Episodes

Kook speculates this could reflect deeper native integration beyond AST's baseline 'no special hardware needed' compatibility, pointing to the AT&T/Vodafone/Google side letter and language in the Ligado bankruptcy documents that reportedly contemplates Apple-device integration on the L-band spectrum, with 'real economics tied to that.'

Kook is unsure whether the demoed connection ran over AST's own proprietary test network/core (for testing purposes) or through an actual MNO core; he notes AST previously confirmed (with AT&T corroboration) making calls directly through an MNO core, but his 'strong suspicion' is that this particular clip used AST's own test core rather than a live MNO core, though he says he doesn't know for sure.

Kook thinks it's 'very reasonable' that a formal Apple/AST partnership story (e.g., in a major outlet) eventually surfaces, similar to how Apple's cooperation with Starlink/T-Mobile became public, and expects Apple to likewise 'accommodate' AT&T and Verizon; he flags a hypothetical tweet from an analyst he calls Katsy/Cathie describing an 'iOS 26 development beta with native FaceTime app doing livestream over Bluebird satellite' as a first take that hasn't been confirmed.

Kook separately notes there is 'strong hope' AST's next launch (FM-1) will fly on a SpaceX Falcon 9, with a lower (and seemingly declining) chance it ends up on Blue Origin's New Glenn 2, but no confirmed date exists yet; he says he has asked industry contacts but has no firm answer.

Kook and @TutuFly attribute the drop mainly to the market conflating normal seasonal weakness with the delayed satellite launch and the SpaceX spectrum-purchase headline, rather than any real change in AST's fundamentals; Kook notes 'the stock price writes the news.'

Kook believes actual deployment will take considerably longer than SpaceX's stated ~2-year timeline, noting the deal itself won't even close until 2027, and full commercial deployment would still require Apple/Google/Qualcomm-ecosystem chipset support plus FCC approval — putting real availability at 2028 or later in his 'worst case' framing.

Kook's own (self-described 'unpopular') read, published as his own tweet, is that the spectrum purchase was a defensive move by SpaceX rather than evidence of market dominance — arguing Starlink began as a byproduct business to fill spare Falcon 9 launch capacity, uses Ka/Ku-band frequencies that don't require AST's large phased arrays, and was never structured for the MNO partnerships that direct-to-device requires.

Kook argues Elon Musk historically avoids partnerships (citing that Tesla never partnered with GM) and doubts Musk would want to work through AT&T's and Verizon's technical/MNO processes; Musk has said he intends to compete as his own MNO, while also acknowledging existing MNOs 'aren't going anywhere' because of their spectrum holdings.

Kook estimates AST SpaceMobile could have a generally available commercial service with continuous coverage in key markets as early as 2026, versus SpaceX's spectrum deal not closing until 2027 and (his worst-case assumption) not deploying until 2028+ — implying at least a 3-year AST head start even before considering chip development.

Kook, citing an informal conversation with a friend who is a principal engineer at Nvidia, argues that a custom low-power ASIC (like AST's AST5000) is essential to make satellite-to-unmodified-phone beamforming power-efficient, and believes no competitor — including SpaceX — is likely to have a comparable ASIC on the market in under 3 to 5 years.

Kook also flags unresolved technical questions for SpaceX around beamforming, Doppler-effect compensation, and MNO-core network integration, noting AST's own carrier integration reportedly took 'hundreds of thousands of hours' of engineering effort to get working.

Kook relays that 'Professor' Kevin Mack characterized the SpaceX/EchoStar spectrum deal as 'largely a non-event' and expects the direct-to-device market to ultimately support three global players, a framing Kook says he agrees with.

Kook cites an essay from a contributor called Jagaloon arguing that AST's structural advantages built over the past year (its own spectrum, partner relationships) outweigh the week's negative headlines.

On the All-In podcast, when a co-host remarked that 'Verizon kind of sucks,' Elon Musk reportedly nodded along; Kook doubts this plays well in Verizon's boardroom and thinks it reduces the odds of a SpaceX-Verizon commercial relationship.

Kook speculates Musk's real long-term ambition behind the spectrum purchase could be building his own 'X Phone' to bypass Apple's app-store/gatekeeper model, reading Musk's past dismissive comments about an 'X phone' as effectively signaling one is coming.

Kook argues this dynamic could push Apple and Google toward supporting AST SpaceMobile as the 'carrier neutral' — and, in his new framing, 'handset-manufacturer neutral' — option, since AST has no plan to build its own phone, unlike a hypothetical SpaceX-built device that would threaten Apple/Google's ecosystems directly.

Kook estimates (his own rough, unverified math) that AST paid roughly $2 billion all-in for 45 MHz of L-band spectrum — about $550 million upfront plus roughly $200+ million of stock plus $80 million/year of lease payments capitalized — versus SpaceX's $19 billion for 50 MHz of S-band spectrum that isn't yet supported by any handset.

Kook relays an analysis (attributed to 'Katsy'/Cathie) explaining the price gap: EchoStar's S-band has viable alternative terrestrial/other-constellation uses, while Ligado's L-band was largely 'orphaned' (blocked from terrestrial use due to interference, previously tied mainly to Inmarsat's narrowband maritime use); L-band's lower frequency also requires roughly 30% wider antenna element spacing than S-band (about 10cm vs. 7cm half-wavelength), meaning about 69% more physical antenna area for equivalent gain.

Kook doesn't yet know whether the FirstNet commercial structure will be a lump-sum contract or usage-based against FirstNet's roughly 6 million subscribers, and speculates pricing could land in a $10-$20/month range.

Kook doesn't know what contractual form AST's Golden Dome-related work might take (e.g., selling satellites outright per unit vs. an ongoing service/software contract), but argues AST's vertically integrated, non-radiation-hardened manufacturing approach (avoiding costs he estimates run up to 20x higher for satellites built to survive 15 years) could let it sell satellites at roughly half the price of traditional 'job shop' competitors, plus attach recurring service revenue.

Kook argues the Homestead facility's importance may be underestimated, since it could serve as a key recruiting tool for top engineering talent outside Midland — he notes, by comparison, that BlueWalker 3 was reportedly built by a core team of only about 12 people, calling this his own speculation.

Kook's own opportunity-cost estimate: Starlink must replace roughly 5 satellites per day (about a full Falcon 9 launch every 5 days) just to hold its constellation flat because its satellites fly low (around 300km) and deorbit quickly, implying roughly $5 billion/year of maintenance capex at retail launch pricing, or about $2.5 billion/year assuming (his own guess of) a 50% launch margin.

Kook questions whether Starlink is fundamentally a good business today, citing historical ARPU north of $100/month (now being cut), terminal subsidies functioning as a customer-acquisition cost, and 'double churn' (subscriber churn plus satellite-fleet churn), and suggests its economics may depend heavily on an unproven transition to Starship and V3 satellites.

Kook raises a possible regulatory tail risk for SpaceX: given the pace and scale of its LEO launches, international regulators (e.g., the ITU) could eventually restrict further megaconstellation buildout on orbital-congestion/re-entry-pollution grounds, potentially favoring AST's much smaller (~100-satellite) constellation design.

Starlink's existing direct-to-cell efforts on T-Mobile have had technical issues operating on what Anpanman believes is 5-by-5 megahertz of spectrum; the EchoStar purchase gives them more spectrum for higher capacity.

Beyond chipsets, the service also requires SpaceX's V3 satellites, which per Anpanman's understanding of SpaceX's plan will only become available once Starship is operational on a successful, regular launch cadence — a second bottleneck.

Anpanman estimates the V3 satellites' larger phased array at roughly 5 meters by 5 meters, compared to AST SpaceMobile's 15-meter-by-15-meter array — still a disadvantage for Starlink despite having more satellites for coverage.

The wider megahertz bandwidth from the EchoStar spectrum should help Starlink solve some of its current interference issues versus operating in a narrow band.

Starlink today, and for the foreseeable future, only operates on mid-band spectrum — currently 1900 MHz — and will expand into 2 GHz once new satellites are running; this gives decent capacity/throughput outdoors but weaker penetration through walls and buildings.

AST SpaceMobile and Starlink both currently need an MNO partner to deliver service and access economics (install base, marketing, sales); unlike Iridium, which had to build a vertically-integrated company, sign its own customers, and develop its own handset from scratch, AST works in a revenue-split partnership model with AT&T and Verizon.

Starlink already partners with T-Mobile (marketed as 'T-Satellite'), even though the two compete in fixed wireless today; Anpanman calls this a 'Faustian bargain' because T-Mobile is spending marketing dollars promoting a service that could become an increasingly direct competitor.

The most likely path for Starlink to build a full consumer wireless offering would be an MVNO (mobile virtual network operator) relationship with T-Mobile and/or a combination of AT&T and Verizon — similar in structure to Mint Mobile or Boost, which use someone else's network under a brand.

Near-term, an MNO might find an MVNO deal with Starlink economically attractive (getting paid for network access even at a discount), and there's a prisoner's-dilemma dynamic where if one carrier partners with Starlink, the other two are worse off for not partnering too.

Long-term, if Starlink's mobile service grows large — Anpanman spitballs a hypothetical of 50 million subscribers as a 'credible 4th wireless competitor' — the carrier that initially partnered loses negotiating leverage at contract renewal and could be forced to accept far worse terms, effectively selling its business for pennies on the dollar over time.

Whoever controls the customer relationship controls pricing power; MNOs currently 'own the keys to wireless mobile access' the way SpaceMobile-related discussions sometimes joke about companies owning 'the keys to space' — even Apple's leverage over MNOs has weakened over time as Android/Samsung's market share has grown.

By providing Starlink with T-Mobile's PCS-G block spectrum to offer US service, T-Mobile's leverage over Starlink has diminished significantly now that Starlink also owns its own EchoStar spectrum.

Anpanman contrasts how Abel Avellan or Scott Wisniewski would likely respond to the same 'will you compete with MNOs' question — insisting AST is a wholesaler in 50/50 partnership with MNOs — versus Musk's response affirming an intent to eventually create a global wireless service competing with regional carriers.

Those cable-branded wireless efforts got a few million subscribers each but were largely viewed as failures, partly due to cable companies' notoriously poor customer service; eventually cable companies sold their spectrum back to MNOs rather than build out their own towers.

Starlink is a 'different animal' than the cable companies because of its stronger brand (the Tesla/SpaceX halo effect), making the competitive calculus for MNOs partnering with it more serious than the cable-MVNO precedent.

If Musk ends up owning the customer relationship via a bundled wireless service, there's a real possibility of an X-branded or Tesla-branded phone with deep integration (XAI, Tesla vehicle integration, pre-installed apps) — a genuine strategic threat to Apple and Samsung's core hardware and services businesses (App Store, iCloud, etc.).

The strategic question is broader than MNOs or handsets — it's whether the industry ends up on 'the Elon stack' (vertically integrated) or an 'open stack' of companies working together, which is where AST SpaceMobile fits as an enabler of an open ecosystem for Microsoft, Amazon, and Google.

This open-ecosystem thesis is why Google made a strategic investment in AST SpaceMobile, and Anpanman expects Apple, Amazon, and Microsoft to eventually contemplate similar investments to preserve an open environment for their apps.

Building a phone is historically difficult — Microsoft's own handset effort failed, and Amazon's Fire Phone attempt (along with rumored MVNO plans) never took off — so Musk's path to a competing device/service isn't guaranteed even if the strategic potential is real.

Only 50-70% of land geography is covered by terrestrial MNO networks despite carriers claiming ~99% population coverage; drones, autonomous vehicles, and trucks will need 100% persistent, often high-throughput/low-latency coverage, which is where AST's broadband model (versus low-throughput/high-latency alternatives) matters.

AST's broadband satellite service is expected to roll out in 2026, while Starlink's equivalent broadband capability (dependent on the new EchoStar spectrum and V3 satellites) is more likely 2027-2028.

When Musk had conflict with Trump and threatened to pull NASA missions and ISS access, it gave the US government a wake-up call that it can't rely on a single company/founder for critical needs, reinforcing the case for dual or triple-sourcing launch, communications, and imaging providers.

Europeans similarly learned the importance of sovereignty and control after Starlink service was reportedly cut over Ukraine, which is part of why AST formed the SatCo joint venture with Vodafone (Vodafone leading in Europe), with MNOs across 21 member countries beyond Vodafone expressing interest in signing up.

AST's role isn't just consumer wireless — it's also relevant for first-responder networks and defense applications, both of which value multi-supplier redundancy.

In Europe specifically, Starlink may be disadvantaged when spectrum renewals come up in 2027 given the politicization of Starlink around Ukraine and a European focus on sovereignty/defense.

The market is shaping into a 2-horse race, perhaps a 3-horse race if Globalstar or Iridium finds a way to remain relevant in a different capacity.

Hypothetically, if SpaceX (valued around $400 billion) wanted to buy T-Mobile (enterprise value about $377 billion), it would be close to a merger of equals requiring SpaceX to issue substantial stock, likely causing Elon to lose control of SpaceX — which Anpanman thinks makes it implausible.

Anpanman compares a hypothetical all-stock SpaceX acquisition of T-Mobile to AOL's stock-funded acquisition of Time Warner, which cratered in value after the dot-com bubble burst — questioning whether Deutsche Telekom (which owns just under 50% of T-Mobile) would want to take 'SpaceX paper.'

Even if SpaceX bought one MNO, it would then need to acquire operators market-by-market globally to fully bypass MNOs, which would be extremely expensive and face regulatory hurdles (e.g., whether European/UK regulators would allow a US company to buy a local carrier).

On AST vs. Starlink for DoD PNT/IoT-type applications: Starlink already does some of this via Starshield, but AST SpaceMobile's differentiated large phased array can do specific non-communications use cases better — the company has cited about 10 unique non-communications use cases.

On concerns SpaceX could refuse to launch AST's satellites: SpaceX (Starlink) and SpaceX (launch) are separate businesses, and SpaceX has repeatedly launched competitors' satellites (OneWeb, Globalstar, Iridium); acting anti-competitively would also raise antitrust concerns under the Clayton Act and Sherman Act and push customers toward Blue Origin/Rocket Lab.

Confirmed to a listener that Starlink's newly acquired spectrum requires chip modifications, similar to AST's Ligado spectrum, though Ligado support in chipsets is further along; phones supporting either spectrum are expected around 2027, coinciding with when the respective mid-band constellations become operational.

Beyond MSS spectrum (Ligado for AST, AWS-3 for Starlink), carriers also hold other non-MSS cellular mid-band spectrum from 1.7-2.6 GHz; both AST and Starlink can enable supplemental or primary coverage on that spectrum for MNO partners once their respective mid-band constellations are operational.

On whether OmniSpace's S-band holdings could be significant: Anpanman is unsure, describing OmniSpace as a 'paper constellation' company with spectrum rights in South America and elsewhere that could eventually be acquired or partnered with, or could lose its licenses, as the market matures into 2-3 players.

On whether T-Mobile could realistically leave Starlink: Anpanman believes there's a path, likely sometime in 2026 once a roughly one-year exclusivity period ends; AT&T has an exclusivity arrangement with AST, while Verizon is not exclusive (it also works with Skylo for simple texting via a GEO satellite service) alongside AST.

Skylo is explained as a middleware/reseller company (not an owner of spectrum or satellites) that aggregates GEO satellite services from providers like Viasat, EchoStar, and Ligado and offers basic texting (and reportedly limited voice) connectivity, currently offered on some Verizon phones; Skylo would become an AST customer once Ligado is acquired by AST, and might also become a Starlink customer, though Anpanman is unsure and needs to research further.

Once the launch campaign starts, Anpanman expects a cadence of roughly every 1-2 months, sending batches of 3 to as many as 8 Block 2 satellites into space at a time.

No new Golden Dome updates, but Anpanman feels strongly (based on management commentary/body language and conversations with people familiar with Golden Dome and contractors) that AST's involvement will happen, with timing as the main open question given Trump wants Golden Dome active before his term ends (a little over 3 years away).

Anpanman guesses initial Golden Dome-related contract awards could start emerging toward the end of September, though it's unclear whether AST would be part of an initial award or a subsequent one.

Ligado spectrum (1.5-1.6 GHz) offers better propagation/coverage while AWS-4 spectrum (about 1.9-2 GHz depending on uplink/downlink) offers slightly better capacity; the Department of Defense already has some applications operating in and around Ligado's spectrum, which could position AST well for future defense applications there.

AST was able to acquire Ligado spectrum usage rights at a very low upfront cost partly because of historical interference concerns (when Ligado's stakeholders originally tried to roll out a terrestrial wireless service using spectrum intended for mobile satellite service); AST's satellite architecture is expected to overcome those interference concerns while returning the spectrum to its originally intended satellite-terrestrial use, though Ligado stakeholders retain a revenue-share stake in the upside.

Ligado has stated in its bankruptcy proceedings that its spectrum (on a full-ownership basis) is worth around $33 billion; Anpanman conservatively values AST's 80-year usage rights to that spectrum at $15-20 billion.

Against AST SpaceMobile's roughly $13.5 billion enterprise value, Anpanman argues an investor buying the stock today is effectively getting the Ligado spectrum rights for less than their conservative value and getting the rest of AST's commercial and defense business for free — versus a few months ago when the market ascribed the stock a $60/share value reflecting both the Ligado upside and the broader commercial/defense business.

Anpanman's closing view: Musk's comments confirm the long-term intent to compete with MNOs, which makes strategic sense for Starlink, but MNOs are powerful (T-Mobile's valuation is comparable to SpaceX's, with AT&T and Verizon also large) and will fight back using AST SpaceMobile as 'the tip of the spear,' creating enterprise value for both AST and the carriers that partner with it.

Kook describes the stock price behavior over the past year as chaotic, with retail investors and even institutions who lack full conviction in the thesis panicking around near-term events (like whether FM1 ships August 31st or September 1st) even though such micro-timing doesn't affect long-term company value.

Kook compares ASTS to a 'King Tut portfolio' of long-duration, back-ended-NPV secular winners (including companies like Aurora) that all got hit hard during the recent August/September growth-stock, interest-rate-driven market dislocation — he argues this doesn't mean the theses are wrong.

Real-time short interest (per 'NPMN' data, likely referring to Ortex or similar short-interest tracking) rose from 33 million shares at the start of August to 41.7 million shares; Kook says shorts covered near $60 and reloaded in the low $40s, and that the true directional short increase is larger than the raw 8-9 million share change because convertible-note hedgers would have reduced their delta/hedge size as the price fell.

Kook argues that shorts believe management has 'lost credibility' over ambiguous wording in recent press releases (the 'definition of is' framing), and that he sometimes plays along publicly as a fearful paper-hand to encourage further short buildup before an eventual squeeze.

Kook discusses stop-losses and chart/technical-analysis debates (referencing 'Reformed Trader' and others) as generally antithetical to a fundamentals-based, multi-year investment approach, arguing the people who make the most money focus on fundamentals over a long horizon rather than technicals.

Kook describes receiving an AT&T-branded gift package (a 'Dallas We Have a Connection' waffle maker, a power bank, and other items) with countdown-style messaging around the same time as FM1 shipment timing questions, and frames this as AT&T — effectively an informed insider given its spectrum lease, FCC lobbying, and launch coordination role — signaling that things are on track by generating organic investor buzz.

Kook encourages listeners who hold ASTS stock and are T-Mobile subscribers to switch to AT&T, framing AT&T's marketing outreach to investors as a sign of confidence in the AST SpaceMobile partnership.

Kook expects possible 'SpaceX lawfare' opposition during the comment process, similar to prior instances where the FCC dismissed SpaceX's objections as moot during other AST-related dockets.

Kook believes FM1 has already completed TVAC (thermal-vacuum chamber) testing and is now undergoing additional testing (e.g., battery maintenance/testing, propellant-loading considerations) before it is actually shipped, noting that 'ready to ship' does not mean testing stops.

Kook says the FM2 structure is visible in newly released photos and appears ready for integration work, per analysis credited to an X user 'Katzi.'

Kook cites a tweet (from 'Cyrus the Great') showing multiple AST SpaceMobile engineering job postings located in Tyson's Corner, Virginia — a hub for defense-industry/DOD-adjacent companies — well outside the Midland, Texas base, as evidence AST is standing up a government/defense hub.

Additional job postings cited (from 'Buckeye State' and 'cats') require expertise in 'military systems and waveforms' and describe a Fairwinds Technology-related 'next generation network account manager' role responsible for militarizing AST's broadband device with AFD tactical hub systems across military branches.

Kook connects this hiring wave to the broader 'Golden Dome' missile-defense initiative, saying he hopes for (but doesn't know if AST will get) a 'marquee role' in Golden Dome, and expects a large, sticky, bond-like government/DOD revenue stream on top of AST's consumer business, similar to how the market values SpaceX's government revenue.

Kook summarizes a Barron's article titled around the idea that Elon Musk/SpaceX has a 'natural monopoly' in low-Earth-orbit satellite broadband due to high fixed costs and economies of scale, but argues AST SpaceMobile has an even stronger natural-monopoly case because of its commercial (MNO-based, super-wholesale) model, which SpaceX's vertically-integrated launch-plus-constellation model lacks.

Kook argues launch services are likely a commoditizing, low-moat business subject to price competition, whereas AST's deep ties with MNOs (with the three main US carriers largely already spoken for) create a durable competitive moat that a third-party trying to build a rival constellation could not easily replicate, referencing Scott Wisniewski's comment on the BofA fireside chat that telecom markets typically settle into 2, maybe a distant 3rd competitor.

Kook believes that once investors broadly accept the 'natural monopoly' framing for satellite-to-phone connectivity (already applied to SpaceX/Starlink), it becomes easier to extend that framing — and the resulting high trading multiples (comparing to Palantir-like multiples) — to AST SpaceMobile.

Kook theorizes that some AST short interest is driven by hedge funds with large EchoStar positions (exposed to the implied stub value of Charlie Ergen's Aurora direct-to-device constellation being built by MDA) using a short position in AST SpaceMobile as a hedge against that EchoStar exposure, since there is no other sufficiently liquid vehicle to short that risk directly.

Kook argues anyone running an 'EchoStar long / ASTS short' pairs trade carries significant idiosyncratic risk, and suspects such traders haven't fully considered that AST relies on internal vertical integration rather than a third-party prime contractor (as Aurora reportedly does), which he believes matters for execution flexibility and agility.

Kook references investor concern that AST may only launch around 6 satellites in 2025, with more satellites (he references a number that in the transcript sounds like '200' but which is very likely a garbled/mis-transcribed figure, possibly meant to be a much smaller number like 20) following in early 2026 — he says this caused brief panic but argues the passage of time reduces the practical impact of any such slip, especially since the earlier real risk (that a delay could threaten the company's ability to fund itself) is now off the table.

Kook says it's still unclear where FM1 will end up in the launch queue, but there is hope it could get an accelerated launch slot sometime in October.

Kook draws an analogy to Tesla's product-line market-cap unlocks (Roadster, then Model S as proof of concept, then the much larger unlock from Model 3 mass-market production, then further unlocks from Shanghai/Germany factories and new TAM from products like Optimus), predicting AST SpaceMobile will follow similar step-function unlocks and could eventually reach a market cap in the hundreds of billions of dollars.

The transaction is valued at $17 billion, which Anpanman calls a 'bet' by SpaceX that validates the direct-to-device market AST SpaceMobile has been building since 2017, countering years of skepticism from legacy industry players about whether the technology or economics would work.

Anpanman says most of the market had priced in this outcome as a relatively low probability, and that most industry watchers expected T-Mobile (or, less likely, Verizon) to end up with the spectrum rather than SpaceX.

SpaceX will also retain EchoStar's European S-band spectrum rights through 2027, when those licenses come up for renewal; Anpanman guesses regulators will eventually split European S-band roughly three ways among Iris (the EU's homegrown solution), SpaceX/Starlink (if renewed), and AST SpaceMobile via its SatCo joint venture.

Anpanman explains that most of the $17 billion price reflects the already-FCC-allocated US AWS-3, AWS-4, and H-block spectrum (roughly 1.9-2.0 GHz, i.e. higher mid-band), which he contrasts with AST's Ligado L-band spectrum (1.5-1.7 GHz, lower mid-band), calling AST's Ligado deal the closer apples-to-apples comparison.

The deal will need FCC review; Anpanman guesses it could be approved sometime next year (2026), around a similar timeframe to the Ligado deal's approval, and doesn't see a reason the FCC would block it given the agency's stated interest in getting unused spectrum into service.

Anpanman guesses SpaceX's spectrum won't be usable until its V3 satellites and Starship are operational, drawing a rough parallel to AST's own Ligado-spectrum timeline of satellites launching toward the end of 2026 and mid-band service starting sometime in 2027 (his own guess, not stated as company guidance).

AST SpaceMobile stock sold off this morning to as low as $36 a share, which Anpanman says put the enterprise value at roughly $12 billion at that point -- below his estimate of Ligado spectrum's standalone value -- and he says he personally bought stock during the dip, calling the $30s a great buying opportunity.

Later in the discussion Anpanman revises his reference enterprise-value figure for AST to about $14 billion versus his estimated $20 billion value for Ligado, reiterating that he thinks the market is mispricing AST relative to its spectrum assets alone.

Globalstar shares rose about 70% on the news, which Anpanman attributes to investors assigning new value to Globalstar's own (limited) spectrum holdings -- he estimates Globalstar holds around 11 MHz of L-band plus roughly 5 MHz of uplink and 5 MHz of downlink, though he says he needs to research this further.

Anpanman relays that an institutional portfolio manager (a friend's contact at a large 'pod shop') called to say they were buying AST stock because they believed the market's negative reaction was wrong and that the deal would bring far more institutional focus to the direct-to-device sector broadly.

Anpanman notes AST stock had already sold off over the prior week before today's announcement, which he attributes to information leakage among hedge funds and industry insiders rather than any company-specific negative news.

Anpanman argues SpaceX 'absolutely had to' do this deal because its phased-array technology can't currently form precise beams, making unlicensed reliance on partner terrestrial spectrum untenable for country-by-country service; owning MSS-type spectrum lets it cover wide areas without respecting borders as strictly.

Anpanman contrasts AST's 'super wholesaler' model -- partnering with MNOs, no ambition to become a carrier -- with Starlink's fixed-wireless business, which already competes directly with MNOs' fixed-wireless and fiber offerings, arguing Starlink's business model is fundamentally less MNO-friendly.

Anpanman lays out a path by which Starlink could eventually become closer to a full MNO -- e.g., a virtual network operator (MVNO) deal with T-Mobile for low-band coverage, similar to how Boost Mobile or Mint operate today -- while saying a full standalone MNO buildout, or acquiring T-Mobile outright, would be very costly and difficult globally.

Anpanman raises the odds that Elon Musk eventually releases his own Starlink-branded phone as 'semi-decent' and higher than before this deal, envisioning an MVNO arrangement with T-Mobile for low-band coverage plus Starlink's own spectrum for a broadband boost, though he stops short of calling it likely.

Anpanman expects this deal will pressure MNOs to sign with AST SpaceMobile sooner rather than later as a hedge against Starlink's growing capability, and expects AST to announce additional MNO partnerships in the coming months and quarters.

Anpanman argues the deal validates AST's own January 2025 decision to acquire Ligado's spectrum out of bankruptcy (45 MHz of L-band across the US and Canada, 80-year rights), which some investors had questioned as a pivot away from AST's core business at the time.

Anpanman says AST separately paid roughly $67 million for global S-band ITU priority rights, describing it as an 'ante' that puts AST third in line (behind EchoStar and OmniSpace) to negotiate S-band allocations with regulators in markets where S-band has not yet been assigned.

Anpanman expects that in most global markets where S-band rights are unallocated, regulators will split allocations between AST SpaceMobile and SpaceX/Starlink (e.g., 5x5 MHz or 10x10 MHz each) rather than award all of it to one player, partly because governments prefer not to rely on a single provider, especially for defense/first-responder use cases.

Anpanman frames the consumer direct-to-device TAM using a Bank of America estimate of roughly $30 billion annually, not counting government and defense applications, and argues that market size was never going to support a single winner.

Anpanman predicts the sector settles into a 'highly profitable duopoly' between AST SpaceMobile and SpaceX/Starlink rather than the three-player oligopoly structure typical of traditional wireless markets, given the scale of investment required in spectrum and constellations.

EchoStar is set to receive more than $7 billion of SpaceX stock as part of the transaction, which Anpanman says appears to be a fixed-dollar-value award (SpaceX shares reportedly valued at $212/share); he flags a risk that if SpaceX later raises a round at a higher valuation, EchoStar would simply receive fewer (not more valuable) shares for the same fixed dollar amount.

Anpanman says EchoStar becomes a 'risk arb' trade post-announcement, with remaining optionality tied to whether EchoStar's pay-TV assets (Dish/Sling) eventually merge with DirecTV, a combination that has failed regulatory approval in the past but could be more feasible under the current administration.

Anpanman calls this an awkward dynamic for the T-Mobile/SpaceX partnership going forward, questioning what it signals about SpaceX's long-term intentions toward T-Mobile even as both companies publicly frame the deal as strengthening their partnership.

Anpanman argues the deal puts pressure on Apple's Globalstar partnership, since Globalstar's planned next-generation constellation (built with MDA Space) is not expected to support broadband capability, leaving Apple's satellite strategy narrower than what SpaceX may eventually offer.

Anpanman views the deal as a net positive for Google, reasoning that if Starlink eventually builds its own phone it would likely run Android, giving Google more device share rather than less -- though he stresses this is speculative and years out.

Anpanman says other companies pursuing their own direct-to-device constellations (e.g., Viasat) are now effectively reduced to being 'spectrum bets' given the difficulty of fielding a credible constellation to compete with AST and SpaceX.

Asked whether this deal affects EchoStar's role as an AT&T MVNO for Boost Mobile, Anpanman says he doesn't think it changes the near-term contractual relationship, though it could matter whenever the arrangement is renegotiated in future years.

Asked whether the spectrum could be used for fixed wireless rather than only direct-to-device, Anpanman says yes, it's possible depending on satellite bandwidth capability, though performance to a phone's small antenna won't match a dedicated dish-based service like Starlink or Kuiper.

Asked why AST stock dropped in the three days before this announcement, Anpanman speculates it reflects information leakage among hedge funds and industry insiders piecing together signs the deal was coming (e.g., the Semafor report on T-Mobile's bidding), rather than any AST-specific bad news.

Asked whether T-Mobile could join AST SpaceMobile's MNO coalition once its Starlink exclusivity ends in a few months, Anpanman says he doesn't expect it near-term, since AT&T and Verizon likely prefer to let T-Mobile struggle competitively, though he says regulators or a strategic reassessment by AT&T/Verizon could theoretically open the door.

AST sees about 10 distinct individual government use cases (comms and non-comms), each of which could become a 'program of record,' which Wisniewski said typically implies $100 million-plus opportunities per year.

Wisniewski expects the launch industry to stay tight through 2025 and 2026, then open up considerably thereafter.

AST's key differentiator versus Starlink Direct-to-Cell, T-Mobile's satellite service, and Amazon Kuiper is delivering broadband directly to the 6 billion existing phones without requiring a $1,000 dish, avoiding the high ARPU ($100+/month) that a dish-dependent business model would require.

AST expects a 5-to-10-year technology advantage, reinforced by pairing its satellite technology lead with long-lived spectrum assets to preserve strategic advantage over time.

Wisniewski agreed the roughly $30 billion TAM figure cited by the moderator is broadly consistent with market research, and said reasonable ARPU and penetration assumptions could easily support tens of billions of dollars in revenue for the direct-to-device market.

Wisniewski described the market as not winner-take-all — comparable to carrier-neutral outsourced services in other industries with multiple players and dual sourcing — with AST expecting to be a leader and the primary player in the early years, but not the only company in the space long-term.

Africa has 40-plus countries with diverse ability to pay, and large portions of the continent are still covered only by 2G, representing an upgrade opportunity for AST's cellular broadband service.

AT&T's FirstNet program (built for first responders, with a couple million subscribers) is a model AST's technology could extend to; use cases include restoring texts and voice calls during power outages or disasters, citing a scary outage in Spain last summer and US wildfire/flooding network outages as examples.

Wisniewski characterized first responder/disaster recovery as a second-tier use case and revenue opportunity relative to consumer and US government revenue, but one with high flow-through margins.

The higher-altitude satellites will have better communication characteristics and won't deorbit as quickly, meaning less cash will need to go toward maintenance capex and more toward constellation expansion, R&D, or potentially future shareholder distributions.

This brings the total authorized fleet to 25 'big boy' BlueBird satellites plus BlueWalker 3; Kook calls it a 'point of no return' toward cash-flow breakeven or positivity and toward continuous (not just intermittent) broad service, though not yet full continuous broad service.

The docket saw opposition from Starlink (described by Kook as 'lawfare') and roughly 2,456 protest letters from astronomers in what Kook calls a coordinated action; FCC Chairman Brendan Carr nonetheless approved the filing.

Kook dismisses weekend 'FUD' claiming Verizon had changed its mind on AST, noting the same source made a similarly false claim about Verizon a couple of years ago.

Kook believes a Verizon definitive agreement (DA) is a coming stepping stone, guessing there are unspecified conditions precedent that must be met first — possibly this FCC approval itself — but says it will only be clear in hindsight.

Blue Origin's New Glenn program is progressing in parallel: New Glenn 3 is already in development, and New Glenn 2 has been hot-fired and looks close to launch-ready, though it's unknown whether AST satellites will be aboard.

New Glenn 2 is slated to carry the ESCAPADE Mars mission, but some observers believe the launch window isn't optimal for ESCAPADE, raising the possibility it could be swapped out; there's also unconfirmed speculation AST could ride along on New Glenn 2.

Kook argues Starship's progress is a net positive for AST, not a threat, because AST's satellites were explicitly designed and budgeted around existing launch vehicles from the start — any launch-cost reduction from Starship is simply upside, and AST is 'short launch' capacity overall, wanting SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Rocket Lab all to succeed to commoditize the launch market.

On whether Starship enables Starlink's V3 satellite (with much larger capacity) to become a real direct-to-consumer competitive threat, Kook says it's unclear how much Starlink's cash flows actually need such an inflection, and argues Starlink lacks the business model to pull off true D2C even with better technology.

Kook discusses a theory from X user Katsy that FirstNet spectrum — federal spectrum coordinated with the FCC via the ITU, for which AST has already filed all necessary FCC work and which is included in SCS rules — could provide a deliberate approval pathway, since by law AT&T can use any unused FirstNet capacity commercially.

The relevant FCC comment period ended August 5; SpaceX has reportedly been spamming that docket as well. Katsy's theory is that full commercial approval could drop at any time via this route, potentially surprising the market with a faster service-link approval than expected.

Several shareholders, including Kook, have reported AT&T reaching out asking for contact details, which Kook takes as a sign AT&T is preparing some kind of marketing or promotional push tied to the satellite service.

Kook expects AT&T's eventual marketing to lean on positive, safety-oriented messaging (e.g., guaranteed coverage, staying connected) rather than fear-based messaging, and predicts this will particularly resonate with women, who statistically value safety messaging.

Kook argues there's no way Verizon lets AT&T get out ahead heading into the holiday shopping season in a competitive phone market, and expects a Verizon DA to follow; he also frames both AT&T and Verizon as motivated to compete against T-Mobile, whose Starlink partnership he calls a mistake being reined in by parent Deutsche Telekom.

Kook reads AT&T's marketing preparation as implying AT&T has already been told by AST that production is ramping and the next 20 satellites will be up 'in the blink of an eye,' letting AT&T set consumer expectations around a realistic delivery horizon of 'within the next months.'

Kook compares this favorably to AT&T's roughly $23 billion purchase of EchoStar spectrum (which he estimates at around 50 MHz), arguing AST is getting comparable spectrum for a fraction of the price because AST is uniquely positioned to use multi-use satellite spectrum terrestrially.

Kook expects the Ligado bankruptcy plan to be confirmed 'hopefully this month' (September 2025), and views the case record as revealing Inmarsat's own view that AST SpaceMobile is an ambitious company clearly angling to eventually use L-band spectrum globally, not just in North America.

Kook ties this to AST's earlier, separate ~$60 million deal to acquire ITU coordination priority rights, arguing it shows AST positioning to eventually use underutilized MSS spectrum (e.g., Inmarsat's narrowband maritime systems) where AST would hold third-in-priority access.

Kook argues low-band spectrum is especially scarce and valuable for building penetration and uplink capacity, while mid-band adds broadband capacity but is less scarce since more mid-band supply is expected from future government auctions.

Because lighting up newly acquired spectrum requires new or modified towers (time and capex), Kook argues AT&T will likely lean on AST SpaceMobile to quickly fill coverage gaps for this spectrum rather than waiting on tower buildouts — potentially previewing scenarios where MNOs skip new towers altogether in some areas in favor of AST.

Kook disclosed he personally bought a (small) position in AT&T stock, comparing AT&T's renewed spectrum focus to IBM's turnaround, and citing the stock's 6-7% dividend yield as attractive in a falling-rate environment; he frames it as a distinct, smaller side bet from his core AST SpaceMobile position.

Kook discusses EchoStar (referred to via a 'Charlie's Angels'/Charlie Ergen joke) pursuing its own direct-to-device strategy using its AWS-3/4 S-band spectrum, building satellites through Canadian prime contractor MDA's generic 'Aurora' communications satellite platform.

Kook views reliance on a third-party prime contractor as a structural weakness (as has historically hurt other satellite constellation efforts), since MDA will resist costly bespoke adaptations (e.g., adding an L-band payload module for defense/Golden Dome use) and AST-style in-house vertical control is lost.

Kook believes EchoStar is likely to either try to sell its spectrum or attempt to operationalize it (since the FCC could otherwise reclaim unused spectrum), and floats a non-zero chance Apple could partner with or pull in EchoStar to complement or replace its existing Globalstar satellite messaging deal, though this would be a notable move toward Apple acting like an MNO.

Kook argues that even if SpaceX had acquired the EchoStar spectrum instead, it wouldn't materially change AST's competitive position, since connectivity/spectrum was never really what was holding back Starlink's direct-to-device ambitions — the bigger constraints are customers and business model.

Kook references an article asking whether FCC Chairman Brendan Carr is the most powerful man in Washington (largely about his influence over media/news networks), noting Carr's expanding influence over spectrum policy is directly relevant to AST.

Kook says evolving understanding of how spectrum will be used for defense/national security (Golden Dome) is rapidly changing, and believes AST SpaceMobile is well-positioned as a company that hasn't antagonized the Trump administration or DOD and has been a reliable, accommodating partner.

Kook closes with a broader theme that the space industry is shifting from a niche 'rich boys club' pastime to mainstream cultural relevance (citing public fascination with SpaceX launch videos), comparing this trajectory to prior hype-to-substance cycles like AI and SaaS, and suggesting AST could see a 'Palantir effect' style dramatic market-cap re-rating as its commercial buildout matures over the next year.

The company also released pictures of FM3, leading Kook to theorize FM2 is currently in or coming out of TVAC testing while FM3 is being assembled, which he says shows the assembly line 'humming' and building a cadence toward roughly 6 satellites per month.

Kook says the stock rallied on the FM1 update and pushes back on FUD accounts characterizing it as 'bad news,' arguing the update shows execution risk is now lower than it was 2-3 weeks earlier.

Kook says the community (including himself) will keep watching for whether AST adds additional TVAC chambers and whether testing time per satellite can be reduced as the team gains experience with the design.

Reformed Trader's charts reportedly show a pattern of consecutive 'red candles' (e.g., 8 in a row) that historically preceded rallies, citing a similar pattern in April 2022, though the exact year label on the chart was unclear.

Kook says AST's India launch has reportedly slipped about 3 months because ISRO gave a national-project satellite (CMS-02) priority on the rocket, which he characterizes as a scheduling issue outside AST's control rather than an AST execution problem.

Using a 'launch constipation' metaphor, Kook argues AST has overbooked launch capacity and that as production ramps to 3-6 satellites per month, launch timing will 'loosen up,' with the current messy period expected to resolve within roughly the next 6 months.

Kook speculates this could mean AST's India ARPU is higher than his prior conservative modeling (which assumed cents to low dollars), since many imported devices are Samsung or Apple smartphones rather than cheaper handsets.

Kook frames AST's use of ISRO as a smart political move — effectively 'building a factory in India' via local launch content — comparable to reshoring pressure he sees happening in the US market.

Kook advances a theory, which he explicitly flags as speculative and hopeful ('kook out,' 'hopium'), that FM1's delay was caused by a design addition — specifically an L-band antenna — added to the satellite's PLM ('stingray tail') payload module, rather than that module being solar-only as previously assumed.

Kook credits an X user known as Katsy with finding evidence in FCC filings and bill-of-materials data suggesting the PLM module carries L-band antenna hardware.

Kook theorizes this could reflect integration of L-band connectivity for DOD/Golden Dome use, speculating the satellites may use aluminum or steel encapsulation (rather than composite) to rush flight heritage.

Kook ties the timeline together: AST's critical design review (CDR) was filed in February, and delays began around the same period as the DIU contract, the SDA HALO/Europa award, and the Ligado bankruptcy — which he says 'line up' to support his theory, while acknowledging it remains unconfirmed.

Jagaloon6's recent post lists several bullish catalysts Kook agrees with: Google-related news, an 'inevitable' Apple partnership, Golden Dome news, definitive MNO agreements, delivery of FM1, initiation of launch campaigns, and IoT partnerships.

Kook says the Ligado financing documents reportedly specify how the Ligado/AST profit share changes upon integration of L-band into iPhones, which he takes as evidence an Apple integration is contractually anticipated.

Kook believes Google has 'fired the starting gun' by adding satellite connectivity to the Pixel 10 and the Google Pixel Watch (via Ligado's L-band), though he caveats the Pixel 10 point specifically as 'very strong speculation' rather than fully confirmed.

Kook predicts a formal Apple unveiling of satellite/L-band integration would come as a shock to bearish analysts and run counter to skeptical sell-side narratives.

Kook argues this shows Avellan's alignment with shareholders, contrasting it with the fact that Avellan could have taken large stock re-ups when the price was around $2 with little shareholder recourse, but chose not to.

Kook highlights a letter from concentrated hedge fund Greenhaven Road Capital discussing AST SpaceMobile (surfaced via Anpanman/'Above Average Odds'), predicting more buy-side firms will publicize positions into the fall/winter 'idea dinner' season in New York.

Kook says he believes L3Harris is a Golden Dome partner providing the missile heat-signature tracking layer, based on clues previously surfaced by Katsy.

Kook draws a speculative parallel between Senator Banks's public support for L3Harris (which he believes helped L3Harris secure a Golden Dome role) and Senator Ted Cruz's public support for AST SpaceMobile, suggesting similar support could translate into a Golden Dome role for AST.

Kook argues this reflects an emerging 'megatrend' around military use of spectrum, comparing the current moment to the early, underappreciated days of ChatGPT before generative AI went mainstream.

Referencing the Inmarsat-Ligado adversary proceeding, Kook notes Inmarsat already provides L-band spectrum to the DOD and receives substantial DOD payments, raising questions (unresolved) about what Inmarsat knew regarding AST's own spectrum arrangements.

Kook highlights that American Tower's CTO now introduces himself as both American Tower's CTO and an AST SpaceMobile board member, which Kook reads as a sign legacy tower companies see AST as central to their future growth.

Kook compares AST's strategic-investor partners (e.g., Rakuten, AT&T, Vodafone, Verizon, American Tower) to Yahoo's stake in Alibaba, speculating some of these legacy businesses could eventually see their AST stake rival or exceed the value of their core business.

Kook argues that regardless of the ruling, the dispute reveals Abel Avellan and Scott Wisniewski are positioning AST as a 'global spectrum treasury company,' noting that even under the stricter binding scenario, AST would retain 'exactly what we bargained for' — US L-band access.

Kook muses about whether Abel Avellan always envisioned building a company worth hundreds of billions of dollars, contrasting AST's current valuation of roughly $20 billion against what he speculates might have initially been a $2-5 billion vision.

Kook interprets the FCC filing as strong evidence a formal commercial deal between FirstNet and AST is already effectively in place, predicting it will be 'the least surprising deal' once formally announced, though he doesn't know the timing.

Kook highlights continued Google rollout of satellite connectivity to the Pixel Watch, alongside the earlier Pixel 10 mention, as part of AST's initial consumer applications strategy.

Kook says AST is intentionally starting with IoT and intermittent-connectivity use cases while capacity-constrained, rather than launching a consumer mobile broadband service that could disappoint users with inconsistent service, which he contrasts with his characterization of Starlink's experience.

What matters most to him as an investor is AST's ability to control its own destiny and ramp operating execution — proving the technology, financing the company, clearing regulatory hurdles, proving the commercial model, and then building satellites at scale (not 1, not 5, but 50-60 at minimum, eventually a couple hundred).

Kook's working group believes Launch 1 is ISRO and Launch 2 is New Glenn (though it could be SpaceX instead) — these two could be flipped, partly because Blue Origin's Escapade cargo isn't ready, potentially freeing up room on New Glenn 2 for AST.

Launches 3 and 4 are almost certainly Falcon 9 launches carrying three satellites each, meaning AST already has about 8 satellites' worth of units ready to go or with visibility toward readiness.

Kook expects the first two launches to have sloppy/uncertain timing, but says what will really matter to serious investors is launches 3 and 4, because once AST is putting up 3+ satellites at a clip, it proves the production rate and the market's perceived risk of AST missing its business plan should go to roughly zero.

If satellites are getting ready to ship for a 6-satellite batch in November, that signals the whole constellation buildout and financing are coming together, making this 'a very de-risked investment' heading into year-end.

Citing his friend 'Reformed Trader's' analysis, Kook says the stock historically trades sloppy after ATM filings and convertible notes offerings, then rips higher afterward — and the stock is currently at the trough of that post-offering pattern (some call it a 'bull flag'), setting up for a possible pre-launch rally into FM1's ready-to-ship announcement.

Kook frames a concept of AST 'inevitability' — a sense that regardless of near-term stock price, the company is close to major valuation unlocks that had previously felt 'evasive' for years but are now 'definitive.'

He identifies the key upcoming unlocks as FM1 and FM2 shipping out, then the FM3-to-FM8 bulk shipments, plus ground stations being locked in and first revenues — after which he believes the market will move past near-term detail-focused skepticism.

Kook predicts that within roughly a year, analysts (referencing a figure he calls 'Shay Balleur') will start listing ASTS alongside monopolies like ASML — consistent with Kook's own prior thesis describing ASTS as 'the next telecom monopoly.'

Kook says ASTS is reportedly Google's single largest public shareholding (unverified by him independently), and that a user known as 'Katsy' found evidence the Google Pixel will support the Ligado L-bands — which Kook says is unsurprising since the Ligado documents include a specific revenue-share trigger tied to Google incorporating Ligado L-band spectrum.

Kook says he doesn't know if Apple will become an ASTS shareholder but hopes so, framing it as a potentially dramatic positive catalyst against short sellers.

Kook says he is very confident ('willing to bet a kidney') that Apple will incorporate L-band spectrum support into iPhones at the request of AT&T and Verizon.

Citing a tweet from 'Bossman45' (@Melnick45) about the concept of a 'terminal share count' — the point at which dilution slows to modest amounts from employee share grants rather than large capital raises — Kook says his own bogey has long been 400 million shares, and AST is currently around 383 million fully diluted, implying roughly $1 billion of additional equity capital could still come in before hitting that terminal count.

Kook dismisses outside 'consultant' criticism of AST's technology (e.g., concerns about thermal cycling in orbit) as uninformed, noting AST employs roughly 400 PhDs and that BlueWalker 3/BlueBird satellites have not broken up in orbit despite such predictions.

Independent consultant Carlos Placido ran a roughly one-million-sample simulation and published a coverage map on LinkedIn; after adjusting to correct input assumptions, the analysis concludes AST's constellation will provide adequate coverage, with only some potential spottiness at 10-degree look angles — a large improvement from three years ago when critics claimed the constellation wouldn't work at all.

Summarizing a Redrum tweet on AST's competitive moats: a technical barrier to entry (roughly 10 years and some of the industry's brightest engineers), a financial barrier (at least $1 billion to replicate), a regulatory barrier (difficulty securing spectrum rights, MNO contiguous-spectrum deals, and FCC launch authority — with a future competitor unlikely to make a public-interest case for a speculative constellation with no MNO partners), and a patent barrier from AST's novel inventions.

Kook argues switching costs would be enormous because AST generates incremental revenue for MNO partners at no cost to them, so switching away means giving up revenue plus new testing/core-integration work; he also argues Starlink's architecture (a separate network with its own eNodeB in the air rather than integrating with an MNO's core) is not a fungible substitute.

AST's distribution/commercial moat comes from not going direct-to-consumer (citing Iridium's failed attempt at that model) and instead being an economies-of-scale business that spreads constellation costs across many geographies via a 'multi-client effect,' making it uneconomic for another company or single MNO to replicate.

Kook notes reports that Donald Trump was expected to (or did — he wasn't sure) sign an executive order elevating the Office of Space Commerce, viewed as part of a broader government push to expand the space sector, similar to how the government previously subsidized housing via Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac.

Following a meeting with Scott Wisniewski this week, Kook believes AST is close to signing two additional MNO definitive agreements (DAs); his own bet is Verizon and Bell Canada, while Anpanman bet Saudi Telecom (stc), Zain, or Mobily — all of which have existing MOUs with AST.

Kook argues AST is deliberately waiting to sign new DAs until the constellation buildout is imminent, since signing early would only offer short-lived PR value while giving away negotiating leverage on long-term commercial terms — consistent with CFO Andy Johnson's earnings-call comment that AST is 'good on money' and expects future funding from government and commercial sources.

On 'Golden Dome,' Kook says the Pentagon is largely under a gag order, but notes ongoing meetings in Huntsville, Alabama (where he believes Lockheed is building the program's command-and-control center), and says Lockheed appears to be copying AST's slide/document formatting, which he takes as a sign the two companies are working together.

Kook speculates, without being able to prove it, that the Department of Defense may already have an informal agreement or understanding with AST regarding use of the Ligado L-band spectrum, given the DOD's involvement in the Ligado bankruptcy proceedings.

Based on this filing's conclusions, Kook believes FCC approval of the constellation is likely to come 'pretty soon.'

Kook contrasts strategic thinkers with critics like Tim Farrar, arguing the recent S-band ITU priority-rights deal (from roughly two weeks prior) does not itself grant AST 60 megahertz of global spectrum, but rather gives AST an advantageous position ('intent' and 'means') in a multi-year strategy to aggregate attractive MSS spectrum globally and monetize it as terrestrial spectrum.

Citing a tweet from Elena Neyra, MNOs' single most important strategic asset is licensed spectrum; Kook reiterates his own long-standing view that AST functions like 'AWS for the telecom industry,' letting MNOs reduce capital spending on low-return tower/equipment infrastructure and instead focus on spectrum and the customer relationship, which AST helps them monetize more efficiently by lighting up otherwise wasted MSS/guard-band spectrum as terrestrial capacity.

A Spanish-language article covered a roundtable meeting in Colombia involving agriculture, environmental science, finance, cartography, the British Embassy, and Navy representatives discussing AST use cases, which Kook cites as evidence the eventual addressable market could be far broader than the consumer/dead-zone use case originally underwritten, potentially making consumer connectivity a minority of total revenue.

Citing a LinkedIn post about Starlink cutting its hardware price by 50% and reducing monthly subscription pricing with no service contract, Kook interprets this as Starlink being 'disrupted' — noting CEO Abel Avellan liked the post — and argues phone-based AST service (no dedicated terminal, unlike Starlink's ~35 Mbps single-antenna or ~120 Mbps multi-in/multi-out setups) will have much less friction and could eat into Starlink's fixed-wireless business, with AT&T's enterprise sales teams eventually competing aggressively for that business once AST's constellation scales and reaches its base continuous-consumer-service goals.

Kook says his 'working group' is spending significant time trying to pin down further launch specifics and expects some news developments within roughly a 3-to-4-week period.

Kook describes having had a recurring anxious vision over the weekend of the stock crashing 30% on earnings, which he attributes to pre-emotional conditioning ("pre-trauma") rather than an actual prediction; he says he did not sell anything in anticipation of it.

Kook frames his overall view heading into the print: after roughly 5 years invested (with due diligence intensifying recently), he sees the company's execution delays as normal for a company "under the scrutiny of being public" doing something genuinely hard for the first time, comparing it to the Apollo program.

Kook stresses that "fully funded" does not mean the company will never raise capital again — any future raise would now be discretionary and strategic, on the company's own timing, rather than a forced/necessary raise.

Kook notes the company canceled/terminated its prior at-the-market (ATM) equity program a couple of weeks before this call but did not mention the ATM at all during the earnings call itself — instead emphasizing cash on hand, the Exim relationship, and a 'we believe we are fully funded' framing, which Kook interprets as a signal that the company is done raising equity via ATM for now.

Kook builds his own rough balance-sheet model live: roughly $1.5 billion of current cash, plus an assumed $500 million from Exim, minus roughly $500 million of operating expense over the next 6 quarters, nets back to about $1.5-2 billion of available capital — which he estimates as worth roughly 75 satellites' worth of capital, separate from capital already spent (e.g., $760 million net PP&E at Q1, including $235 million for satellites in orbit [BW3 $92 million of that] and $226 million for BlueBird satellites; $525 million of satellite materials/advance payments/advance launch payments in construction-in-progress as of June 30).

AST made an early $25 million payment to a launch partner described only as helping a relationship with a 'strategic launch partner'; Kook speculates this is most likely for Blue Origin/New Glenn 2 (possibly related to the New Glenn's primary payload, the Escapade project, not being ready), though he says it's equally plausible it was an early payment to secure SpaceX launch capacity, and states he isn't certain which.

Kook references the earnings release mentioning '2 types of satellites' for commercial use, and speculates (crediting community analyst 'Katzi'/Kasey's theory) that FM1 and FM2 — already known to be tied to the government HALO contract — may carry an additional phased array/tail enabling multi-in-multi-out capability not present on standard commercial BlueBirds; he says he isn't fully certain of this interpretation.

Kook notes ITU filing schedules show 2 satellites at a 520km altitude, 18 satellites going to 690km, and a later reversion to more satellites at 520km (sun-synchronous orbit), speculating this could indicate a more complex multi-satellite-type product roadmap (jokingly likening it to a 'Model S/3/X/Y' lineup), but defers to Kasey for a firmer read.

Kook speculates the term 'sovereign' in the disclosure may indicate interest is coming not just from MNOs but also from state/government entities seeking their own FirstNet-style government satellite service in addition to commercial coverage, though he says he isn't certain of this reading.

Kook argues the SatCo model (pooling multiple MNOs into one shared high-fixed-cost satellite asset rather than each building competing constellations) mirrors shared-infrastructure models like Visa or ASML, and could become a template for Asian and potentially African markets, though he says he doesn't understand the African market well.

Kook notes AST added 2 additional government contracts this quarter for a total of 8, tying back to the 'programs of record' framing, and says he is uncertain whether the several-hundred-million-dollar figures cited per program are annual or cumulative.

Kook speculates Scott's comment about 'more, and bigger' government opportunities under the current administration could be a veiled reference to the Golden Dome missile-defense initiative, but notes no one on the call actually asked about Golden Dome directly, and that recent reports indicate the Department of Defense (under Secretary Hegseth) has told companies not to discuss it — which Kook reads as a bullish sign that the topic is real rather than hype.

Kook floats a purely speculative, self-described 'made up' figure that AST's aggregated global spectrum position (including Ligado and other deals) could represent on the order of $100 billion of spectrum value, explicitly flagging it as a guess.

Kook speculates, without evidence beyond his own suspicion, that Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, and Morgan Stanley's absence from covering ASTS may be due to those banks' relationships with Elon Musk (all bank Elon-affiliated entities) rather than a reflection of the company's fundamentals.

Kook describes AST as effectively becoming a 'spectrum treasury company,' comparing spectrum scarcity favorably to Bitcoin (spectrum can't be created, unlike new Bitcoin) as a long-term thesis extension beyond pure cash-flow analysis.

Kook walks through the mechanics of the outstanding 2.375% convertible bond, stating (with some uncertainty/potential inconsistency versus officially reported figures) roughly $575 million of bonds outstanding, each converting into 8.75 shares per $1,000 of face value (working out to roughly 8 million underlying shares); he explains that a rising stock price increases the bond's delta, which forces convertible-bond arbitrageurs to sell shares to rebalance their hedge, partly offset by the company's capped call.

Kook predicts that the stock's opening move the next day will likely be distorted/suppressed by mechanical convertible-bond hedge-rebalancing sales (and short-covering), citing a similar pattern from the prior August where the stock opened around $22 but didn't make its real move up to $31 until about 90 minutes later; he frames this purely as an observation, not trading advice.

Kook references a recent chart pattern (citing an account called 'Reformed Trader') showing a roughly two-week corrective 'bullish wedge' following the prior financing, which he says lines up with the current post-earnings setup, though he flags his own confirmation bias as a long holder.

Calls the Q2 update 'an incredibly bullish call' and says it was exactly what the market needed, arguing the company is at a very different point than in 2022 or 2024 now that it is entering a multi-launch campaign and commercialization.

Says some bears had been claiming the stock could fall to $30, which he argues would require an 'absolute failure' scenario (e.g., satellites not launching for another year or two, or a Midland factory catastrophe) that isn't reflective of reality.

Says short interest had risen ahead of the print and bears were 'celebrating' yesterday and today, but argues that after this bullish update, given the launch cadence and path to commercial service, being short the stock now is 'financial suicide,' recalling that short sellers betting on an FM-1 delay in late May got run over as the stock rose over 100% in June.

Notes some of the delays are reportedly related to the US government/defense customers requesting modifications to the satellites, which he frames as a 'good delay' since it reflects a large customer's engagement rather than a technical failure.

Guesses FM2 could launch roughly 2 weeks after FM1, calling this his own estimate rather than something the company stated.

The company guided to 5 orbital launches by the end of Q1 2026; Anpanman estimates this breaks down to FM1 and FM2, then 3 Falcon 9 launches with 3 BlueBirds each (6 total), then a 3rd launch (possibly New Glenn) with 6 to 8 BlueBirds — his own math totaling roughly 14 to 16 new satellites, or about 20 to 21 total in orbit including the 6 already up, by end of Q1 2026.

A launch payment to an unnamed partner was pulled forward from Q3 to Q2; Scott Wisniewski called this a demonstration of 'flexibility.' Anpanman speculates it could be Blue Origin (perhaps to secure more launch commitments or accept expendable-booster risk) or SpaceX (perhaps to secure backfill capacity), but says it's unclear which.

The company said it hopes to average 6 to 8 BlueBirds per launch, which Anpanman says points toward Blue Origin New Glenn as the primary high-capacity vehicle, though he floats the possibility that AST could also pay up for SpaceX Falcon Heavy to get similar per-launch volumes.

Notes there is flexibility to fill launch slots that other customers vacate when their satellites aren't ready, which he views as a potential low-cost opportunity given AST's growing stock of ready satellites.

Notes the company is already thinking beyond Block 3 (mid-band) toward future satellite generations 4, 5, and 6, which he says was a key factor for Verizon in choosing AST SpaceMobile over Starlink, since competitors are still working toward first-generation parity.

Says government is likely to dwarf commercial revenue for the first 2 to 3 years of commercialization, calling this his own guess, with commercial business kicking in afterward — comparing the dynamic to Starlink's consumer-plus-government business mix.

Scott Wisniewski said there could be some government contract awards before the end of the year, which Anpanman speculates could coincide with the 'Golden Dome' missile-defense initiative, though he notes no analysts asked about Golden Dome directly.

Notes Canada's carrier partner is Bell Canada (an IPO-era investor), though the company did not name Bell Canada specifically on today's call.

Scott indicated other MNO deals are 'in the works' and hinted at upcoming strategic agreements; Anpanman guesses this could include a definitive Verizon commercial agreement, a Bell Canada agreement tied to Q1 Canadian service, and possibly Saudi Telecom or other Middle East telecom partners.

Says he wasn't worried about the hearing delay, viewing it as a normal complication in a complex bankruptcy proceeding, and notes Kook has separately done research suggesting people close to Ligado remain bullish on AST SpaceMobile.

Suggests tracking Viasat (ticker VSAT) — which merged with Inmarsat and stands to receive Ligado-related payments — as an informal barometer for the health of the Ligado deal; he says Viasat closed around $25.55, up from trading in the tens before the Ligado deal was announced, and that a sharp Viasat drop (e.g., back toward $10) would signal a problem with the Ligado transaction.

Lists current sell-side price targets: Barclays $37, Roth $51, Deutsche Bank $64, ClearStreet $59, Scotiabank $42.90, and Cantor $30 (Cantor published an initial reaction today), with UBS still restricted; he expects some targets to be raised following the call.

In response to a listener question, says he doesn't think analysts have enough visibility yet to model near-term government revenue into price targets, since the current government contracts are still exploratory, but expects this to become easier to model later this year as contracts expand.

Says he believes there is a coming government revenue ramp later this year and into the first half of next year that most analysts haven't modeled, calling it underappreciated upside.

In response to a listener question about an appropriate price target, says some analysts may be in 'wait-and-see' mode until FM1 is completed and launched (about 20 days out at the time of the call), after which he expects price targets to move higher as launch risk, government contracts, and potential MNO deals like a Verizon agreement materialize.

Asked whether current spectrum (L, S, plus MNO low-band) is all AST needs or whether further licenses could be purchased, Abel said the current blocks are large and sufficient to hit the 120 Mbps per-cell target data rate globally, and while AST never discards opportunities, no further specific purchases are currently planned.

Explaining the value of AST's spectrum strategy, Abel said the phased-array technology can tune to low-band (700-950 MHz) or mid-band (1,700-2,600 MHz) and connect directly to standard cell phones, turning otherwise-underused satellite spectrum into valuable dual-use satellite/terrestrial spectrum — describing it as 'beachfront property' that only has value once you build a house on it.

Early government contracts are building toward 'programs of record,' which in this sector typically run north of $100 million to several hundred million dollars; since the change in administration, Scott said there appear to be more, and potentially bigger, such opportunities, across 5-10 distinct use cases.

Asked about the timeline given government program documents released that day implying roughly $2 billion of incremental opportunity, Scott said specific award timing could occur even this year, without speculating on ultimate scale, citing demand and budget growth plus AST's unique offering across 5-10 use cases.

AST believes it solves a tangible government problem where satellite size, power, and manufacturing cadence matter — building the largest satellites ever launched at AST's cadence, a combination no other operator is close to matching.

On teaming with 'neo-prime' defense players (e.g., Anduril) blending defense hardware and consumer electronics: AST's antenna technology can deliver 120 Mbps from something a few square inches in size, embeddable in drones, ground vehicles/carts, or phones, and non-communications applications across multiple domains are a growing opportunity alongside the larger communications market.

Asked whether AST could pursue similar government business with other Five Eyes countries, Abel said there is no exclusion preventing that, but AST's current focus remains the US government.

AST reiterated its belief that operating a constellation of 25 BlueBird satellites could generate cash flow from operating activities to help further fund buildout of the remaining constellation.

Anpanman believes there was quite a bit of market confusion the prior day about what the deal actually is, given how esoteric spectrum regulatory processes are, and expects the company to review the transaction further on the upcoming Monday update.

Anpanman speculates, based on things he's seen discussed, that EchoStar holds the number 1 global priority position, OmniSpace is number 2, and this deal puts AST at number 3.

Unlike terrestrial spectrum, there is no auction process for most global MSS spectrum since licenses haven't been granted yet — the company will go to regulators, make its case, and be granted (or not) a license; AST could still directly purchase spectrum from an existing unused holder for speed-to-market (he speculates AST may have had past conversations with OmniSpace or EchoStar along these lines), but this ITU priority deal lets the company largely bypass that path.

Spectrum allocations by regulators aren't fixed at the up-to-30-by-30-MHz figure AST has cited — a given country's regulator could split available S-band capacity among multiple applicants (e.g., 10x10, 15x15, or 5x5 MHz), with the quality of the applicant mattering for how much any single player receives.

Anpanman frames AST's broader strategic shift as moving beyond relying solely on MNO partners' cellular spectrum to also bringing its own global MSS spectrum (L-band via the Ligado deal, S-band via this new deal) to the table, which strengthens the value AST offers MNO partners and appeals to regulators looking to put underutilized spectrum to work — citing FCC Chairman Brendan Carr's public rhetoric about 'unleashing' spectrum and innovation as reflective of a broader regulatory mindset.

OmniSpace is described as having a business plan and a 'paper constellation' but no real deployed service — Anpanman says they have perhaps one or two test satellites in space with fits and starts of activity but 'nothing there' for all intents and purposes.

EchoStar has satellites and some limited service but is under heavy financial duress, with a pay-TV/satellite business Anpanman calls a 'melting ice cube,' roughly $29.5 billion of debt, and roughly $5 billion of cash, some portion of which is restricted.

In response to FCC pressure, Charlie Ergen/EchoStar announced a deal with MDA Space to build a direct-to-device constellation using Aurora satellites, which Anpanman estimates will cost 'something north of $5 billion' — money he says the company doesn't currently have; there is some speculation a deep-pocketed financial partner could help fund it, though Anpanman notes Ergen has a reputation as a notoriously difficult negotiating counterparty.

Anpanman views the EchoStar/MDA deal as primarily a gambit to buy time with the FCC and to have something material to show ahead of the EU's 2027 decision on whether to renew EchoStar's S-band license.

AST's financial position is cited as a competitive advantage versus these two legacy players: an approximately $18 billion market cap (down that day) and roughly $1.5 billion of cash on hand, combined with an actual committed mid-band satellite constellation program (guessed to cover roughly 1.5-2.4 GHz) and real MNO partnerships, versus EchoStar/OmniSpace's weaker financial and execution positions.

Anpanman frames the Vodafone SatCo joint venture as step one, this ITU priority deal as step two, and actually obtaining S-band licenses in 2027 (when EU licenses come up for renewal) as step three of AST's European spectrum strategy.

Two competing solutions could emerge for Europe: the EU's own homegrown IRIS satellite initiative, estimated to cost north of $10 billion and viewed skeptically by the market given it would be bureaucrat-run and Europe is several generations behind in the technology, versus the Vodafone/AST SatCo JV, which by the time of 2027 licensing is expected to have interest from MNOs covering 22 countries (Anpanman guesses Orange and other key players).

If granted, up to 30 MHz by 30 MHz of S-band capacity would provide pan-European broadband coverage without cross-border coordination or interference issues, layered on top of the terrestrial cellular supplemental-coverage service — described by Anpanman as a 'true game changer' for Europe.

Anpanman contrasts AST's fixed, precisely-beamformed cell architecture (which avoids cross-border interference in Europe's many small, closely bordered countries) with Starlink's direct-to-cell service, which he says cannot form fixed cell beams — beams are constantly moving — creating interference challenges he believes are hindering Starlink's ability to provide service in Europe.

AST's European S-band play is framed as enabling the first pan-European FirstNet-equivalent first-responder network, relevant both for disaster response and for European defense communications amid increased defense spending in the context of the war in Ukraine, with Anpanman speculating there could eventually be a 'European version of Golden Dome.'

Anpanman references recent flooding in Spain (which he estimates occurred one to two years prior) that caused fatalities when cellular networks went down, and cites this as an example of the kind of disaster scenario where AST's cellular supplemental coverage plus future S-band capacity could support both the public and first responders.

Anpanman speculates Rakuten, as AST's Japanese MNO partner, will likely form a SatCo-style joint venture with AST to pursue an S-band license, pitching Japanese regulators on competitive benefits of a stronger 4th carrier (arguing markets function better with 4 competitors than 3, since 3 tends toward oligopolistic behavior) plus a first-responder network akin to FirstNet, which he views as especially important given Japan's earthquake and tsunami exposure.

In less mature regulatory markets, Anpanman notes regulators tend to follow ITU rulings, priority, and coordination more directly than fully developed markets do, making AST's improved ITU priority position particularly useful for opening discussions in those countries.

Anpanman attributes the stock's pullback on the day of this recording to broad 'risk-off' sentiment across the space sector, noting several other space companies reported weak (in his words, 'pretty bad') earnings results, rather than a negative reaction to this spectrum deal specifically.

Anpanman expects AST to provide an update the coming Monday that will be 'chock-full of strategic updates,' including production and launch timing information.

Anpanman speculates AST may see a US-based Cape Canaveral launch occur earlier than an ISRO (India)-based launch, though this reference was garbled in the transcript (rendered as 'Israel') and should be treated as an uncertain/unclear point.

Kook opens by noting the stock has stayed strong even amid what looks like bad news: ASTS priced a new convertible note (dilution), and there's been a delay to the FM1 satellite launch with no company PR about it, plus EchoStar's Charlie Ergen claiming to be building the 'first ever wideband D2C constellation' and saying AST isn't even a competitor.

Kook describes his own 'Kook sentiment indicator' as a contrarian signal — his instinct to panic when the stock dips is, in his telling, itself evidence of overreaction in the broader Space Mob community, and he says the day-to-day drama (like DMs about a rumor that FM1 might launch imminently, or someone claiming Starlink/direct-to-cell might not scale until '2040') is noise relative to what mobile carriers, FirstNet, and Verizon's CEO are actually saying about the technology working.

Kook argues the market looks 3-6 months ahead rather than at daily news, and that ASTS is now largely a 'name your price' stock because the things previously outside the company's control (cash, satellite production progress) are now largely within it; remaining dependencies are FCC Chairman Brendan Carr's approvals and mobile carrier partners (including confirming Verizon has a spectrum agreement).

Kook reviews August seasonality for ASTS: up ~40% in August 2024 (after a strong July), down 9% in August 2023, up 71% in August 2022, up 15% in August 2021, and roughly flat in August 2020 — framing August as historically the strongest month because satellites tend to be ready around then, though he says September has historically been 'less good.'

Kook cautions that a single large long-only manager (e.g., a Fidelity or Capital Research fund) buying 10% of the company, combined with low float, could move the stock sharply on news like a Verizon definitive agreement (DA).

AST SpaceMobile reports its quarterly update on August 11; Kook says he hasn't prepared a formal earnings preview but expects the company to address FM1's status (either shipped or fully wrapped and ready) and possibly surprise with an update on FM2, which he speculates (guessing) might launch on Blue Origin.

Kook expects a possible update on Golden Dome given a Golden Dome industry conference/seminar occurring on Thursday, August 7, though he says he doesn't know what the right expectations are for progress on that front.

Kook expects the company to highlight a balance sheet of roughly $1.5 billion in cash and potentially report meaningful revenue for the first time, given Block 1 satellites have been operational for a while and the company previously gave back-half revenue guidance.

Kook speculates that even if satellite-launch-driven revenue guidance is revised slightly downward due to launches being 'a little backended,' overall revenue guidance could actually be raised because of accelerating government contract wins — and says any reported revenue at all, plus reaffirmed guidance, would be a positive surprise for the market.

Kook says the timing of a Verizon definitive agreement (DA) or other large DAs remains unknown, and argues the company benefits from waiting to sign such deals until it has a working constellation in orbit to actually monetize, rather than locking in terms too early.

Kook argues that reinserting specific, dated language into a prospectus while issuing $575 million of convertible bonds is a meaningful signal of confidence, since the company is highly risk-averse about avoiding any statement that could be construed as a false statement (fraud) to bondholders, and would not have re-added it without good reason.

Citing a tweet from community analyst 'Katzi,' Kook frames the purpose of FM1 and FM2 as: inaugurating Block 2 production, spreading launches across multiple providers, and testing the satellites' new, larger, easier-to-unfold antenna form factor before committing to the next 20-50 satellite launches.

Kook argues that because the company now has roughly $1.5 billion in cash and multiple satellites in the production pipeline, a future satellite failure would no longer be an existential/binary risk to the company (unlike earlier in its history when a failure combined with no cash could have been fatal) — it would just cause a mark-to-market stock hit, not a fundamental collapse.

Kook references Redrum's analysis showing a path to a $1,500 stock price based on $24 billion of revenue, and argues the total addressable market (commercial, government, military) is large enough and the business high-margin/high-moat enough to support a high valuation multiple.

Kook says Charlie Ergen (EchoStar) publicly claimed to be building the 'first ever wideband D2C constellation' and stated EchoStar is not competing with AST SpaceMobile.

Kook's theory is that Ergen structured the contract with 'Swiss cheese' contractual outs to allow an easy walk-away, and that the real purpose of the announcement is to create leverage against the FCC (to avoid losing EchoStar's spectrum) and against potential buyers of that spectrum, rather than to build a real network — calling it a likely 'paper constellation.'

Kook frames the broader dynamic as AST having won access to Ligado's L-band spectrum (a 'rational' seller) while EchoStar (an 'irrational' seller, in Kook's view) was passed over, and separately accuses SpaceX/Elon Musk of trying to obtain spectrum access without paying for it rather than negotiating — an unproven characterization presented as Kook's opinion.

Kook expects a Ligado Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan confirmation hearing this week, on August 7 ('if I remember'), which he views as an important step toward finalizing AST's long-term L-band spectrum access deal.

Kook highlights new NTIA Director Ariel Roth appearing publicly with FirstNet vehicles and describes her as strongly pro-satellite and a supporter of including satellites in the BEAD broadband program; he believes she will be central to clearing the DOD spectrum-coordination requirement needed for the Ligado deal's bankruptcy confirmation.

Kook argues that because a bankruptcy reorganization plan must pass a legal 'feasibility test' (it can't be approved if the DOD would simply block it), and given the number of professionals involved in the Ligado case, the DOD spectrum-coordination issue has likely already been substantively cleared, though he has not found anyone who can confirm this directly.

Kook notes AST SpaceMobile representatives were recently photographed with NTIA officials, which he interprets as corroborating evidence that the Ligado regulatory path is progressing.

Kook says the Space Development Agency's HALO program bidding process is complete, AST is a prime contractor in that pool, and he believes FM1 and FM2 correspond to the two test satellites specified in the HALO program (based on matching orbital altitude/inclination between AST's FCC filings and SDA program documents), noting AST has already publicly confirmed HALO program participation via press release.

Kook says a Golden Dome industry conference/seminar is scheduled for Thursday, August 7, and he expects updates but is uncertain what to expect on progress, while personally believing AST will 'win it.'

Kook notes that, doing rough math, ASTS now has about $4 of cash per share — more cash per share than the entire stock price was roughly a year to a year and a half ago — and says Anpanman separately arrived at the same calculation independently.

Kook frames the core valuation question as whether ASTS can generate $5-10+ billion of revenue, arguing that if so, the company could be worth $100-300 billion, which (divided by his estimated ~400 million terminal share count) supports very high per-share price targets.

Citing 'Dr. Mike,' Kook notes the UK's Ofcom (the UK equivalent of the FCC) is still working to finalize a direct-to-device regulatory framework by the end of 2025, driven partly by Vodafone pushing to launch service, consistent with the pattern of the FCC leading and other regulators following.

Kook discusses Blue Origin CEO Dave Limp meeting with Senator Ted Cruz (who Kook notes also visited AST's facility), framing US government support for Blue Origin's New Glenn as a hedge against SpaceX; Kook expects AST to use New Glenn capacity for a significant number of future satellite launches to diversify away from reliance on SpaceX.

Kook mentions Rakuten has talked about trying to launch its AST-based satellite service earlier than expected, citing this alongside AT&T and FirstNet public commentary as evidence that carrier partners ('insiders') are seeing positive signals about the network's progress.

Because MNOs own their own cores, this integration gives telecoms full control and all normal safety/functionality (e.g., 911) over ASTS-based mobile connections, in contrast to SpaceX's Direct to Cell, where the phone is a separate system that must actively search and switch between T-Mobile and Starlink, draining battery.

Kook compares ASTS to an AWS-style cloud vendor: once an MNO is integrated with ASTS at the core level, he believes it will never switch away, similar to how enterprises fear cloud vendor lock-in — this durability is what he says drives valuation multiples via visible, growing cash flows and 'net expansion' as usage grows.

Kook argues the platform effect — third parties building applications/use cases on top of ASTS's anywhere-connectivity — will push monetization well beyond the original 'dead zone' coverage thesis, potentially leading to a scenario where ASTS has $1 billion of revenue yet trades at a quarter-trillion-dollar market cap; he stresses this is upside asymmetry, not his base case.

It has been over a year since Verizon's LOI was announced, and the definitive agreement (DA) still hasn't formally been announced; Kook argues this is not because talks fell apart, citing FCC filings, LinkedIn job postings requiring Verizon-systems familiarity, and industry contacts as evidence the deal is still on track.

Kook says once ASTS has definitive agreements with both AT&T and Verizon, it controls two-thirds of the US market, giving it a blocking position that would make a competing constellation economically infeasible — he frames this as 'chess, not checkers' by Abel Avellan and Scott Wisniewski's team.

Kook's own unconfirmed suspicion is that the delay in formally announcing the Verizon DA reflects negotiation over revenue share and a possible large prepayment (he floats a rough guess of a quarter- to half-billion-dollar check) tied to ASTS effectively financing spectrum and infrastructure buildout (including fallow spectrum) for Verizon at attractive capital-efficiency economics; he explicitly caveats this could be true or not.

Kook says he believes this FirstNet development is material to the overall investment mosaic but is uncertain how much any single agreement like this would move the stock on its own.

By Kook's own calculation, factoring in Q3-to-date ATM proceeds plus the new bond proceeds, ASTS might currently have roughly $1.6 billion of cash, plus an estimated ~$400 million of satellites/work-in-progress on the books (based on $226 million of BlueBird satellites and $235 million of satellites-in-orbit figures from Q1), for a combined roughly $2 billion of cash and satellite assets.

Kook says he hopes Q2 results show early revenue (potentially including prepayments and Exim-related items), which he believes would let the market extrapolate a linear path to billions of dollars of eventual revenue from a full constellation.

Kook explains that the company aggressively bought back/flushed its old convertible bonds in June because the stock's cost-to-borrow had spiked to around 13% (a 'short squeeze'-like condition), which was breaking convertible-bond arbitrage economics; by protecting those bondholders, the company demonstrated it's a reliable repeat issuer, and cost-to-borrow subsequently fell to roughly 60 basis points.

Kook attributes the stock's decline around the new convert pricing (roughly 8-10% into the close, versus a steeper ~16% drop after the January 2025 deal that took only 8 days to recover) to mechanical hedging by convertible-bond arbitrage funds shorting the stock against their new bullish bond positions, not to any fundamental negative news.

Kook argues retail investors are often confused about dilution, noting that without any dilution/capital raising the company likely wouldn't exist (it would be bankrupt) — raising capital via ATM or converts is simply inducting partners into the company to fund growth while trying to minimize how much of the 'pie' is given away.

Kook expects there will likely be another ATM filing and argues a slow, dollar-cost-averaged ATM raise (e.g., another $500 million to $1 billion, roughly 5% dilution spread over 3 months) is preferable to a single large overnight offering that would tank the stock 10% at once.

Kook says he wants ASTS to maintain a large cash balance (he'd like to see $1.5-2 billion and never wants it under $1 billion until well past the investment phase) because he does not want to take on financial/leverage risk on this investment — only technology risk and execution risk, since running out of cash would permanently destroy the value-creation opportunity.

Citing analysis from an account he refers to as 'Katzie'/'Cassie,' Kook says that after FM1 and FM2, satellites are being raised to a 690-kilometer orbit (better field of view, lower deorbit risk, more economical for consumer coverage) starting with a third satellite, whereas the next roughly 18 satellites appear slated for a lower ~500-520 kilometer shell not well suited to commercial coverage.

Kook speculates this out-of-order sequencing (going back to a lower shell after starting the higher commercial shell) suggests those 18 satellites are for the Department of Defense — tying back to the earlier HALO/SDA contract, which Kook believes bought two satellites (FM-1 and FM-2) up front for DOD/HALO testing, possibly related to the 'Golden Dome' program.

Kook frames the growing number of planned orbital shells (a 'BlueBird shell,' low-band shell, mid-band shell, and a speculative 'laser weapon from space shell' per Cassie) as evidence the total addressable market and satellite count are larger than originally envisioned, not evidence of CapEx inefficiency.

Kook expects the stock's run-up into the August launch window to potentially continue (citing 'Katzie's' comparison of the 2025 versus 2024 stock chart into launch season), and notes that with a busier launch cadence (including upcoming Blue Origin New Glenn flights) there may not be a post-launch stock hangover this time.

Kook, citing 'Katzie's' review of the public Golden Dome solicitation, says changes appear to give the DOD more flexibility to buy 'services' rather than only hardware, which he interprets as potentially opening the door for companies like Anduril, and possibly ASTS, to sell satellite capability as a service rather than selling satellites outright.

Kook cites a Breaking Defense article quoting Golden Dome program lead General Guetlein discussing the technical challenge of the program, including whether there is sufficient industrial base capacity to build satellites fast enough — Kook notes ASTS is rapidly expanding manufacturing capacity across two states beyond what would be needed for a ~95-satellite commercial fleet, implying (his own inference) a connection to Golden Dome.

Kook believes any prudent bankruptcy judge would have checked with the NTIA before ruling the Ligado restructuring plan feasible, though he says this is his own conjecture and could be wrong.

Roth has also championed satellite usage under the roughly $42 billion BEAD broadband program, and Kook notes there has been public interaction/photos between ASTS and the NTIA, which he speculates relates to coordination on both Ligado and Golden Dome.

Kook argues the NTIA's involvement isn't necessary for ASTS's baseline success but could unlock additional significant upside on Ligado and potentially on Golden Dome, including a scenario where the government simply grants federal spectrum for Golden Dome use rather than requiring a paid auction.

Kook, referencing a 'Katzie' tweet, speculates that ASTS satellites operating in the 1200-2400 MHz band could be used to jam or spoof GPS, BeiDou (China), and GLONASS (Russia) navigation signals, describing the satellites' signal strength as over 50 decibel-watts stronger than GPS signals at Earth's surface, potentially disabling enemy radar, missiles, and drones in a theater of war while appearing to be ordinary telecom satellites.

Kook connects this to a recent Wall Street Journal report that the US nearly ran out of missile interceptors during a 12-day war, arguing that disabling adversary missile guidance via spectrum could be a complementary, ammunition-free way to counter such threats, and sees this as a growing DOD business opportunity for ASTS over the next 10-40 years.

Kook says it's possible the political dynamic (NTIA plus FCC) could result in spectrum being made available for these national-security-linked use cases even without a costly auction, though he says this remains to be seen.

Kook notes AT&T's social media accounts have been unusually active — using blood-type-A and waffle emojis to troll T-Mobile — which he jokingly suggests could mean the account was hacked or that AT&T is genuinely excited about something, questioning whether this coincides with the Verizon CEO's on-air comments and the start of the Block 2 launch cadence.

AST believes it is well positioned to contribute to Golden Dome's goals given the size and power of its satellites, which it considers unique and differentiated versus what industry or adversaries can field.

Argued that competing systems have only proven text messaging capability, whereas AST offers text, voice, data, internet, and video; smaller satellites face physics limitations plus practical problems (revisit time, handovers, phone-to-satellite connectivity) that limit their capability, while AST's broadband capability is dual-use (serving both governments and the majority of global MNOs) with access to billions of subscribers via existing operator agreements, contingent on building sufficient network capacity.

Scott said pursuing quasi-government funding has been a long-term part of AST's funding strategy and an attractive capital pocket to keep open; the company will 'assess cash needs when it becomes available' rather than committing to a specific use now.