigabit per second under ideal (low-congestion) conditions.

Abel Avellan was reportedly adamant in response to a handpicked retail investor question about the company's IP moat, emphasizing the patent portfolio's size relative to competitors; Anpanman speculates the company may be strategically allowing competitors to develop technology further before enforcing patents against them later.

JPMorgan and Morgan Stanley participated on the company's last convertible note deal, leading Anpanman to speculate they may be close to initiating research coverage, possibly timed around the SpaceX IPO.

He notes the SpaceX IPO is roughly a month away and views its roadshow and institutional exposure as a likely positive tailwind for the broader space sector, including AST.

AST's stock had been leading the space sector's performance early in the year but has since underperformed, particularly after-hours following this earnings report; Anpanman believes anyone selling around $74 post-market will regret it within a few months.

Andrew SpaceMobile's spectrum position combined with MNO partner spectrum can reach up to 100 MHz of allocated spectrum with some partners when combining IMT/3GPP MNO spectrum with AST's own MSS (L-band and S-band) spectrum, which the company argues is a materially different and larger proposition than competitors offering only narrow SOS-type spectrum allocations.

Asked which government programs AST could target given a large prospective defense budget increase, Abel Avellan said AST spans the full range from FirstNet to classified programs to Golden Dome, for both communications and non-communications capabilities, and expects significant growth in government revenue and opportunity.

Abel Avellan said the Globalstar/Amazon capability (already available via iPhone SOS emergency messaging) represents only a very small fraction of spectrum versus the hundreds of MHz needed for broadband, so he does not see it dramatically changing the competitive landscape in the foreseeable future; AST's combined MNO and MSS (L-band/S-band) spectrum access can reach up to 100 MHz with some partners, which he framed as a fundamentally different, broadband-focused proposition.

Kook said Bloomberg characterized Space Mob with a meme angle but also credited the group with doing research-level work that hedge funds cannot replicate, calling it a 'Skynet-type' globally distributed knowledge base of roughly 150 contributors, many of whom are senior engineers and lawyers with six-figure-plus day jobs, working for free.

Kook laid out that the bear thesis evolved in stages: first, skeptics (citing analyst Tim Farrar) said the technology would not work at all; second, after BlueWalker 3 proved it worked, skeptics said there were no regulatory rules to allow it; the FCC's Supplemental Coverage from Space framework and AT&T/Verizon/FirstNet support resolved that.

Kook said the next hurdle was whether any MNO would actually sign up, since AST cannot economically go direct-to-consumer (citing Iridium's costly 30-year-old go-it-alone attempt as a cautionary precedent); AST needed cross-sell partnerships with mobile network operators to work.

Kook said the final remaining frontier of the thesis is execution -- can the company build the satellites, and will the market actually use them -- calling the market-demand question one that remains genuinely speculative.

Kook noted that secondary-sale shares typically take time (previously 3-10 days after a convertible bond offering) to fully settle and recycle through the market, and this Rakuten sale was more of a protracted ATM-style overhang, which explained some Thursday stock weakness; he expects the overhang to clear quickly if earnings go well.

Kook speculated (without confirmation) that batch two might launch in July, and expects the pace to be described as 'constellation constipation' ending -- the market is hyper-focused on launch cadence, and once production is running, multiple launches will follow in quick succession.

Kook estimated (assuming a roughly 60% cancellation fee on a $300 million midpoint commitment, divided by a $74 million full sticker price per Falcon 9 launch) an implied count of secured Falcon 9 launches, while assuming no material minimum-committed launches with ISRO or other providers.

Kook said his understanding is that AST's Blue Origin New Glenn launch agreements are effectively options with no money down, since Blue Origin doesn't yet have a certified vehicle and needs the cargo, giving Blue Origin little leverage, whereas SpaceX (as the preferred, proven partner) commands standard deposits and minimum commitments.

Kook said AST released an unblurred image the Friday before earnings showing a Micron testing device labeled 'ASIC,' which he interprets as a deliberate signal to informed observers, given the company's awareness that Space Mob analyzes every disclosed image closely.

Kook described the AST5000 ASIC as the next-generation chip, roughly 10 times as power-efficient as the FPGA chips currently used, explaining that power is the critical bottleneck limiting bandwidth and beam count, so a more power-efficient chip meaningfully improves capacity.

Kook argued the company's real enterprise value lies in its capacity to build satellites at scale, not the satellites themselves, positioning this as the foundation for a broader space-economy opportunity (on-orbit power, AI data centers) beyond closing terrestrial coverage gaps.

Kook said he believes the company deliberately delayed announcing 'Patch 1' (a groundbreaking milestone) until after the ASIC image reveal, to 'prime the pump' for a bigger surprise at the Q1 2026 earnings call scheduled for the next day, and speculated this could include batch 2 shipment clarity.

Kook expects management to likely maintain full-year 2026 guidance of around 45 satellites with some hedging language ('target 45'), while stating that hitting the exact number matters less than the trajectory, since the market is forward-looking over a 12-month horizon.

Kook expects the earnings call to cover the balance sheet (citing roughly $4 billion of cash), spectrum position, an expanding book of government business, European opportunities (referencing the SatCo Luxembourg office and a Space Mob correspondent, Peter Lindberg), production cadence, and ASIC integration status.

Kook said he personally expects the company may announce new government contracts, potentially a 'mega deal' tied to Golden Dome, though he stressed this is speculation and he is 'not a paid consultant.'

Kook said there are two additional New Glenn boosters already in Blue Origin's facility and he expects the rocket to return to flight, but does not expect AST to launch its composite satellite batches on New Glenn again soon, viewing the FM2 flight as a trial run and expecting the bulk of composite-bird batches to launch on Falcon 9 until New Glenn accumulates more flight heritage.

Kook argued SpaceX cannot selectively refuse to launch AST satellites for competitive reasons without inviting antitrust scrutiny from the FTC, Department of War, and NRO, noting SpaceX already launches competitors like Viasat and Amazon's Kuiper satellites.

Kook cited FCC Chairman Brendan Carr's public comments applauding the direct-to-cell industry and emphasizing the importance of a competitive market (not a single monopoly), which Kook interprets as support for maintaining a balanced AST-versus-SpaceX competitive dynamic, drawing an analogy to Intel historically needing AMD to remain viable to avoid antitrust concerns.

Kook argued SpaceX and Amazon lack AST's commercial access through mobile network operators and would likely need to build their own captive devices to use their spectrum, whereas AST's MNO-based model gives it 'right of capture' on spectrum and orbital real estate that Kook expects to keep appreciating in value.

Kook noted a widening valuation spread between ASTS and Rocket Lab, with ASTS currently the cheapest it has been versus Rocket Lab despite both being founder-led 'true founder' companies, and suggested a catch-up trade could be forming (attributing some of this analysis to Anpanman).

Kook referenced a post from a Space Mob contributor, 'iPilot,' summarizing Rocket Lab's results and arguing Wall Street is increasingly valuing space companies as strategic infrastructure platforms (tied to defense, communications, AI infrastructure, sovereign resiliency, Golden Dome, PNT, and launch capacity) rather than speculative SPACs.

Kook said the 'space economy' concept -- once dismissed as a vague buzzword -- is becoming real, citing AI data centers in space, on-orbit power generation, and non-communication RF use cases as new applicable opportunities for AST given its large arrays and on-orbit power, though he stressed he does not know what the space economy or AST's opportunity is ultimately worth.

Kook pushed back on criticism (including on Reddit) that AST under-communicates or over-promises, arguing that founders like Abel Avellan and Elon Musk deliberately set aspirational, 'batshit crazy' goals to rally teams to achieve otherwise-impossible outcomes, even if delays occur, rather than sandbagging expectations.

For comparison, the precursor BlueWalker 3 test satellite peaked at roughly 20 Mbps, versus the ~99 Mbps now shown with Block 1, illustrating generational improvement even before Block 2.

Anpanman says Starlink's direct-to-cell satellites (he cites a figure of roughly 650, which he states somewhat unclearly and should be treated as an uncertain number) fly at very low Earth orbit and only deliver about 7 Mbps peak per cell, with real-world tests suggesting closer to 4 Mbps based on published reports and user testing — effectively an SOS/texting-level service comparable to Globalstar (which Amazon is acquiring).

Starlink originally planned to orbit its direct-to-cell satellites at about 500 km but had to lower them to about 350 km to make the link budget work, which Anpanman characterizes as a sign of a solution not engineered from the ground up for this use case.

SpaceX CEO Gwynne Shotwell has disclosed a next-generation Starlink satellite with a large phased array (echoing AST's original design choice), which will use spectrum from the EchoStar deal (expected to close around the end of next summer) and a newly designed ASIC; Anpanman estimates that satellite won't be in production until around 2028-2030 given typical space-industry schedule slippage, and is also dependent on Starship reaching commercial launch cadence, with a targeted speed of about 150 Mbps.

Block 2 satellites operate on low-band spectrum; a future generation (referred to as Block 3, and credited to a community figure 'Katzi' for pointing this out) is planned to add mid-band spectrum leveraging the Ligado L-band and S-band spectrum deals, which will provide more data capacity (though with different coverage/propagation characteristics than low-band).

Anpanman recalls that a future Block 4 generation using C-band spectrum (which the FCC is freeing up) has been on AST's roadmap since he discussed it with Abel Avellan around 2020/2021; C-band would provide substantially more data throughput and would primarily target enterprise-level fixed wireless (e.g. broadband to data centers) rather than mobile phones.

Anpanman describes the overall approach as a 'layered cake': low-band for coverage, mid-band for capacity, and C-band for heavy-duty enterprise applications.

Because AST's satellites are coordinated through the carrier's network, the architecture could support carrier aggregation/MIMO with multiple satellites (e.g. three) simultaneously serving a single phone; Anpanman throws out a conservative placeholder target of roughly 1 Gbps per second aggregate, noting speeds could go even higher, and recalls Abel Avellan discussing MIMO across multiple satellites back in 2017 with a theoretical target of 750 Mbps.

At that speed range the service would start approaching 'replacement level' for terrestrial networks in non-dense areas, though Anpanman stresses towers will always be superior in dense urban areas — the use case is augmentation (e.g. offloading traffic during a stadium event) and closing coverage gaps in suburban/rural areas, not replacing dense urban capacity.

Anpanman raises future autonomous-vehicle connectivity as a use case, arguing regulators will require constant connectivity (a 'kill switch') for autonomous vehicles even in areas with no terrestrial coverage, which satellite augmentation could support.

Because AST's large phased array can project a fixed ground cell even while the satellite moves at roughly 17,000 mph, a phone stays connected to the same satellite for about 8-9 minutes; by contrast, Anpanman says Starlink's regenerative, moving cell requires a phone to reacquire a new satellite roughly every 2 minutes, which he says causes additional battery drain.

Anpanman says it 'dawned on him' this morning that AST moved Micron production out of Odessa entirely, to free up floor space at the original site for payload integration, assembly, and satellite testing — a facility transition he says takes real time (moving/adding equipment, standing up a clean space) rather than being a sign of the 'constellation constipation' some critics have alleged.

Anpanman states the company has well over six production facilities that are leased and either fully stood up or in the process of being stood up, more than the few locations he says are publicly known.

He compares AST's anticipatory manufacturing buildout to how defense contractors like Raytheon built out capacity ahead of Golden Dome-related awards, framing AST's facility expansion as preparation for both commercial and defense demand.

Anpanman argues the company is deliberately front-loading detailed disclosure videos (the 99 Mbps test and the Micron facility tour) ahead of today's earnings call so investors are already educated and the call itself, including analyst Q&A, can focus on additional new information rather than re-explaining these milestones.

Anpanman says he expects some interesting nuggets on today's call and that the bearish narrative around New Glenn not yet returning to flight, and questions about Falcon 9 cadence, will likely be addressed — he says he and Kook have diligenced a number of upcoming Falcon 9 launches lined up.

Anpanman relays commentary from Kook's X Space the previous night: Kook pushed back on a listener's business-school framing that companies should 'under-promise and over-deliver,' arguing instead that a company 'redefining an industry' should set audaciously ambitious ('batshit crazy') goals to inspire the team to attempt the impossible, since the alternative to occasional delays is nothing being attempted at all — and that this is what both Abel Avellan and Elon Musk do.

Anpanman adds that companies can't run two separate goal-setting processes (an internal aspirational one and a public conservative one) because they must coordinate suppliers and subcontractors around one plan, so ambitious public and internal goals go hand in hand with occasional delays.

Anpanman argues that even with the current pace, Block 2 hitting 200 Mbps versus Starlink's own target of roughly 150 Mbps in about four years (Anpanman's estimate) means AST being delayed by 'a few weeks, a few months' shouldn't matter much to investors focused on the fundamental trajectory.

The headline, 'SpaceX rival soars 6,000% ... proves meme stock mania lives on,' bothers Anpanman because of the meme-stock association, but he acknowledges Bloomberg and its editors chose an eye-catching angle to engage readers.

The article discussed 'the Kook bottom' — a reference to Kook, described as Space Mob's de facto leader, whose emotional public reactions during downturns became a recognized signal; Anpanman agrees with this characterization and jokes about 'key man risk' hoping Kook stays healthy.

Anpanman notes the article did not emphasize that the stock endured years in the doldrums (down to about $2) before its rally, and argues that period — not the recent 6,000% gain — is when Space Mob's resolve was truly tested.

Anpanman argues the Bloomberg article, while acknowledging AST's technology and definitive telecom partnerships, could have focused more on this multi-year conviction arc rather than solely the recent rally.

Per Street consensus estimates Anpanman cites, AST SpaceMobile revenue is projected at $177 million in 2026, $710 million in 2027, $1.65 billion in 2028, and $2.5 billion in 2029, with EBITDA reaching about $2.3 billion by 2029 — figures he says illustrate why the company is drawing rapid-growth interest despite its current small revenue base.

Anpanman contrasts AST SpaceMobile with GameStop, AMC, and Koss, which he characterizes as highly-shorted companies with no real financial or operational prospects targeted in a technical short squeeze, versus AST SpaceMobile, which was highly shorted but has genuine game-changing technology, MNO partnerships, and long-term shareholders.

Anpanman notes such volatility is expected for a high-beta, disruptive stock, and reiterates the community's longstanding advice against holding on margin so investors have staying power through drawdowns.

Tim Farrar, described by Anpanman as the community's long-running short-seller 'boogeyman,' was apparently not interviewed and does not appear in the article, which Anpanman finds notable since Farrar has been a frequent target of Space Mob rebuttals.

Anpanman says he would rather the company focus on fundamentals, partnerships, and defense contracts than on PR hype, though he acknowledges the company has improved its communication over the years.

Anpanman recalls that the company never had to disclose in a 10-Q/10-K that it had less than 12 months of liquidity, but there was genuine uncertainty among Space Mob members at the time about whether the company would survive financially.

During capital raises in that period, offerings were reportedly priced down 20-30% due to lack of institutional demand, with much of that demand filled by short-covering funds or retail investors.

Anpanman argues institutional analysts, despite financial resources, are limited by covering 10-40 names at once and rely on management calls, sell-side research, and expert-network calls, which he says are often stale or motivated by an axe to grind (citing Ryan O'Connor's view that expert-network 'TIGS' interviews function as 'the perfect inverse indicator').

As an example of this edge, Anpanman says Space Mob's network suggests the FAA's investigation into the Blue Origin New Glenn anomaly (which caused the BlueBird 7 loss) will conclude sooner than skeptics expect, since NASA/regulators want the vehicle back on the pad quickly for lunar missions and the issue is believed to be minor and well-understood, not a design flaw.

Anpanman dismisses concerns that Amazon's acquisition of Globalstar threatens AST, arguing Globalstar is a narrowband, low-bandwidth service reliant on MDA Space satellites for years, lacking the patents and spectrum efficiency (roughly 3 bits/hertz) needed to become a true broadband competitor to AST or Starlink.

Although BlueBird 7's launch failed, Anpanman frames it as a manageable setback rather than company-ending, noting BlueBird 7 was a backup to the already-successful BlueBird 6 and would have been 'gravy' for demonstrating satellite operations tied to an SDA contract.

Anpanman believes journalist Sana Pashankar may have originally intended a less meme-focused article but was likely steered by her editor toward the more sensationalized framing to attract readers; he speaks positively of her work and recommends following her ongoing space-sector coverage (including of Rocket Lab and eventually SpaceX).

Responding to a listener comment calling the community 'inexperienced,' Anpanman concedes many Space Mob members are non-professional investors (engineers, production workers, lawyers, accountants) but argues that years of holding through AST's volatility have made many of them experienced investors by now.

Anpanman closes by flagging two near-term items: a quarterly update coming on Monday, and a first Block 2 satellite batch shipment that could go out 'any day now' over the next two weeks if the company is to make a targeted mid-June Falcon 9 launch window.

Rakuten Mobile's wireless buildout left the parent company overleveraged, spending 'north of like $500 million' a year in USD-equivalent interest expense; with Japanese interest rates rising from previously near-zero/negative levels, Rakuten has been under pressure to deleverage, exploring options including monetizing its fintech business and, ultimately, selling down its highly appreciated AST SpaceMobile stake.

Anpanman, a former banker himself, argues Bank of America should have executed an overnight block trade (bookbuild) for the roughly 15 million shares — similar to how Redwire recently moved stock for AE Industrial Partners — rather than an open-market sale spread over about three weeks.

In a block-trade scenario, Anpanman guesses the bank could have priced the whole 15 million shares at a 5-10-15% discount to the April 17, 2026 closing price of $88 (e.g., around $80), placing it overnight with long-only and hedge-fund accounts, avoiding weeks of visible selling pressure.

Because the multi-week open-market sale was visible (Rakuten being a former board member and 13D holder), the market knew Bank of America would be a seller every day, in a range Anpanman estimates from mid-single-digit to over 10% of volume, giving short sellers 'carte blanche' to trade against the stock.

Anpanman speculates that had Rakuten not pre-announced the sale and had BlueBird 7 not been lost, the stock likely would have traded closer to the '90s' rather than the mid-$80s around the time of FCC approval, or the bank could have executed a block trade at a higher price.

With the sale now complete, Anpanman expects the stock's 'overhang' from the presumed daily seller to be lifted, allowing the shares to trade more freely going forward.

Anpanman frames the cut positively: since the stock was already up that day, the lower target carries little cost, but it gives B. Riley room to raise the target back up after the May 11, 2026 earnings report if results and guidance (e.g., on production/shipments) come in positive.

Conversely, short sellers sometimes convince analysts to raise estimates or guidance expectations before a print (posing as bulls), which can raise the bar high enough that the company disappoints even on an in-line result — Anpanman says this pattern makes him nervous for stocks he owns.

Anpanman singles out the Scotiabank analyst as an example of an analyst who was previously very bullish on AST SpaceMobile but has since turned very bearish; he speculates this reflects influence from short-seller commission relationships rather than independent analysis, noting Scotia isn't (to his knowledge) working on any of AST's financings.

Anpanman still holds only a smaller position in Strata Critical but remains positive on continued execution and a gradual re-rating; he has a management call scheduled for the next day to get more detail on the quarter and plans to discuss it further next week.

Anpanman believes AST acts as a proxy for the broader space sector, so when AST sells off, other space names tend to sell off too; he notes AST has underperformed the rest of the space sector since the launch failure.

The SpaceX IPO is still expected to happen in the next few weeks, indicating overall sector interest hasn't disappeared even as momentum has shifted elsewhere.

Anpanman said he's looking forward to updates on government contracts (in the 'sweet spot' of additional Golden Dome-related work) and whether the company will give an update on the approximately $1.1 billion of contracted revenue backlog, as well as any new MNO definitive agreements.

Falcon 9 integration of the next BlueBird batch is expected to take roughly 3-4 weeks after shipment, pointing to a launch in June; two further batches of three satellites are expected in late June/early July and then August.

Anpanman expects Blue Origin's New Glenn could return to operations for its next launch sooner than the market anticipates; skeptics are pricing in several months, with an aggressive-end estimate around 60-70 days, but Anpanman says there are hints Blue Origin understands the Stage 2 failure well and could return sooner.

Reaching the company's approximately 45-satellite target this year is an aggressive 'reach goal' contingent on getting the next 9 satellites off via Falcon 9 and then resuming Blue Origin New Glenn launches (capable of carrying 6 satellites at a time), on top of the 6 BlueBirds already in orbit; Anpanman doesn't think it would make a big difference if the company instead reaches 40, 35, or the high 30s.

Anpanman argues what matters most by year-end is the exit velocity of production cadence: consistently producing 6 satellites a month (72/year) is the key number for building toward the 45-60 satellites needed for decent global coverage; going beyond that improves performance further.

The next three BlueBird batches on the catalyst tracker are BB8-10, BB11-13, and BB14-16, expected to launch within the June-July-August timeframe, followed probably by the first fully loaded Blue Origin New Glenn launch.

Institutional short interest has risen; the straightforward bear narrative is that BlueBird 7 wasn't put into proper orbit and that production cadence has been delayed, comparing it to Tesla-style 'production hell' common to first-of-its-kind manufacturing.

Rakuten had been planning to sell half its stake beginning in January under a 10b5-1 plan after stepping off the board; Anpanman estimates Rakuten is probably about two-thirds of the way through that sale, with not much remaining, and says this overhang has weighed on sentiment.

The Amazon acquisition of Globalstar has also been an overhang on AST sentiment.

There's been a flurry of institutional investors using expert networks to conduct due diligence on the company, which Anpanman says typically happens either when investors are considering going long during strong performance, or when shorts are trying to gather ammunition during a downturn.

Anpanman believes the combination of low implied volatility, all-time-high short interest, and very negative sentiment creates the ingredients for what should be a pretty spectacular rally over the coming weeks and into the summer, especially given the lined-up launches.

Anpanman jokes he'd have preferred the article come out when the stock was at $100-120 rather than at $64, referencing the recurring pattern where retail regret and awareness cycles play out as the stock swings between lows and new all-time highs.

Anpanman describes AST as a high-beta, high-growth name requiring investors to stomach significant volatility, noting the company has previously experienced multiple 40-50% drawdowns (as previously highlighted by 'Reformed Trader'), which he frames as a feature of investing in the name, not a bug.

Anpanman's own portfolio was at an all-time high in January but is now roughly flat to slightly down for the year; he says he's been through this cycle multiple times and is mentally prepared for it, citing the FCC full-constellation approval, Block 2 production, and the upcoming full launch campaign as reasons for confidence despite the drawdown.

Anpanman advises investors not to be overleveraged or trade on margin during periods of high uncertainty, calling it the quickest way to financial ruin, and suggests taking breaks (yard work, family time) during difficult sentiment stretches.

Kook compares the intensity of hatred directed at AST SpaceMobile and founder Abel Avellan to the hostility historically directed at Elon Musk/Tesla, framing it as a pattern of resentment toward 'visionary founders,' and contrasts AST's third-party-validated technical progress with unsubstantiated comparisons bears make to failed companies like Nikola.

Kook describes the prior week's stock decline as personally difficult ('last week sucked'), noting visible burnout and capitulation across the SpaceMob community, but frames this as a recurring pattern near cycle bottoms, contrasting it with prior run-ups to roughly $130 that he says historically marked local tops.

Kook lays out a 'tiered buyer' framework borrowed from oil & gas NAV analysis (1P vs. 3P reserves): the most knowledgeable, highest-conviction holders (who already own the stock) provide little incremental buying support on the way down, while more conservative, generalist buyers using a stricter NAV floor — which Kook pegs at roughly $50 as a hypothetical downside support level — are what ultimately sets a bottom.

Kook's key framework for the call is 'batch shipment number 1' and what he calls '3 till infinity': once the next batch of three satellites ships, he believes it will demonstrate the production line's manufacturing bottleneck has been uncorked, enabling continuous output from there.

Kook expects the earnings call to provide either an actual next shipment or at least high visibility into it, which he believes will be an important signal for long-term investors about the pace of the business into the second half of 2026, along with possible developments on military contracts.

Kook characterizes the setup heading into earnings as: all-time-high short interest, acutely negative investor sentiment, and implied/realized volatility sitting near lows just before what he expects to be a large catalyst.

Kook notes AT&T recently posted supportive commentary about AST SpaceMobile on X, which he connects to his prior week's 'forensic analysis' of AT&T CEO John Stankey's earnings-call comments — arguing Stankey's statements about SpaceX/Amazon alternatives actually revealed that AT&T cannot afford for AST to fail because it depends heavily on AST and has no timeline for other services.

Kook argues that a guidance miss caused by competitive disruption (e.g., Chegg missing guidance because of ChatGPT, or a hypothetical Blockbuster-style miss due to Netflix) is fundamentally different from a miss caused by attempting something unprecedented, citing Tesla's early guidance misses while commercializing EVs and SpaceX's Starship schedule slips as comparable 'innovation misses' rather than failures.

Kook's framing is that AST SpaceMobile is simultaneously inventing new satellite technology and building the physical factory to manufacture it — two very hard things at once — so missed guidance during that buildout should be judged differently than a mature company missing guidance due to competitors like Starlink or Kuiper, which he says are also running behind.

Kook says AST SpaceMobile is using techniques that let it run different waveforms (e.g., radar-type versus communications-type signals) on the same spectrum without interference, which he frames as a significant monetization opportunity for the company's spectrum holdings.

Kook recounts that community member 'Katzy' first raised these spectrum/waveform and non-communications use-case theories roughly three years ago (when the SpaceMob was only about six people) and was mocked, including by analyst Tim Farrar, but says Katzy's FCC/ITU-filing-based research has since proven correct.

Kook argues Abel Avellan taking $0 salary and being compensated the same way as shareholders (via stock) is, along with Katzy's existence, one of the two most important pillars of his investment thesis, framing it as proof that 'incentives drive outcomes' and Avellan's incentive is to make the stock go up.

Kook compares AST SpaceMobile's manufacturing buildout to Ken Griffin's build-out of Citadel/Citadel Securities' infrastructure (calling Griffin an 'S-class' business tactician), arguing the real value AST is creating is not just satellites but the physical infrastructure to build satellites at scale.

Kook argues the broader macro shift from 'software eats the world' toward physical manufacturing (missiles, ships, EV batteries, humanoid robotics, chips, data centers) favors AST, which he says is building the global infrastructure to become one of the largest satellite manufacturers by tonnage in the world.

Kook references a 28-minute SpaceX video about Starship's manufacturing/test facilities as inspiration, comparing AST's dual challenge — designing cutting-edge satellite technology and simultaneously designing/building the physical plant to manufacture it — to a 'Manhattan Project' for satellite manufacturing, and argues Blue Origin is one of the few peers with comparable capital/scale to replicate this kind of physical buildout.

Kook characterizes the current dominant bear argument as simply 'ASTS is not launching satellites fast enough,' and argues this thesis is fragile because it could be invalidated quickly — e.g., if there are four successive SpaceX launches of three BlueBirds each, if the FAA grants an expedited launch approval for New Glenn, or if AST has an undisclosed relationship with the government's NSSL launch program.

Kook paraphrases (mockingly) the short-seller thesis he's heard on expert-network calls as being narrowly focused on launch risk — whether SpaceX or Blue Origin would actually honor launch contracts for a competing satellite company — and says this is the primary basis he's seen for short positioning.

Kook speculates that additional 'stranded' spectrum — citing Ligado, Grain Management, and potentially SiriusXM — could be repurposed and approved for direct-to-device use, which would represent additional spectrum capacity for AST's satellites to process and monetize.

Kook cites a Tsinghua University study that tested Starlink's direct-to-cell service (including WhatsApp) and found significant dropped calls and poor reliability, arguing this explains weak current demand but doesn't necessarily mean the broader direct-to-device market lacks potential, drawing an analogy to early PCs and cell phones before their 'killer app' moments.

Kook highlights a SpaceX 'direct to cow' use case — a rancher using SpaceX connectivity for smart cattle collars to remove the need for cell towers or on-ranch infrastructure — citing roughly 86 million head of cattle in the relevant context as an example of an unanticipated demand driver for direct-to-device technology.

Kook argues AST SpaceMobile's core platform advantage is generating the most power in orbit, with RF/telecom signals as the first monetization use case and AI compute or power-beaming as potential future uses, drawing an analogy to Iceland's cheap hydro power leading it into aluminum smelting.

Kook mentions a roughly $140 million Department of War contract as part of a radar system that surfaced this week, saying 'we'll see if that goes through us' — explicitly flagging this as hoped-for rather than confirmed to involve AST SpaceMobile.

Kook references a recent approval for using spectrum over the ocean, which he says has obvious military use cases, as another positive data point for AST's defense-related positioning; he says he has real (but unconfirmed) expectations of near-term military contract awards, possibly around the earnings call.

Kook argues that because SpaceX and Amazon do not have enough of their own spectrum to pursue an ambitious direct-to-device build-out, while AST SpaceMobile operates in partnership with MNOs who control the terrestrial spectrum, this creates a structural check-and-balance in AST's favor.

Kook details Elon Musk's SpaceX incentive-compensation structure: roughly 200 million supervoting shares tied to SpaceX reaching a $7.5 trillion valuation AND establishing a permanent Mars colony of at least 1 million people, plus an additional roughly 60 million shares tied to valuation targets and operating space-based data centers delivering 100 terawatts of compute — noting neither incentive trigger references direct-to-device or a phone product, and using this to argue Musk's real strategic focus (including the Cursor acquisition) is Mars colonization and AI data centers rather than the D2C/phone business.

Kook notes Starlink has been cutting prices, which he interprets as a sign it has exhausted the premium tier of willing payers at its current price point and must expand its addressable market by lowering price.

Kook flags the upcoming Russell index reconstitution as a technical event, estimating (by his own admission, a rough/unverified AI-assisted calculation he has not personally checked) roughly 10 million shares of incremental buy-side demand into the end of June.

Kook recalls that a similar Russell rebalance benefited the stock during a prior rally (which he associates with 'Block 1'), but that the effect was offset at the time by the company selling shares into strength via its ATM program; he says this time it does not look like AST is currently in the market raising money on strength, given it recently completed a convertible-notes offering.

Kook notes Anpanman's data point that short interest sits at an all-time high of almost 64 million shares, with convertible-note holders covering their hedges (due to lower delta) partly offsetting the record shorting, and frames the combination as setting up for a potential short squeeze.

Terrestrial cell towers achieve roughly 7 to 9 bits per hertz of spectral efficiency; traditional satellite systems typically achieve only 1 to 2 bits per hertz; AST is currently around 3 to 4 bits per hertz.

Terrestrial systems achieve dual polarization physically, using two antennas at 45-degree angles (one vertical, one horizontal); AST's very large phased array instead does this dynamically, transmitting effectively two channels on the same frequency to a phone in a burst manner (since a phone's orientation constantly changes), roughly doubling the 'highway lanes' of communication — something Abel referenced conceptually (MIMO and other optimization techniques) back in 2017-2018.

The near-term 3x claim likely comes from polarization-transparent switching plus better scheduling; the longer-term 10x claim is likely tied to the AST5000 chip and AI dynamically optimizing polarization, beams, time/frequency resources, power, MCS, and interference across the constellation, allowing the same spectrum to carry far more traffic — echoing prior company comments that 3GPP protocols are inefficient and can be optimized for more performance.

Using an AI-derived breakdown, Anpanman lists prospective efficiency multiplier stack components: polarization mismatch recovery (1.5x-3x), better MCS/higher signal-to-noise ratio (1.5x-3x), better user grouping and scheduling (1.2x-2x), more aggressive frequency reuse (2x-4x), better beamforming and power optimization (1.2x-2x), and ASIC/software/RAN maturity gains (1.5x-3x).

Anpanman compares this to SpaceX's Falcon 9 development curve, where early engine iterations were far less optimized than later versions, arguing AST will see similar incremental step-function improvements over time.

Anpanman speculates that as spectral efficiency proves out, AT&T and Verizon could eventually dedicate more low-band spectrum fully to satellite service, or widen an entire regional band (e.g. 5x5 or 10x10 MHz) as an additional capacity layer, once consumers demonstrate the experience works.

Achieving this level of dynamic polarization/spectral efficiency requires a very large phased array with many antenna elements; Starlink, by contrast, uses circular polarization (not the same technique) and has smaller phased arrays, lacks precise cell-beamforming, and uses a regenerative architecture, so it cannot derive the same efficiency benefits until a future satellite generation.

By comparison, Starlink's V1 array is about 2.5x2.5 meters and its V2 array is targeted at about 5x5 meters, versus AST's current 15x15 meters — illustrating AST's scale advantage.

Legacy/narrowband direct-to-device players who buy a satellite constellation off-the-shelf from a prime contractor may achieve narrowband/IoT service, but full broadband requires proprietary in-house innovation that Anpanman believes only AST currently has.

Anpanman describes 'spectrum alchemy': L-band spectrum (historically contested because GPS, the military, and others opposed terrestrial use — as seen with LightSquared's failed terrestrial buildout attempt) is unlocked in value once used from satellite-to-device, which AST's large-aperture satellites can do without interfering with adjacent spectrum, restoring the spectrum's 'original intent.'

AST's Ligado L-band spectrum position (roughly 45 MHz for ~80 years) could be valued today at $15 to $20 billion in a sum-of-the-parts analysis, according to Anpanman, before layering in efficiency-driven upside.

Using rough spectrum valuation math (roughly $0.10-$2 per MHz-pop depending on quality, times ~340 million US population), Anpanman calculates that if AST's efficiency gains effectively turn 50 MHz of spectrum into 150 MHz of usable capacity (a 3x gain, not the full 10x), at roughly $0.40 per MHz-pop that additional 100 MHz of effective capacity would be worth about $13.6 billion in the US market alone.

AST's mid-band/Ligado spectrum gives it 45 MHz of nationwide coverage across the US and Canada, which Anpanman argues is powerful because carriers could pay AST to offload traffic during peak terrestrial congestion, an additional revenue stream beyond per-subscriber usage that he says is not built into most valuation models.

There is also 20x20 MHz of S-band spectrum 'up for grabs' that was not part of the FCC's constellation/SCS order, which Anpanman flags as another spectrum asset in play.

Viasat initially supported the Ligado-AST spectrum deal but later became litigious trying to block it, and has 'largely failed,' according to Anpanman, with a judge slapping down its attempts.

Anpanman states AST agreed to pay Ligado roughly $420 million (a figure he presents somewhat uncertainly) to cover what Ligado owed Viasat as part of making the L-band spectrum contiguous — he flags this as separate from, and roughly consistent with, AST's broader deal terms, though the company's disclosed contingent payment to Ligado has been reported elsewhere as approximately $550 million with about $535 million flowing to Inmarsat/Viasat.

Anpanman argues Viasat's stock re-rated because AST's deal effectively rescued it from potential bankruptcy (its core airline broadband business is also losing ground to Starlink), and speculates Viasat may be 'worth more dead than alive' due to its L-band spectrum rights, with shareholders hoping management leases or sells spectrum to AST rather than building its own constellation; he calls the idea of an AST-Viasat merger 'silly' and unlikely.

Anpanman singles out satellite consultant Stewart Taylor as a biased critic of AST — noting Taylor previously held Viasat shares, publicly stated he knows Viasat CEO Mark Dankberg personally, and had predicted (three years ago) that Viasat would become a major direct-to-device player; Taylor's public criticism of AST intensified once Viasat became litigious, which Anpanman says undermines his claimed independence.

Because of its contracts with Ligado, AST believes it retains the ability to pursue L-band spectrum rights globally (outside North America) as well, provided it coordinates with Viasat to avoid interference, and Anpanman speculates Viasat may eventually work out a deal with AST for the rest of global L-band given the difficulty of funding an independent constellation.

Anpanman notes Viasat has talked about deploying ex-US L-band spectrum for direct-to-device with two other partners, capitalized at $1 billion, which he says is 'not nearly enough money' to build a competitive constellation, especially via a prime contractor.

Anpanman argues T-Mobile's Starlink Direct to Cell partnership was a historic strategic error ('breathing a competitor into existence'), predicting it will become a Harvard Business School case study, since Starlink now knows exactly where T-Mobile's coverage gaps and customer pain points are and could use that data to sell a competing mobile service.

Anpanman speculates that if Elon Musk/SpaceX ever bought a carrier like T-Mobile outright to fully enter the retail wireless business, it would push AT&T, Verizon, and other global carriers to integrate even more closely with AST as a competitive response.

On Amazon's Kuiper/D2D ambitions: Amazon is leasing Globalstar's existing constellation (plus 17 more Globalstar satellites) for roughly the next four years, then will move to MDA Space's Aurora satellites (aiming to launch around 50), before eventually building and launching a fully proprietary satellite (Anpanman guesses around 2030-2031) — by which point he estimates AST will be on roughly its fourth satellite generation.

Anpanman notes Amazon's recent earnings call stated it wants to provide 100% customer connectivity and bought Globalstar mainly for its spectrum value, without yet detailing satellites or service deployment plans; he speculates AST and Amazon could eventually cooperate if MNOs approved lighting up Amazon's spectrum with AST's technology, but says this is unlikely without MNO buy-in.

Anpanman frames satellite connectivity pricing as effectively 'insurance' for the time consumers are away from Wi-Fi, arguing an extra 5-10% on a phone bill for guaranteed connectivity is reasonable given that most usage (he estimates 90-95%) already occurs on Wi-Fi.

Anpanman recounts how T-Mobile historically lacked low-band spectrum (relying only on mid-band), resulting in poor indoor/rural/subway coverage, until it acquired 600 MHz spectrum via FCC auction after merging with Sprint, dramatically improving its network — used as an example of why low-band spectrum ('the fundamental part of AST's service') is so valuable, and why Verizon's and AT&T's low-band holdings drove their historical subscriber advantage (referencing Verizon's 'can you hear me now' campaign).

Anpanman contrasts AST's low-band-based service with MSS/mid-band-only competitors like Starlink (1.9 GHz) and Globalstar (2.4 GHz), arguing their smaller apertures and lack of true low-band spectrum mean worse propagation, slower speeds, and packet loss.

Anpanman highlights the Middle East, and specifically the Saudi Telecom (stc) partnership — described as AST's largest partnership by financial commitment — as a potentially very lucrative market because of vast arid land combined with dense population centers, making satellite coverage far more efficient than building thousands of terrestrial towers.

Anpanman speculates that Middle Eastern consumers' relatively high willingness/ability to pay for connectivity (he cites $15-$20/month as an easy add-on for many customers) could make the region a high-margin market relative to the limited satellite capacity needed to serve it.

Anpanman extends the same logic to other large-landmass, dense-population regions such as Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia, where terrestrial tower buildout for full geographic coverage is prohibitively expensive.

Anpanman notes AST has not historically been litigious with its patents, and speculates the company could use its portfolio either offensively (blocking competitors from replicating its techniques) or cooperatively (licensing fundamental patents for royalty/licensing revenue, similar to memory-chip companies), including patents related to heat dissipation ('Microns') and solar-array power generation relevant to AI data centers.

Anpanman cites StarCloud, an AI data-center company that reportedly raised at roughly a $1 billion valuation a month or two prior and is now raising at about a $2 billion valuation, as an example of a company likely to run into AST's existing patents.

AST has a quarterly update scheduled for the following week; Anpanman expects possible news around Block 2 Bluebird shipping within the next week or two, and says things 'seem to be going well.'

Anpanman speculates that Blue Origin's New Glenn 4 could launch sooner than generally expected.

The first three batches of Block 2 Bluebirds are expected to launch on Falcon 9, with Anpanman estimating a launch window starting as early as June and continuing through July and August; he expects a shipment in the May/June timeframe ahead of a June launch.

Anpanman closes bullish, saying the stock has been 'consolidating for a really long period' and predicting new all-time highs in the coming weeks and months.

AST SpaceMobile and Rocket Lab trade almost on top of one another; Anpanman says he checked and the correlation between the two is 'in the 96th percentile,' and recommends anyone watching AST also watch Rocket Lab, Firefly, Intuitive Machines (LUNR), and BlackSky (BKSY) since these names increasingly trade as a basket via ETFs and arbitrage flows.

Since Bluebird 7's failure to reach proper orbit, comparing stock returns from April 17 (the Friday before the launch) to now, AST has underperformed the peer sector by roughly 10%, even though the entire space sector has drawn down from its April highs -- meaning day-to-day AST moves are often just sector beta, not fundamental news.

Total shares outstanding across Class A, B, and C is 388 million. Non-float strategic holdings: Class A strategics total ~42.4 million shares (Rakuten 15.5M pro forma after its sell-down to half its prior stake, Alphabet/Google 8.9M, AT&T 6.3M, Verizon 6.1M, Vodafone 5.5M); Class B has only two holders, Vodafone (9M shares) and American Tower (2.2M shares, after partially monetizing its stake); Class C is entirely Abel Avellan's 78.2 million supervoting shares. Subtracting all of these leaves a tradable float of about 256 million shares.

Real-time short interest is at an all-time high of 64 million shares. Assuming about 80% of convertible bondholders are arbitrageurs trading deltas rather than holding a fundamental view, Anpanman estimates roughly 11 million shares of that short interest is convertible-bond arb-related; subtracting that leaves about 53 million shares, or 20.7% of the 256 million tradable float, as the 'fundamental' or basket short position.

Anpanman compares the current setup to 2024, when high short interest ahead of an unknown catalyst (which turned out to be the Verizon commercial agreement) preceded a rally from about $3 to a summer high of $39; and to May 2025, when short interest was also high before catalysts including the Russell 1000 addition, a Trump comment about moving business away from SpaceX/Elon Musk, and the Ligado spectrum term sheet going definitive kicked off a rally into June.

Anpanman describes a recurring seasonal pattern: consolidation in Q1, then things 'get spicy' heading into Q2; this year the expected kickoff (a successful Bluebird 7 deployment) didn't go as planned, but he still sees May/June 2026 as a big setup period given the first, second, and third satellite batch shipments approaching.

Implied volatility is close to an all-time low and realized volatility is also down significantly; combined with all-time-high short interest and low sentiment, Anpanman calls this 'the perfect ingredients' for the stock to explode higher once positive catalysts land.

Anpanman says a friend with access to index-arbitrage research suggested the reweighting could drive demand for roughly 10 million incremental AST shares -- explicitly a speculative, third-party estimate, not a firm number.

Rakuten is selling down to roughly half its previous AST stake; per its most recent 13D amendment, it was selling at a pace of about 250,000 shares a day, a rate Anpanman says 'is not going to impact the stock price much.' He estimates Rakuten may have only 2-3 million shares left to sell, and that the sell-down being nearly finished could help sentiment given how much attention it has drawn.

Anpanman frames the upcoming first, second, and third satellite batch shipments as key data points on production cadence -- specifically whether the company has solved the stacking issues that previously slowed production. After satellites are assembled they must go through roughly two weeks of environmental-chamber testing, which can extend timelines if testing surfaces a problem to fix.

Unlike SpaceX's Starship (which aims to reuse both stages), Blue Origin's New Glenn only reuses the first-stage booster; the second stage is expendable. Blue Origin currently has 2 first-stage boosters and is working toward a 30-day refurbishment turnaround (enabling ~2 launches/month), with a third first-stage booster reportedly being brought into rotation.

Anpanman guesses New Glenn will launch 6-8 times total in 2026.

Anpanman notes New Glenn's first mishap investigation (from the earlier New Glenn 1 booster-landing failure) took about 71 days, with the FAA announcing conclusions roughly 2 days after closing it out; Blue Origin identified 7 fix areas at that time. Applying a similar timeline to the Bluebird 7 investigation, he guesses it could close around the end of June or the first week of July 2026, with a possible first commercial cargo launch (likely Amazon LEO satellites, needed for Space Force flight certification) around August 2026.

Because the mishap resets Blue Origin's Space Force certification clock (requiring 4 consecutive successful flights with real cargo before government payloads can fly again), Blue Origin is precluded from launching government cargo in the interim -- which paradoxically frees up manifest slots for commercial customers like AST once New Glenn returns to flight.

Anpanman dismisses the idea that Blue Origin would want to sabotage AST, arguing the failure hurts Blue Origin's own path to Space Force certification and commercial cargo business, so both companies are aligned on fixing the root cause quickly.

Anpanman's estimated timeline: if the first batch ships to Florida around May 19, 2026, with a normal 2-3 week Falcon 9 fairing integration process, that points to a June 2026 launch (though a new satellite design could take longer to integrate).

Anpanman dismisses bear claims that the satellites don't physically fit inside the Falcon 9 fairing, noting AST engineers have already flown on Falcon 9 twice (BlueWalker 3 and the Block 1 BlueBirds) and have access to SpaceX's detailed payload integration manual.

Anpanman expects three Falcon 9 launches of three satellites each (9 satellites total) across June, July, and partially August 2026, followed by the first multi-satellite Blue Origin New Glenn launch of 6 satellites around September 2026.

Anpanman's own math toward 45: 6 satellites already in orbit, plus 9 via three Falcon 9 launches, plus roughly 24 via four assumed Blue Origin launches of 6 satellites each (September-December, contingent on monthly refurbishment cadence) totals about 39; sprinkling in 1-2 more launches could get to 43-45. He stresses this is a stretch goal and that steady month-over-month production cadence (reaching 6/month, then 8, then 12/month) matters more than hitting the exact number.

Anpanman speculates that reaching a 12-satellites-per-month production cadence would let AST stand up a full ~60-satellite mid-band constellation in about 5 months.

Abel Avellan has not sold any shares through the stock's full range -- $10, $2, $1.30, and now in the $70s-$80s after touching $130 -- which Anpanman calls unusual for a founder/CEO; he contrasts this with other executives such as Scott Wisniewski and Andrew Johnson, who have sold a portion (not a majority) of their holdings.

Key executives are paid a modest cash salary (Anpanman cites roughly $250,000/year plus benefits), so selling some stock-based compensation to cover taxes and living costs in an expensive metro area is reasonable and gives executives financial breathing room to focus on the business rather than personal finances.

Anpanman speculates Abel Avellan may feel a 'shareholder pact' with early individual investors who supported the company, and expects at some point an estate planner or advisor will convince him to monetize some portion (5-20%) of his holdings while retaining substantial ownership -- contrasting this with companies like Palantir where insiders have sold heavily.

Anpanman describes the 'kook bottom' concept -- extreme bearish capitulation among investors as a contrarian bottom signal -- and says he personally has experienced a 40% drawdown on much of his public AST portfolio but has not sold any of his core position, only trading around a smaller peripheral portion (partly to avoid triggering capital gains taxes on the core).

Anpanman advises investors to check whether the broader space sector (Rocket Lab, Firefly, Intuitive Machines, etc.) is moving in the same direction before reacting emotionally to AST's daily price moves, and cautions that oversized, margin-fueled positions that cause mental distress should be reduced regardless of investment thesis.

Anpanman names 'Pivotal Capital,' a hedge-fund-affiliated X account, as a reliable contrarian indicator: previously bearish and 'blown up' on AST, then bearish and blown up on HIMS, now mostly posting about college football but occasionally resurfacing to celebrate AST drawdowns (e.g., around the stock hitting $67-69) right before rebounds.

Anpanman criticizes industry consultants he says use bearish AST commentary for media attention or consulting business, naming Tim Ferrar (an industry analyst frequently quoted in bearish articles) and a newer critic, 'Stuart Taylor,' who Anpanman suspects may be a paid consultant for Viasat given his consistently pro-Viasat posting.

Anpanman references a short report published by a college student that recycled 'old tired tropes' of bear arguments against AST, treating its appearance as itself a sentiment/contrarian signal.

Anpanman recaps that Viasat sued AST in New York last fall over the Ligado spectrum deal, seeking to unwind it because Ligado was contractually obligated to pay Viasat money AST provided as part of acquiring 80-year L-band spectrum rights; Anpanman states this AST-to-Ligado payment was $420 million, flagged here as an uncertain/possibly imprecise figure given the AST-Ligado deal is otherwise documented at a larger contingent payment amount.

Anpanman argues Viasat's stock re-rated positively as a result of this dynamic, since the market began treating direct-to-device L-band spectrum as valuable, and Viasat itself pivoted from criticizing the D2D market to trying to pursue it.

Anpanman interprets a recent FCC order on L- and S-band spectrum as establishing that whoever holds US spectrum rights effectively has a first-right-of-refusal to use that spectrum globally (though the FCC has no direct authority over foreign regulators); he argues this favors AST's ability to pursue L-band globally under its agreement with Viasat (which requires interference coordination but doesn't grant Viasat global L-band rights), and speculates that over the long term it may make economic sense for AST and Viasat to cooperate given AST's control of the most valuable US/Canada L-band market.

On S-band, Anpanman notes Starlink has rights to a specific 20x20 MHz portion in the US with another 20x20 MHz still contested; he believes AST's path to securing S-band internationally runs through partnering with local MNOs who have regulatory relationships and existing subscribers.

Asked about Telus's stake, Anpanman confirms Telus is a strategic investor but there is no public filing yet disclosing its holdings; he speculates Telus likely bought additional shares in the open market, though he's unsure of the entity or share count involved.

Asked whether the next 6-satellite batch (referenced by Abel Avellan on the last earnings call) could go up as a double Falcon 9 batch, Anpanman thinks it's more likely split into two separate batches of 3 sent shortly after one another, partly because SpaceX's integration facility processes many payloads and won't want satellites arriving before they're ready to be processed.

Asked when Blue Origin might be clear to fly AST payloads again, Anpanman says it's hard to imagine before September 2026 at the earliest, after which a monthly launch cadence (if booster refurbishment goes well) could resume.

Asked why the AST5000 ASIC isn't yet flying, Anpanman confirms satellites currently use FPGAs (built up to 30 Microns so far) rather than the ASIC, but says he doesn't know exactly why or when the ASIC will be ready; he speculates the ASIC's much higher performance and lower power draw could allow architectural changes (e.g., fewer batteries) that increase per-launch satellite counts (3 to 4 on Falcon 9, 6 to 8 on New Glenn), and suggests this is a good question for management at the upcoming earnings call.

He expects some Golden Dome-related news for AST to trickle out, at a minimum within Q2 2026, though exact timing is unclear; broader macro uncertainty (e.g., Iran) is also weighing on sentiment.

He compares current Q1/Q2 2026 consolidation to 2024 (stock around $3 before AT&T, then Verizon partnership announcements in May, after which the stock never looked back and eventually peaked near $40 in August) and 2025 (stock bottomed near the mid-$20s at end of May, after catalysts including Trump threatening to pull SpaceX/Musk's government contracts, AST's addition to the Russell 1000, the Ligado spectrum term sheet finalizing, and the Vodafone Idea deal - then rallied into the 60s by July and hit $100 in October).

He believes AST is set up for a similar pattern in 2026: consolidation through April/May followed by a batch of catalysts that could reignite the stock, though he cautions macro shocks (e.g., a COVID-like event or armed conflict escalation) could override company-specific fundamentals.

He compares recovery timelines: Falcon 9 mishaps have historically had roughly 2-week FAA investigation turnarounds; the earlier New Glenn booster refire failure took a few weeks to investigate and roughly 1.5-2 months to fix. Based on indirect signals from AST management, he guesses New Glenn could fly again as early as August 2026.

Blue Origin now has two boosters (one named 'Never Tell Me the Odds'); if they reach a roughly 30-day refurbishment cadence per booster, they could launch roughly every two weeks. He estimates Blue Origin will complete about 6-8 launches in 2026 versus an original target of 8-12, with the first post-anomaly commercial launch likely reserved for Amazon's LEO constellation and four consecutive successful commercial launches required before Blue Origin can resume Space Force/government payload launches.

He lays out a speculative shipment/launch cadence: batch 1 (3 Block 2 satellites) ~May 19 via Falcon 9; batch 2 late May/early June; batch 3 mid-June; batch 4 (a larger 6-satellite batch) second half of July, corresponding to Falcon 9 launches in the second half of June, first half of July, and second half of July/early August, followed by the first New Glenn batch of 6 satellites in late August/early September.

He says he wouldn't assign a high probability to actually hitting the 45-satellite target given the New Glenn dependency, and argues the more important metric is how consistently the time between batches shrinks, rather than the arbitrary 45 number itself.

AST currently has 2 thermal-vacuum chambers (TVACs) with 2 more on the way; testing (roughly 2 weeks per satellite) is being done on every satellite in early production batches, following a path similar to Starlink's early testing approach, before shifting to sampling (e.g., every 2nd or 3rd satellite, eventually every 10th-15th) as confidence in the production process builds.

At 12 satellites/month (144/year), and given roughly 90 satellites needed for global coverage, AST would then move to densification satellites (enabling MIMO/carrier aggregation), Block 3 mid-band satellite production, and potentially dedicated government and ex-US sovereign satellite 'shells.'

Citing analysis credited to another X user ('another Smith'), he reads a recent FCC order as granting whoever holds current US MSS L-band or S-band rights (i.e., Ligado/AST) an FCC-recognized priority to pursue those same rights globally with the same US-flagged constellation; a competitor like SpaceX couldn't use its existing US-flagged constellation to operate on L-band in another country and would instead need to build and flag an entirely separate constellation abroad.

He argues this puts Viasat and Inmarsat, which hold pre-existing L-band rights outside the US but not within it, in a difficult position, while AST/Ligado - per their existing coordination agreement with Viasat (to avoid interference) - are not precluded from pursuing L-band rights globally, effectively backed by the FCC's stance.

Initial readings suggested the FCC order shut AST out of S-band entirely in favor of EchoStar, but a typo (also found by 'another Smith') meant the order only covers part of S-band; an additional 20 MHz x 20 MHz block of uplink/downlink S-band spectrum remains unruled-on and could go to EchoStar, Viasat, or AST.

He credits AST's regulatory lead Jennifer Manor, a former EchoStar regulatory-policy veteran with decades of experience, with confidence in navigating toward more L-band access and potentially another 10x10 or 20x20 MHz of S-band.

He frames terrestrial low-band cellular spectrum (600-900 MHz) as the core of AST's business, with carriers initially allocating small slices (e.g., 5 MHz, or 10 MHz for FirstNet) and expected to allocate more over time as AST demonstrates non-interfering, effective coverage; S-band/L-band access is described as incremental upside ('gravy') on top of that core thesis.

He expects Europe's reallocation of 2 GHz S-band MSS spectrum to occur around May 2027, with EchoStar's deal with SpaceX/Starlink expected to close around the end of summer 2027; regulators will assess who has actually deployed service (EchoStar reportedly has done nothing with the spectrum) when deciding allocation between Starlink/EchoStar and AST (partnered with Vodafone Satellite Connect Europe, Orange, Telefonica, and other European telcos).

AST's European vehicle, Satellite Connect Europe, is a Luxembourg-based entity that will be wholly owned/controlled by Europeans with its own 'kill switch'; if that governance structure isn't sufficient for European comfort, AST could build Europe its own dedicated satellite shell (e.g., roughly 30 satellites, his guess) once production cadence and costs allow.

He explains spectrum-band tradeoffs: L-band (~1,500-1,600 MHz) sits between low-band (better coverage/propagation) and mid-band (more data throughput/capacity); S-band spans roughly 1.9-2.2 GHz. AST's Block 2 satellites can communicate across a wide range - roughly 600-900 MHz on the low end and up to 1.5-2.4/2.6 GHz - while Starlink's smaller phased arrays focus on a narrower mid-band range (roughly 1.8-2.2 GHz), including the PCS block and T-Mobile's allocated 1.995 GHz 'G block.'

Starlink's acquisition of EchoStar and partnerships are centered on mid-band spectrum, consistent with its technical sweet spot; mid-band gives good data throughput but weaker propagation/coverage (e.g., in-building) compared to AST's low-band-centric approach.

Globalstar (relevant to Amazon's satellite plans) uses spectrum closer to Wi-Fi, requiring more direct antenna-to-sky pointing; Amazon/Globalstar will rely on MDA Space's older 17 replenishment satellites plus a new, not-yet-produced MDA Space 'Aurora' satellite (50 planned) with a small phased array - expected to improve beamforming efficiency somewhat but not to match AST or Starlink capability.

He expects Apple will eventually develop its own satellite service, but notes it takes significant time - citing that Starlink announced its direct-to-cell initiative in 2022 and is targeting Block 2 BlueBird-level performance only around 2029, partly because it needs its own ASIC and Starship to be ready.

He cites a claim that Starlink's V2 satellites, once operational, could achieve over 120-130 Mbps, compared to AST's current satellites already exceeding 150 Mbps on FPGA (pre-ASIC) hardware.

He argues AST's advantage is building satellites in-house rather than 'by purchase order': when a design issue arises (e.g., the composite shell problem AST previously encountered), AST can redesign and direct its own manufacturer to fix it quickly, whereas working through a prime contractor like MDA Space involves slow contractual processes and cost overruns.

Asked when AST could provide intermittent US coverage, he says it's technically possible today but would be very intermittent; he estimates roughly 25 satellites would support limited FirstNet/alpha-stage coverage, while reasonably good intermittent coverage for full-scale open beta testing with AT&T and Verizon customers would need around 45 satellites in view/service.

Asked about analyst Tim Farrar's recent criticism of AST on latency/altitude, he declines to engage in detail, saying he doesn't follow Farrar's commentary and considers him a consistently poor forecaster.

He characterizes Farrar as a paid consultant whose negative public positioning drives clients to hire him for due diligence calls, and says several SpaceMob investors sold at a loss in 2022-2024 after being influenced by his bearish commentary.

He expects the upcoming SpaceX IPO to remain a catalyst for the broader space sector, but expresses some concern that SpaceX is increasingly bundled with unrelated ventures (an option to acquire Cursor, and xAI), diluting its value as a 'pure space play'; he notes rumors of a $3-3.5 trillion valuation against roughly $15 billion of revenue last year, a high multiple reflecting future rather than historical expectations.

He points to Amazon's strong recent stock performance as partly reflecting growing investor perception of 'space exposure,' driven by its Globalstar deal (expected to close next year) and a growing cadence of Amazon LEO/Kuiper satellite launches (two recent launches cited).

He urges investors not to be overleveraged during volatile drawdown periods, not to fixate on daily stock price moves, and to use the consolidation period to read and deepen their understanding of the investment thesis rather than capitulate before the anticipated May catalysts.

He plans to attend the next three Falcon 9 launches (June, July, August) and the subsequent Blue Origin New Glenn launch (expected around August/September) carrying the first 6-satellite batch.

Kook recaps returning from Orlando exhausted after learning the fate of BB-7, framing the launch as a success in 99 ways and a failure in only one, while acknowledging his own bias as a hopelessly positive long-term holder.

Kook says the team was confident in the company's tech and future but 'confused' about how SpaceX or Amazon (using third-party contractor MDA) will build a competing solution.

Kook argues a common thread behind past constellation failures (Teledesic, ICO) was reliance on a prime contractor leading to protracted disputes; cites Viasat's antenna problems similarly, contrasting with AST's and SpaceX's vertical integration.

Kook explains 150 Mbps relates to per-beam capacity; each satellite can produce roughly 2,000 beams. He contrasts this with SpaceX Direct-to-Cell, which he recalls Musk described as roughly 4 Mbps per beam, framing AST's throughput as superior spectral efficiency per MHz.

Kook reiterates the hardest part is scaling AST's own satellite factory simultaneously with financing and team-building, comparing it to SpaceX's Starship infrastructure and Blue Origin's program.

Kook says FM1/FM2's value was shaking down the production line: phased arrays (Microns) seemingly ahead of schedule; composite rings a persistent bottleneck; satellite buses being shipped in via Antonov aircraft.

Kook jokes about predicting a production-cadence ramp for roughly 9 months without it materializing, but believes a steady cadence is coming soon and that the factory is a large, defensible source of value.

Kook guesses Abel did not call Bezos and 'chew him out,' and that AST and Blue Origin remain committed to working together, with Blue Origin now 'owing' AST after losing its satellite.

Kook notes Blue Origin landed its booster and reached orbit, but the second-stage circularization burn failed, leaving the satellite in an elliptical orbit; he states, with hedging, the orbit was roughly 116 km perigee by 400 km apogee, causing excess drag.

Kook notes the lost satellite was a copy/insurance satellite for the SDA program, a twin of FM1, and AST used a higher risk posture on it (hot-firing while mated), suggesting the mission wasn't make-or-break.

Kook recounts a past FUD claim (account 'Free Speech') that AST was missing an FAA debris-mitigation grandfather period; Kook researched it and found the claim false, with AST fully compliant.

Kook says the failure gave AST a real-world deorbit example, previously only hypothetical amid 'Kessler effect' concerns; cites a video (@MVCrisis) apparently showing the satellite breaking up, roughly matching a Harvard professor's tracked orbital path (with some timing discrepancy).

Kook concludes this closed the loop on a major debris-mitigation FUD question, and separately notes this is the company's first public launch failure, which he believes will teach investors such dips are buying opportunities.

Kook says hedge funds are fixated on whether AST will 'get to 45' satellites, but he personally focuses on pace and trajectory instead (e.g., 20-30 satellites up by year-end).

Kook notes the stock traded around $78 after the failed launch, referencing a tweet from Anpanman summarizing upcoming catalysts (Falcon 9 batches, Golden Dome, FirstNet, Ligado FCC approval).

Kook argues this creates an 'impenetrable moat': low-band requires wide phased-array element spacing (large satellites), and since ~80% of traffic is indoors, low-band penetration is crucial; SpaceX (S-band only) cannot access it the way AST can.