Episodes

AST management reportedly had frequent (weekly or daily) updates with the Blue Origin team, met founder Jeff Bezos and Blue Origin's David Limp multiple times, and visited the factory repeatedly, expressing confidence the booster-landing issue would be resolved on the second attempt.

The US now has two reusable orbital launch vehicles (Falcon 9 and New Glenn), which Anpanman says breaks open what had been viewed as a SpaceX launch monopoly and should benefit customers industry-wide, with additional launch providers expected to add capacity through 2026 and especially 2027.

Anpanman's own guess is that AST won't put its own BlueBirds on a Blue Origin flight until New Glenn has demonstrated one or two more successful launches, likely using Falcon 9 in the meantime; he guesses AST's first BlueBirds could fly on New Glenn around February or March 2026 (spring).

Anpanman believes the defense business could be larger than the commercial business in the early years, before the constellation is fully deployed, after which commercial revenue would eventually dwarf it.

Scott said a Bank of America analyst who runs regulatory checks in DC indicated they see no issues and expect the Ligado spectrum transaction to be approved; Scott agreed based on feedback AST has received.

Starlink today operates at roughly 1,900-1,990 MHz (T-Mobile's PCS G block), which is effectively MSS spectrum requiring an unobstructed view of the sky and doesn't work well indoors; in 2027 Starlink is expected to gain access to EchoStar's AWS-4 spectrum (~2 GHz), which is also not low-band cellular spectrum.

For Starlink to match AST's low-band cellular coverage, it would need a larger phased array and a different, 'fixed cell' (non-regenerative) beam architecture to avoid interfering with existing terrestrial cell towers — a significant engineering change from its current approach.

AST's very large phased array lets it connect to an ordinary phone's small antenna and low power output with a much stronger link than a competitor using a smaller phased array.

Growth and momentum stocks, ASTS included, sold off heavily throughout the trading day on Nov 14, 2025; Anpanman attributes this partly to the government shutdown obscuring labor/inflation data and weak incoming economic numbers, calling the broader market 'flying blind.'

Anpanman expects a Fed interest rate cut in December, citing comments from a New York Fed governor about low bank reserves and expectations the Fed will resume asset purchases to build reserves, adding liquidity to markets.

Anpanman argues carrier cost-cutting is actually bullish for AST: the company's roughly three-week-old Verizon commercial agreement gives Verizon a new service to sell (raising ARPU), reduces subscriber churn, and lets carriers decommission underused rural towers, saving on leases, electricity, and maintenance (cited at a few hundred thousand dollars per tower per year).

BlueBird 6 is currently being integrated into its ISRO LVM-3 rocket in India, with launch expected the first or second week of December 2025.

BlueBird 7 is expected to be delivered to Florida within the next two weeks, with launch probably in mid-to-late December 2025.

Per the current timeline, two additional batches of three BlueBirds each (BB-8 through BB-13) could potentially be ready in December 2025, though Anpanman is unsure whether they'd ship that month or in January 2026, with launch likely in January.

Anpanman believes AST has a good shot at receiving FCC approval for its US commercial market access application by the end of 2025, now that the government has reopened and FCC Chairman Brendan Carr has signaled the agency is resuming application reviews.

Additional Golden Dome-related defense contract awards could potentially be announced in the coming weeks.

Scott's comments suggest AST is on track to begin launching mid-band BlueBirds by the end of 2026.

Asked about ground-station complexity for country-level data sovereignty, Anpanman explained AST's architecture puts the 'brains' (RAN) on the ground rather than on the satellite, which does add some complexity across many countries — though large blocs like the EU may be comfortable centralizing data in one country (e.g., Germany or Spain) — and cited Saudi Telecom, which covers Saudi Arabia plus 13 other countries, as an example the company will likely handle via a small number of regional gateways.

Asked about the revenue ramp timeline, Anpanman noted current guidance of $50-75 million for second-half 2025, that Scott mentioned gateway sales averaging around $10 million a month, and that military contracts are expected to reach the hundreds of millions next year; Anpanman personally guessed (hedging that he didn't want to misspeak) AST could see roughly $200 million of revenue next year (2026), ramping to several hundred million up to a billion dollars in 2027 once commercial service is fully launched, if timing holds.

Asked what happens if the service is oversold during a natural disaster, Anpanman explained AST can throttle service — for example selling lower-speed plans (1-2 Mbps) in developing markets to support more simultaneous users, and during emergencies could restrict bandwidth-heavy uses like video streaming to prioritize texting and voice so more people can get basic connectivity.

Asked whether New Glenn's success signals 'the demise of Mr. Musk,' Anpanman said no — SpaceX will do fine, and the added competition from Blue Origin should keep pricing honest and spur further innovation, similar to how AST's competition with Starlink doesn't preclude both companies succeeding given the size of the market.

Of the projected Q4 revenue, Anpanman estimates about $10 million will come from gateway equipment sales, with the balance being revenue recognized from military/government-related work.

For the first time, AST disclosed $1 billion in aggregate contracted revenue commitments, all from commercial partners; Anpanman speculates a majority of that figure comes from the $1.8 billion, 10-year Saudi Telecom (stc) definitive agreement announced the prior week.

The $1 billion in aggregate contracted revenue is also viewed as opening a new debt-funding avenue, since the company could potentially raise some quantum of capital backed by that revenue base -- Anpanman was unsure whether that could be $100 million, $200 million, or $300 million, saying it depends on how solid the revenue number is.

Anpanman explained the $1 billion figure includes prepayments from partners -- his recollection (flagged as possibly swapped) is Vodafone around $20 million and AT&T around $25 million, Verizon at $65 million, and Saudi Telecom (stc) at $175 million -- which are prepaid revenues creditable against future service once the network goes live, after which partners pay directly for usage under what he believes is a 50/50 revenue-share structure.

BlueBird 7 is expected to be completed and shipped this November, guessed at roughly 2 weeks out; allowing about 30 days to integrate the satellite into the Falcon 9 fairing, that points to a launch in the second half of December 2025 on a new SpaceX Falcon 9 from Cape Canaveral.

Overall Anpanman expects two launches in December 2025 -- BB-6 on ISRO in the first two weeks, and BB-7 on Falcon 9 in the last two weeks -- followed by two additional batches of three satellites via SpaceX Falcon 9 in January 2026, with production catching up to the original plan and a possible first New Glenn launch by February 2026.

Anpanman speculates a Japanese launch would make political and commercial sense given Rakuten's status as an important AST investor and partner; Mitsubishi's H3 heavy-lift rocket, in its 4-solid-rocket-booster configuration, has a lift capacity of about 16,000 kg to LEO similar to a Falcon 9.

Anpanman estimated a reusable Falcon 9 costs roughly $60-70 million versus research suggesting the H3 rocket might cost around $50 million, but flagged real uncertainty about whether that H3 pricing information is accurate given it seems surprisingly cheaper than Falcon 9; he noted MHI launched a satellite on the H3 in late October (around October 26).

Anpanman noted (as his own speculation) that when flying over Europe the constellation will effectively be fully controlled by Europeans.

On the EU's IRIS² satellite program (awarded in 2024 to a consortium of SES, Eutelsat, and Hispasat, covering both fixed broadband and a more open-ended direct-to-device concession that must be led by MNOs), Anpanman notes MNOs from 21 of 27 EU member states have already signed up with SatCo; when Scott Wisniewski was asked on the earnings call whether AST could win part of the IRIS² award, he deflected, saying they wouldn't discuss what they've won -- which Anpanman took as a signal AST is well positioned, though not necessarily having already won it.

Anpanman guesses that when the 2 GHz MSS spectrum (30x30 MHz) comes up for reallocation around May 2027, AST/Vodafone will likely get one 10x10 MHz block, another 10x10 will likely go to a different party (possibly the IRIS² consortium), and the last 10x10 will likely be allocated to shared IoT usage -- explicitly framed as his own guess based on early research.

In response to Greg Pandy (ClearStreet), on the roughly 50 MNO partners representing ~3 billion subscribers versus an estimated total addressable market of about 5.6 billion mobile subscribers: Scott Wisniewski said AST SpaceMobile has intentionally structured its technology, network, go-to-market, and even its cap stack to be favorable to MNOs, and that nearly all global operators (except in China, Russia, and a few other restricted countries where AST has chosen not to do business) are potential candidates and are in some level of dialogue with the company.

Declined to comment on whether AST would be part of the IRIS² program specifically, but said that given AST is already building a multi-capability constellation, the company believes it is very well positioned for any country or customer seeking this capability, citing high marginal economics for adding in-orbit capabilities given its technology, manufacturing, and existing ecosystem.

Analysts asked management to disclose the breakdown of the $1 billion figure but the company did not provide details; Anpanman guesses it includes the Saudi Telecom $175 million prepayment plus an undisclosed 10-year minimum revenue commitment, Google's 2024 3-year commercial agreement, some combination of AT&T, Verizon, Vodafone, and Rakuten, and possibly Bell Canada.

The updated coverage map presented this quarter added logos for Bell Canada and stc, whereas last quarter's map only showed AT&T, Vodafone, Verizon, and Rakuten — Anpanman infers Bell Canada has some form of agreement in place even if not yet a definitive commercial agreement, since the company reiterated Canada as one of the initial launch countries and Ligado spectrum also covers Canada.

Anpanman argues the $1 billion in contracted revenue is valuable not just for equity markets but for debt markets too — credit investors can underwrite against contracted commercial revenue the same way lenders would against long-term government contracts, opening up an additional path of fundraising.

Government/defense contracts typically start with small initial payments, and once the technology is proven and the military becomes comfortable with it, contract values balloon into the hundreds of millions of dollars over multiple years.

Revenue prepayments have ramped up over successive deals — from AT&T and Vodafone, to Verizon, to Saudi Telecom — and Anpanman expects that trend to continue with future MNO agreements.

The control set/bus (the metal or composite structure that encapsulates the satellite) is the current critical-path bottleneck, not the microns; this is a new satellite form factor and part of the 'production hell' vertically-integrated manufacturers go through, similar to Tesla, and in contrast to companies like ViaSat whose first satellite was followed by one that arrived 5 years late.

Manufacturing space has grown to 500,000 square feet, up from 400,000 square feet disclosed over the summer; the company has discussed eventually moving production rate from 6 satellites/month toward 10-12/month over 2026, which Anpanman guesses relates to both accelerating Block 2 deployment and starting Block 3 (mid-band) production.

Based on the deployment schedule, Anpanman expects two launches in January 2026 (for satellites tied to Launch 3 and Launch 4), one launch in February, and possibly two in March.

Management explained they stay deliberately vague on exact launch dates and specific launch-provider assignments until the last possible minute, both because changing a committed launch date costs money and because remaining flexible across providers (ISRO, SpaceX, Blue Origin, Mitsubishi Heavy, Rocket Lab) preserves competitive tension for better pricing; AST is described as the largest commercial satellite customer besides Starlink and Kuiper.

The company disclosed it will have 80 MHz of deployable spectrum in the US, which Anpanman flags as larger than the sum of what's publicly known — roughly 40-45 MHz via Ligado plus an estimated 5x5 MHz FirstNet allocation plus AT&T/Verizon's contributed 850 MHz — suggesting either AT&T and Verizon are contributing more spectrum than originally planned, or AST is close to acquiring/leasing additional L- or S-band spectrum (Anpanman speculates this could tie to Globalstar's ~15% leasable capacity).

Anpanman speculates that Cohere Technologies — a spectral-efficiency AI company that also works with Bell Canada and reportedly Vodafone, and whose board overlaps with AST via former Vodafone CTO Johan Wibergh (who sits on the boards of Bell Canada, Cohere, and AST SpaceMobile) — may be involved in AST's newly disclosed AI engine, though there has been no public confirmation of a partnership.

EchoStar previously held an 18-year concession on 2 GHz spectrum and did little with it beyond narrowband IoT; Viasat holds the other 2 GHz allocation, used mainly for airline wifi, but Starlink has taken much of that fixed-wireless business; on their own earnings calls, Viasat said it hopes someone will lease its spectrum rights, and Globalstar suggested it will pursue EchoStar's underused allocation.

In the SatCo JV, AST SpaceMobile will be a minority/junior partner economically (Anpanman guesses roughly 49-50% economics, though this is not confirmed) with even lower voting rights depending on MNO participation; the JV will be structured to look and feel European to regulators, including a kill switch and data that originates and lands in Europe.

Backing out the reiterated $50-75 million second-half-2025 revenue guidance implies Q4 2025 revenue of roughly $35-60 million; Anpanman estimates about $10 million per quarter comes from gateway sales, meaning the remaining $25-50 million of Q4 revenue would be government-contract related.

Management feels good about its launch-provider stable (ISRO/LVM3, SpaceX Falcon 9, and Blue Origin New Glenn) for near-term needs; near-term (2025-2026) launch capacity remains constrained industry-wide, but the company expects more options by 2027 as New Glenn matures, Rocket Lab's Neutron potentially comes online, and other providers scale.

Abel Avellan for the first time called out Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' H3 rocket, which launched successfully in October 2025 in its heaviest 4-solid-rocket-booster configuration, capable of carrying 16,000 kg to LEO; Anpanman estimates the cost at around $50 million per launch (uncertain estimate), which he compares to a reusable Falcon 9 launch at roughly $67 million for a similar 16,000-17,000 kg payload. He suggests Rakuten's Japanese ties make MHI a logical future launch partner.

Abel Avellan reiterated the company's cadence goal of roughly every 30 to 45 days for launches, though Anpanman speculates this could eventually accelerate toward a Starlink-like cadence of every 2 weeks as more launch capacity comes online.

Anpanman expects additional price-target updates from Barclays and ClearStreet, and possibly reiterations from UBS and Bank of America, though he had not confirmed those at the time of recording.

Asked about a listener's observation that Abel kept emphasizing AST is 'an American company' when discussing the EU and IRIS-2, Anpanman explained that AST itself remains American-focused (important for US government work and funding), while the separate SatCo JV is intentionally structured to look and be European for EU regulators.

Asked how much lag exists between service going live and AST actually receiving cash, Anpanman said he was not certain of the exact figure, but guessed there would be a roughly 30-day consumer billing lag plus some additional period (days to weeks) before MNOs disburse payment to AST, on top of prepayments being drawn down first.

AT&T released a promotional video this week that Kook calls 'engagement farming,' generating thousands of likes compared to only ~10 likes on AT&T's NCAA sponsorship content, which Kook says shows AT&T's marketing team is aware of the outsized engagement the 'space mob' community drives compared to traditional sponsorships.

Kook argues AST SpaceMobile, while structurally a B2B company selling to MNOs, has unintentionally become a strong consumer brand through community engagement, which he says helps AT&T's case for lower churn and higher ARPU and should help AST's profit-share economics with partners.

AT&T CEO John Stankey was in Midland last week; Kook says Abel Avellan reportedly has MNO partners sign completed satellites (rather than break champagne bottles, since the solar panels are fragile) before shipment, and speculates that this visit and the resulting promotional video mean the FM2 satellite was likely just signed/christened, though he stresses this is speculation ('my suspicion... at best 50/50').

Kook raises the possibility that instead of a single FM2 launch, AST could surprise the market by bundling 3 or 4 satellites into one launch batch, calling this 'some possibility' but not a certainty.

Kook frames the facility growth as consistent with Scott Wisniewski's prior statements about scaling production toward 6 satellites per month, and potentially up to 12 per month under certain circumstances tied to government business, speculating this could be preparation for Golden Dome-related contracts.

Kook notes that following the recent stc Saudi Arabia deal, MNO prepayments and revenue commitments are reaching numbers consistent with bullish investor estimates, though he's unsure whether Bell Canada (already an AST investor) will follow the same prepayment structure as other partners.

Kook categorizes investors into three buckets: outright bears ('ASTSQ people') who expect bankruptcy; 'small thinkers' who see AST as solely a niche 'dead zone' fix based on FCC coverage-gap statistics (roughly 1-2% of the population); and bulls like himself who see a much larger market akin to home insurance — low-frequency need but high perceived value when needed — plus government (FirstNet), IoT, and defense demand.

Kook says the release resembles the EU's IRIS² initiative (originally intended to reduce reliance on Starlink) and includes a new ITU filing in Germany for a mid-band EU constellation; he speculates this may be a distinct regulatory 'shell'/mid-band constellation using the same BlueBird hardware, potentially usable globally rather than only over Europe (unlike the original, economically-flawed IRIS² concept), possibly subsidized by the EU.

Kook speculates the arrangement could effectively grant AST/Vodafone access to EU 2 GHz MSS spectrum currently associated with Inmarsat and EchoStar, noting (via research from an account called 'Mega Constellations') that some of these spectrum licenses are up for review around 2027-2028 and existing holders may be forced to coordinate with or share with AST.

Despite the US government shutdown, an account called 'Katsy' observed that the FCC continued processing AST's spectrum consent letters, which Kook says matters because it could be a precursor to final Supplemental Coverage from Space (SCS) market access approval; Kook says he firmly believes approval will come but timing is uncertain, calling it potentially 'the final regulatory wall' for the company.

Kook says he hadn't previously considered the backhaul use case and views it as an underappreciated part of the opportunity.

Kook argues that for developing markets, getting roughly 35 Mbps directly on an existing phone will be 'good enough' compared to needing a separate SpaceX terminal, creating a market-segmentation threat to SpaceX in the fixed-wireless-adjacent space, particularly where consumers lack fiber alternatives (using his own fiber/Cox home internet as the contrast case where satellite broadband wouldn't be needed).

Kook says some had speculated AST might instead pay the Ligado fee directly off its own balance sheet as a carry trade, but he's glad the company kept the loan non-recourse, since it keeps the core satellite operating business (the 'recourse' business shareholders are exposed to) cleanly separated from the spectrum capital structure — if the FCC were to reject the deal, shareholders would be largely insulated, whereas if the spectrum is worth 10-20x what AST paid (as Kook believes likely), that excess value flows to AST shareholders.

Kook notes comparable spectrum transactions are emerging that suggest the 45 MHz of Ligado L-band spectrum could be worth roughly $10-20 billion on its own, which he argues provides meaningful downside protection ('a put') for AST shareholders.

Kook relays a point from an account (@Tomster000) that Level 5 fully autonomous vehicles must operate safely with zero connectivity by design, but major markets (EU, US, Japan) will require redundancy for safety-critical functions, meaning autonomous vehicles can't rely solely on optional terrestrial 5G — creating a role for satellite as a redundant positive-control link.

Kook distinguishes 'universal coverage' (the dead-zone concept, covering roughly 2-3% of the population) from 'redundancy' (covering 100% of the population, since redundancy applies everywhere including areas already served by terrestrial networks), arguing this redundancy use case — driven by capacity payments — is a larger and underappreciated part of the market opportunity that many investors miss.

Kook argues legacy MSS spectrum holders (Globalstar, Iridium, Viasat, etc.) are individually low-value operating businesses (single-digit-billion-dollar companies) that can't fully utilize their spectrum themselves, and their spectrum's value depends on a limited pool of buyers (mainly AST and SpaceX); he compares this to Charlie Ergen's (EchoStar) prior situation of holding spectrum with only 2-3 potential buyers, which nearly led to a forced, unfavorable deal.

Kook says Cantor Fitzgerald published a note directly addressing whether AST 'won' IRIS²; he notes Cantor has close industry connections and is 'saying some good things,' though he doesn't reveal a confirmed outcome.

Elon Musk received a trillion-dollar Tesla pay package this week, and separately Musk floated the idea that SpaceX could become a public company; Kook says he's skeptical of the public-company idea given the pressures it would put on Starship development.

Kook compares Starlink's potential future competitive/growth trajectory to Charter Communications' decline from cable-industry darling to a company facing competition, no growth, and margin compression, suggesting Starlink could face similar pressure as satellite broadband competition increases.

Kook notes SpaceX spent about $2.5 billion on additional EchoStar spectrum this week, on top of an earlier roughly $20 billion spectrum purchase, financed partly in cash and partly other means, and questions SpaceX's underlying launch-business cash flow given heavy Starship spending.

Kook cites an analysis by space consultant Quilty (whom he trusts as unbiased) concluding Globalstar is in a difficult position because Apple effectively controls Globalstar's spectrum (paying for constellation buildout through Globalstar's balance sheet) and any Globalstar transaction would require Apple's approval.

Kook concludes he believes a SpaceX acquisition of Globalstar is likely 'in trouble' and that Globalstar may be shopping for other interest but is largely boxed in by its Apple dependency.

Kook says he does not expect AST SpaceMobile to step into a Globalstar transaction.

Based on weekend reporting about Apple's satellite ambitions (wanting more capability than Globalstar offers while avoiding directly competing with MNOs), Kook concludes 'all roads' point to Apple eventually partnering with AST SpaceMobile, noting Apple would need to account for AST's Ligado spectrum given its inclusion in cellular standards, though he flags this as his own inference ('to a man with a hammer, the world looks like a nail').

Kook pushes back on negative sentiment toward New Glenn, noting it is currently the largest operational rocket in the US market (versus Starship, which is not yet operational), and says booster reusability is 'a Blue Origin problem, not an ASTS problem' since New Glenn will need to be price-competitive with reusable rockets to win cargo business.

Kook expects ample launch capacity, largely from SpaceX, going into 2026 and beyond, predicting a 'buyer's market' for companies with satellite cargoes and that launch-availability concerns will dissipate.

Kook frames AST's core investment risk as total addressable market (TAM): if the service is only a dead-zone fix with low attach rates, it won't become a trillion-dollar company, but if it becomes a ubiquitous, insurance-like service sold repeatedly across consumer, government, military, and B2B channels — and creates new markets like IoT and autonomous driving — the opportunity is far larger than originally modeled.

Kook uses Duolingo as an analogy: a company can have a plausible trillion-dollar vision (AI-powered education) but still face go-to-market headwinds (Duolingo's stock fell this week on slowing user growth, raising questions about market saturation or AI-driven demand erosion), illustrating that TAM alone doesn't guarantee outcome realization.

Kook says five years ago, early AST investors would never have seriously contemplated the company being in the running for a sovereign European satellite system or Golden Dome-related defense work, and cites Nvidia's evolution from gaming chips to AI as an analogy for how a company's addressable market can expand well beyond its original framing.

Kook shares a VC analogy ('win the foyer of the house') that a company must first dominate a perceived small market before it earns the right to expand into much larger adjacent markets, arguing AST is following this pattern.

Kook previews the earnings call happening the next day (Nov 10/11, 2025), saying he expects a mix of good and bad news typical of a company at this stage, but that the market will be relieved if AST shows a credible path to ramped production by roughly Q1 2026 (acknowledging this would represent a modest slip), and that continued confirmation of the 2026 thesis should increasingly convince the market of the story's inevitability.

It's been a risk-off week across the market; high-growth, high-beta names including ASTS have been coming off despite the SatCo news, in part because of the ongoing US government shutdown finally impacting markets and a more balanced/hawkish tone from Fed Chair Powell, who said another rate cut is not a given and the Fed needs to reassess incoming data.

Anpanman views the current pullback as healthy profit-taking after stocks ran hot over the past year, and remains optimistic on the market longer term, but notes every stock (including ASTS) has beta/co-movement with the broader market that can overwhelm even very positive company-specific news in the short term.

The EU's push for a sovereign, fully European-controlled satellite solution stems largely from concerns raised during Russia's invasion of Ukraine, when Starlink's use by Ukrainian forces reportedly saw the network turned off at certain points depending on SpaceX's comfort level -- a red flag that pushed the EU toward wanting complete control over its own data and network sovereignty.

It's unclear whether some portion of the Block 3 mid-band BlueBirds (the L- and S-band-focused satellites) will be an entirely separate shell exclusively dedicated to Europe, or whether satellites within the same shell will simply be handed over to European operational control while flying over Europe and handed back elsewhere -- Anpanman flagged this as still ambiguous from the press release.

Anpanman does not know AST's exact ownership percentage in SatCo (guessing it could be 49% or 40%), but guesses economics could be roughly a 50/50 split of whatever SatCo generates, split further with Vodafone and partners based on usage location -- explicitly framed as a guess.

Because SatCo is a separate legal entity, it can independently raise capital -- other MNOs (and potentially governments) could buy an ownership stake in the JV, giving significant funding flexibility.

Anpanman's guess is SatCo gets at least a 10x10 MHz paired allocation (uplink/downlink), with an upside scenario of 15x15 MHz, reasoning that the EU likely wants at least 2-3 spectrum players and SatCo's broad MNO backing makes it hard to exclude; at 10x10 MHz, he estimates roughly 40 Mbps of downlink and a similar ~40 Mbps of uplink speed based on spectral efficiency -- explicitly a spitball estimate.

On Globalstar's earnings call the day before (around Nov 6, 2025), management said it doesn't comment on press reports about spectrum/SatCo, while emphasizing being first to assemble global spectrum and hinting it may lease out the roughly 15% of satellite capacity not contractually obligated to Apple -- Anpanman speculated this could be aimed at SpaceX, AST, or used as leverage/a sale angle, though he's uncertain which.

Globalstar also said some spectrum holders who 'purchased spectrum recently' may not retain rights going forward, which Anpanman interpreted as an implicit reference to EchoStar's spectrum facing the May 2027 EU reallocation risk.

Based on his own surface-level research, EchoStar runs only a narrowband IoT network on its EU 2 GHz spectrum today with maybe a few thousand devices and no separately reported revenue line, which Anpanman thinks gives it a weak case to keep its spectrum allocation in 2027.

By contrast, Inmarsat and Viasat run an active pan-European airline-connectivity network on their 2 GHz spectrum with smooth handoffs to terrestrial networks, which Anpanman believes gives them a stronger case for reallocation; his overall prediction is Inmarsat/Viasat retain some allocation, EchoStar likely loses out, and AST/SatCo gets roughly a 10x10 MHz allocation.

The EU has proposed its own Iris satellite constellation program estimated to cost over €10 billion, with a decent amount of planned functionality focused on direct-to-device connectivity; Anpanman argues it will be hard for the EU not to favor SatCo given how far along AST/Vodafone already are, and cites an unnamed AST SpaceMobile person's comment that this SatCo announcement 'makes Iris kind of dead on arrival,' which he agrees with.

Anpanman believes Starlink faces two headwinds in Europe: political unpopularity tied to Elon Musk's involvement in European politics, and a technical/architectural issue -- Starlink's regenerative satellite network doesn't respect national borders (beams aren't fixed cells and can hand data between countries), which conflicts with EU sovereignty requirements; he speculated a future Starlink V3 satellite generation might address this but is uncertain.

Anpanman noted reports that SpaceX's Starlink V3 satellites will add data center capabilities on top of fixed wireless and direct-to-device functions, and expressed skepticism about whether adding so much functionality to one satellite platform will hurt performance ('doer of all but master of none'), while cautioning that not all announced SpaceX satellite features tend to materialize on schedule.

Anpanman cited the 2025 Spain floods, where terrestrial cell towers went down, as an example of why Europe needs a satellite emergency-response backup network.

Potential SatCo funding sources include a share of the EU's roughly €10 billion Iris program budget, Import-Export Bank funding, EU MNO prepayments, and direct MNO/government investment into SatCo; Anpanman also noted that using Europe's Ariane launch vehicle becomes more economically viable given subsidies available for launches backed by European governments or commercial entities.

The SatCo news was released Friday morning European time, two weeks after the Saudi Telecom announcement and just ahead of Monday's Q3 2025 earnings call, which Anpanman guesses was timed so the market could digest the SatCo news over the weekend before a likely deeper discussion on the earnings call.

Anpanman called the SatCo announcement a 'game-changing' development that puts AST SpaceMobile and Vodafone in pole position to win an EU 2 GHz spectrum allocation in May 2027, arguing it satisfies every EU requirement (sovereignty, local ownership/operation, existing MNO buy-in) better than any alternative from Inmarsat/Viasat, EchoStar, or Starlink.

Asked whether Block 2 satellites already address EU sovereignty concerns, making this announcement just confirmation of future Block 3 mid-band satellites, Anpanman said Block 2 does alleviate a lot of sovereignty concerns but this SatCo announcement goes further by proposing a fully European-owned/operated entity, which he calls the 'gold standard' for what European regulators want.

Asked what it means for SatCo to 'own' satellites given satellites are normally shared globally, Anpanman explained SatCo (a European entity) will have ownership of a select number of satellites exclusively providing coverage over Europe, which makes economic sense because of European funding plus a 2 GHz spectrum allocation Anpanman guesses could be worth roughly $10-20 billion 'off the top of his head' -- an explicit guess -- which would make any satellite deployment cost look minuscule by comparison.

Anpanman noted that Bank of America reportedly has roughly a $200 million revenue target for AST for around 2026 or 2027, and suggested the Saudi Telecom deal alone could account for that entire figure.

AST's earnings call has been moved up to next Monday (November 10, 2025) at 5:00 PM Eastern; Kook says he can only speculate why, floating Golden Dome-related news as a guess but explicitly labeling it 'hopium.'

Kook contrasts this with Apple/SpaceX direct-to-cell headlines, calling them signs of struggle rather than success (a 'tow truck came to pick up the busted car' analogy), citing T-Mobile comments about 'thousands and thousands of hours' of engineering needed to make SpaceX's system work because it lacks backward compatibility.

Relaying analysis credited to 'Kevin,' Kook says Block 1 and Block 2 BlueBirds are already supported by all chipsets via low-band spectrum, and the upcoming Block 3 (mid-band spectrum) will similarly be supported by new phones going forward.

AST's coverage maps showed Algeria, Oman, and Kuwait 'light up' (turn orange) over the summer, which Kook says in hindsight was probably a telltale sign the stc deal was advancing (credited to a user he calls 'only 6 inches').

stc previously won an auction for 60 MHz of spectrum in Saudi Arabia and is likely to lease that spectrum to AST; Kook compares AST's role to how the 'Seven Sisters' oil majors captured value by owning downstream refining/distribution rather than the raw resource itself.

Kook reiterates his 'winner-take-most' thesis: each additional locked-in country/MNO reinforces AST's competitive moat and makes any competing constellation less economically viable, with SpaceX likely to be 'a distant second' at best.

NVIDIA is giving Nokia $1 billion to accelerate development of 5G/6G RAN software to run on NVIDIA's architecture; Kook cites this as further validation that AST will become an 'AI edge company.'

Drawing on a narrative-driven investing framework he attributes to an X commentator ('Transhumanica'/'Future Plan') discussing the Kraken thesis, Kook argues that once massive AI inference/data-center capacity is built out, the next bottleneck becomes ensuring people (and devices) can actually access it via connectivity -- positioning AST centrally in that narrative.

Kook believes the stock could eventually trade at a 'Palantir-type multiple' (100-200x sales) once the market recognizes this narrative, provided the company also delivers large absolute revenue dollars.

Kook draws a parallel to the US, where locking in the #1 MNO (about 35% market share) was followed by the #2 carrier and the long tail also signing on (AT&T then Verizon); he expects a similar pattern in Europe but is unsure whether Japan's legacy carriers will extend the same courtesy to Rakuten.

Citing observation from @Dunwalls1, Kook notes Bank of America's 2026 revenue forecast for the whole company is $232 million, while the stc deal alone looks like it could be about $200 million a year.

Kook argues AST's real TAM should be measured in devices, not people, floating a figure of roughly 50 billion 'things' versus 7 billion people, and recalling a prior industry estimate that the direct-to-device IoT market (including connected cars) was expected to reach about $10 billion a year.

Kook cites utilities as an example (roughly 500 million devices installed globally -- smart meters, energy-grid assets) and speculates about a potential future Saudi Aramco relationship, noting a former Rakuten executive now leads Aramco's tech group -- explicitly framed as a guess.

Using his own household as an example (multiple phones, connected cars, a hypothetical pet tracker), Kook illustrates per-device ARPU economics of roughly $10-15/month, suggesting a typical family could have 10-20 connected devices.

Kook says he separately modeled an airline-connectivity market in his own due-diligence document and believes it could be a meaningful market, potentially saving airlines significant capex versus installing Starlink hardware.

Kook speculates that senior executive visits like this typically signal something concrete happened, guessing Stankey may have signed an agreement connected to FM2 -- explicitly unconfirmed.

Kook recalls that after Trump's election, some (including a well-connected friend) feared new FCC Chair Brendan Carr would favor SpaceX and harm AST; Kook says he stayed positive based on his belief in US institutional integrity, and this fear proved wrong.

AST's SES market access filing is now past its FCC reply-to-comment period, which Kook calls a 'big approval' that could land within a couple of months, though he notes the ongoing government shutdown could affect timing.

Kook frames a scenario where, once FM1 and FM2 are confirmed working and satellite production reaches 3-6 birds per month alongside US market access approval, AST would be sitting on close to $3 billion of cash on the balance sheet.

Kook interprets this leak as a positive signal for AST, reasoning that Golden Dome contract news is now 'leaking past the funnel of the Pentagon,' implying AST's own award announcement may be imminent.

Kook plays a Trump soundbite praising Elon Musk personally ('a bad spell, a bad period... but I like Elon') and interprets it as signaling Musk being kept at arm's length from future contracts for political reasons, without being fully cut off.

Rumors surfaced this week that SpaceX may be in talks to acquire Globalstar (GSAT); Kook is skeptical, arguing that a real M&A negotiation under NDA wouldn't typically be leaked by a banker unless it's a tactic to create pressure/perceived urgency.

Kook reasons SpaceX's rationale for buying Globalstar could be to eliminate a competing constellation and inherit Globalstar's Apple contract, since SpaceX's own direct-to-cell satellites reportedly lack sufficient MNO contracts to utilize their capacity.

Kook believes that if SpaceX did acquire Globalstar, it would push remaining MNOs even more decisively toward AST as the only remaining independent direct-to-device option.

Kook says he personally would rather see AST acquire Iridium, citing Iridium's roughly $500 million cash flow, existing government narrowband business, and spectrum holdings (he cites a figure of '8.75 gigahertz,' flagging it may be imprecise), plus Iridium's depressed valuation of about $1.84 billion (per the 'Mega Constellations' X account).

Kook frames the broader trend -- EchoStar's earlier sale, the Globalstar/SpaceX rumors, Iridium's struggles, and Lynk/OmniSpace facing what he calls 'European bureaucracy' -- as a wave of legacy satellite operators exiting or consolidating, which he sees as validating his 'winner-take-most' thesis for AST (with SpaceX a distant second).

Kook says the news cadence out of AST is accelerating right before earnings and wonders aloud what additional news the company might be saving specifically for the earnings call.

Says all roads in any potential Globalstar deal lead through Apple, since Apple effectively controls the company; a deal is possible only if Apple has had a change of heart and is willing to work with SpaceX.

Identifies industry consultant Tim Farrar as a likely primary source/conduit for these leaks, noting Farrar's D2D market report disclosed it was paid for by Globalstar in small print, and suggesting this explains Farrar's longstanding hostility toward AST SpaceMobile.

Combines the two tranches to roughly $92 million/year in required Apple paybacks against a company generating $130-150 million of EBITDA — calling it 'a pretty decent size nut.'

Warns that if Globalstar loses any spectrum licenses (which SpaceX has reportedly challenged at the FCC) or fails to deliver the new constellation on its milestones, Apple can reportedly claim immediate default and demand repayment of disbursed infrastructure funds — potentially forcing Globalstar into bankruptcy if Apple chooses not to extend further support.

Argues this financial pressure — combined with the threat that AST SpaceMobile and Starlink direct-to-cell could siphon away Apple users who no longer need Globalstar's SOS/messaging-only service — is the likely impetus behind Globalstar's leaked sale process starting around May 2025 and escalating in late October 2025.

Argues Globalstar's leaked sale narrative serves two purposes: pressuring Apple into buying the company outright or loosening its financial terms/milestones, while also implicitly threatening Apple that if SpaceX buys Globalstar instead, 'it's basically game over for everybody' (attributed to Tim Farrar's framing in The Information articles).

Notes Globalstar has not formally announced a strategic alternatives process (which would be a much higher-stakes, harder-to-walk-back move), but has effectively put itself in play informally via these leaks — a risky gambit if no deal materializes.

Argues the Globalstar/Apple dynamic closely mirrors Kano/Humana: Apple could similarly let Globalstar's sale process fail or push it into bankruptcy and buy assets on its own terms, and could kill any deal simply by voicing anti-competitive concerns to the DOJ/FCC during regulatory review.

Draws a secondary analogy to Circle's USDC stablecoin, which gave up roughly 80-90% of its economics to Coinbase to drive adoption, arguing Globalstar is similarly 'structurally flawed forever' under its current Apple arrangement regardless of who acquires it.

Says it's uncertain whether the FTC or DOJ would review a SpaceX-Globalstar (or SpaceX-Iridium) deal, and that the outcome depends heavily on how regulators define the 'direct-to-device' market (broad satellite data/phone market vs. narrower messaging-only submarket, and whether AST SpaceMobile — not yet commercially live — is counted as a competitor).

Argues a straightforward Globalstar/Iridium/SpaceX 3-player-to-2-player market definition would be an 'immediate block' under traditional antitrust analysis, while a broader 4-player market including AST SpaceMobile going to 3 would still face a difficult review, possibly requiring concessions.

Cites the DOJ's approval of the Sprint/T-Mobile merger (4-to-3 players), with conditions requiring divestiture of Boost Mobile and spectrum to Dish Networks (Charlie Ergen) to create a 4th facilities-based competitor, as a cautionary precedent — consumer prices have risen since, Dish's build-out failed, and Dish ended up selling spectrum to AT&T and SpaceX (and probably Verizon), which Anpanman calls a 'complete failure' of the DOJ's fix that regulators would want to avoid repeating.

Notes that even a business-friendly-seeming Trump administration blocked some high-profile mergers on other grounds in the past (citing the AT&T/Time Warner matter, which AT&T ultimately won and later spun off), cautioning against assuming this administration would be reliably permissive on a SpaceX-Globalstar deal.

Estimates the odds of a SpaceX-Globalstar deal actually clearing regulatory review at roughly 20-30% at most, even with Apple's consent.

Concludes he thinks the highest-probability outcome is that no Globalstar deal happens; there is a smaller probability of a deal with AST SpaceMobile or another party, but he does not believe AST SpaceMobile would acquire Globalstar on its own — it would need to be done in partnership with Apple given the size of the financial commitment.

Argues that at an assumed $10 billion price, against only ~$130M EBITDA this year and ~$150M next year, Globalstar is financially 'better dead than alive' since most of the value is in its spectrum rather than the current operating business, which would largely be shut down in a deal.

Compares Globalstar's spectrum position (8.7 MHz L-band plus 17 MHz S-band globally) favorably to Iridium's (about 8 MHz of L-band globally), but argues Iridium is financially the more attractive acquisition target since it is generating roughly $500 million of EBITDA this year, has stopped its share buyback, and offers more room to cut costs and run for cash versus Globalstar's smaller, Apple-encumbered financial profile.

Responds that he agrees it's likely not a Rocket Lab-specific issue, but suspects the overall timeline for Globalstar's next-generation constellation (built via prime contractors including MDA Space, with Rocket Lab providing buses) may be running behind what Globalstar promised Apple, drawing a comparison to Viasat's second satellite, which he says arrived roughly 5 years delayed.

Adds, as a tangent, that AST SpaceMobile's own FM1 and FM2 Block 2 satellites are heavier than planned because of added features, and that AST's subsequent satellites are expected to use lighter composite materials, though possibly without some of FM1/FM2's undisclosed features.

Wraps the space, noting he expects more AST SpaceMobile news this week heading into the quarter, and that Kook (referred to informally as 'Coop') will host his own separate space later that evening likely covering some of the same Globalstar/Apple/SpaceX topics.

Reflects that legacy satellite players (Globalstar and Iridium) have gone from being comfortable about their competitive position a few years ago to now facing pressure to sell themselves, calling it a sign of how fast the direct-to-device industry has evolved.

Taking this article together with two prior information articles and Tim Farrar's public comments, Anpanman concludes Globalstar itself has been leaking this news because it has put itself up for sale and is trying to generate strategic buyer interest.

Tim Farrar is described as a paid consultant for Globalstar who leaked information to The Information in January and again in a more recent article.

Naming SpaceX as a bidder in a leak is a common sale-process tactic to inflate buyer interest/price, similar to what happened when EchoStar was running its own sale process.

Globalstar CEO Jay Munroe (Monroe) reportedly gave a specific quote that he thinks he could sell the company for $10 billion; Anpanman calls this a risky gambit — as a former banker/event-driven investor, talking up a sale process that later fails leaves the company with 'egg on its face.'

Anpanman doesn't think SpaceX urgently needs to move on Globalstar since Globalstar isn't likely to sell to anyone else soon; he expects a 'melting ice cube' dynamic where acquirers wait and potentially buy Globalstar/Iridium cheaper later.

Apple owns 85% of the capacity of Globalstar's constellation, which Anpanman believes was given to Apple in exchange for roughly a $1.8 billion Apple investment.

MDA Space (Canadian ticker MDA, US ticker MDAALF) stock fell because a big chunk of its expected future revenue was tied to being the prime contractor building Globalstar's planned new constellation.

Anpanman estimates Globalstar will generate $265 million of revenue and $137 million of EBITDA this year, versus Iridium's expected $880 million of revenue and about $500 million of EBITDA — Iridium is in a much better financial position but has a worse spectrum position.

Iridium holds one sliver of L-band spectrum, about 10.5 MHz, of which Anpanman says only about 7.8 MHz is usable; this spectrum sits right next to Ligado's L-band spectrum, creating potential synergy for whoever acquires it (e.g., AST).

Starlink already bought EchoStar's AWS-4 S-band spectrum in the US, but lacks global spectrum; acquiring Globalstar would jumpstart Starlink's global spectrum consolidation, and Anpanman expects Starlink would eventually decommission Globalstar's satellites and phones and migrate users to Starlink.

Starlink's MNO partner base is limited because its core fixed-wireless business competes with MNOs' core internet business; Elon Musk has alluded in interviews to eventual ambitions to compete directly with MNOs, and Anpanman sees a Globalstar acquisition as a step toward that, warning that if he were T-Mobile he'd 'be shitting bricks.'

If Starlink develops much larger satellites/phased arrays (potentially enabled by Starship), Globalstar's spectrum could let Starlink offer a real (if not full terrestrial-replacement) wireless alternative in some areas.

Anpanman frames the direct-to-device market as splitting into two stacks: a vertically integrated Starlink/SpaceX/Tesla/X/Grok stack pursuing connectivity, payments, AI, and connected devices; versus an 'open stack' anchored by AST SpaceMobile working with MNOs and potentially Google, Microsoft, Amazon, and Meta.

Anpanman believes both Starlink and AST would probably prefer this market to evolve more slowly, but thinks Globalstar's strained relationship with Apple (and its need to sell) is forcing the consolidation issue now.

Apple's specific contractual rights over Globalstar's capacity haven't been disclosed, but Anpanman assumes Apple's legal team negotiated an 'airtight' agreement that would survive any change of Globalstar ownership, constraining any acquirer.

If SpaceX buys Globalstar, Anpanman sketches possible Apple outcomes: Apple participates in the deal, Apple negotiates a payout to exit, or Apple steps back to become an open, multi-partner player working with both SpaceX and AST SpaceMobile — which Anpanman thinks 'probably makes the most sense' for Apple. He doesn't think Apple would buy Globalstar outright since that would make Apple an FCC-regulated satellite operator.

Audience Q&A: how would a sale work given Apple's 85% capacity ownership? Anpanman says it's unclear — if Apple buys Globalstar it's straightforward, but if SpaceX buys it, SpaceX and Apple would have to work out whether Apple gets paid to exit or retains its 85% capacity rights over the new owner's future constellation.

Audience Q&A: Grok reportedly estimated a 90% chance Apple takes a stake in AST if SpaceX buys Globalstar. Anpanman is skeptical of AI chatbot predictions but says a post-transaction Apple investment in either AST or Globalstar is plausible, noting Apple is already shaping the next 3GPP NTN (non-terrestrial network) standard across Ligado, EchoStar, and Globalstar spectrum interests as a handset maker wanting phones to work with all these services.

Because of AST's commercial relationship with Saudi Telecom, AST effectively gains access to a majority of S-band spectrum in Saudi Arabia; since Saudi Telecom's footprint covers roughly 15 other markets, Anpanman expects the AST/Saudi Telecom partnership could help secure regulatory spectrum rights in those markets too.

Saudi Arabia's L-band spectrum has not yet been allocated; Anpanman speculates AST won't pursue that L-band itself but will let Saudi Telecom (government-owned, well-connected with regulators) obtain the allocation and lease it to AST, sidestepping Viasat's argument (via the Ligado dispute) that AST's L-band rights are limited to the US and Canada.

Anpanman connects last week's Iridium earnings call, which he says 'seemed like a funeral,' to this news, arguing the writing is also on the wall for Iridium.

Iridium's global L-band spectrum sits next to Ligado's L-band spectrum with an unused guard band in between; combining the two bands could unlock synergy, and Iridium generates strong free cash flow that could help fund a constellation buildout if AST were to acquire it.

Anpanman says AST has a huge runway and no urgent need to acquire Iridium or Globalstar now, but says a Starlink-Globalstar deal would raise the probability that AST eventually does something with Iridium — whether an acquisition or, as pure speculation ('just spitballing'), a scenario where other strategic players make investments to back an alternative to Starlink.

Audience Q&A (Lee): is Iridium or Globalstar spectrum worth more to SpaceX? Anpanman says Globalstar has more total spectrum (~8 MHz L-band uplink, ~16 MHz S-band downlink, plus C-band feeder spectrum) versus Iridium's single global L-band band (~10.5 MHz) that lacks separate uplink/downlink and uses a TDMA-like sequential transmission scheme, making it comparatively less valuable despite being global and adjacent to Ligado spectrum.

Q: Could SpaceX buy both Globalstar and Iridium? A: 'Unequivocally no' — from an antitrust standpoint, owning both would make SpaceX a dominant monopoly in satellite phone services and would be 'dead on arrival,' even accounting for a different Trump-administration regulatory posture.

Even acquiring just one of Globalstar or Iridium 'is not a layup' regulatorily for Starlink — Anpanman expects a rigorous review with possible required concessions or spectrum divestments, and says a Globalstar acquisition could make the pending EchoStar regulatory review longer/less smooth, though he still expects that EchoStar deal to close.

Even after a deal closes, merger integration (harvesting cash flow, eventually decommissioning old satellites, going through regulatory processes to repurpose spectrum for a new LEO constellation) is a slow, complex, multi-step process — not something that happens overnight.

Q: Will Blue Origin/Kuiper (a fixed-wireless project) become obsolete given AST and Starlink's direct-to-device progress, and could partnering with AST be more likely? A: Anpanman doesn't think Kuiper's rationale changes — he views fixed wireless and direct-to-device as separate, distinct markets for now (though direct-to-device could eventually encroach if handsets get stronger).

A Blue Origin/Amazon partnership or strategic investment in AST is possible (e.g., manufacturing synergies, or an 'Nvidia investing in Nokia'-style placeholder strategic investment with board observer rights), but Anpanman says AST doesn't need the cash since it has already raised a lot of money; he notes Abel Avellan and Jeff Bezos are described as friends who are 'clearly working closely together,' though he wouldn't bet on a deal happening.

Anpanman says this structure was implemented around AST's Series B fundraising round, when there was strategic acquisition interest — he guesses (without certainty) it may have involved American Tower and possibly AT&T or Vodafone — to prevent a hostile acquirer from buying stock and forcing a sale before Abel could build the company to his goals.

Anpanman argues an MNO (e.g., AT&T or Verizon) buying AST outright would be value-destructive, since it would break AST's neutral, wholesale-to-all-MNOs business model — other MNO partners like Verizon would likely balk at continuing to work with an AT&T-owned AST.

He views Apple and Google as the most strategically logical potential AST acquirers (Google via its Android ecosystem); tower companies like American Tower could theoretically do a deal but it would now be too financially dilutive given current valuations; Meta or Microsoft could also potentially do it. He doesn't think AST needs to be acquired, since Apple/Google can just partner with AST instead — though Apple's hardware/handset business could be a factor prompting it to act.

Anpanman personally bought a small amount of ASTS stock on the dip following the Globalstar sale news, arguing the consolidation of legacy operators (Globalstar, Iridium) validates AST's spectrum and business model rather than threatening it, and that Iridium and Globalstar 'will not survive' independently and will eventually be consolidated into Starlink or AST.

Anpanman recalls that when SpaceX bought EchoStar's spectrum, ASTS stock initially dropped on a knee-jerk reaction before the market digested that the news actually validated the value of AST's own spectrum holdings (i.e., its Ligado L-band rights); he expects a similar 'digestion' pattern — taking a few days or less — to play out with the Globalstar news.

Anpanman's closing view: this market will settle into a 2-player structure (Starlink and AST SpaceMobile), each able to charge high economics for both consumer and defense/government (dual-use) applications, and he considers early investors in both companies fortunate to have 'caught lightning in a bottle.'

Anpanman speculates the satellite signed during the Stankey visit is 'BB-7' (Bluebird 7) and guesses AST will put out a press release announcing the satellite is shipping to Florida (Cape Canaveral), likely later that day or on Friday.

Anpanman calculates that stc did approximately $20 billion of 2024 revenue, so 9% implies a contract value of roughly $1.8 billion — noting this is just for one MNO partner out of AST's roughly 50 total partners, and guessing (given stc's size and prepayment) that stc likely secured favorable revenue-share terms, possibly a 50/50 split.

Responding to a listener question (Philip Wright) about why stc used a percent-of-annual-revenue metric for a 10-year contract, Anpanman says he isn't sure why it was framed that way, and on reflection thinks it's plausible the 9%/$1.8 billion figure could represent annual economic value rather than the total 10-year contract value, leaving the exact scale of the deal unresolved.

Anpanman characterizes the stc deal as further validation of AST's model, coming roughly 2-3 weeks after Verizon's definitive commercial agreement, and predicts other MNOs will feel pressure to sign now that a $175 million benchmark prepayment exists.

Using ChatGPT to total wireless subscribers across the 15 non-Saudi countries covered by the deal (Egypt ~106 million, Morocco ~56 million, Algeria ~51 million, Iraq ~46 million, Yemen ~20 million, Syria ~17 million, Tunisia ~16 million, and others), Anpanman arrives at a combined total of roughly 391 million subscribers, framing this as the addressable market AST/stc could pull from competing carriers once service launches — larger than the entire US population.

Anpanman predicts a Bell Canada definitive commercial agreement is coming within about a week or two, pointing to global IoT company Beware's announcement the prior day of positive test results using Bell Canada's network as a signal; he expects the eventual Bell agreement to include some revenue prepayment, similar to other signed partners, though the specific economic terms are unclear. He also notes Bell was an investor in AST's IPO.

Responding to a listener question about whether Block 2's first-phase constellation (aimed at the most profitable markets, roughly as far north as the US/Canada and as far south as upper South America) will also cover the MENA markets in the stc deal, Anpanman says he isn't sure and needs to check the geography, but speculates the pulled-forward $1 billion convertible note may be intended partly to get satellites up faster to cover additional markets like these sooner.

Anpanman estimates that hedging on the recent $1 billion convertible note added roughly 6 million shares of short interest (assuming ~60% delta hedge on ~80% of the issue placed with convert-arb investors); he notes short interest peaked at about 49.5 million shares in early October, and roughly 20 million shares of shorts have been covered since then net of the convert-related additional shorts.

Anpanman jokingly cites X account 'Pivotal Capital' (@pivotal_capital) as a reliable contrarian bottom signal, noting the account tweeted bearishly on AST around October 24th near a $71 share price, which Anpanman characterizes as a near-term bottom given the stock's subsequent rise to around $83.

Anpanman expects sell-side analysts including UBS, Scotiabank, and Barclays (which previously issued a 'double downgrade') to upgrade their ratings and/or raise price targets on ASTS within the next day or two in response to the stc agreement.

Kook speculates the board may have decided further capped calls aren't worth it: at a ~$100+ stock price the dilution from straight conversion is small, and he questions whether the market can absorb even larger capped-call structures given the company's two existing capped calls are still outstanding.

Kook walked through (with some on-air self-correction/garbling of the numbers) the value of the outstanding capped call from the July 2025 bond: the call spread's lower strike is $72 and upper strike is $120; he estimated it's worth about $25 million intrinsic right now but could be worth almost $400 million at the upper strike, given the stock is already around half of the way to that level. He flagged this as rough, live-calculated math.

Looking back at the January 2025 convertible bond's 'flush' (conversion), the company issued 9.6 million shares gross, which after treasury-method adjustment for the capped call benefit was effectively 7.6 million shares net. Kook estimates straight equity at a 15% discount would have required issuing roughly 11.8 million shares instead — meaning the convert saved the company an estimated $300 million of value at a stock price of about $74, reducing dilution by roughly 1% of shares outstanding.

Incorporating the new convert, the ATM usage, and modest operating cash flow, plus a Q4 capex estimate he admits could be too high, Kook projects the company will end Q4 2025 (the current quarter) with about $2.2 billion of cash, in addition to satellite work-in-progress value on the balance sheet.

New updates from ISRO suggest Indian Prime Minister Modi is set to formally announce the launch, and the launch could occur in early December.

Kook believes the market won't be too concerned about the exact timing since it's clear the company is 'cranking,' and that a formal PM Modi announcement would generate significant international news exposure, potentially exposing billions of people to the AST SpaceMobile name for the first time and creating incremental stock demand.

Kook argues orbital pollution/deorbiting risk will eventually become a regulatory focus that disadvantages thousand-satellite constellations like SpaceX's relative to AST's much smaller design, and frames AST's early orbital-slot acquisition as a 'rule of capture' land-grab analogous to historical railroad land grants.

Kook noted this shows hyperscalers like Meta will care about the technology, which he says the community has long expected.

News surfaced of a Japanese effort involving roughly 8 major carriers cooperating to build a disaster-relief connectivity system resembling a 'Japanese FirstNet,' with testing occurring on relevant spectrum (flagged to Kook by a contact he calls 'Inner Italia'). He frames this as part of a global 'why now' trend, given Japan's tsunami risk and remote island populations, distinct from the US's post-9/11 approach of building redundant terrestrial networks.

AST SpaceMobile is working with Altán Redes (transcribed 'Altman Redes'), a Mexican public-private spectrum initiative, which holds substantial spectrum now being tested; Kook believes this could become a pathway to access Mexican MNOs, and recalled prior discussion of some relationship with Carlos Slim/América Móvil, noting Slim's public animosity toward Elon Musk (who called him a 'drug dealer') as a reason ASTS could plausibly expand into Mexico and Central America.

Kook relayed analysis from a community member he calls 'Katzi,' arguing SpaceX's architecture is flawed because its service requires a dedicated, power-hungry chip that can't work with unmodified phones, and because Starlink lacks a fixed/constant beam design like AST's — instead needing to cycle many moving beams, creating complex handovers between cells.

A widely circulated article reported Apple testing/accommodating SpaceX spectrum needs; Kook expressed doubt about why Apple would help a would-be AST competitor, speculating it more likely reflects Apple accommodating T-Mobile rather than SpaceX directly.

Kook characterized Iridium's most recent earnings call as unusually bad, saying management effectively admitted the business's long-term prospects (potentially not lasting past 2030) and that they hadn't communicated the company's value well; SpaceX was mentioned repeatedly on the call but AST SpaceMobile was never mentioned, which Kook called notable. He used this as a case study for why founder-led, reinvesting companies outperform finance-driven, capital-return-focused ones (calling the latter a 'cigar butt' strategy).

Kook's own theory is that AST SpaceMobile could pursue a spectrum-lease agreement with Iridium (which has underutilized spectrum), comparing it to Charlie Ergen's strategy of creating a spectrum holding company; alternatively, AST could acquire Globalstar outright to obtain global S-band spectrum, cash flow, and an emergency-services relationship angle with Apple — explicitly framed as his own speculation, not a confirmed plan.

As a hypothetical, Kook floated AST SpaceMobile acquiring Iridium (market cap about $2 billion) for roughly $1 billion cash plus about $2 billion of stock — a roughly 50% premium — which would bring worldwide S-band spectrum and about $500 million of EBITDA from Iridium's narrowband service, which Kook believes could be migrated to different, higher-value uses over time.

Kook compared AST SpaceMobile's M&A optionality to how Google's acquisitions of DoubleClick, YouTube, and Motorola Solutions became disproportionately valuable once integrated into its platform, and drew an analogy to Mark Zuckerberg's underappreciated M&A skill, suggesting AST's leadership (citing Scott Wisniewski's banking background and Abel Avellan's prior M&A experience) could similarly accelerate value creation, using the Ligado deal as an early proof point.

On Iridium's spectrum specifically, Kook stated the company holds roughly 10 MHz of S-band assets, though he flagged this number as uncertain ('I think it's 10 megahertz, I forget the exact'), and noted Lynk and OmniSpace are now merging with SES.

Kook speculates this language change is a deliberate signal about upcoming plans, potentially related to M&A, new strategic markets, or Golden Dome-related spending, though he says the company hasn't yet revealed what specifically it refers to.

Kook referenced an article titled 'Golden Dome's rapid timeline collides with industry funding fears,' describing the program's hybrid commercial/defense funding model, where participants must self-fund development with limited opportunity to recoup costs except via prize/milestone payments — a difficult proposition for smaller companies. Kook argues this actually favors AST SpaceMobile since the company now has strong access to capital (helped by the recent convert and the roughly quarter-billion dollars raised via the ATM), which he calls a competitive barrier the company previously lacked.

Kook estimates (as a rough guess, 'más o menos') that pro forma cash by Christmas could be around $3 billion, factoring in typical ATM usage restrictions of about 15 days following a convert, giving the company significant flexibility to push growth initiatives, particularly potential government work, that it previously would have had to more carefully rationalize.

Describes the report's genesis: AST SpaceMobile initially looked easy to dismiss given base rates of failed LEO constellations, its SPAC origin, and an active ATM program, but deeper diligence over about a year and a half revealed what he calls the 'majesty of the business model' driven by MNO partnership leverage and tech-enabled hyperscalability.

Describes AST's opportunity as the 'third great communications revolution,' the transition from a partially connected to a universally connected world, and states his thesis calls AST 'the final bridge to a universally connected world.'

Admits he had a strong initial negative ('visceral') reaction to AST's ATM usage, having previously been burned by another company's poorly-executed ATM, but came to see space as an industry where extended, uncertain timelines are 'par for the course,' unlike industries where consistently missed timelines would normally be a red flag.

Argues it's easier to tolerate dilution/ATM usage from a CEO like Abel Avellan who takes no bullish RSUs or performance-comp packages and is being diluted 'alongside' shareholders, versus a misaligned management team.

States that once revenue and cash flow become visible, an $800 million ATM or a billion-dollar convertible offering no longer worries him because he has 'implicit trust' in Abel Avellan's execution track record.

Argues that company culture doesn't matter for a 1-3 year investment horizon but is 'the only thing that matters' for a decade-long hold, and says AST's culture under Abel Avellan is exceptional for the scale of the tasks the company faces.

Compares AST's roughly 8-year execution timeline to Tesla launching the Model S from scratch in about 5 years, and notes AST is 'about to launch a 90-satellite constellation that will provide 5G broadband anywhere in the world' within a span of a decade.

Recommends the book 'Eccentric Orbits' for understanding why prior LEO satellite ventures failed — largely because they weren't vertically integrated (dependent on external parts suppliers) and had to fully fund and build a constellation before seeing any revenue, a hurdle only Starlink (aided by NASA/ISS relationships) had previously cleared.

Cites the company's ability to attract world-class talent as a signal to track alongside management commentary, mentioning a recent hire, 'Chip Walcott,' with experience in radar and missile-defense programs (name and details as stated in the episode, not independently verified).

Notes J.R. Wilson left AT&T after roughly 20 years — where he was most recently VP of towers, roaming, and in-building commercial strategy and eventually chief of networks and spectrum — to join AST SpaceMobile, which he views as a sign of growing industry confidence and a boost to AST's network-integration and roaming-partnership capabilities.

Uses a 'following Patton out the door' analogy — arguing that seeing not just Avellan's old team but new all-star hires continue joining AST throughout its evolution is a powerful positive signal ('poker tell') about the company.

Explains that companies deliberately announce aggressive timelines to push regulators and suppliers to move faster, and that a quarter or two of slippage is normal and should not be read by investors as a broken promise.

Compares AST's timeline slips to ViaSat's second satellite being delayed by about 5 years, and to Elon Musk's public 2022 target for landing Starship on Mars, which has slipped well past that date (Anpanman guesses Mars landing is now maybe closer to 2030).

Cites Rocket Lab's Neutron rocket, originally expected to fly in 2024 and now expected in 2025, as another example of normal industry timeline slippage.

Argues that whether the constellation turns on in 18 months or 2.5 years is irrelevant to the business's long-term intrinsic value, and that investors who panic over timeline slips likely don't understand the business well enough.

Says most current investor inbound interest in AST comes from smaller, unconventional funds and long-duration capital (family offices, endowments) rather than institutions requiring investment-committee approval, but predicts that once revenue and cash flow prove out, AST will become an easy pitch to investment committees, which he calls the true 'endless rally.'

Recounts helping a friend (a former analyst at a fund with roughly $150 billion in AUM) prepare an investment-committee pitch for AST; the fund's minimum position size was around $4-5 billion, and building such a position at 10-20% of average daily volume would take months, which he says creates a durable, multi-institution 'forever bid' beneath the stock over time.

Argues that a Golden Dome contract award, even if small relative to AST's overall revenue, would be significant because institutions seeking a pure-play way to invest in Golden Dome would identify AST SpaceMobile, which also comes with its consumer broadband business.

States that public equity exposure to direct-to-device (D2D) connectivity essentially doesn't exist outside AST, since Starlink sits inside privately held SpaceX; he estimates roughly 75% of SpaceX's intrinsic value is attributable to Starlink, calling AST the only true public D2D pure play.

Argues similarly that pure-play public exposure to Golden Dome is 'elusive,' with Palantir as roughly the only alternative, since otherwise investors must buy legacy defense primes like Northrop Grumman or Boeing, which come bundled with unrelated business lines.

Predicts that within roughly 6 to 12 months the market will begin to more broadly recognize AST's scarcity value as a pure play on both Golden Dome and direct-to-device connectivity, calling this transition 'quite exciting.'

Predicts that major hedge funds (using Dan Loeb and Bill Ackman as illustrative examples) will eventually feature AST SpaceMobile in their quarterly letters, describing it as a potential largest wireless carrier by subscribers with dual consumer and military applications; notes AST's market cap has grown from about $700 million at the time some investors got involved to roughly $25-26 billion at the time of the episode.

Describes Iridium's recent quarterly earnings call as sounding 'like a funeral,' saying the company had previously been raising debt to buy back stock and grow its dividend while taking a 'CapEx holiday' (a phrase AST investors joke about), but recently halted its buyback, admitting it needs to spend on its future.

Says a recent industry article (in 'The Information,' which he believes was prompted by satellite analyst Tim Farrar) discussing Starlink, Apple, and Globalstar made no mention of AST SpaceMobile at all, which he characterizes as a deliberate omission of 'the elephant in the room.'

Argues that competitors avoiding AST's name publicly is a 'catch-22' — acknowledging AST's threat would accelerate their own demise by prompting Wall Street to connect the dots, so their silence is itself a strong signal.

Explains that AT&T and Verizon will likely walk a careful line publicly — supporting AST while also signaling openness to other satellite partners (citing AT&T's John Stankey talking about wanting multiple players and competition) partly because they don't want to become overly dependent on AST or lose negotiating leverage ahead of periodic contract renegotiations roughly every 5 years.

Argues that once networks are technically integrated with seamless handover, it would not make practical sense for a carrier to run two competing direct-to-device satellite providers simultaneously, since it would confuse which system takes network priority.

Agrees that carriers' talk of wanting multiple options reflects the abstract value of optionality/negotiating leverage rather than a realistic desire to actually add an inferior competing provider, drawing a parallel to his firm's 6+ year investment in Nintendo, where understanding a company's communication style prevents investors from misreading normal statements as red flags.

Reveals that the group learned Indian Prime Minister Modi may personally announce the launch date for BlueBird 6 (FM1), which he says would be a major profile-raising event for AST given how active Indian social media users are.

Distinguishes TAM from SAM (the addressable market on day one when the constellation turns on, covering markets with exclusive definitive agreements such as AT&T and Verizon), and frames India as a critical proof-of-concept for regions with similar geographic/coverage challenges, such as Southeast Asia and Africa; notes Canada's population dispersion (following the recent Bell Canada news) is 'almost as bad as India.'

States a core thesis point from the report: the physics and economics of terrestrial cellular networks create a permanent coverage gap that only satellite solutions can bridge, meaning connectivity demand for AST-like service is structurally guaranteed regardless of economic conditions.

Praises Abel Avellan and Scott Wisniewski for strategically positioning the India launch, saying it will be a 'huge profile-raising event' amplified by highly active Indian social media users.

Argues the India launch is geopolitically important, noting India banned Huawei and ZTE (Anpanman states since 2020) and is a swing state between Russia and the West; having India align with AST and Starlink rather than adopt competing Chinese satellite constellations is seen as strategically valuable for the US.

Speculates AST likely paid full freight to ship BlueBird 6 to India via an Antonov aircraft but may have received a discount on the LVM-3 rocket launch given the prestige of carrying the first Block 2-design satellite and AST's status as a marquee US commercial customer for that rocket.

Says he received a large amount of inbound feedback and, as of the recording, no one had identified a valid flaw in the report's reasoning; he says nearly every prior skeptic he's personally discussed the piece with is no longer skeptical, and those who don't yet own the stock are now considering it.

States his view that anything under a $100 billion valuation for AST SpaceMobile is 'asininely stupid' given what he considers the best intrinsic business he's studied at scale, adding the key uncertainty is whether the company can reach scale, not the quality of the business itself.

Compares AST's long-term subscriber potential (which he suggests could reach roughly a billion subscribers) to Netflix's approximately 300 million subscribers and roughly 40x trailing EV/EBIT multiple, arguing AST at scale would make comparable subscription businesses like Netflix and Spotify 'look adorable' a decade from now.

Speculates that absent COVID-era circumstances, AST would likely have gone public around 2026 via a traditional IPO at roughly a $50-60 billion valuation, but instead the group was able to invest earlier via a Series C round.

Cites Peter Thiel's stated biggest mistake with Facebook — underestimating how network effects mean a business like Facebook (or AST) gets better as it gets bigger, scaling from $100 million to $1 billion to $10 billion to $100 billion in valuation.

Admits he personally finds it easier to hold a stock through a bear market (where he's looking for bargains) than to hold a stock up roughly 300% in a year without trimming, and cites Charlie Munger's view that the hardest thing in intelligent investing is developing the conviction to hold.

Describes his personal trick for holding long-term winners as being deliberately 'lazy' about short-term details, predicting there will be a point after the constellation turns on and cash flow starts when he'll stop actively thinking about AST because subscribers won't cancel their cellular service.

Recalls that around April-May 2025 there was a sense in the investing community that satellite launch delays were coming, prompting some hedge funds to sell or go heavily short in May; the stock subsequently rose for roughly 18-20 consecutive trading days in June, a streak the group says was matched at the time by only Amazon and Facebook among large companies.

Closes the topic by warning that even investors who find 'the next Warren Buffett' typically abandon the position after the first tripling out of misplaced doubt, and that trying to trade in and out of a name with AST's characteristics has historically led to 'tragic' consequences for investors.

Notes that many investors who sold AST early for 20-30% gains never got back in, while others who admitted being wrong bought back in at higher prices and did well; stresses the importance of managing position sizing if AST becomes a very large share of one's net worth.

States that even using deliberately conservative ('sandbagging') assumptions, he finds it hard to model AST doing less than roughly $5-6 billion in EBIT, and says he wouldn't be shocked if the company generates around $20 billion in free cash flow within 10 years.

Notes AST has gone from zero to roughly 8 military/government contracts, arguing it's implausible that the technology is a 'sham' when numerous government agencies (SDA, DIU, and others) have engaged with the company.

Compares the credibility of AST's regulatory and legislative backers (FCC Chairman Brendan Carr and Senator Ted Cruz's support for space legislation) to having 'the chairman of the Federal Reserve backing your fintech startup,' arguing this undercuts bearish claims that the FCC is hostile to AST.

Jointly mock satellite industry critic Tim Farrar (referred to in the recording by a name that transcribes as 'Tim Ferriss') for having been consistently wrong about AST for roughly five years, while conceding he inadvertently benefits AST bulls by keeping a 'wall of worry' alive that encourages continued short selling.

Contrasts Avellan's approach with Palantir, where insiders have sold shares as the stock rose (which Anpanman says is fair, since 'they earned it'), noting Avellan is instead fully 'all in' on AST.

Observes that history's biggest wealth-creating founders were typically mission-driven rather than money-driven, and frames Abel Avellan's drive to connect the unconnected as fitting that same pattern.

Jokes that biographer Ashley Vance will one day have to write a book about the AST Space Mob community, referencing hosts by their pseudonyms.

There was strong demand for the deal from both long-only fundamental credit investors and convertible arbitrageurs, with arb investors hedging a portion of their allotment via short sales in the days following pricing, meaning some short-term stock 'digestion' from hedging flows over roughly the next 3 days.

Why no capped call this time (unlike the prior convert, where the capped call raised the effective conversion price to about $120): Anpanman's guess is the company wanted the full proceeds and/or derivatives dealers may not have had capacity for another large capped-call transaction with one already outstanding.

The company changed its use-of-proceeds language to mention adding 'incremental strategic markets,' which Anpanman reads as a signal AST may now target the full ~90-satellite constellation for full global coverage rather than the 45-to-60-satellite build sufficient for its primary/most commercially attractive markets.

He also speculates part of the raise is earmarked for upcoming military/government contract awards he expects the company to win, though the government shutdown means news on those awards is likely delayed until the government reopens (8 awards received so far; a Golden Dome-related award would be the 9th).

With over $3 billion of total liquidity (roughly $2.6 billion cash plus about $530 million remaining on the ATM), Anpanman argues the company no longer needs strategic investment or prepayments from MNOs to fund itself, which shifts negotiating leverage in AST's favor — MNOs wanting priority service after AT&T, Verizon, Vodafone and Rakuten will need to offer better commercial splits (he floats a hypothetical 60% AST / 40% MNO split) and larger prepayments.

He speculates Saudi Telecom, Zain, or Mobily (Saudi MNOs) could be candidates for a new definitive commercial agreement given the pivot toward incremental markets, though this is explicitly framed as speculation.

Now that the company is a $26-27 billion market cap business, Anpanman argues it no longer makes sense to run with a bare-minimum cash balance of $200-300 million as in the 2024 'lean years'; building a multi-billion-dollar war chest lets the company act offensively — procuring materials faster, adding production shifts, procuring additional factory space — and gives MNOs/regulators/governments confidence the company can reach the finish line.

FM2 is in final testing and, per prior company guidance, was expected to ship to Florida before the end of October; assuming about 30 days of integration/prep after arrival, Anpanman estimates a launch window of late November to early December for FM2, meaning FM2 and BB6 could launch around the same time or FM2 could even go first.

He cites Bloomberg's projection of the next quarterly earnings call landing around November 14, and expects it to be 'jam-packed' with updates on how convert/ATM proceeds are being deployed, military awards, and additional MNO partners.

He expects the FCC — which he describes as moving at 'warp speed' under its current focus on space competitiveness versus China — to approve the US commercial SCS application within this quarter, though he's unsure of the exact timeline from comment-period close to decision.

This quarter (Q3 2025) is expected to be the first of two quarters this year (Q3 and Q4) where the company generates material revenue against its previously guided $50-75 million for the second half of 2025; Anpanman speculates the company deliberately withheld a pre-announced revenue figure this time (unlike some past capital raises) to save it as a highlight for the earnings call.

He argues direct-to-device is becoming unavoidable mindshare for institutional/TMT investors, with increasingly detailed questions on recent MNO earnings calls about competitiveness with terrestrial networks, customer satisfaction, adoption, and ARPU impact.

His framing: it will be a duopoly market between AST SpaceMobile and Starlink serving roughly 6 billion global subscribers; AST has the superior architecture/technology, giving it a strong position even without capturing the entire market.

Iridium holds globally harmonized L-band spectrum, only 8 MHz wide, adjacent to Ligado's spectrum; Anpanman notes a theoretical synergy where AST (already using Ligado spectrum on its Block 2 mid-band Bluebirds) could potentially combine with Iridium's spectrum across the guard band between the two allocations, though this is speculative.

He believes AST has no near-term need to pursue Iridium given AST's own large opportunity set, capital, MNO relationships, and spectrum access, but could imagine a future 'sweetheart deal' where a buyer (AST or Starlink) manages Iridium for cash flow and eventually folds in its spectrum once their own constellations are ready; he also floated the idea that Iridium retains strategic value to the US government for communications redundancy/resiliency in contested/electronic-warfare environments.

Headlines from the same article suggested Globalstar could be sold for over $10 billion, but Anpanman read the underlying article as actually bearish for Globalstar, noting it describes Apple as dissatisfied with the relationship; he cautions Globalstar shareholders that Apple effectively controls the company (owning about 85% of Globalstar's satellite capacity) and would likely have right of first refusal on any sale.

He views Apple integrating multiple satellite partners' frequencies (Starlink, Ligado, EchoStar, Viasat via FCC filings on NTN standards) as standard industry practice to shape 5G non-terrestrial network standards, not evidence of any exclusive Apple-Starlink arrangement.

He personally guesses (without confirmation) that Globalstar spectrum is also incorporated into AST's ASICs, reasoning it's low-cost optionality in case a future partnership with Apple/Globalstar emerges; he frames this explicitly as his own guess, not a confirmed fact.

The two companies' spectrum/technology aren't currently compatible; Lynk would need to re-architect its satellites to use Omnispace's spectrum, requiring further capital investment, and Lynk claims roughly 50 MNO partners today, though Anpanman characterizes most as small operators of little consequence.

He speculates Omnispace had been unsuccessfully shopping itself for sale because spectrum rights without a funded buildout plan carry little value with regulators, and guesses the merger is partly meant to help both companies meet spectrum buildout requirements and buy time ahead of license renewals.

He cautions that MNO CEOs' public comments about direct-to-device (e.g., calling it useful for 'filling gaps' in dead zones) should be read with context, since admitting broader need would mean conceding their terrestrial network has coverage gaps; he cites Verizon's stated 96% coverage as referring to population coverage, not landmass, estimating actual US landmass coverage closer to 70%.

He argues Block 1 Bluebirds serve mainly as coverage gap-fillers, while Block 2 Bluebirds using Ligado's roughly 40 MHz of uplink/downlink capacity will provide 100% broadband coverage that can also add network capacity (not just coverage) during congestion — e.g., offloading a crowded cell at a beach or stadium onto satellite.

He frames 100% guaranteed coverage via satellite/MSS spectrum as essential for future applications like IoT, autonomous vehicles, and drones, which will require connectivity for remote human-operator kill switches since they won't be fully autonomous.

Asked why no capped call was used this time, he guessed the company wanted the full proceeds and/or dealers lacked capacity for another large capped-call derivative transaction given the prior one is still outstanding (from the earlier convert that raised the effective conversion price to about $120).

Asked about battery consumption on handheld devices using the service, he expects AST's large fixed-cell phased array to keep a phone locked onto one satellite for a fixed period (roughly 7-10 minutes) before handoff, which should be more battery-efficient than Starlink's smaller, constantly-moving beams that require more frequent satellite handovers and searching, which drains battery more.

Asked whether Amazon's Kuiper is being boxed out of direct-to-device globally and needs an AST partnership, he said Kuiper's near-term priority is standing up its fixed-wireless constellation and generating cash flow before tackling direct-to-device, and speculated (based on the personal/commercial relationship between Abel Avellan and Jeff Bezos) that some form of AST-Kuiper partnership is plausible in the future.

Asked about data centers in space, he was skeptical, arguing they'd need to be positioned far beyond LEO (to avoid orbital debris/collision risk and to stay fixed toward the sun for power/cooling), and that reaching such high orbits is extremely costly (e.g., Falcon 9/Falcon Heavy boosters going to high-GEO-type orbits are typically expended, not recovered).

Responding to charts circulating that group AST with pre-revenue/speculative names like Oclo and IonQ, he rebutted by comparing 2030 consensus estimates: AST is projected to generate over $6 billion of revenue and over $5.5 billion of EBITDA in 2030, versus a few hundred million in revenue and roughly $100 million EBITDA for some of the quantum-computing names it gets lumped with.

Rumors had suggested the ISRO/LVM3 launch of FM1 could occur in November rather than the community's earlier assumption of January; Kook personally believes Falcon 9 launches from Florida will happen first, but says he could be wrong.

FM2 is expected to ship this weekend/soon by truck to Cape Canaveral, Florida; Kook says he'd prefer confirmation only after it has actually arrived, for operational-security reasons.

Per a graphic from the analyst 'Katsi': FM1 was boxed/tagged and shipped to India in October; FM2 is scheduled to ship this month; FM3 through FM5 are flowing through the production/shipping system; a possible scenario has FM2 launching alongside a combined 3-4 satellite shot for FM3 and FM5 on a dedicated Falcon 9 launch in December, followed by FM1's ISRO launch in January.

Anpanman has built a recurring chart mapping Starlink/SpaceX operational milestones to SpaceX's implied valuation over time, which Kook and Anpanman use as an analogy for how AST SpaceMobile's own milestone execution could drive its share price.

Using rough, admittedly made-up figures, Kook estimates SpaceX's launch business alone (roughly 120 launches/year at about $70 million per launch sticker price, ~$8.4 billion) isn't enough by itself to justify a half-trillion-dollar valuation; he attributes the bulk of SpaceX's value to Starlink, which he guesses has about 5 million subscribers and roughly $1,000/year ARPU (~$5 billion revenue) plus additional government revenue (e.g. Starshield), putting total Starlink-related revenue at over $10 billion.

Kook argues AST SpaceMobile is now at a stage analogous to SpaceX's own inflection point — when large-scale satellites were in orbit and regulatory approvals were secured — right before SpaceX's valuation went from roughly $40-50 billion to a quarter-trillion and eventually half a trillion dollars.

The stock's recent move from about $40 to roughly $87 in aftermarket trading reflects, in Kook's view, the market recognizing there's 'no showstopper' on the new satellite form factor; he says the next thing the market wants to see to push valuation further is actual revenue turning on.

Kook runs through a sequence of major uncertainties he says have now been resolved for AST SpaceMobile: can the company finance itself (yes), did the satellite prototype work (yes), will regulators permit the service (yes), and will major mobile carriers (MNOs) actually sign on — citing that the market had debated whether Verizon would 'bail' on AST SpaceMobile before Verizon's deal came through and the stock jumped.

Kook expects a 'flurry' of additional definitive commercial agreements (DAs) with carriers ahead, but believes the market may eventually stop rewarding each new DA announcement and instead wait to see roughly 20 satellites in orbit and revenue actually flowing before re-rating the stock sharply higher; he is unsure whether that re-rating pressure builds around $85/share or $150/share, but believes the resolution window is within about one year.

Kook cites commentator Kevin Chen's 'dam breaking' analogy: AST SpaceMobile's MNO deals have been 'wiring' cash flow and go-to-market infrastructure for roughly seven years even though revenue hasn't yet flowed through the P&L.

Kook argues that for MNO partners like AT&T and Verizon, revenue-sharing with AST SpaceMobile is largely incremental revenue with little added cost, pushing back on bears who frame carrier competition/pushback as a risk.

Kook concludes that Bell Canada wouldn't be discussing specific pricing publicly unless a definitive commercial agreement (DA) with AST SpaceMobile were imminent, expecting one 'any day now.'

Kook models AST SpaceMobile's core capacity constraint as analogous to a solar company — capacity is bounded by satellite solar power/processing bandwidth on the chips, not by user count — meaning the network's economics depend on modeling concurrent usage (demand), not just subscriber counts.

Because a $10-15/month consumer plan is 'divorced' from actual data usage (most users rarely need satellite coverage), Kook believes AST SpaceMobile can oversell its data capacity by roughly 100-200% or more (versus only 2-5% typical oversell on an airline flight), implying an effective realized wholesale price that could reach $50-100 per gigabyte of actual data delivered, versus the $2/gigabyte assumption he currently uses in his own models.

An X account, 'ASTS Investors,' published analysis (linked by Kook) estimating a path to roughly $5 billion of revenue from the US market alone; Kook says he has independently arrived at similar figures.

Kook says he recently did unpublished due diligence valuing the Ligado spectrum purely as a bandwidth/capacity asset and arrived at 'huge numbers,' which he views as a reasonable floor revenue estimate; he is holding off publishing new DD while the stock is rallying so as not to 'add fuel to the fire.'

Kook frames AST SpaceMobile's current roughly $35-40 billion valuation against potential future revenue scenarios of $5-20 billion, and separately cautions against ever shorting a growth stock purely on valuation grounds, citing Palantir as an example where the market is pricing in a growth trajectory that's easy to underestimate.

Kook recaps analyst Katsi's theory (from the prior week) that MNOs tend to sign their definitive commercial agreement (DA) with AST SpaceMobile only once their own spectrum position is locked down, which Kook uses to explain the timing of Verizon's DA (it reportedly came after Verizon's spectrum situation was resolved).

Anpanman reminded listeners that SatCo, the Vodafone-AST SpaceMobile European joint venture, now has roughly 21 MNOs signed up and working with it, though Kook says he isn't certain of the exact current count.

An X account, 'Mega Constellations,' noted that competitors Skylo and EchoStar are set to lose (have expiring) S-band spectrum licenses in Europe; Kook argues this creates an opportunity for AST SpaceMobile, since a broadband-capable system like AST's should be able to outbid narrowband operators for renewed spectrum access.

Kook reiterates his thesis that AST SpaceMobile is effectively a 'spectrum treasury company' — able to aggregate underused/hard-to-use spectrum cheaply (as it did with the Ligado deal) because it is the only operator that can practically utilize it, then monetize that spectrum through its existing MNO partnerships; he contrasts this with Dish Network's Charlie Ergen, who accumulated spectrum but had no efficient way to deploy it and became financially cornered.

If his 'spectrum treasury' thesis is correct, Kook argues it supports a valuation path toward half a trillion to a trillion dollars for AST SpaceMobile, driven by the ability to aggregate spectrum globally and monetize it through MNO subscriber access.

Kook says there is a 'strong suspicion' the company will soon land a Saudi Arabian contract, and recalls that a former Rakuten board member named Tarek, previously a proponent of AST SpaceMobile, left Rakuten to reportedly become chief technology officer of Saudi Aramco, where he would need connectivity solutions for remote oil-field assets.

Kook floats the idea, without confirmation, that the Trump administration could push for a direct US government strategic investment or equity stake in AST SpaceMobile in exchange for the company's participation in the 'Golden Dome' missile-defense program, drawing a parallel to the Pentagon's reported effort to diversify away from sole reliance on SpaceX after past friction with Elon Musk; Kook says he doesn't know if this will happen but views it as a scenario that would meaningfully reduce tail risk for short sellers if it did.

Kook argues Europe is increasingly recognizing gaps in its own defense command-and-control capabilities, citing the war in Ukraine (Starlink's important role, and the risk of being denied access to it) as a wake-up call; he characterizes Europe's own IRIS² satellite system as potentially flawed.

Kook positions Vodafone's SatCo joint venture as well-suited to European 'data sovereignty' requirements (data must stay within the continent when serving European customers), calling this a key differentiator versus IRIS².

Kook argues AST SpaceMobile's architecture avoids this vulnerability because it encrypts data directly from the phone to the satellite using the same encryption standards as terrestrial cell networks, and uses tight phased-array beamforming that isolates signals to specific devices, making eavesdropping much harder than on traditional satellite relay systems.

Anpanman flagged that two BlueBird satellites have been observed flying in close formation, which the community believes is testing position-navigation-timing (PNT) and radar applications, potentially enabling high-resolution radar backup capability.

Boeing is launching a new family of tiltrotor combat drones; citing a conversation with a military contact, Kook argues helicopters are becoming unusable in contested areas (per lessons from Ukraine) and that these drones will need reliable non-terrestrial connectivity, which he suggests AST SpaceMobile is well positioned to provide.

Palmer Luckey's company is developing an 'Eagle Eye' warfighter augmentation helmet platform integrating mission command and AI; Kook speculates it will require small, reliable broadband satellite connectivity (rather than a large, reflective Starlink-style terminal or a slow narrowband link), and notes Palmer Luckey is an AST SpaceMobile investor, speculating that Abel Avellan and Luckey may be in talks about integration.

Kook says he could personally see a scenario where AST SpaceMobile shares are eventually worth $500 to $2,500 per share, explicitly framing this as a long-run possibility ('not going to happen overnight') rather than a near-term prediction, and loosely compares it to how few people predicted ServiceNow would become a $1,000 stock.

Kook cites Kevin Chen's observation that investors who are very close to a story (i.e., who have done extensive research) can mistakenly convince themselves that well-known future catalysts are already 'priced in.' Kook agrees, citing his own expectation that stock reactions to a FirstNet contract or additional MNO definitive agreements (DAs) will still be meaningful when they land, even though the space-mob community treats them as inevitable.

Kook reflects that the most-informed, highest-conviction holders (like himself and the 'space mob' community) often run out of capital to buy more right when their conviction is highest, meaning the marginal buyer/seller setting the stock's price at any moment tends to be less informed; he says this dynamic has caused sharp selloffs in the past (e.g., the stock falling from around $40 to around $20 when the community was already fully invested) but can also work in investors' favor on the upside, as happened over the past year and a half as many predicted catalysts materialized.

Kook notes new videos show SpaceX's Starship looking visibly damaged/worn after landing, raising questions in his mind about how economical Starship will really be once refurbishment costs and payload utilization (dollar-per-kilogram efficiency) are factored in versus Falcon 9; he says this remains an open, undetermined question rather than a conclusion.

Anpanman said this is a fair argument to a degree and that he's told people in Spaces all along that, depending on personal financial situation and exposure, it's always good to reevaluate a position given how much the stock has run.

He recommends a simple framework: take out your original cost basis (and taxes owed) and let the remainder ride; position sizes he's seen range from a few percentage points of net worth up to 80% for some long-time holders, which he says did not come from irresponsible behavior but from very early investment that compounded.

He extended the tax discussion to retirement accounts (traditional IRA/401k), suggesting that at retirement, someone in a high-tax state like New York or California might consider relocating to a state like Tennessee, Florida, or Texas before taking withdrawals to avoid state/city tax on the gains.

He suggested that once someone is financially independent with an outsized AST SpaceMobile position relative to a mortgage (e.g., a position grown to $1.5 million against a $300,000 remaining mortgage on a $600,000 house), it's not a bad idea to monetize a portion to pay off the mortgage.

He said his general advice has been to take out your original pre-investment net worth once a position grows large (e.g., from $1 million net worth to a $5 million position) and let the rest ride.

He argued that deep due diligence creates strong attachment to a stock, which outsiders label as a 'cult'; people who don't own the stock tend to root for it to fail out of jealousy/envy, and dismiss reasons the company doesn't have revenue yet or will 'get crushed by Starlink.'

He noted that after a drawdown (e.g., from $100 to $36), investors who felt on top of the world start blaming management ('Abel needs to tweet,' 'why is the satellite delayed') rather than recognizing normal volatility.

Anpanman said that when the r/ACDSpaceMobile (AST SpaceMobile) subreddit is in full despair ('bloody murder'), that has historically marked a bottom; conversely, when known bears like Stone Fox Capital, 'Pivot Capital' (who he says has mysteriously disappeared), or Onada Capital come out doing victory-lap 'I told you so' tweets, that also tends to mark a bottom.

He argued there is no longer a realistic 'zero' scenario for AST SpaceMobile: the company is well capitalized, has satellites in production, and has launch already paid for, contrasting this with 2022 when the company was 'running on the seat of our pants' during the BlueWalker 3 launch with little cash cushion.

He said the company currently has two satellites, FM1 and FM2, expected to launch almost simultaneously, so if something happens to one, the other should still proceed; he estimated a launch or satellite failure might cause a 20-40% stock drawdown rather than a wipeout.

He said at ~$100 the company has an estimated $1.5-2 billion in cash, potential Golden Dome-related defense opportunity, 8 defense contracts, definitive commercial agreements with Rakuten, Verizon, AT&T, Vodafone, Google, and American Tower, a Bell Canada relationship, a possible upcoming Saudi Telecom deal, positive testing results, and is on the cusp of FCC US market access approval — framing it as comparing a company 'on the cusp of bankruptcy' at $5 to one 'about to cure cancer' at $100.

He argued retail investors can tolerate 10-20% portfolio drawdowns without consequence (aside from a spouse's reaction), whereas at a hedge fund/'pod shop,' a 5-7% drawdown gets capital cut and a 10% drawdown can end a team's mandate, so hedge fund commentators' risk framing doesn't directly apply to retail.

He described a pattern where people who sell (e.g., half a position at $70, the rest at $80) later start publicly emphasizing risk/reward concerns and 'the stock went up too fast' arguments as post-hoc justification, which he considers disingenuous compared to genuinely disclosing a sale.

He recounted a member of a private Twitter chat who was an outspoken bull and, within about a week, turned to spreading FUD about delays and the AST5000 ASIC; it later emerged he had secretly sold his entire position around $30 before the stock ripped higher, and out of FOMO tried to talk the stock back down so he could rebuy, before eventually leaving the chat and deleting his Twitter account out of self-awareness/shame.

He generalized this as a recurring pattern: people who sell and then feel regret often become more 'balanced' or negative to rationalize their decision, which he said is natural human psychology and not something he faults people for, but readers should recognize the motivation behind the shift.

He said the most vocal, sensational Twitter voices during turbulence are often people long short-dated calls or puts, who become extremely vocal ('management needs to do something,' or 'Verizon's going to walk away') depending on which way they need the stock to move.

He described people who sold covered calls near $50-70 (e.g., $60/$70 strikes for $2-4 premium) turning bearish and citing Starlink competition or launch-capacity doubts once the stock ripped through their strikes; he referenced seeing similar complaints on WallStreetBets.

He said Stone Fox Capital, a Seeking Alpha contributor and AST SpaceMobile bear for roughly the past year to year and a half, has low engagement and touts 50,000 Seeking Alpha followers, but Anpanman questions his actual influence.

He explained that subscription-service sellers often lead with credibility-building lines like 'I bought this stock at $2' to build trust, and place recurring 'marker' tweets (e.g., repeated market-crash warnings) so they can later claim credit if proven right; he said Stone Fox Capital pointed back to an earlier warning when the stock fell to $36, though Anpanman attributed that drop to the SpaceX/EchoStar spectrum news rather than the warning itself.

He attributed the drop to $36 to the market's 'visceral reaction' to SpaceX acquiring EchoStar's AWS -H block spectrum, after which hedge funds long EchoStar shorted AST SpaceMobile as a pair trade down to $36, a trade he said has since badly backfired as the stock recovered.

He said hedge funds always talk their book regardless of long or short positioning, citing Bill Ackman going on CNBC to promote long positions or argue against government programs that fund companies he's short as a classic example.

He said hedge funds operate under different constraints (limited partners, risk parameters) than retail and often dismiss a 10-20% retail portfolio allocation to AST SpaceMobile as reckless, even though no hedge fund would run that concentrated a position themselves (he joked investor Ryan O'Connor might be an exception).

He argued the most vocal short-side Twitter accounts (e.g., 'Pivot Capital,' who he says vanished as AST ripped against him, or Onada Capital) tend to be the ones actually in trouble on their trade, using public negativity to try to sway sentiment in their favor.

He described an account called 'Grandma Party,' known since the 2020-2021 SPAC boom, who became relentlessly negative toward management ('complete scam,' calling for leadership's heads) once the stock fell into the single digits (roughly $5-7), despite Anpanman privately encouraging him to just sell if it was mentally tormenting him; the person refused, saying he'd never forgive himself if it later succeeded (which, in hindsight, was the financially correct call), but Anpanman said the public negativity likely pressured other holders to sell.

He argued against running a broadly diversified retail portfolio (15-20 names), saying retail investors have no edge managing that many names alongside a full-time job; he recommends either an S&P 500 index fund if time is limited, or a concentrated portfolio (e.g., 50% S&P plus 10% allocations to a handful of well-researched names), while explicitly warning against getting stock ideas from CNBC's Mad Money/Jim Cramer.

He advised that if someone wants to sell covered calls, they should only do so on part of a position, not the whole position, to avoid maximum regret if the stock rallies.

He recounted podcaster Tim Ferriss repeatedly calling SpaceX/Starlink overvalued as its valuation rose from roughly $10-20 billion through $100 billion, before eventually admitting (a few years ago) he was wrong as SpaceX reached an estimated $450-500 billion valuation and predicting Starlink would dominate communications; Anpanman used this as an analogy for how naysayers dismiss AST SpaceMobile using the 'Starlink will crush them' argument without acknowledging SpaceX/Starlink itself was once dismissed the same way against incumbents like ULA, Arianespace, and Roscosmos.

He said he still believes AST SpaceMobile will breach $100 this week, and noted that the Antonov aircraft carrying BlueBird 6 has now arrived in India ahead of its launch.

AST SpaceMobile traded as low as $75-76 the prior Friday amid a broader market selloff tied to a potential Trump tariff war with China; he speculated some of the selling was margin-related and noted short sellers who shorted the dip 'not looking so smart today.'

BlueBird 6, the satellite loaded on an Antonov cargo aircraft, was picked up over the weekend and is now on its way to India; BlueBird 7 appeared close to being finished and was expected to ship via flatbed truck to Cape Canaveral, with a company PR likely to follow.

Anpanman frames space, and direct-to-device communications specifically, as an increasingly contested strategic sector versus China and Russia; Russia's anti-satellite weapons capability is flagged as a major risk (Kessler syndrome fears if a space conflict generates debris), while China is developing its own direct-to-cell constellation reportedly modeled on AST's Block 1 satellites, though he cautioned it's unclear how much is real versus 'vaporware.'

He expects the Western/allied direct-to-device market to be dominated by AST SpaceMobile and Starlink, with AST currently working with AT&T and Verizon and Starlink working with T-Mobile; he stated AST has 50 MNO partners versus Starlink's roughly 9 (counting Boost Mobile), while China will likely build a separate constellation serving countries like Iran, Russia, and North Korea plus some developing nations.

Unlike large defense primes (Lockheed Martin, Boeing) that are already de facto government-backed via large contract revenue, or SpaceX (already past 'max Q' commercially and heavily government-contracted), Anpanman argues newer space companies like AST SpaceMobile, Rocket Lab, and BlackSky (which he said gets over 90% of revenue from the US government) are earlier-stage and could be candidates for a government stake or loans to lower their cost of capital.

Anpanman said Scott Wisniewski has publicly disclosed AST sees 10 non-communication use cases for defense, and noted SDA, DIU, and multiple armed forces branches are testing/working with AST SpaceMobile; he believes AST will be an important, potentially critical piece of the Golden Dome missile-defense initiative, though this is his own inference, not a confirmed award.

Anpanman initially said AST has 6 military contracts, then later in the Q&A corrected himself after a listener comment, saying it might actually be 8, flagging he 'might be behind' on the exact count.

Anpanman estimated the probability of a US government stake in AST SpaceMobile at around 20-25%, up from something he would have dismissed 4-5 months earlier; he said the probability would rise further depending on how Golden Dome and other defense contracts unfold, and could effectively be announced alongside a Golden Dome award.

A listener (Dylan) asked Grok to estimate the odds of a US government passive stake in ASTS; Grok cited AST's DoD/SDA/DIU relationships and the Intel/MP Materials precedents and put the odds at 10-20% with high uncertainty, which Anpanman said broadly agreed with his own view, though he'd lean toward the higher end (~20%).

Anpanman explained the 'lower cost of capital' mechanism with a hypothetical: if the government bought AST shares at a 10% discount (e.g., $80) and the stock later doubled to $180 on the validation signal, future equity raises at $180 would be far less dilutive than raising at the pre-stake price, effectively halving the company's cost of equity capital.

In response to a listener question asking why the government would take equity on top of contracts, Anpanman said the Trump administration has shown a preference for taking equity stakes (not just issuing contracts) because it lets them claim a political/financial win if the stock appreciates, similar to how a forced 10% Tesla stake on its original government loans would have been extremely lucrative in hindsight.

Anpanman said he expects a government stake to be passive with no board seat, similar to prior stakes in MP Materials and Intel, and that it would not come with 'strings attached' beyond signaling.

On the risk that a government stake could jeopardize AST's international MNO relationships, Anpanman argued the SatCo European joint venture with Vodafone (majority-owned by Vodafone, AST a minority owner) is structured to be governance-ring-fenced from AST, preserving European sovereignty concerns even if the US government held a stake in AST itself.

Anpanman cited AST's short interest at roughly 42 million shares as of the day of recording, while noting uncertainty about how much of that reflects convertible-note-related short positions versus a smaller outright short (guessing it could be as low as 10 million or as high as 30 million); he argued a government-stake announcement, or even a rumor of one (e.g., a Wall Street Journal report), could force a severe short squeeze, calling it potentially 'career-ending' for short sellers.

Anpanman ran an audience poll asking where ASTS would trade if a major outlet reported the government was considering a 5-10% passive stake; the highest-voted responses were around $150-$200, roughly double the price at the time.

Anpanman said AST's market cap was about $33 billion at the time of recording, and speculated the market may be partially rewriting/discounting the stock's valuation following the recent Ligado bankruptcy-court approval, valuing the Ligado spectrum access alone at roughly $15-20 billion, implying roughly $10-15 billion of remaining equity value attributable to the rest of the business.

Anpanman argued the market is shifting from valuing AST off trailing financials (near-zero historical revenue) toward valuing it off future 2026-2028 cash flows, drawing an analogy to the Alaska Pipeline being valued on future oil flows before it carried any oil, and to SpaceX being valued on its eventual potential rather than then-current financials as it grew from roughly $10 billion to nearly $500 billion in valuation.

Anpanman said that once regular satellite launches begin, the cadence should be roughly one payload every 1 to 1.5 months on average, giving investors something tangible to track as satellite economics get underwritten one by one.

Anpanman said he could see the stock potentially double by mid-2026, or possibly more, driven by the market increasingly pricing in AST's three business verticals — commercial MNO service, government/first-responder, and defense (including any Golden Dome contribution) — though he stressed this is hard to pin down precisely.

Anpanman responded that AST SpaceMobile has the potential to become the largest wireless carrier in the world with over a billion subscribers, which he speculated could be worth roughly 10x today's market cap (about $320 billion) or more, though he wasn't sure if that takes 10 or 15+ years; he compared the opportunity to Netflix's subscriber growth and cited Netflix's current market cap of about $518 billion as a scale reference.

Anpanman said it would depend on whether the acquirer is US-friendly and whether the US government is comfortable with it — he thought the government would likely view an Apple acquisition positively, but a foreign buyer would likely be off the table if the US held a stake; he added that AST's dual-class share structure (Abel Avellan's supervoting control) exists specifically to prevent an outside party from forcing a sale, and that he personally believes AST's highest value is in remaining independent and neutral (not owned by Apple, Google, Meta, or Amazon) so it can keep serving many MNOs and tech companies as a neutral connectivity provider.

Anpanman closed by reiterating that a US government stake or loan is something investors should be prepared for, especially around the timing of Golden Dome contract awards, but cautioned that the ongoing government shutdown has delayed award announcements; he expects to learn more about pending awards, including Golden Dome-related ones, in the coming weeks and months.

Anpanman said he expects additional commercial agreements 'any day now,' naming Bell Canada and Saudi Telecom (stc) as likely near-term candidates for further news.